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Abstract 
 
 
Several  recent  works  have  emphasised  contemporary  hierarchical  trends 
within international society. These trends have been most readily demonstrated by 
the  willingness  of  dominant  states,  such  as  the  United  States,  to  conduct 
interventions in support of the promotion of liberal values and political institutions. 
Yet  while  many  scholars  have  identified  new  relations  of  hierarchy  within 
international society, few have explored what they suggest regarding international 
society’s  normative  constitution  or  what  factors  have  given  rise  to  these  new 
hierarchies.  The  end  of  colonialism  in  the  1960’s  resulted  in  a  fundamental 
reconstitution  of  international  society.  The  result  of  decolonisation  was  that 
pluralism, the notion that all states have the equal freedom to constitute their internal 
socio-political  and  economic  institutions  as  they  see  fit,  was  entrenched  as  the 
central constitutive principle of the post-colonial international society.  
Contemporary  hierarchical  trends  suggest  a  transition  away  from  this 
pluralist  constitution,  with  resultant  changes  in  the  processes  of  inclusion  and 
exclusion  and  modes  of  interaction  between  different  members  of  international 
society.  This  thesis  aims  to  explore  these  processes  of  reconstitution  within 
international society in the post-Cold War era and explain why Western societies 
have felt compelled to intervene in particular territories in order to promote liberal 
values. Utilising sociological theories of risk, particularly the work of Ulrich Beck, 
this thesis suggests that a new ‘liberal social logic of risk’ underpins the emergence 
of  new  forms  of  hierarchy  and  contemporary  constitutional  transition  within 
international society. New forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded security  
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risks  (such  as  terrorism),  and  Western  attempts  at  managing  these  risks  through 
intervention  and  the  imposition  of  liberal  values  in  so-called  ‘risky  zones’,  has 
altered the constitution of international society in a way that gives rise to various 
hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the sudden ending of the Cold War 
was a critical juncture in the recent history of international society. By 1991, the last 
vestiges of the Cold War had been swept away. Germany was reunited, the states of 
Eastern  Europe  were  free  from  Soviet  domination,  and  scholars  and  government 
officials alike viewed the United Nations (UN) with increased optimism now that the 
Cold War shackles which had previously disabled the Security Council had been 
broken. Most importantly, the West’s Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, had been 
eliminated. Western political, military and economic power was now unparalleled 
and  Western  leaders  and  academics  celebrated  the  victory  of  liberalism  and 
capitalism and the supposed coming of a ‘New World Order’.
1 However, in the wake 
of these momentous events, debate continues as to the ramifications and significance 
of the end of the Cold War, particularly in regard to its implications for international 
society.  
The question that many scholars still grapple with is what does international 
society, removed from the bipolar structure of the Cold War, look like? What are its 
features? Have there been shifts within international society’s constitution? That is, 
has there been a change in the norms and principles that inform the criteria used to 
determine which polities are entitled to membership of this society and order social 
interactions between states? What effect has the relative increase in Western power 
and  influence  had  on  the  international  conduct  of  Western  societies  and  their 
                                                 
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992). Introduction 
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interstate relations? These questions have been compounded by further significant 
events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In short, while many scholars would agree 
that today’s international society is at least qualitatively different from that of the 
Cold War era, the nature of the changes that have been wrought and their effects are 
less clear. 
Part of the reason for this lack of clarity has been the multitude of divergent 
approaches employed and arguments put forth that have sought to contribute to the 
question of ‘what form of international society’? Realists have emphasised American 
primacy and the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era.
2 Others, such as Huntington, 
have focused on new areas of conflict and potential disorder.
3 Within the English 
School of International Relations (which has attracted high levels of interest since 
the end of the Cold War), much of the discussion, particularly during the 1990s, has 
focused on the debate between pluralist and solidarist forms of international society.
4 
While these differing approaches have all contributed significantly to the question of 
what form of international society has emerged in the post-Cold War era, none as of 
yet have provided an entirely satisfactory answer. 
One  reason  for  this  is  that  many  scholars  have  either  overlooked  or 
insufficiently theorised two of the main features of the post-Cold War era. The first 
is an increasing assertiveness on the part of Western societies that liberal values and 
institutions  are  the  required  standard  of  membership  within  international  society. 
This assertiveness has manifested in a new ‘liberal interventionism’, demonstrated 
                                                 
2 See Michael Mastanduno, ‘A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International Order’, in 
International  Order  and  the  Future  of  World  Politics  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1999): 19-40. Ikenberry has also discussed American unipolarity, questioning whether the US will use 
this  unipolarity  to  construct  an  order  based  around  liberal  values  or  one  based  around  ‘imperial 
characteristics’ such as coercive domination. See G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberalism and Empire: Logics 
of Order in the American Unipolar Age’, Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 610.  
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
4  Alex  J.  Bellamy,  ‘Conclusion:  Whither  International  Society?’,  in  International  Society  and  its 
Critics, edited by Alex J. Bellamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 283-4. Introduction 
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by  various  Western  interventions  in  previously  illiberal  or  failing  (non-Western) 
states designed to impose liberal values and institutions.
5 The second are continuing 
processes of globalisation and the emergence of transnational security risks that have 
led to a radically altered international strategic environment from that which existed 
during  the  Cold  War.  Taken  together,  these  two  features  of  post-Cold  War 
international  society  provide  important  insights  into  its  changing  constitutional 
structure,  with  resulting  shifts  in  prevailing  notions  of  rightful  membership  and 
rightful conduct.
6   
The point of this thesis is therefore two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to provide a 
contribution to the question of ‘what form of international society’. In this regard, 
the  thesis  seeks  to  investigate  the  effects  of  recent  Western  interventions  for 
international society’s constitution. Specifically, it examines how these interventions 
affect  prevailing  notions  of  rightful  membership  and  rightful  conduct  within 
international  society.  Secondly,  the  thesis  seeks  to  explain  the  closely-linked 
question of why these interventions have occurred. What compels Western states to 
intervene  in  particular  territories  in  order  to  promote  liberalism?  This  second 
question is crucial to the first as it is through an understanding of the factors that 
underpin these interventions that we can also explain the emergence of a particular 
type of international society in the post-Cold War era. 
This  thesis  takes  as  its  starting  point  the  English  School  concept  of  an 
international society and incorporates many of the concepts, methods and insights of 
                                                 
5 Examples include interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Solomon 
Islands, Papua New Guinea and the European Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy in Northern 
Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  
6 These two features of post-Cold War international society are identified by Ikenberry as part of a 
broader range of factors that have led to a crisis in what he terms the ‘liberal international order 2.0’ 
that emerged after World War Two. However, as shall be discussed, Ikenberry’s conclusions as to the 
effects of these changes for international order differ from the conclusions that I make in this thesis. 
See G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World 
Order’, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 71-87. Introduction 
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the School. Like the English School and constructivists, it views interstate relations 
as inherently social or ideational in nature, informed and underpinned by norms and 
ideas that constitute state identity and behaviour. Works such as Hedley Bull’s The 
Anarchical  Society  or  Robert  Jackson’s  The  Global  Covenant  have  exerted  a 
substantial influence on this thesis.
7 However, unlike Bull or Jackson, this thesis 
goes beyond simply outlining international society’s core institutions by questioning 
what informs the construction of these institutions and what explains institutional 
variation  over  time.  This  thesis  argues  that  international  society  is  not  a  static 
constitutional  construct.  Rather,  international  society  is  a  fluid  and  dynamic 
construct of constitutive norms and principles that is regularly reconstituted over 
time.  
Several recent works, particularly those of Reus-Smit, Philpott, Clark and 
Simpson have also identified international society as a historically contingent set of 
norms and investigated the ways in which international society has historically been 
reconstituted.
8 This thesis can be broadly situated within this literature, and seeks to 
contribute to it in two main ways. Firstly, unlike Philpott and Reus-Smit, this thesis 
explicitly  focuses  on  international  society’s  shifting constitution  in  the  post-Cold 
War era. It thus provides one of the few works (along with Simpson, Clark and a 
handful of others) to explicitly examine the constitution of international society in 
the post-Cold War era.
9 Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the thesis attempts 
                                                 
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 
1977); Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).  
8 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Christian 
Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in 
International Relations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions 
in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped the Modern World (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001). 
9 Also see Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  Introduction 
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to provide a more rigorous account of the post-Cold War constitutional revisions that 
it identifies than either Simpson or Clark.  
Indeed,  a  systematic  theoretical  account  of  normative  change  within 
international society is something that is generally lacking in the English School’s 
repertoire. Despite the excellent work of Clark and Simpson, neither outlines any 
mechanism of change that can explain either a shift towards an ‘anti-pluralist’ form 
of international society (Simpson) or shifting notions of legitimacy (Clark). Both 
identify an increasing invocation of liberalism and democracy by Western societies 
as the new ‘membership standard’ that states are expected to achieve in order to 
qualify  for  full  membership  within  international  society.  However,  Clark  and 
Simpson fail to explain what has prompted the emergence of these new standards 
and changes in prevailing notions of rightful membership. Lacking then is a rigorous 
theorisation of the causal factors underpinning recent constitutional revision within 
international society. 
To fully understand what form of international society has emerged in the 
post-Cold war era, we first need to understand what form of international society 
existed before the end of the Cold War. Although its significance has been largely 
overlooked,  particularly  within  the  English  School,  decolonisation  was  a 
fundamental  moment  of  constitutional  revision  within  international  society.
10  It 
resulted in the emergence of a truly pluralist international society, one constituted 
according to the principle that a ‘good society’ is one that maximises the potential 
range  of  values  and  regimes  that  states  may  legitimately  adopt.  A  pluralist 
international society is therefore one in which all states have the equal freedom to 
                                                 
10  However,  some  scholars,  such  as  Philpott  and  Jackson,  have  recognised  the  importance  of 
decolonisation  in  relation  to  international  society’s  constitution.  See  Philpott,  Revolutions  in 
Sovereignty; Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
 Introduction 
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determine their domestic socio-political institutions according to their own societal 
values. This pluralist constitution provides for the rules of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention that currently prevail within international society and also renders 
formal hierarchical relationships between states illegitimate. 
With the end of the Cold War, it is precisely this pluralist constitution that 
has been called into question by the willingness of Western states to intervene in 
other societies in order to impose liberal values and institutions. Emboldened by the 
supposed victory of liberal democracy and the removal of power constraints with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has sought to globally promote its own liberal 
values. These interventions are distinctly anti-pluralist in that they effectively seek to 
limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states can legitimately adopt. 
They also signal the emergence of new relations of hierarchy within international 
society, involving the assertion by Western societies that they have the authority to 
determine the socio-political institutions of other countries. Paradoxically then, as 
Western societies seek to forge a ‘normatively thicker’ international society based 
around liberal values, a more anti-pluralist and hierarchical, rather than solidarist, 
form of international society emerges.  
This leads to the second question that the thesis seeks to address – why have 
these  interventions  occurred  and  what  underpins  the  emergence  of  a  more 
hierarchical  form  of  international  society  at  this  particular  historical  juncture? 
Further, how can we understand the role of liberalism in the emergence of these new 
hierarchies? Several scholars have identified the emergence of these new hierarchical 
trends. For instance, Simpson has identified the contemporary resurgence of anti-Introduction 
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pluralism and hierarchy within international society.
11 Likewise, Dunne, Donnelly, 
Lake and Hobson and Sharman, among others, have also identified the existence of 
hierarchical relationships within international society.
12 Despite this, few scholars 
have satisfactorily explained what underpins the formation and reproduction of these 
new hierarchies, or the way in which they affect international society’s constitution. 
For  example,  Simpson,  Anghie  and  Dunne  all  fail  to  adequately  explain  the 
emergence of new hierarchies within international society.
13 
Further, both Anghie and Dunne fail to forcefully link these new hierarchies 
to  shifts  within  international  society’s  constitution.  Anghie’s  discussion,  for 
example, conceptualises contemporary hierarchy as merely a continuance of the old 
colonial  hierarchies.
14  This  ignores  the  very  different  features  of  the  colonial 
hierarchies compared to more recent forms of hierarchy and the different ways in 
which  contemporary  hierarchies  have  been  operationalised  within  international 
society. Dunne, on the other hand, argues that new hierarchies within international 
society, particularly those represented by the 2003 United States (US) invasion of 
Iraq, threaten its existence.
15 However, the weakness of Dunne’s argument is that it 
appears  to  assume  that  international  society  is  a  static  pluralist  construct  that  is 
incompatible with hierarchical relations between states. This ignores international 
                                                 
11 See Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International 
Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
12 See Tim Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International Relations 17, no. 
3 (2003): 303-20; Jack Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power 
and International Society’, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006): 139-70; 
David A. Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Studies Review 5, no. 
3 (2003): 303-23; James M. Hobson and J.C. Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World 
Politics:  Tracing  the  Social  Logics  of  Hierarchy  and  Political  Change’,  European  Journal  of 
International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 63-98. 
13 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States; Dunne, ‘Society and 
Hierarchy in International Relations’. 
14 As Anghie argues, colonialism is an enduring feature of international law, having shaped many of 
the doctrines of international law, particularly sovereignty. See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law, 3-4.  
15 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, 316. Introduction 
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society’s  constitutionally  dynamic  nature  and  its  ability  to  accommodate  several 
different forms of interaction between states, including hierarchical relationships. In 
short,  Dunne  mistakes  contemporary  hierarchy  as  signalling  the  retreat  of 
international society, rather than its reconstitution.  
In  order  to  understand  what  underpins  the  formation  and  reproduction  of 
contemporary  hierarchies,  it  needs  to  be  understood  what  motivates  Western 
societies to intervene in other countries in an attempt to promote liberalism. One 
might  respond  by  suggesting  that  spreading  liberalism  itself  is  the  primary 
motivation  of  these  interventions.  However,  the  conspicuous  selectivity  of  these 
‘liberal interventions’ indicates that the perceived desirability of spreading liberal 
values is not the primary motivation. Rather, drawing on the ideas associated with 
particular  liberal  international  theories  that  advocate  a  hierarchical  form  of 
international  society,  Western  societies  have  identified  the  promotion  of  liberal 
values  as  a  means  of  generating  greater  security  for  themselves.
16  Importantly, 
however,  contemporary  dangers  to  Western  security  cannot  be  conceptualised  in 
terms of the readily identifiable threats of the Cold War era. Overt threats have been 
replaced with new forms of transnational security risks such as terrorism, providing 
for the emergence of a much more uncertain and unpredictable international strategic 
environment.  
The  nature  of  these  new  security  issues  is  best  captured  through  Ulrich 
Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis.
17 The idea of the risk society, as well as the concepts of 
risk and risk management, provides a way not only of understanding contemporary 
security issues, but also the formation and reproduction of contemporary hierarchical 
                                                 
16 These liberal theories include the democratic peace theory, the work of neo-Kantian scholars such 
as  Fernando  Teson  and  new  liberal  legal  theories  popularised  by,  amongst  others,  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter. See chapter two. 
17 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Ulrich Beck, 
World Risk Society (Malden: Polity, 1999).    Introduction 
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relationships  and  their  effects  for  international  society.  One  of  Beck’s  main 
arguments is that his risk society thesis is not about the increase of risks to personal 
well-being or national security in Western societies, but rather the emergence of new 
forms of risk that escape established mechanisms of insurance and control.
18 Part of 
Beck’s argument is that new forms of risk are characterised by their temporally and 
spatially de-bounded nature. In other words, these risks are not limited in terms of 
time or space.  
Initially, Beck’s focus was on environmental risks such as global climate 
change,  but  recently  he  has  also  focused  on  security  risks  such  as  terrorism.
19 
Terrorism,  for  instance,  can  occur  in  any  location,  at  any  time  and  often  with 
minimal warning. The de-bounded nature of contemporary security risks makes them 
very difficult to identify and manage. Given this difficulty, Western societies have 
explicitly focused on environments within international society that are conducive to 
the  origination  or  fomentation  of  security  risks.  These  environments  have  been 
primarily defined in terms of a lack of liberal institutions or state weakness. The 
perception on the part of several Western governments is that liberal societies do not 
produce  global  security  risks.  Hence,  given  the  inherent  difficulty  in  directly 
managing de-bounded security risks, Western societies have attempted to manage 
potential  dangers  by  reshaping  those  states  or  territories  identified  as  potentially 
risky or dangerous into stable liberal democracies. 
Recent ‘liberal interventions’ are in fact exercises in risk management. The 
hierarchical relationships that these interventions signify are therefore underpinned 
by what can be termed a ‘liberal social logic of risk’. A social logic is, as Hobson 
and Sharman suggest, a set of norms and social ordering principles that construct the 
                                                 
18 See Beck, Risk Society and Beck, World Risk Society.    
19  See  Ulrich  Beck,  ‘The  Terrorist  Threat:  World  Risk  Society  Revisited’,  Theory,  Culture  and 
Society 19, no. 4 (2002): 39-55. Introduction 
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identity of states as either superordinate or subordinate parties and legitimate the 
hierarchical relationship.
20 More specifically, this new liberal social logic of risk 
constructs liberal democracies as inherently peaceful and prosperous and non-liberal 
or weak states as inherently risky and dangerous. This ‘social logic approach’ differs 
from Beck’s thesis in that it views risk and perceptions of risk as politically and 
socially mediated constructs rather than objective realities that exist ‘out there’.
21 
Viewing risks as objective realities obscures the way in which particular objects or 
events are defined as risks according to the values and perceptions of the individual 
or organisation making the risk assessment. This is particularly important as Beck’s 
‘realist’ definition of risks as objective realities prevents an analysis of the role of 
liberal values in constructing Western perceptions of risk. 
The main argument of this thesis then is that a new liberal social logic of risk, 
which  seeks  to  impose  liberal  values  and  institutions  as  a  mechanism  of  risk 
management,  underpins  the  emergence  of  a  more  hierarchical,  anti-pluralist 
international society in the post-Cold War era. The pluralist idea that all states should 
be free to constitute their socio-political institutions according to their own societal 
values has been challenged by the notion that fragile states or those lacking liberal 
democratic  institutions  are  potentially  dangerous  sites of  instability  and  disorder. 
This  liberal  social  logic  of  risk  has  become  central  to  the  governing  of  social 
relationships  between  states,  leading  to  an  on-going  process  of  constitutional 
revision within international society. This new social logic increasingly determines 
the  prevailing  notions  of  rightful  membership  and  conduct  within  international 
society.  These  changes  are  most  evident  in  new  liberal  standards  of  rightful 
                                                 
20 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68. 
21 See Beck, World Risk Society, 143.  Introduction 
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membership within international society and the West’s claim to hold the authority 
to conduct interventions within states identified as potentially dangerous.  
Importantly, while this thesis can be primarily situated within the English 
School or constructivist literature, it is also distinctly multidisciplinary in nature. The 
theoretical framework to be employed, and the main arguments to be made, both 
borrow heavily from other disciplines. The framework itself is a synthesis of the 
English School of International Relations and sociological theories of risk. It seeks to 
incorporate  the  insights  of  Beck’s  risk  society  framework  into  the  discipline  of 
International Relations as a way of theorising contemporary processes of normative 
transition within international society. For some time, the concepts of risk and risk 
management  have  received  extensive  treatment  in  the  fields  of  economics  and 
sociology, amongst others. A small, yet burgeoning, literature has also emerged that 
seeks to deal with the concepts of risk and risk management in an International 
Relations context. 
However, the literature on risk, risk management and International Relations 
is still comparatively small and there is still significant scope for the theorisation and 
utilisation of these concepts. This need for the further theorisation of risk and risk 
management occurs at several levels of analysis, but is most apparent at the meta-
theoretical or structural level. Most works on risk and International Relations thus far 
have focused on risk in relation to specific issue-areas such as terrorism, warfare, 
strategic studies or climate change. However, very little has been said regarding the 
impact  of  state  perceptions  of  risk  and  their  attempts  at  risk  management  on 
prevailing  modes  of  international  governance  or  the  structure  of  international 
society. Part of the aim of this thesis then is to contribute to this emergent literature 
and push the research agenda on risk, risk management and international relations Introduction 
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forward by exploring what the risk society thesis and the concepts of risk and risk 
management tell us about international society’s constitution in the post-Cold War 
era. 
Finally, it is important to note that this thesis is intended primarily as an 
explanatory, rather than normative, work. That is, the argument to be developed in 
the  thesis  is  concerned  simply  with  providing  a  particular  explanation  or 
interpretation of recent Western interventions and their effects for post-Cold War 
international society. It is not intended as a critique of these interventions, nor should 
it be read as supportive of them. It also should not be read as indicating a preference 
for  either  pluralist  or  hierarchical  forms  of  international  society.  This  thesis  is 
concerned with constructing and testing an explanatory theoretical framework that 
will  hopefully  shed  light  on  important  aspects  of  contemporary  International 
Relations and open new avenues of research.  
 
Thesis Structure and Case Studies 
This thesis consists of seven chapters split into two main parts. Part one is 
concerned  with  investigating  the  core  concepts  and  ideas  to  be  employed  in  the 
thesis. It also outlines and establishes the theoretical framework and main arguments 
of the thesis. Part two is comprised of case studies designed to test the theoretical 
framework outlined in part one. Chapter one firstly outlines what a constitution of 
international society entails. It is argued that international society is a construct of 
fundamental norms that constitute state identity through the criteria they establish for 
rightful  membership  and  order  social  interactions  between  states.  Drawing  on 
pluralist political theory, chapter one also explores the constitutional structure and 
historical  evolution  of  the  pluralist  international  society  that  emerged  after Introduction 
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decolonisation. In order to analyse changes in international society’s constitution in 
the post-Cold War era, it first needs to be understood what this constitution looked 
like before the end of the Cold War.  
Chapter two outlines a conception of international hierarchy and explores the 
role of liberalism in the emergence of new hierarchies in the post-Cold War era. 
Similar  to  Hobson  and  Sharman,  hierarchies  in  this  thesis  are  defined  as 
fundamentally social authority relationships underpinned by particular social logics 
or norms. The second part of the chapter surveys the literature on a range of liberal 
theories in order to draw out the ideas that underpin the promotion of liberal values 
as a mechanism of risk management. If Western societies are intervening to impose 
liberal values and institutions in states identified as risky, then what ideas inform the 
notion that liberalism is an effective risk management tool? Chapter two thus partly 
establishes the social logic that underpins contemporary hierarchy.  
Chapters three and four complete the theoretical picture by introducing the 
concepts of risk and risk management. Chapter three introduces Beck’s risk society 
thesis in an attempt to understand why Western societies have felt compelled to 
intervene in non-Western territories in order to promote liberalism in the post-Cold 
War  era.  It  suggests  that  existing  accounts  of  contemporary  hierarchy  within 
international  society  are  inadequate  for  understanding  the  nature  of  these  new 
hierarchies or their constitutional effects. Chapter three therefore fully outlines what 
a liberal social logic of risk entails and considers the impact of this new social logic 
on international society’s pluralist constitution. The main argument developed in this 
chapter is that Western perceptions of de-bounded security risks, and their attempts 
to  manage  them,  have  become  central  to  the  governing  of  social  relationships 
between states. The chapter concludes with a critique of the risk society thesis.  Introduction 
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Chapter  four  concludes  the  first  part  of  the  thesis  by  examining  risk 
management  and  its  associated  concepts  of  prevention,  precaution  and  proactive 
anticipation.  The  point  of  this  chapter  is  firstly  to  broadly  outline  the  particular 
methods  and  features  associated  with  risk  management  activities.  Secondly,  it 
outlines  the  specific  risk  management  approach  that  Western  societies  have 
employed  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  In  particular,  it  is  argued  that  promoting 
liberalism is a way of reshaping potentially dangerous environments in order to limit 
risks. Faced with de-bounded risks that are difficult to locate and define, Western 
societies  have  adopted  a  form  of  ‘situational  risk  prevention’.  This  involves  the 
identification  of  environments  which  are  conducive  to  the  origination  or 
materialisation of risks which are then subject to a form of environmental regulation 
and reshaping. 
Chapters  five,  six  and  seven  comprise  the  case  studies  of  the  thesis.  To 
empirically  validate  the  theoretical  framework  developed,  three  case  studies  are 
examined. A common structure is employed in each of the case studies to allow for 
comparison  and  to  highlight  areas  of  congruity  and  incongruity.  Broadly,  each 
chapter  is  broken  into  three  components.  Firstly,  each  chapter  begins  with  an 
analysis  of  the  security  policies  and  doctrines  of  the  Western  country  under 
examination  and  the  justifications  provided  by  government  officials  for  the 
intervention  undertaken.  The  point  here  is  to  identify  perceptions  of  risk  as  the 
impetus  for  the  intervention.  Questions  to  be  asked  include  were  security  issues 
central  to  the  justification  for  the  intervention?  If  so,  were  these  issues 
conceptualised in terms of traditional threats or temporally and spatially de-bounded 
risks?  Were  prevention  or  precaution  active  components  of  the  justifications 
provided for intervention? Introduction 
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The second part of each chapter examines the conduct of the interventions. 
Questions asked here include did Western interveners attempt to impose liberalism 
and democracy in the target state? What methods were employed to compel the 
target state to adopt liberal values and institutions? Was the intervention consensual, 
and did both parties recognise the legitimacy of the situation? The case studies each 
conclude with a section considering the implications for international society. These 
sections  provide  an  analysis  of  the  interventions  and  the  resulting  relations  of 
hierarchy to which they give rise in relation to their effects for international society’s 
constitution. Each of the case studies demonstrate that attempts to manage risk by 
promoting liberalism give rise to new relations of hierarchy that violate international 
society’s pluralist constitution.  
The  three  cases  selected  include  the  European  Union’s  (EU)  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Australia’s recent interventions in the Asia-Pacific 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three basic criteria were used to select the cases. 
Firstly, each case had to involve an intervention by a Western society or grouping of 
Western  societies  in  a  non-Western  territory.  Secondly,  the  intervention  had  to 
involve the imposition of liberal institutions and/or notions of good governance. In 
terms  of  promoting  liberal  good  governance,  this  can  include  a  range  of  liberal 
values such as the accountability of government to the people, respect for the rule of 
law, or individual civil and political rights. Finally, each case study had to focus on 
an intervention by a different Western society in a different geographical region. The 
cases have been deliberately chosen on the basis of these disparities in order to allow 
for comparison so as to identify common trends across unlike cases.   
This is intended to validate the main argument that perceptions of risk and 
attempts at risk management are common features of contemporary interventions Introduction 
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conducted  by  Western  societies,  despite  other  disparities  that  may  exist  between 
these different instances of intervention. Further, the selection of cases involving 
interventions by different Western countries is intended to strengthen the claim that a 
preoccupation with de-bounded security risks and attempts to manage them via the 
imposition of liberalism in identified ‘risky zones’ within international society is 
common to many, if not most, Western societies. This preoccupation with risk is not 
only confined to the US, for example, which is partly why interventions in Kosovo 
or Afghanistan were not selected along with that in Iraq.  
Finally, the number of cases selected and the criteria that each intervention 
must have occurred in a different geographical region is intended to strengthen the 
claim that these interventions do not simply represent isolated cases or aberrations 
with only localised or regional effects. Rather, by selecting cases of intervention in 
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and the Asia-Pacific, the thesis 
intends to show that new forms of hierarchy underpinned by a liberal social logic of 
risk are relatively widespread. These interventions (and the hierarchical relationships 
of  which  they  are  representative)  have  important  effects  and  implications  for 
international  society  as  a  whole.  When  considered  together,  these  various  cases 
demonstrate a systematic pattern of recent behaviour by several Western societies. It 
is  precisely  the  demonstration  of  this  systematic  pattern  of  behaviour  that 
underscores the claim that recent interventions by Western countries have important 
consequences for international society as a whole. 17 
 
One 
Pluralism and the Constitutional Structure 
of International Society 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of an international society is arguably the English School’s most 
distinctive contribution to the field of International Relations. Containing elements 
of realism, idealism and constructivism, the concept of an international society and 
English School theory in general provide a unique perspective on how states interact 
with one another and how these relationships are structured and ordered.
1 As Hedley 
Bull famously commented  
A  society  of  states  (or  international  society)  exists  when  a  group  of  states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.
2  
This provides an excellent definition of what an international society is, but it does 
not provide much information on how an international society is constituted.   
Questions that might be considered are how do states arrive at the common 
rules that they feel obliged to follow? How are the core institutions of international 
society constructed and implemented and what explains institutional variation over 
time? Despite the fact that international society is arguably the central concept of the 
English School, the question of how it is constituted is one that has received little 
attention,  at  least  until  relatively  recently.  Recently,  scholars  such  as  Reus-Smit, 
                                                 
1 International order is an important issue addressed by English School theorists, particularly in the 
work of Hedley Bull. See Bull, The Anarchical Society. 
2 Ibid., 13 (italics in original).  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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Philpott and Clark have highlighted the inherently ideational nature of international 
society  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  constituted  by  certain  fundamental  norms.
3 
Further, these scholars have sought to demonstrate the historically variable nature of 
the constitution and institutions of international society, something that much of the 
rest of the English School literature has failed to do. 
Indeed, one of the significant weaknesses of Bull’s account of international 
society is that this account appears to conceptualise its constitutional structure in 
relatively  static  terms.
4  This  is  particularly  evident  in  terms  of  the  pluralist 
conception of international society, a key element of English School theory. Within 
most of the English School literature, pluralism has largely been used to describe a 
particular  form  of  international  society  exhibiting  certain  features.  However,  this 
ignores  the  prescriptive  elements  of  the  concept  and  pluralism’s  role  as  a 
fundamental,  and  historically  variable,  constitutive  norm  of  international  society. 
While  most  English  School  theorists  have  described  contemporary  international 
society as ‘pluralist’, they have not engaged in any systematic way with pluralist 
political  theory  (Jackson’s  The  Global  Covenant  being  a  notable  exception)  or 
provided  a  persuasive  historical  account  of  the  evolution  of  this  pluralist 
international society.
5 
                                                 
3 See Clark, Legitimacy in International Society; Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State and 
Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty. 
4 This is also apparent in historical analyses of the emergence of contemporary international society. 
For example, Bull and Watson’s accounts of the expansion of international society tend to view this 
process of expansion as simply an enlargement of a constitutionally unaltered European international 
society.  See  Adam  Watson,  The  Evolution  of  International  Society:  A  Comparative  Historical 
Analysis  (London:  Routledge,  1992);  Adam  Watson,  ‘European  International  Society  and  its 
Expansion’, in The Expansion of International Society, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 13-32 and Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal 
International Society’, in The Expansion of International Society, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 117-26.   
5 Despite his excellent study of pluralist international society, drawing explicitly on pluralist political 
theory, Jackson’s account of the evolution of this society is not entirely persuasive, for reasons set out 
below. See Jackson, The Global Covenant. Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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This  failure  to  historically  account  for  the  emergence  of  a  pluralist 
international society is most evident in the failure of the English School to identify 
decolonisation  as  a  fundamental  moment  of  constitutional  revision  within 
international  society.  For  example,  the  expansion  of  international  society  is 
conceptualised as merely representing the extension of a constitutionally unaltered 
European  international  society  to  the  former  colonies  in  The  Expansion  of 
International Society.
6 The analyses presented in this work generally do not explore 
the normative changes and resulting constitutional revisions that such an expansion 
entailed.  This  failure  is  also  evident  in  several  recent  accounts  of  contemporary 
hierarchical  trends  within  international  society  that  do  not  link  these  trends  to 
changes in its pluralist constitution.
7 
This is an important point, as it means that the English School literature as it 
currently  stands  is  largely  ill-equipped  to  adequately  account  for  contemporary 
constitutional revision within international society. This is precisely the purpose of 
this  thesis.  Accordingly,  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  way  in  which  international 
society is constituted, arguing that its constitutional structure is comprised of certain 
constitutive  norms  that  determine  its  core  characteristics  (e.g.  hierarchical  or 
egalitarian) and institutions. These norms are dynamic, meaning the characteristics 
and institutions of international society vary over time. In order to illustrate the role 
of  norms  in  constituting  international  society  and  their  historical  variability,  this 
chapter  examines  pluralism  as  a  constitutive  norm  of  contemporary  international 
society.  
Drawing on pluralist political theory, this chapter argues that pluralism is 
more  than  a  descriptive  label  –  it  is  a  prescriptive  norm  that  underpins  the  key 
                                                 
6 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984).  
7 See chapter three.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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features and institutions of international society.
8 This chapter also provides a brief 
historical account of the evolution of this pluralist society. Others, such as Simpson 
or  Jackson,  have  traced  the  emergence  of  contemporary  pluralist  international 
society to the drafting and implementation of the UN Charter, or even as far back as 
the  Peace  of  Westphalia.  However,  this  chapter  contends  that  the  constitutional 
structure  of  a  pluralist  and  global  international  society  developed  gradually after 
Westphalia, but was only ever imperfectly realised until the onset of decolonisation 
in the mid-twentieth century. The diversity of the European international society, and 
the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention that held among the European 
states, was severely circumscribed by the refusal to recognise the sovereignty of non-
European  political  entities,  many  of  which  were  incorporated  into  the  European 
empires during the nineteenth century.
9  
The  continued  existence  of  the  hierarchical  European  empires,  and  the 
widespread  and  explicit  derogation  of  norms  of  pluralism,  equality  and  non-
intervention that they represented, means that these norms cannot be said to have 
formed the underlying constitutional framework of international society until such 
                                                 
8 Notable works on pluralist political theory include Bernard Williams, ‘Introduction’ in Concepts and 
Categories, edited by Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980): xi-xviii; Isaiah Berlin, 
The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, edited by Henry Hardy (New 
York: Knopf, 1991); John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press,  1993);  William  A.  Galston,  Liberal  Pluralism:  The  Implications  of  Value  Pluralism  for 
Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); George Crowder, 
Liberalism  and  Value-Pluralism  (London:  Continuum,  2002);  Glen  Newey,  ‘Value  Pluralism  in 
Contemporary Liberalism’, Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 493-522. 
9 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’, Review of International 
Studies 31, no. S1 (2005): 73.The subjugation and colonisation of the African and Asian territories in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries occurred on the basis of the ‘standard of civilisation’ and the 
perceived inability of the colonial territories to live up to this standard. This standard was explicitly 
codified within international law during the colonial period. For more on the standard of civilisation 
in international society, see W.E. Hall, International Law (1
st Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1880)  and  James  Lorimer,  Institutes  of  International  Law:  A  Treatise  of  the  Jural  Relations  of 
Separate Political Communities (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1883). For more contemporary accounts, 
see Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984); Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World 
Politics  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2002);  William  Bain,  Between  Anarchy  and 
Society:  Trusteeship  and  the  Obligations  of  Power  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003)  and 
Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 232-247.    Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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violations were ended. Thus, a truly pluralist international society did not emerge 
until  the  onset  of  decolonisation  in  the  early  1960s.  At  this  point,  international 
society’s  constitution  was  significantly  revised  and  a  globalised,  pluralist 
international  society  emerged.  Since  the  early  1960s,  the  norm  of  pluralism  has 
largely  determined  how  political  community  among  states  is  to  be  constituted, 
especially  with  regard  to  membership,  namely  who  should  be  a  part  of  that 
community and who should not.
10 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, it discusses the question of how 
international society is constituted. What exactly is a constitution of international 
society,  and  what  does  it  entail?  Following  this,  the  chapter  outlines  a  political 
theory of pluralism and examine what an international society based on this theory 
looks like. By outlining a political theory of pluralism, the chapter intends to give 
pluralism more conceptual and theoretical weight than it has previously had in much 
of the English School literature. The chapter concludes with a brief study of the 
historical  evolution  and  formation  of  the  contemporary  pluralist  constitution  of 
international society.  
 
Constituting International Society 
Within the English School, much emphasis has been placed on fleshing out 
the  concept  of  international  society  and  outlining  its  core  institutions,  rules  and 
principles. Indeed, much of the early English School literature, particularly the work 
of Bull, Wight and Manning, focused on outlining the English School approach to 
International Relations and the concept of an international society.
11 As Linklater 
                                                 
10 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’, European Journal of International Law 12, no. 3 (2001): 542.   
11 For example, see Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in Diplomatic 
Investigations:  Essays  in  the  Theory  of  International  Politics,  edited  by  Herbert  Butterfield  and 
Martin  Wight  (London:  George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1966):  35-50;  Bull,  The  Anarchical  Society;  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
 
22 
 
and Suganami argue, the primary orientations of the English School’s investigation 
into world politics have been its focus on structure, function and history.
12 In terms 
of structure and function, the focus of the English School has been on outlining the 
institutional framework of international society and evaluating the functioning of 
these institutions. The historical wing of the English School has sought to analyse 
the historical evolution of the society of states.
13  
While  scholars  identified  as  part  of  the  English  School  have  certainly 
provided a number of excellent accounts of international society and its institutional 
structure, most of these works, until recently, have focused on the questions of what 
is an international society and what are its core features?
14 However, very little has 
been  said,  at  least  in  any  systematic  way,  of  how  an  international  society  is 
constituted  or  how  it  comes  to  exhibit  particular  features  or  institutions.  While 
Linklater and Suganami argue that identifying the constitutive and regulative rules of 
international society has been a core priority of English School theorists, little has 
been said about its constitution.
15 Therefore, this section examines how international 
society  is  constituted.  It  is  argued  that  international  society  is  fundamentally 
ideational,  or  normative  in  nature.  That  is,  international  society  is  constituted 
according  to  fundamental  norms  or  ideas  that  inform  prevailing  conceptions  of 
rightful  membership,  rightful  conduct  and  international  society’s  institutional 
framework.  
                                                                                                                                          
Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’ in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the 
Theory of International Politics, edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1966): 89-131 and Charles Manning, The Nature of International Society (London: 
Macmillan, 1975). 
12  Andrew  Linklater  and  Hidemi  Suganami,  The  English  School  of  International  Relations:  A 
Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 43.  
13 Ibid., 43-80.  
14  Important  works  in  this  regard  include  Bull,  The  Anarchical  Society;  Alan  James,  Sovereign 
Statehood:  The  Basis  of  International  Society  (London:  Allen  and  Unwin,  1986);  Manning,  The 
Nature of International Society and Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1977).  
15 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 52.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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The relative neglect of the question of how international society is constituted 
is perhaps most evident in Hedley Bull’s study of international society and order in 
The Anarchical Society. As Reus-Smit, whose work attempts to understand shifts 
between different forms of international society, persuasively argues, although Bull 
provided an excellent account of the basic institutional framework of international 
society and how states can peacefully coexist in an anarchical environment, he did 
not engage with the question of how these institutions came to be, or how they vary 
over time.
16 It should be noted, however, that Bull did suggest that within world 
politics  there  are  three  complexes  of  rules,  the  first  of  which  he  referred  to  as 
constitutive or meta-rules which state the fundamental normative principle of that 
age.
17 As Bull argues, these rules are not static and are subject to change in different 
eras. 
Yet what Bull refers to here are the basic meta-principles along which world 
politics as a whole was to be organised – as a society of sovereign states as opposed 
to a cosmopolitan community of mankind, etc. This is in keeping with Bull’s (and 
the  wider  English  School’s)  distinction  between  an  international  system, 
international  society  and  world  society.  This  also  reflects  Wight’s  distinction 
between the three ‘Rs’ that characterise international politics and theory – realism 
(system), rationalism (international society) and revolutionism (world society).
18 In 
sum, Bull was talking of the constitutive rules that order world politics in general. 
He was not referring to the constitutive norms that structure international society. 
Bull’s constitutive rules therefore provide a way of understanding shifts between an 
international system, international society and world society. 
                                                 
16 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, xi.  
17 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 67-9. 
18 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian 
Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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Thus,  although  Bull  concludes  that  contemporary  world  politics  is 
characterised by constitutive rules that provide for the existence of an international 
society  of  sovereign  states,  he  does  not  systematically  examine  the  normative 
foundations of this society itself. While Bull’s constitutive rules can usefully provide 
an account of the existence of an international society as opposed to other forms of 
global  political  organisation,  they  have  little  to  say  about  how  an  international 
society of states is constituted and structured. Such criticisms also apply to Watson’s 
historical account of the evolution of international society. Watson’s rather thorough 
study  of  international  systems  and  societies  (dating  back  to  ancient  Greece) 
examines the way in which they have shifted along a spectrum between hegemony 
and  independence.  However,  these  shifts,  and  the  institutional  changes  that  have 
accompanied them, are not forcefully linked to underlying normative changes within 
international society’s constitution.
19  
Indeed, Watson largely fails to examine how changes within international 
society towards hegemony or independence are affected by, and affect, its normative 
constitution. However, Watson does briefly hint at this with his focus on legitimacy. 
Watson argues that the point of greatest legitimacy for all political communities that 
are members of a given system or society plays a central role in determining what 
point on the spectrum is most stable for a given international society at a given 
time.
20 This would suggest that prevailing ideas, or norms, of legitimacy at least 
partly  determine  the  basic  nature  (hegemony  versus  independence)  and 
characteristics  of  international  society.  However,  unlike  Clark’s  recent  study  on 
legitimacy (see below), Watson does not carefully examine the way in which ideas 
or principles of legitimacy are constitutive of international society.   
                                                 
19 Watson, The Evolution of International Society. 
20 Ibid., 131. Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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Therefore, Bull and Watson, along with other English School theorists such 
as Martin Wight, have largely overlooked the question of how international society 
is constituted and the dynamic nature of the norms involved in its constitutional 
structuring.  They  appear  to  view  international  society  in  relatively  static  terms, 
which is inadequate for understanding constitutional change and transition within 
international society.
21 This is not to say that the importance of norms has been 
discounted  by  these  theorists,  nor  has  the  English  School  completely  failed  to 
recognise the normative or ideational dimensions of international society. The key 
role of norms and intersubjective understandings between states is arguably implicit 
in  Bull’s  assertion  that  an  international  society  is  comprised  of  states  that  are 
conscious of common interests and values. Still, while these common interests and 
norms (in part) are outlined (e.g. states’ interest in international order), their role in 
structuring international society and its institutions is not. 
In  contrast  to  Bull  and  Watson,  Jackson’s  study  of  pluralist  international 
society  explicitly  considers  the  importance  of  norms  in  relation  to  international 
society  and  the  scholarly  study  of  international  politics.  Indeed,  Jackson’s 
understanding  of  international  society  as  a  historical  arrangement  of  norms  and 
institutions which is periodically reconstituted in response to changing ideas and 
circumstances is largely synonymous with the interpretation of international society 
provided here.
22 As Charles Manning put it, international society is a game based 
upon certain rules and conventions.
23 Like any game, international society exists and 
                                                 
21 Wight does explicitly discuss the constitutive role of recognition within international society, which 
I discuss further below, but did not examine the normative content of the criteria used to decide 
whether  or  not  a  political  community  claiming  membership  of  international  society  would  be 
recognised as a sovereign state. See Wight, Systems of States, 135.  
22 Jackson, The Global Covenant, viii. Gerry Simpson’s conceptualisation of international society’s 
constitution  as  a  continuous  interplay  between  norms  of  pluralism  and  anti-pluralism  also  draws 
attention to its historically variable nature. See Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States.   
23 Manning, The Nature of International Society, xxiii. Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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functions due to the intersubjective meanings between the participants, or ‘players’, 
that render the game meaningful and knowable.
24 As Wheeler argues, ‘If we want to 
understand  how  international  society  becomes  possible,  then  it  is  necessary  to 
recognise  that  the  practices  that  constitute  it  have  no  real-world  existence 
independent of the ‘communal imagining’ that conjures them into existence’.
25   
In  other  words,  international  society  exists  as  a  result  of  intersubjective 
meanings between states (or more accurately, state officials). It is thus ideational in 
nature  –  as  Wilson  argues,  it  is  a  ‘notional  society  of  notional  entities’  (like 
international society, the state is also an ideational construct).
26 It is the ideas of what 
constitutes  acceptable  interstate  relationships,  acceptable  state  behaviour,  or  an 
acceptable  form  of  international  order  that  determines  the  fundamental 
characteristics and scope of international society. In short, international society is 
constituted according to fundamental constitutive norms that inform the institutions, 
rules and practices that order state interactions. As noted above, more recent English 
School (and constructivist) works have emphasised the importance of constitutive 
norms  in  shaping  and  structuring  international  society,  although  theorists  have 
differed  as  to  what  these  values  are  or  the  processes  by  which  they  constitute 
international society. 
                                                 
24 This overlaps to a significant extent with the constructivist literature. As Dunne argues, like the 
English School, constructivists view International Relations as primarily social in nature and similarly 
focus on intersubjective norms, rules, institutions and practices that shape state identity, interests and 
behaviour and constitute international society. See Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society: A 
History of the English School (London: Macmillan, 1998): 187-90. For a general overview of the 
constructivist literature and its affinities with the English School, see Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is 
What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization 46, 
no.  2  (1992):  391-425;  Alexander  Wendt,  Social  Theory  of  International  Politics  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining Society: Constructivism and the 
English School’, British Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (2002): 487-209; John Gerard 
Ruggie,  Constructing  the  World  Polity:  Essays  on  International  Institutionalisation  (London: 
Routledge, 1998) and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).  
25 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000): 22.  
26 Peter Wilson, ‘Manning’s Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited’, The 
Round Table 93, no. 377 (2004): 760.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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For example, Philpott and Reus Smit have both highlighted the centrality of 
norms in the constitutional structuring of international society.
27 Reus-Smit suggests 
that international society is defined primarily by constitutional structures that inform 
its  core  institutions.
28  For  Reus-Smit,  these  constitutional  structures  can  be 
disaggregated into three components – a norm of procedural justice, an organising 
principle  of  sovereignty  and  most  importantly,  the  moral  purpose  of  the  state.
29 
These norms define legitimate statehood, rightful conduct and shape the prevailing 
institutional designs of a given international society.
30 Thus at the most basic level, a 
constitution of international society determines the key questions of which political 
communities  are  eligible  for  membership,  what  rights  and  duties  these  members 
have,  and  how  these  members  are  to  behave.  As  Finnemore  argues,  ‘at  its 
[international society’s] core lies some principled rules, institutions, and values that 
govern both who is a member of the society and how those members behave’.
31 
Philpott’s  understanding  of  the  constitutional  structure  of  international 
society is very similar to Reus Smit’s. Like Reus-Smit, Philpott’s definition of a 
constitution  of  international  society  focuses  on  the  questions  of  membership, 
member rights and standards of conduct. As Philpott suggests:  
a constitution of international society is a set of norms, mutually agreed upon by 
polities who are members of the society, that define the holders of authority and 
their prerogatives, specifically in answer to three questions: Who are legitimate 
polities? What are the rules for becoming one of these polities? And, what are the 
basic prerogatives of these polities? Constitutions of international society are both 
                                                 
27 See Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State. 
28 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 6. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 18.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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legitimate...and  practiced,  generally  respected  by  all  polities  that  are  powerful 
enough regularly to violate them.
32 
Taking  a  slightly  different  approach  to  Reus-Smit  and  Philpott,  Clark 
highlights the centrality of principles of legitimacy in the constitutional structuring 
of international society.
33 For Clark, legitimacy represents societal consensus over 
important principles and issues. Indeed, core principles of legitimacy express social 
agreement over who is entitled to participate in society and how members should 
behave.
34 This is akin to Philpott and Reus-Smit’s suggestions that core norms shape 
rightful membership and conduct within international society. Indeed, Clark does not 
discount the role of norms, arguing that legitimacy is a composite of core norms 
within international society, including legality, morality and constitutionality.
35 Most 
importantly, legitimacy, because it is an expression of a political condition grounded 
in  social  consensus  over  what  is  acceptable,  exists  in  a  mutually  constitutive 
relationship with international society.
36 On the one hand, legitimacy has no meaning 
outside  a  societal  construct  –  it  is  a  product  of  consensus  between  society’s 
members. On the other hand, by studying principles of legitimacy and how they are 
implemented, we can demonstrate the existence of the shared norms and rules that 
order social relations among states and provide the basis for fundamental rules and 
institutions.
37   
Each  of  these  three  accounts  thus  stresses  the  role  of  ideas  in  the 
constitutional  structuring  of  international  society.  Each  adopts  the  constructivist 
notion that norms both shape and constrain state behaviour and identity. That is, 
                                                 
32 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 12. 
33 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 166. 
36 Ibid., 220. 
37 Ibid., 245. Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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ideas of rightful membership and rightful conduct shape what constitutes a legitimate 
member of international society and how such members may behave.
38 Indeed, the 
very notion of what constitutes a legitimate state is constructed by prevailing norms 
and  ideas  within  international  society.  During  the  colonial  era,  notions  of 
‘civilisation’ determined what it meant to be a legitimate state and, subsequently, 
which polities could be admitted into international society as sovereign states and 
which  would  be  denied  sovereign  status  and  remain  outside  its  confines.
39  State 
identities, including the identity of a state as a sovereign entity, are thus constructed 
by international society’s constitutive norms. Further, as Jackson suggests, norms are 
fluid and dynamic, meaning that the constitution, and hence the nature and scope, of 
international  society  is  also  dynamic  and  regularly  re-constituted  at  various 
intervals.
40 
Shifts in norms can socialise states to behave in different ways and articulate 
different interests.
41 They can alter legitimate state conduct and even, as suggested 
above, what constitutes a legitimate polity within international society. This is an 
important point because, as subsequent chapters will show, the post-Cold War era 
has witnessed discernible shifts in the idea of what constitutes a legitimate polity or 
under what circumstances the norm of non-intervention can be violated. It is these 
shifts in ideas that have led to new practices of intervention and new relations of 
hierarchy  between  Western  and  non-Western  societies  that  signals  an  on-going 
process  of  constitutional  revision  within  international  society.  Again  though,  the 
dynamism  and  historical  variability  of  international  society’s  constitution  has 
generally  not  received  adequate  treatment  within  much  of  the  English  School 
                                                 
38 See Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’.  
39 See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society.  
40 Jackson, The Global Covenant, 15.  
41 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 23.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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literature,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  the  historical  analyses  of  contemporary 
international society’s evolution.  
This is most evident in the failure of the English School, including many of 
those  scholars  who  have  explicitly  explored  the  issue  of  international  society’s 
constitution,  to  identify  decolonisation  as  a  moment  of  significant  constitutional 
revision within international society.
42 This failure stems from the tendency of many 
English School theorists to view contemporary international society as merely an 
expansion of a constitutionally static and unaltered pluralist European international 
society. It also stems from the tendency to view pluralism as a descriptive label for a 
minimalist form of international society exhibiting certain features rather than as a 
prescriptive and historically variable constitutive norm that actually underpins and 
informs  these  features.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  role  of  norms  in  constituting 
international society, the next section examines pluralism as a key constitutive norm 
of contemporary international society.   
 
Pluralism and the Pluralist Interpretation of International Society 
When one examines contemporary international society, one cannot help but 
be impressed by its scope. The political form of the state has truly become globalised 
since its beginnings at Westphalia. What is most remarkable about this global society 
is that despite the enormous diversity amongst its members in terms of territorial 
size, wealth, population, culture, values, ideology and so forth, major conflict has 
been a relatively rare occurrence. This order is preserved by the strong emphasis 
placed upon the respect for cultural diversity and the right of all states to liberty and 
                                                 
42 Interestingly, although Reus-Smit and Clark both undertake a historical analysis of the constitution 
of international society, neither includes decolonisation as a fundamental moment of constitutional 
revision  within  international  society.  Conversely,  Philpott  argues  that  decolonisation,  along  with 
Westphalia, is a key moment of constitutional transition within international society.   Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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independence.  As  Reus-Smit  contends,  contemporary  international  society  is  one 
which  
transposes onto the international stage core liberal ideas of the legal equality of the 
individual before the law, the individual’s rights to liberty and self determination, 
and the inviolability of the individual’s physical person. The state becomes the 
individual ‘writ large’, bearing the right of sovereignty (qua individual liberty) 
within a putative international society.
43 
Crucial to these ‘liberal’ rules and rights within international society is the 
norm  of  pluralism.  Pluralism  is  the  central  structuring  principle  of  international 
society,  determining  its  basis  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  and  legitimate  state 
behaviour. It provides for a highly inclusive international society in which diversity 
is tolerated, the consequence of which is the extension of the ‘liberal’ rights of non-
intervention  and  formal  equality  to  all  states.
44  This  high  level  of  inclusivity  is 
demonstrated  by  the  absence  of  any  real  positive  obligations  for  membership  in 
terms  of  the  domestic  constitution  or  cultural  attributes  of  political  communities 
applying  for  membership.  In  other  words,  international  society’s  pluralist 
constitution  means  that  recognition  of  sovereign  statehood  has  become  largely 
detached from the internal characteristics of states.
45   
Drawing on pluralist political theory, this section will show that pluralism 
rests on the recognition of diversity, on recognition of the ‘other’, which precludes a 
                                                 
43 Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’, 76.  Krasner similarly argues that 
under contemporary international law, the state is seen as in a position analogous to the individual in a 
liberal state, enjoying the benefits of independence and equality. See Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 14.   
44 This of course is not to say that the norms of formal equality or non-intervention have always 
obtained within international society since decolonisation. Indeed, the existence of the UN Security 
Council provides an enduring example of formal inequality and hierarchy between states on the basis 
of their substantive inequalities in terms of military and economic power, political influence, etc. The 
point here is that these norms have been generally respected by most states since the early 1960s.  
45 It is precisely this lack of concern for the domestic constitution or internal affairs of the state that is 
central to the solidarist critique of the ethical implications of a pluralist international society that 
privileges non-intervention and formal equality between states over individual rights.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
 
32 
 
restrictive or hierarchical international society based upon distinctions between the 
internal characteristics of states or societies. The implication of this is that a truly 
pluralist international society, one which is informed by the idea that diversity is to 
be at least accepted, is global in scope. There is no legitimate basis for excluding 
particular  states  or  regions  on  the  basis  of  their  cultural  attributes  or  form  of 
government. Pluralist  political  theory,  when  applied  to  the  study  of  International 
Relations, suggests an international society which maximises the potential range of 
values  that  can  be  pursued  by  states,  all  of  which  have  the  equal  freedom  to 
constitute their internal social, political and economic institutions as they see fit. 
Indeed,  Williams  argues  that  from  a  pluralist  perspective,  societies  can  be 
objectively evaluated according to the extent to which they promote diverse values. 
As he puts it, ‘More, to this extent, must mean better’.
46  
However,  this  conceptualisation  of  pluralism  as  a  constitutive  norm  of 
international  society  is  generally  not  one  that  has  prevailed  within  much  of  the 
English School literature. The pluralist interpretation of international society is an 
important feature of the English School. Despite this, it is a concept that has not 
benefited  from  a  systematic  treatment  in  the  work  of  many  prominent  English 
School theorists. For the most part, pluralism has been used merely as a descriptive 
term in the literature, a label or categorisation of an international society that exhibits 
particular features. There has been little consideration of the prescriptive elements of 
the concept or their constitutive role within international society, that is, the way in 
which pluralist ideas constitute many of the features that have been associated with a 
‘pluralist’ version of international society. 
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This is evident in the definitions of pluralism provided by key English School 
theorists. For example, Bull, who first introduced the categories of pluralism and 
solidarism,  describes  pluralism  as  a  conception  of  international  society  in  which 
states are only in agreement for minimal purposes, such as the provision of order 
through the mutual recognition of sovereignty and the norms of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention.
47 Buzan argues that pluralism and solidarism represent points 
on a spectrum – pluralism representing a thin version and solidarism representing a 
thick  version  of  agreed  values  between  states.
48  Mayall  similarly  argues  that 
international society can be understood as pluralist in the sense that states do not 
agree  on  substantive  values  other  than  sovereignty  or  engage  in  the  pursuit  of 
common  projects.
49  In  this  sense,  pluralism  simply  represents  an  empirical 
judgement of the level of agreed values between states.
50  
Pluralism, as it is defined by these scholars, describes international society as 
a practical rather than purposive association.
51 This means that international society 
is  primarily  concerned  with  sustaining  international  order  amongst  states 
characterised by a large degree of domestic diversity by adhering to a minimalist set 
of norms and rules.
52 Pluralists are sceptical of the ability of states to agree on any 
norms or values other than those in which they have a common interest (e.g. those 
                                                 
47  Hedley  Bull,  ‘The  Grotian  Conception  of  International  Society’,  in  Diplomatic  Investigations, 
edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966): 52. 
48 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Structure of 
Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 45-62.  
49 James Mayall, ‘Democracy and International Society’, International Affairs 76, no. 1 (2000): 63.  
50 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 60.  
51 The distinction between practical and purposive associations belongs to Nardin, who described 
international  society  as  a  practical  rather  than  purposive  association,  a  society  of  different  states 
pursuing different ends bound together only by the rules and institutions that allow for the orderly 
pursuit  of  these  disparate  ends.  See  Terry  Nardin,  Law,  Morality  and  the  Relations  of  States 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).  
52 This is evident in Fawn and Mayall’s description of international society as a consensus which 
binds states together through a common commitment to certain minimum values. See Rick Fawn and 
James  Mayall,  ‘Recognition,  Self-Determination  and  Secession  in  Post-Cold  War  International 
Society’, in International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, edited by 
Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996): 193.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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that provide for orderly interstate relations).
53 The fundamental distinction between 
pluralist and solidarist interpretations of international society then is the question of 
order  versus  justice.  Pluralism  is  used  primarily  in  most  of  the  English  School 
literature as a label for an international society characterised by a normatively thin 
constitution that privileges international order over individual justice.  
Another  key  feature  of  the  pluralist  interpretation  of  international  society 
within the English School literature is its inherent statism – the state is taken as the 
primary unit of international society. Therefore, it is important to note that pluralism 
refers to a plurality of states.
54 Jackson refers to this as jurisdictional pluralism – the 
existence of a multitude of states each with their own territory and population.
55 
Pluralism does not refer to an international society in which the state is but one of a 
multitude  of  political  actors.  This  is  in  contrast  to  socio-political  theories  of 
international pluralism, which emphasise the extent to which international politics is 
shaped by a broader range of interests and groups other than the state.
56 Pluralism, as 
the term is used by the English School, and indeed as it is used here, does not refer to 
the ascendance of actors other than the state onto the world political stage. Other 
forms  of  political  organisation;  indeed,  even  individuals  themselves  are  not 
recognised as legitimate members of international society.
57 
                                                 
53 Alex Bellamy, ‘Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium 
31, no. 3 (2002): 476. 
54 Terry Nardin, ‘International Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, Review of International Studies 26, 
no. 1 (2000): 107.  
55 Jackson, The Global Covenant, 178.  
56  This  literature  is  generally  associated  with  liberal  IR  theorists  who  contend  that  transnational 
networks and relationships are an important part of International Relations. For example, see Karl 
Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell and Robert A. Kann, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press,  1957);  James  Rosenau,  The  Study  of  Global  Interdependence:  Essays  on  the 
Transnationalisation  of  World  Affairs  (New  York:  Nichols,  1980);  John  Burton,  World  Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). This ‘socio-political pluralism’ is also encapsulated 
in  the  English  School  idea  of  World  Society  –  for  more  on  this  see  Ian  Clark,  International 
Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
57 The extent to which international politics remains the exclusive domain of the state, however, is 
questionable in light of the effects of globalisation on international society. This was a point that Bull Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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Despite the above criticisms, it should be noted that several scholars within 
the English School have engaged more deeply with the ethical and moral issues 
associated with pluralist international society. Usually this has concerned the ethics 
or  morality  of  privileging  state  sovereignty  over  individual  rights,  or  the  ethical 
desirability  of  moving  beyond  pluralism  towards  a  more  solidarist  international 
society.
58 For example, Jackson’s work on pluralist international society engaged in 
a robust defence of pluralism and also stands as one of the few English School works 
to utilise pluralist political theory. For Jackson, pluralism is more than a mere label; 
as he argues ‘By ‘pluralist’, I mean international society affirms the moral value of 
independent political communities, sovereign states. And it affirms the moral value 
of the society of such states’.
59 But again, aside from Jackson, few English School 
theorists  have  explicitly  sought  to  explore  the  prescriptive  elements  of  pluralist 
theory or the vision of political community that it gives rise to.  
By  focusing  on  pluralism  as  a  description  for  a  minimalist  form  of 
international  society,  the  English  School  has  largely  missed  its  importance  as  a 
constitutive norm of international society. Further, this focus has served to mask the 
constitutionally variable nature of international society, particularly in relation to 
decolonisation and the expansion of international society. The failure to engage with 
pluralist political theory, and the vision of political community it entails, means that 
the English School has applied the ‘pluralist label’ to international society without 
fully exploring whether or not such a society is actually constituted in a way that 
reflects the prescriptive elements of pluralist theory. In other words, international 
                                                                                                                                          
recognised,  and  is  one  that  is  gaining  increasing  attention  within  the  English  School  and  indeed 
International Relations in general. For example see Bull, The Anarchical Society, 39.    
58  For  example,  solidarists  arguably  see  such  developments  as  an  ethical  imperative  as  it  would 
potentially  afford  greater  protection  of  human  rights.  Pluralists,  however,  might  argue  that  it  is 
ethically undesirable as attempts to forge a normatively thicker international society could undermine 
international order and lead to conflict.  
59 Jackson, The Global Covenant, 42.  Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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society  has  been  conceptualised  as  constitutionally  static,  overlooking  the 
fundamental constitutional revisions that underpinned the transition from a European 
to a globalised form of international society.  
Hence, to fully understand this transition, along with the current post-Cold 
War processes of constitutional revision that signal a shift from a pluralist to a more 
hierarchical form of international society, it needs to be understood what a norm of 
pluralism  entails.  Important  here  is  the  distinction  between  pluralism  as  a 
prescriptive  norm  and  pluralism  as  a  constitutive  norm,  a  distinction  alluded  to 
above. In terms of pluralism’s prescriptive elements, what is referred to here are the 
visions of society and political community that pluralism prescribes. The question to 
be determined here is what does a pluralist social order look like? What sorts of rules 
and  principles  does  pluralism  prescribe  when  it  comes  to  the  ordering  of  social 
relationships? On the other hand, when pluralism is discussed as a constitutive norm, 
what  is  referred  to  is  the  way  in  which  pluralism  generates  or  constitutes  an 
international  society  by  determining  its  fundamental  characteristics  (scope, 
membership,  etc)  and  the  rules  which  guide  interstate  relationships  within  this 
society.    
A constitutive norm of pluralism does not merely prescribe certain rules or 
actions;  rather,  it  gives  rise  to  rules  or  actions  (such  as  international  society’s 
relatively undemanding rules for membership) that would not exist independently of 
the  constitutive  norm.  The  remainder  of  this  section  outlines  the  prescriptive 
elements  of  pluralist  political  theory  before  exploring  the  constitutive  role  of 
pluralism within international society. The starting point of pluralist political theory Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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is the distinction drawn between pluralism and monism.
60 As Crowder and Griffiths 
state, ‘Monism, applied to morality, is the view that a single value or narrow range of 
values overrides all others. Subject to the super-value or values, all other goods can 
be comprehended within a single harmonious system’.
61 Therefore, monism suggests 
that there is a universal value-set or standard through which all other values or goods 
can be ranked – it proposes that human values can be hierarchically ordered. 
In  comparison,  pluralism,  or  value  pluralism  as  it  is  referred  to  in  the 
literature,  suggests  that  humans  are  a  species  capable  of  inventing  a  variety  of 
natures for themselves.
62 Ultimate human values are irreducibly diverse and often 
cannot  be  combined.
63  Such  values  often  come  into  conflict,  and  are  therefore 
incompatible. Pluralism thus denies that there is only one universally valid morality 
or value-system.
64 Values or goods may differ widely and may be incompatible or 
incommensurate with each other, but pluralism holds that they are equally valid and 
equally  genuine.
65  As  Berlin  argues,  ‘The  world  that  we  encounter  in  ordinary 
experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate 
and  claims  equally  absolute,  the  realisation  of  some  of  which  must  involve  the 
sacrifice of others’.
66 Pluralists thus reject the idea that such ends or values can be 
hierarchically ordered according to some common measure or standard. Each value-
set is its own measure, meaning that often we will have to make choices between 
incommensurate values.
67  
                                                 
60  George  Crowder  and  Martin  Griffiths,  ‘Postmodernism,  Value  Pluralism  and  International 
Relations’ in International Relations and the ‘Third Debate’: Postmodernism and its Critics, edited 
by Darryl S. Jarvis (Westport: Praeger, 2002): 138. 
61 Ibid. 
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The notion that we can achieve an ideal or universally-valid form of life is 
thus taken to be a fallacy – there is no set of values that can resolve the diversity of 
differing cultures, of differing conceptions of the good life.
68 Indeed, pluralists such 
as Berlin have warned of the possible dangers of attempting to achieve a type of 
political perfection by harmoniously combining all human values or conceptions of 
the good life in one ‘perfect’ political system.
69 The promise of such a resolution of 
human diversity turns out to be illusory and dangerous. If one really believed that 
such a solution was possible, then no price would be too high in order to obtain it.
70 
Further, since such a monist system would cut against the grain of the natural human 
condition, it could only be constructed and maintained forcefully or coercively.
71 
Berlin’s  argument  against  monism  also  flags  the  main  argument  of  this  thesis, 
namely that attempting to impose particular socio-political institutions informed by 
particularistic  values  leads  to  anti-pluralist  and  hierarchical  outcomes  within 
international society.  
Pluralism  is  thus  characterised  by  a  strong  commitment  to  diversity. 
However,  despite  the  pluralist  commitment  to  diversity  and  the  rejection  of  any 
attempt to hierarchically order differing values and ways of life, pluralism cannot be 
collapsed into a form of cultural relativism.
72 Relativism is the notion that there are 
no universal values or moral outlooks, only particular moral judgements made from 
particular  moral  standpoints.
73  Cultural  relativism  holds  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
criticise the practices of a culture on any grounds but its own – there is no external 
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point of view from which the norms of a culture can be second-guessed.
74 Thus, 
meaningful  communication  and  interaction  that  transcends  purely  instrumental 
concerns between different cultures is impossible.
75 In the international realm, this 
would preclude the existence of an international society based upon the shared norms 
and understandings of its member states. 
Pluralism, on the other hand, holds that there are universal values, values that 
are intelligible to all cultures by way of our common humanity.
76 As Berlin argues, 
‘Incompatible these ends may be, but their variety cannot be unlimited, for the nature 
of men, however various and subject to change, must possess some generic character 
if it is to be called human at all’.
77 Such values might include basic human rights, 
such as freedom from abuse, although this is not clearly specified in the literature.
78 
These universal values, ones that we can make sense of, enable us to understand and 
communicate with those from differing cultural backgrounds. We might find the 
cultural practices or ways of life of different individuals or societies repulsive, but 
we can still make sense of these practices and ways of life, can still recognise them 
as  valid  for  that  individual  or  society,  and  ultimately  we  can  still  enter  into 
meaningful communication with other people and other societies.  
The above summarises some of the main themes of pluralist political theory 
and hints at some of the main features of a pluralist vision of political community. In 
sum, beginning from the notion of the inherent diversity of human nature and human 
values,  and  its  rejection  of  any  ranking  or  ordering  of  what  are  taken  to  be 
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incommensurate human values, the pluralist prescription of an ideal form of society 
is one in which a maximum range of values are accommodated. Within international 
society,  this  involves  allowing  for  diverse  political  communities  with  differing 
cultures and forms of government to claim membership of international society and, 
more importantly, have these claims recognised by other members irrespective of the 
domestic social or political differences between them.    
Indeed, the issue of recognition is crucial to understanding pluralism’s role as 
a  constitutive  norm  of  international  society.  Fundamental  to  the  existence  of  a 
pluralist  form  of  international  society  is  the  recognition  of  the  ‘other’  and  the 
‘other’s’ right to pursue diverse values and conceptions of the good life. As Bellamy 
argues ‘pluralist international society rests on mutual recognition of the component 
units’ right to exist’.
79 Indeed, recognition is a fundamental precondition of any form 
of international society. Reus-Smit suggests that  
As English School theorists have themselves noted, the foundation of international 
society  is  mutual  recognition,  the  use  of  standards  of  legitimate  statehood  to 
determine which polities will be granted the entitlements of sovereign statehood. 
A deep politics of identity thus undergirds international society, determining its 
membership.
80 
Recognition forms the basis on which any society can be formed. Any actor 
wishing to enter into social relations with other actors must first be recognised by 
these other actors as properly participating in the society.
81 Indeed, as Dunne states 
‘Clearly the act of mutual recognition indicates the presence of a social practice: 
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recognition is fundamental to an identity relationship’.
82 In other words ‘Recognition 
is a process whereby an entity is acknowledged by a state as being a state...’
83 Wight 
makes the important point that ‘It would be impossible to have a society of states 
unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognised that every other 
state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well’.
84  
Wight’s comment highlights the extent to which the existence of a sovereign 
state  can  be  said  to  depend  upon  its  recognition  as  such  by  other  members  of 
international society. Reciprocity and mutuality are therefore inherent in the concept 
of recognition. Sovereignty or statehood is not merely something that is unilaterally 
claimed.  Rather,  it  is  something  that  has  to  be  bestowed  by  other  political 
communities who have also claimed the status of a sovereign state.
85 The important 
point  here  is  that  pluralism  mandates  the  recognition  of  a  political  community 
irrespective  of  its  internal  characteristics.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  a  pluralist 
international society would attempt to accommodate the widest range of possible 
values  and  political  regimes.  The  mere  fact  of  diversity  among  states  does  not 
necessarily equate with a pluralist international society.  
Rather, it is the recognition, tolerance and respect of such diversity that is a 
crucial  feature  of  a  pluralist  international  society.  Recognition  of  statehood  in  a 
pluralist international society is also recognition of the diversity of that society’s 
membership. It is an affirmation of the moral value of the plurality of human values, 
cultures and regimes. It is recognition of the equal right of all peoples to freely 
determine the way in which they should live and the right of all states to constitute 
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their socio-political institutions as they wish free from external interference.
86 As 
such, pluralism is a constitutive norm of international society in the sense that the 
criteria  for  recognition  that  it  entails  generates  an  inclusive,  global  form  of 
international society. This is one in which all political communities are entitled to 
formally equal membership irrespective of their socio-political institutions or values.  
However, the right to freely determine their own socio-political institutions 
and  values  and  the  enjoyment  of  equal  membership  also  imposes  a  negative 
obligation upon states entering international society to reciprocally recognise and 
tolerate the diversity of its membership. As Buzan suggests, states must be prepared 
to accept the values of international pluralism, and are therefore obliged to recognise 
and tolerate varying forms of government and cultural practices.
87 Failure to do so 
could  threaten  the  existence  of  a  global  international  society.
88  An  international 
society  that  attempts  to  predicate  recognition  of  statehood  and  membership  on 
adherence to particular values or political regimes is therefore not pluralist. Any 
attempt to impose positive obligations upon states domestically for the recognition of 
their  sovereignty,  such  as  adherence  to  particular  cultural  values  or  forms  of 
governance,  is  necessarily  corrosive  of  pluralism  at  the  international  level.  The 
imposition of such obligations would limit the range of possible values and regimes 
that different societies could reasonably adopt. 
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For example, European international society (like any international society) 
was formed on the basis of the recognition of each member as a sovereign state by 
the other members of that society. But in determining the criteria for recognition, 
European  states  consciously  limited  such  criteria  to  particularistic,  or  monist, 
standards of domestic conduct and constitution. States had to adhere to European 
values and notions of statehood and ‘civilisation’ in order to be recognised. In the 
post-Cold War era similar trends have emerged that involve the conditioning of full 
membership within international society, particularly the enjoyment of the rights of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention, on adherence to non-risky (liberal) forms of 
domestic governance. This leads to a monist or anti-pluralist form of international 
society. 
Again, it is the use of pluralism as a descriptive label within the English 
School that has blinded many scholars to the fundamentally anti-pluralist nature of 
international society before decolonisation. Both European international society and 
its globalised successor may be institutionally similar and both may be minimalist in 
the  level  of  agreed  norms  between  states.  However,  simply  applying  the  label 
‘pluralist’ to both ignores the varying criteria for recognition, rightful membership 
and  rightful  conduct  and  hence  the  different  constitutional  structures  of  these 
international societies. Further, it is important to reiterate that similarly attempting to 
account for hierarchical trends within an international society merely described as 
‘pluralist’ prevents an examination of how these trends affect the pluralist vision of 
political community currently reflected in international society’s constitution.  
Finally,  it  is  pluralism’s  constitutive  role  within  international  society, 
particularly  its  emphasis  on  recognising  and  accommodating  diversity  between 
values,  cultures  and  political  regimes  that  leads  to  what  might  be  termed  the Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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‘regulative rights’ of non-intervention, formal equality and self-determination within 
contemporary international society.
89 For example, the pluralist notion that human 
values are equally valid and its rejection of any hierarchical ordering of such values 
provides for an inherently egalitarian vision of political community. Within pluralist 
international  society,  this  is  realised  through  the  norm  of  sovereign  or  formal 
equality, taken by many scholars, particularly those within the field of international 
law, as the key norm of international society.
90 Likewise, the contention by pluralists 
such as Williams that a ‘good’ society or regime is one that provides individuals 
with  maximum  choice  between  differing  values  implies  that  it  is  also  one  that 
provides individuals with the freedom to choose between these values or ways of life 
by themselves.
91   
This freedom to choose is intrinsic to a pluralist vision of society for, as Gray 
suggests,  it  is  precisely  our  capacity  for  choice  which  allows  human  beings  to 
develop a diversity of natures.
92 Therefore, in seeking to maximise the choices that 
individuals or societies may reasonably make, the freedom to make such choices in 
the absence of external interference is an important component of pluralist political 
theory. This freedom to choose is essentially commensurate with Berlin’s notion of 
negative  freedom.
93  As  Crowder  argues,  non-intervention  provides  the  space  in 
which individuals (or societies) can act without obstruction. That is, it is the space in 
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which freedom of choice can be exercised, which is a goal that is in keeping with 
pluralism.
94 This is realised within international society through the rule of non-
intervention.  Importantly,  the  point  here  is  that  a  respect  for  pluralism  and 
recognition of diversity is a pre-requisite for a strong norm of non-intervention. It is 
precisely when heterogeneity and difference come to be seen as undesirable features 
of international society that the rule of non-intervention can be subject to violation.   
Pluralist  political  theory  thus  provides  for  an  international  society 
characterised by diversity, formal equality and non-intervention. Since the end of 
colonialism,  the  above  have  all  been  marked  features  of  international  society  – 
pluralism is its central constitutive norm. The prescriptive elements of pluralism or 
its constitutive role have generally not been acknowledged in much of the English 
School literature, leading to a static view of international society’s constitution. This 
is most evident with respect to the historical accounts provided by English School 
theorists of the evolution of contemporary international society. The next section 
provides a brief analysis of this evolution. As is argued, until the end of colonialism, 
recognition of diversity within international society can only be said to have been 
substantially  limited.  With  the  end  of  colonialism,  international  society’s 
constitutional structure was fundamentally altered, leading to a new, inclusive form 
of international society.  
 
The Historical Evolution of Pluralism in International Society  
This  final  section  briefly  considers  the  historical  evolution  of  pluralist 
international society. Historical investigation is a key aspect of the English School, 
yet notably most English School scholars have generally not considered the role of 
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pluralism in international society’s historical development, particularly in terms of 
its eventual global expansion. The questions to be asked are has pluralism been a 
continuous feature of the society of states? And if not, at what point did a pluralist 
international society emerge? As Bellamy suggests, there are two main historical 
questions  that  have  yet  to  be  answered  satisfactorily  in  relation  to  international 
society: how did today’s international society emerge? And why, and how, do the 
norms and rules underpinning international society change over time?
95 The point of 
this  section  is  therefore  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  international  society  has 
historically reflected the central pluralist idea that the human condition is irrevocably 
plural  and  that  there  can  be  no  universal  standard  with  which  to  rank  values  or 
political regimes other than those universal values which bind us together as human.  
Beginning  with  Westphalia,  this  section  traces  the  emergence  of  pluralist 
international  society.  Many  scholars  have  taken  Westphalia  or  other  significant 
historical events, such as the creation of the UN, to be the seminal moment in the 
evolution  of  contemporary  international  society.  Contrary  to  these  claims,  the 
argument presented here is that only with the end of colonialism did a truly pluralist 
international society emerge. Decolonisation was, as Philpott suggests, a ‘revolution 
in  sovereignty’  and  a  moment  of  constitutional  restructuring  within  international 
society.
96 The granting of independence and sovereignty to the colonies represented 
a fundamental shift in the normative constitution of international society, one which 
changed the rules of the game and resulted in the ascendance of pluralism as its 
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fundamental constitutive norm, something that has not been clearly acknowledged in 
most of the English School literature.
97  
Despite the almost mythological status of the Peace of Westphalia as the 
founding  moment  of  the  modern  states-system,  it  did  not  ‘magically’  create  the 
states-system.  Westphalia  did  not  represent  an  instant  metamorphosis,  yet  it  did 
consolidate centuries of transition and change that would eventually result in the 
emergence of the modern states-system.
98 Sovereign states such as England, Sweden 
and France had already emerged prior to Westphalia, but the changes wrought by the 
Italian Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation were finally given European-
wide effect. After Westphalia, the ideal and reality of a united Christendom was 
gone.
99 The result was that Europe had become an assemblage of sovereign states. 
But the extent to which social relations amongst these new states reflected pluralist 
ideas is highly questionable. 
The notion that a pluralist international society emerged immediately after 
Westphalia  sits  uncomfortably  with  certain  features  of  the  post-Westphalian 
international order.
100 Even after the treaties had been signed and the new states of 
Europe  began  to  take  shape,  most  of  these  new  states  still  saw  themselves  as 
belonging to the wider whole of Latin Christendom.
101 Indeed, the delegates at the 
peace conferences were happy to designate themselves as the ‘senate of the Christian 
world’.
102 As Bull argues, there might have been an international society, but it was 
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one with a Christian core.
103 Diversity and, more importantly, the idea that diversity 
was to be tolerated and respected among these new states were severely limited. A 
strong sense of differentiation prevailed between Christian Europe and the rest of the 
world, but crucially, these differences were not regarded as legitimate or tolerable, 
evident  in  the  refusal  of  Christian  Europe  to  admit  the  Ottoman  Empire  into 
international society.
104  
Pluralism, both in the sense of actual diversity and in the commitment of the 
members  of  international  society  to  recognise  such  diversity,  was  virtually  non-
existent  immediately  after  the  Peace  of  Westphalia.  This  was  not  a  pluralist 
international society; it was more akin to contemporary English School notions of a 
solidarist  international  society,  one  in  which  member  states  shared  substantive 
Christian values and principles of dynastic legitimacy. As Reus-Smit suggests, for 
two  hundred  years  after  Westphalia  a  pre-modern  set  of  Christian  and  dynastic 
values  determined  legitimate  statehood  and  rightful  conduct.
105  This  lack  of  a 
normative  commitment  to  pluralism  in  the  centuries  following  Westphalia  was 
further demonstrated by the reaction of the dynastic monarchies to the emergence of 
republicanism as an alternative basis of the internal constitution of the state during 
the French Revolution. 
The reaction of the European monarchies was to form the Holy Alliance, 
established in 1815. This Alliance was a largely reactionary and loose organisation 
that eventually came to encompass most of the states of Europe, with the notable 
exception of Britain.
106 It sought to suppress any further revolutions and preserve 
Christian,  dynastic  monarchism  within  Europe.  The  Holy  Alliance  was 
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fundamentally  hostile  to  democracy  (republicanism)  and  secularism.
107  It  was 
concerned  with  preserving  what  Russia’s  Tsar  Alexander  the  First  and  Austria’s 
Foreign  Minister  Metternich  saw  as  the  legitimate  social  order  of  Europe,  one 
founded  on  Christian  values  and  absolute  monarchy.  Constitutional  reform  or 
republican  revolution  anywhere  in  Europe  or  the  Americas  was  regarded  as  the 
legitimate concern of the Holy Alliance, and would be met with ‘military reaction 
and reactionary militancy’.
108 At Troppau in 1820, the powers of the Holy Alliance 
agreed to quash constitutionalism and prevent instability in Europe.
109 
The  intention  of  the  members  of  the  Alliance  was  to  create  ‘a  regular 
European directory for keeping the states of Europe in a fixed political system’.
110 
The  Holy  Alliance  was  thus  distinctly  anti-pluralist  in  its  orientation.  It  was,  as 
Simpson suggests ‘an evangelical pact designed to promote a particular version of 
the good life and buttressed by certain non-negotiable moral beliefs’.
111 The attempt 
by the members of the Holy Alliance to impose one particular set of values and 
system of governance on all of Europe demonstrated the extent to which pluralism 
had yet to become widely accepted as a principle of European international society. 
The  Holy  Alliance’s  repudiation  of  pluralism  and  its  unwillingness  to  tolerate 
internal diversity among the states of Europe also demonstrates the way in which 
norms of equality and non-intervention are easily eroded in the absence of a respect 
for plurality. The interventionist doctrine of the Alliance was directly based on its 
repudiation of any values or forms of governance other than those which it endorsed. 
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Further,  the  assertion  that  the  powers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  could  police 
Europe and intervene wherever they pleased suggested a fundamentally hierarchical, 
unequal  relationship  between  the  Great  Powers  of  the  Alliance  and  the  smaller 
European states. Yet the significance of the Holy Alliance should not be overstated. 
While it certainly demonstrated the extent to which most of the major European 
powers opposed any form of government other than dynastic monarchism or set of 
values that were not explicitly Christian, international society had already become 
more diverse with the granting of independence to the United States. This trend 
continued with the independence of the South American colonies and the admission 
of the Ottoman Empire into international society. However, again it is important not 
to overstate the significance of these events. 
The states of South America were not treated as equals after independence, 
and were subject to continued European intervention in their affairs.
112 Further, as 
Bull argues:  
This initial expansion, to embrace peoples Christian in religion and European in 
race and culture, did not strain the criteria of membership and in itself did little to 
advance the prospects that non-Christian and non-European peoples could gain 
admission.
113  
Those territories that were not European or settled by Europeans were not admitted 
into international society. However, the exception here is the Ottoman Empire, the 
first  non-European,  non-Christian  state  accepted  into  the  European  international 
society in 1856.
114 Yet, while the Ottoman Empire was formally recognised by the 
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1856 Treaty of Paris, it was not treated as a European state – it did not enjoy parity 
of status with the other European powers.
115 
The Ottomans were subjected to continued capitulations with the European 
powers, which were modified by the Europeans to protect their nationals and trade 
by  ensuring  both  were  subjected  to  European  laws  and  practices.
116  Indeed,  the 
Ottoman  administration  was  also  required  to  ensure  that  it  observed  European 
standards  in  its  dealings.
117  The  Ottomans  were  thus  subjected  to  European 
interference in their internal affairs in order to compel them to conform to European 
values and standards of governance. Respect for pluralism and diversity was still 
limited within international society. While a non-Christian state had been admitted 
into international society, it was admitted on the basis of capitulatory agreements 
which  enforced  European  values  and  standards  that  were  taken  to  constitute  a 
universal  standard  for  all  societies  to  adhere  to.  Tolerance  and  recognition  of 
diversity was thus not consolidated with the admission of the former settler colonies 
of the Americas or the Ottoman Empire into international society. 
In particular, these small steps towards greater respect for pluralism were 
radically mitigated in the nineteenth century by the invocation of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ which was applied to non-Western territories as a precondition for full 
membership  within  international  society.
118  Further,  European  imperialism  again 
demonstrates that a refusal to accommodate the variety of values and ways of life 
between different societies leads to the derogation of the rights of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention which the European society of states reserved for itself. Writing 
on the concept of sovereign equality under international law, Dickinson claims:  
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Fundamental  differences  in  the  character  of  civilization  have  always  been  the 
source  of  important  limitations  on  capacity...Most  of  the  modern  publicists 
recognize  that  equality  can  be  the  rule  only  among  states  having  common 
standards of civilization.
119 
Those  societies  with  differing  cultures  or  values  to  that  of  Europe  were 
deemed ‘deviant’ or ‘backward’ and thus lacked the capacity for self-government. 
This justified their conquest by the imperial European powers and the denial of the 
rights  of  sovereign  equality  and  non-intervention.  As  Brown  states:  ‘Among  the 
[European] full members of international society, the norm was non-intervention. On 
the other hand, in their relations with peoples not deemed members of international 
society...no such norm of non-intervention was held to apply’.
120 In sum, it would 
not be until decolonisation and the recognition and acceptance of the colonies as 
sovereign states that pluralism would emerge as the central structuring principle of 
international society. As Jackson suggests, the significance of decolonisation and the 
subsequent  globalisation  of  international  society  is  often  missed  by  International 
Relations scholars.
121 
This is certainly true of the English School. As noted, many English School 
theorists  have  attributed  to  international  society  a  relatively  static  constitutional 
structure, demonstrated by the tendency to label both European international society 
and its global successor as pluralist. However, this ignores the anti-pluralist nature of 
European  international  society  and  hence  the  constitutional  revisions  that 
decolonisation represented. Interestingly despite his claim that the significance of 
decolonisation is often overlooked, Jackson devotes little attention to decolonisation 
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as a fundamental period of normative transformation within international society in 
The  Global  Covenant.  Instead,  he  argues  that  sovereignty  is  expressive  of  the 
pluralist  underpinnings  of  international  society,  and  thus  pluralism  within 
international society can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia.
122 The problem 
with  this  argument  is  that,  as  Philpott  argues,  state  practice  within  international 
society must actually correspond to its constitutional norms if these norms are to be 
called ‘constitutive’ at all.
123 
What Jackson does not acknowledge is that in the centuries after Westphalia, 
the explicit refusal of Europe to admit differently constituted political communities 
into international society suggests the absence of pluralism as a constitutive norm of 
this society. If pluralism has been a fundamental norm of international society since 
Westphalia, this certainly was not reflected in state practice until at least 1960. Until 
then, non-European communities were either excluded from international society or 
admitted only after their internal political, social and economic institutions had been 
radically altered. The lack of acknowledgement of decolonisation as representing a 
fundamental normative shift towards a pluralist international society is also evident 
in one of the key English School texts dealing with decolonisation, The Expansion of 
International Society. 
In this work, the topic of decolonisation is discussed in numerous chapters 
and in some depth. However, there is virtually no discussion of the relationship of 
decolonisation  to  the  emergence  of  a  pluralist  international  society.  While  Bull 
suggests  that  decolonisation  involved  a  transformation  of  the  moral  and  legal 
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environment,  there  is  little  analysis  of  the  specifics  of  this  normative  change.
124 
Clark’s work on legitimacy in international society also demonstrates a surprising 
lack of awareness of the significance of decolonisation for the political constitution 
of international society. Despite his contention that rightful membership forms one 
of the central components of international legitimacy, decolonisation, a period where 
the legitimacy of colonialism and empire was discredited and principles of rightful 
membership substantially altered, barely rates a mention.
125  
This  failure  to  identify  pluralism  as  a  key,  and  historically  variable, 
constitutive norm of international society, or indeed to even identify decolonisation 
as  a  moment  of  significant  constitutional  revision,  is  a  crucial  weakness  of  the 
English  School’s  conceptualisation  of  contemporary  international  society  and  the 
analysis  of  its  historical  evolution.  It  means  that,  generally,  the  current  English 
School literature is ill-placed to adequately conceptualise the constitutional revisions 
wrought by Western risk management interventions in the post-Cold War era. Rather 
than engage with pluralism as a variable norm and consider the extent to which 
Western  interventionism  contravenes  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution, 
much of the literature on Western interventionism or attempts at promoting liberal 
values has focused on how these interventions violate certain principles such as non-
intervention  or  have  been  unhelpfully  ensnared  within  the  pluralist-solidarist 
debate.
126 
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However, some scholars have identified pluralism as a historically variable 
norm of international society. For example, Simpson identifies pluralism and anti-
pluralism as historically variable features of international society. However, he traces 
the emergence of a pluralist international society to the drafting and implementation 
of  the  UN  Charter.  As  noted,  a  case  can  certainly  be  made  that  the  Charter 
symbolically represents the emergence of a pluralist international society. In the final 
draft of the Charter there is no distinction made between states on the basis of their 
internal characteristics. Indeed, the Charter, in Article 2(1) affirms the sovereign 
equality  of  all  of  its  members,  and  in  Article  2(7)  affirms  the  norm  of  non-
intervention by precluding any interference in those affairs that are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the state.
127  
There is little doubt then that, as Simpson argues, the UN Charter represents 
the highest expression of the norms of equality and non-intervention.
128 Yet despite 
its supposedly pluralist connotations, during the negotiations over the drafting of the 
Charter, there was no mention of providing the rights of sovereign equality or non-
intervention to the colonies. Indeed, the Trusteeship Council was established within 
the UN to oversee the administration of colonial territories. Sovereign equality and 
non-intervention were norms that would apply only among the West and those non-
Western  states  that  had  been  seen  to  meet  the  standard  of  civilisation  and  thus 
admitted  into  international  society.
129  The  pluralism  of  the  immediate  post-1945 
period  was  therefore  still  substantially  limited.  While  the  norms  of  sovereign 
equality  and  non-intervention  were  enshrined  in  the  UN  Charter,  as  Reus-Smit 
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claims they ‘only became a general organising principle for the international system 
as a whole when decolonisation replaced the formal hierarchies of empire with the 
first global system of sovereign states’.
130 
In other words, the rhetoric of the Charter did not conform to the existing 
hierarchical  relationships  (the  European  empires)  prevalent  within  international 
society in the immediate post-World War Two period. The sovereign equality and 
non-intervention of the Charter were mitigated to a large extent by the existence of 
the formal hierarchies of Western imperialism. However, it could be argued that 
decolonisation  merely  represented  the  codification  of  a  normative  shift  that  had 
begun in 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter. In this respect, decolonisation 
was  merely  a  formal  acknowledgement  of  transformations  in  the  constitution  of 
international  society  that  had  begun  several  years  earlier.  Yet,  despite  the 
codification  of  pluralist  norms  such  as  equality  and  non-intervention  in  the  UN 
Charter, pluralism was not legitimated as a constitutive norm of international society 
until decolonisation. It was decolonisation that finally saw the global application 
(rather than merely codification) of pluralist notions of recognition and norms of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention to social relationships amongst all political 
communities.  
Indeed, Simpson eventually acknowledges as much:  
The  Charter  era,  then,  was  marked  by  a  commitment  to  a  formally  non-
hierarchical international order. This is certainly true of a period between 1960 
(the  Declaration  of  the  Granting  of  Independence)  and  1989...The  distinction 
between  civilised  and  non-civilised  peoples  had  finally  been  abandoned, 
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previously criminal states were returned to the fold, and democracy was left as a 
desideratum rather than a genuine prerequisite of the society of states.
131  
It is thus the end of colonialism which represents the crucial point in the emergence 
of  the  post-colonial  international  society.  It  was  at  this  point  that  international 
society  finally  affirmed  the  plurality  of  human  values  and  culture  and  formally 
abandoned the attempt to hierarchically order societies according to particular values 
or  standards.  The  illegality  and  illegitimacy  of  colonialism  was  highlighted  in 
several  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly,  the  most  important  of  which  was 
Resolution  1514:  The  Declaration  of  the  Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, adopted on 14 December 1960. 
This  resolution  effectively  outlawed  colonialism  in  all  its  forms,  and 
represented a formal codification of the normative shift that had occurred. As stated 
in the resolution: ‘All people have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that 
right  they  freely  determine  their  political  status  and  freely  pursue  their  social, 
economic  and  cultural  development’.
132  Here  we  find  an  important  statement  of 
pluralism as a fundamental norm of international society. As Robert Jackson argues, 
after 1960, the rules of the ‘old sovereignty game’, which justified overseas empire 
and made membership in the society of states dependent on the possession of a 
capable and ‘civilised’ government, were fundamentally changed.
133 Keene likewise 
suggests that ‘The toleration of different ways of life has thus become an absolutely 
central  principle  in  the  new  global  political  and  legal  order’.
134  Most  colonial 
territories  were  recognised  as  sovereign  states,  regardless  of  the  perceived 
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disorganisation or illegitimacy of their domestic institutions.
135 It no longer made 
sense  to  speak  of  a  hierarchical  world  order  in  which  certain  states  or  political 
communities  could  be  excluded  from  international  society  on  the  basis  of  their 
societal values or political regimes.  
The end of colonialism thus resulted in a substantial revision of international 
society’s constitution, particularly in terms of rightful membership. The right of all 
states  to  adopt  differing  societal  values  or  forms  of  internal  political  or  social 
constitution was realised. The result of this normative shift was the globalisation of 
international  society.  With  the  ascendance  of  a  pluralist  constitution  and  the 
accompanying de-legitimation of a hierarchical ordering of political communities 
based upon their internal characteristics, there was no longer a basis on which to 
exclude a political community from international society. Between 1957 and 1967 
(especially between 1960 and 1966), many colonies gained their independence.
136 
The pluralist constitution of international society is therefore one that underwrites 
the  existence  of  a  diverse  range  of  states  irrespective  of  their  internal 
characteristics.
137  
With the formal codification of a pluralist constitution of international society, 
the  rights  of  sovereign  equality,  self-determination,  and  non-intervention  were 
likewise globalised. The principles of the UN Charter were globally implemented, 
with the result that these rights were reified and embedded as key values of the post-
colonial international society. Indeed, the norm of non-intervention was one that was 
repeatedly affirmed in several General Assembly resolutions following the collapse 
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of the European empires.
138 While these norms, especially non-intervention, have 
been  subject  to  violation  since  the  end  of  colonialism,  they  have  generally  been 
respected by most states, including the great powers. In sum, since decolonisation, 
international practice and state behaviour have reflected the norms and rules of the 
pluralist constitution of international society. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to address the question of how international society 
is  constituted  and  has  placed  particular  emphasis  on  the  role  of  norms  in  its 
constitutional structuring. In order to illustrate this point this chapter has explored 
the constitutive norm of pluralism, arguing that since decolonisation pluralism has 
represented the core structuring norm of international society, informing the rights of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention that states enjoy. The result of this pluralist 
constitution is that international society is global in scope and highly inclusive in 
nature, a result of the pluralist idea that diversity between human values is to be 
recognised and accommodated. Further, the historical analysis of the evolution of 
this pluralist society has sought to reinforce the contention that norms, and hence 
international society’s constitution, are dynamic and shift over time.  
Thus  pluralism,  rather  than  a  descriptive  label  or  static  feature  of 
international society, is both a prescriptive norm that provides a particular vision of 
political community between states and a historically variable constitutive norm that 
generates a particular form of international society. Indeed, pluralist international 
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society is actually a historical anomaly – for most of its history, international society 
has been characterised by positive criteria for membership and relations of hierarchy. 
In the post-Cold War era new hierarchical trends have emerged within international 
society  that  signals  a  shift  within  its  constitution.  The  pluralist  constitution  of 
international society has begun to give way to a new, anti-pluralist and hierarchical 
constitutional order, one in which the criteria for membership within international 
society  is  predicated  upon  compliance  with  positive  obligations  to  adopt  liberal 
values  and  institutions.  However,  the  nature  of  these  new  hierarchies  and  their 
significance  for  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution  have  been  largely 
overlooked.  
The  next  two  chapters  explore  the  nature  of  these  hierarchies,  their 
significance for international society’s pluralist constitution and the causal factors 
that have underpinned their emergence. Drawing on the work of Lake and Hobson 
and Sharman, among others, the next chapter explores the issue of hierarchy within 
international society. In particular, it considers the role of liberalism in these new 
hierarchies,  questioning  how  an  ideology  supposedly  based  on  the  ideals  of 
individual  equality  and  freedom  can  become  encapsulated  within  structures  of 
international  hierarchy.  Reviewing  the  literature  on  various  liberal  international 
theories,  the  next  chapter  suggests  that  liberalism,  when  applied  to  International 
Relations, can give rise to an anti-pluralist and hierarchical vision of international 
society that suggests that liberalism within the state is much more important than the 
liberal relations between states which pluralism gives rise to. As will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, these theories of a hierarchical form of international liberalism 
are  important  as  many  of  the  ideas  that  they  contain,  particularly  regarding  the 
pacific  effect  of  liberalism  and  democracy,  have  been  utilised  by  Western Pluralism and the Constitution of International Society 
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governments  as  a  justification  for  adopting  the  promotion  of  liberal  values  as  a 
mechanism of risk management.   
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Two 
Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
 
 
Introduction 
As  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  international  society  has  had  a 
pluralist  constitution  only  since  the  early  1960s.  Throughout  most  of  its  history, 
hierarchical  political  relationships  have  been  a  marked  feature  of  international 
society.  With  the  de-legitimation  and  ending  of  European  colonialism,  formal 
hierarchy  within  international  society  was  largely  discredited.  However,  some 
exceptions remained, most notably the Soviet Union’s hierarchical relationship with 
East European communist states.
1 Yet, between decolonisation and the end of the 
Cold  War  such  exceptions  were  generally  not  widespread.  Rather,  interstate 
relationships  within  international  society  were  generally  ordered  by  its  pluralist 
constitution. This is particularly so in terms of the prevailing criteria for recognition 
as a sovereign state and legitimate state conduct. However, since the end of the Cold 
War,  this  pluralist  constitution  has  increasingly  been  called  into  question  by  a 
renewed  emphasis  on  the  internal  socio-political  conditions  of  states  by  Western 
societies.  It  has  also  been  challenged  by  several  interventions  by  Western  states 
designed  to  promote  liberalism  and  democracy  in  various  territories  across  the 
globe.
2 
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Underpinning  these  new  hierarchies  has  been  the  increasing  Western 
emphasis on liberal values as the positive criteria states must meet in order to be 
recognised as full members of international society. That is, new hierarchical trends 
within international society are informed by the distinction between liberalism as the 
preferred  (and  non-risky)  form  of  government  and  governance  and  illiberal  or 
undemocratic regimes viewed as potentially dangerous and inherently inferior. The 
West’s  renewed  enthusiasm  for  its  liberal  values  was  apparent  with  liberalism’s 
supposed  victory  over  communism  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,
3  an  enthusiasm 
perhaps best captured by Fukuyama with his thesis on the ‘end of history’.
4 The end 
of the Cold War thus gave rise to a Western reaffirmation of its own unique liberal 
values.
5  
There has also been a steady increase of academic work since the 1980s (and 
particularly during the 1990s) that has sought to portray liberalism as inherently 
different and thus superior to other ideologies or forms of political organisation. 
These  works,  spanning  disciplines  such  as  International  Relations,  political 
philosophy  and  international  law,  have  provided  ideological  justifications  for  the 
superiority of liberal democracy (such as its pacific effects) and have argued for 
special  governance  rights  for  liberal  states  within  international  society.
6  This 
literature  implicitly  queries  ‘what  constitutes  a  liberal  international  society’?  It 
suggests  that  a  desirable  form  of  liberal  international  society  is  one  based  upon 
domestic liberal governance within as many states as possible. In order to achieve 
this, the literature has sought to justify the establishment of hierarchical relationships 
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within international society based on distinctions between states in terms of their 
adherence to liberalism and democracy.  
These  claims  of  liberalism  as  the  legitimate  standard  of  statehood  within 
international society are distinctly monist and anti-pluralist in that they explicitly 
seek  to  limit  the  range  of  values  and  regimes  that  states  can  legitimately  adopt. 
Curiously  then,  liberalism,  an  ideology  supposedly  based  upon  the  ideals  of 
individual  freedom  and  equality,  has  become  ensnared  within  structures  of 
international  hierarchy.
7  The  point  of  this  chapter  is  twofold:  firstly,  it  seeks  to 
explore  the  concept  of  hierarchy  within  International  Relations.  Secondly,  the 
chapter aims to outline the ideational framework that underpins the encapsulation of 
liberalism within international hierarchy in the post-Cold War era. Reviewing the 
literature on liberal international theory mentioned above, it is argued in this chapter 
that liberalism, when applied to International Relations, can give rise to a distinctly 
anti-pluralist and hierarchical vision of political community between states. 
As opposed to a pluralist international society, which can also claim to be 
‘liberal’  in  the  sense  of  the  application  of  liberal  rights  of  non-intervention  and 
formal  equality  to  states,  liberalism  can  also  provide  an  exclusionary  vision  of 
international society. This second version of a ‘liberal’ international society is one in 
which only its so-called core members, the liberal democracies, enjoy the full rights 
and privileges of sovereign status. The analysis of these ‘hierarchical’ versions of 
liberal international theory, and especially the ideas that they contain, is important as 
it is largely these ideas that inform the West’s belief that promoting liberal values 
within international society is the appropriate solution to new forms of security risks 
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with which they are currently faced.
8 While the next two chapters are dedicated to 
understanding  the  causal  factors  that  underpin  new  structures  of  international 
hierarchy  and  the  goals  and  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  West’s  ‘liberal 
interventions’, neither can be fully appreciated without first examining the ideas that 
underpin  the  notion  that  promoting  liberalism  can  provide  security  benefits  for 
Western societies.     
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in two parts. Firstly, it examines what 
is meant by the use of the term hierarchy. Questions to be discussed here include 
what is hierarchy? And what does a hierarchical political relationship entail? It is 
argued that hierarchy is an authority relationship, one in which the superordinate 
party views itself as having the authority to command, the subordinate party views 
itself as having a duty to obey, and both recognise this relationship as legitimate.
9 
Hierarchy in this sense is fundamentally a social relationship, one underpinned by 
ideational  frameworks  or  what  Hobson  and  Sharman  refer  to  as  ‘social  logics’, 
which determine the nature of the hierarchical relationships.
10 Crucially, and counter 
to conventional wisdom, this section argues that hierarchy is not incompatible with 
the notion of an anarchical international society comprised of sovereign states. The 
second section of the chapter conducts a review of several literatures on liberalism 
and liberal International Relations theory in order to draw out the ideas, or social 
logic, which not only underpin a hierarchical form of international liberalism, but 
also  inform  the  West’s  preference  for  promoting  liberalism  within  international 
society as a form of risk management. 
                                                 
8 For more on this see chapter four.  
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This  literature  provides  a  vision  of  a  fundamentally  anti-pluralist  and 
hierarchical  form  of  international  society,  one  in  which  rightful  membership  is 
restricted  to  those  states  adhering  to  liberal  values  and  democratic  government. 
However,  it  is  important  to  note  here  that  the  nature  of  new  hierarchies  within 
international  society  cannot  simply  be  reduced  to  the  ideas  that  underpin  the 
perceived  superiority  of  liberalism.  It  is  one  thing  to  believe  that  a  particular 
ideology or mode of social and political organisation is ‘better’ than others; it is 
quite  another  to  intervene,  in  some  instances  forcefully,  in  order  to  impose  this 
ideology  on  other  regions.  Contemporary  hierarchy  within  international  society 
cannot be fully understood without exploring the causal factors that compel Western 
societies to attempt to establish themselves as the superordinate (intervening) party 
in new structures of international hierarchy. Important here are Beck’s notions of 
risk and the world risk society, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Hierarchy in International Society 
Several  recent  works  have  highlighted  not  only  new  hierarchical  political 
relationships within international society, but have also sought to draw attention to 
the  concept  of  hierarchy  itself  and  the  enduring  role  of  hierarchy  within  world 
politics.
11 Several of these works have sought to challenge the conventional image of 
international  society  as  consisting  entirely  of  sovereign  states  in  a  condition  of 
anarchy. Rather, they argue that world politics exhibits both anarchic and hierarchic 
                                                 
11 Notable examples of the latter include Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in 
World  Politics’;  Lake,  ‘The  New  Sovereignty  in  International  Relations’;  Donnelly,  ‘Sovereign 
Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’; Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy Under 
Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State’, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 
edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 
240–77  and  Daniel  Deudney,  ‘Binding  Sovereigns:  Authorities,  Structures,  and  Geopolitics  in 
Philadelphian Systems’, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and 
Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 190-239. Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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political relationships.
12 For these scholars, hierarchy has always been an enduring 
feature  of  world  politics.  This  challenges  conventional  wisdom,  including  the 
English  School’s  assertion  that  international  society  is  solely  one  of  sovereign 
states.
13 The point of this section is to explore the concept of international hierarchy, 
with  a  particular  focus  on  the  definition  of  hierarchy  as  a  fundamentally  social 
relationship informed by norms and ideas as laid out by Hobson and Sharman.
14 
This  conceptualisation  of  hierarchy  as  a  social  relationship  suggests  that 
hierarchical relationships in and of themselves are not incompatible with the notion 
of an international society of sovereign states. One of the important points to be 
made in this section is that social relationships within international society need not 
conform to any particular mode or model (including the pluralist model of an ideal 
form  of  international  society).  The  norms  that  underpin  international  society’s 
constitution are dynamic and shift over time, meaning that social interactions and 
political  relationships  within  international  society  can  take  a  variety  of  forms, 
including hierarchy. This runs counter to both Bull’s and Dunne’s arguments that 
hierarchy and international society are incompatible.
15  
Hierarchy and inequality are nothing new within world politics. Substantive 
inequalities between states in terms of wealth, military power or political influence, 
for  example,  are  a  readily  noticeable  feature  of  international  society.
16  These 
substantive  inequalities  are  both  informally  reflected  in  the  distinction  between 
superpowers,  great  powers  and  small  powers;  and  formally  reflected  in  the 
                                                 
12 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 64; Lake, ‘The New 
Sovereignty in International Relations’, 303.  
13  See  Tim  Dunne,  ‘New  Thinking  on  International  Society’,  British  Journal  of  Politics  and 
International Relations 3, no. 2 (2001): 227; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13; Deudney, ‘Binding 
Sovereigns’, 190.  
14 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 64. 
15  See Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’; Bull, The Anarchical Society.  
16 Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977): 3.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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membership  of  the  UN  Security  Council,  for  example.
17  However,  under 
international  society’s  pluralist  constitution  states  are  for  the  most  part  formally 
equal and the substantive inequalities that exist do not generally provide the more 
powerful states with any direct authority over weaker states. Further, particularly in 
the period between decolonisation and the end of the Cold War, the construction of 
hierarchical relationships between states on the basis of societal values or political 
regimes was illegitimate and generally absent within international society.
18 States 
could  legitimately  adopt  a  range  of  values  and  political  regimes  without  being 
subject to a denial of their sovereign rights on the basis of these values or regimes.   
With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  inequalities  between  Western  and  non-
Western  states  have  widened,  particularly  in  terms  of  military  power,  economic 
wealth  and  political  influence.
19  However,  inequality  is  not  synonymous  with 
hierarchy and the mere fact of increased inequality between Western and many non-
Western  states  is  not  of  itself  indicative  of  new  forms  of  hierarchy  within 
international society. Rather, it has been the attempt by Western societies to claim 
the  authority  to  intervene  and  impose  liberal  values  in  particular  territories  that 
signifies the emergence of new hierarchical relationships between the West and these 
territories. Western societies have thus sought to limit the range of acceptable values 
and regimes that states can adopt and subject those states that do not conform to a 
qualification of their sovereign rights. This contravenes the pluralist vision of social 
order  between  states  and  signals  a  process  of  reconstitution  within  international 
society.  
                                                 
17 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 142. 
18 Ibid., 151.  
19 This was certainly true during the early years of the post-Cold War period, although more recently 
the economic resurgence of Russia and the growth of China and India signal a gradual shrinking of 
economic and military inequalities between these countries and Western powers.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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While  inequality  is  an  intrinsic  element  of  any  hierarchical  political 
relationship,  hierarchy  is  not  simply  reducible  to  different  forms  of  inequality 
between different states. Rather, as several scholars have argued, at its core hierarchy 
denotes  an  authority  relationship.
20  For  example,  in  their  definition  of  hierarchy, 
Hobson  and  Sharman  start  with  the  concept  of  authority.  For  them,  hierarchical 
relationships  are  fundamentally  authoritative,  as  opposed  to  purely  coercive,
21 
entailing a social relationship between the superordinate and subordinate parties that 
both recognise as legitimate.
22 As they suggest ‘Hierarchical authority means exactly 
the opposite — that some are entitled to command and some are required to obey, 
and  that  both  sides  recognize  as  legitimate  the  social  logic  of  this  unequal 
situation’.
23 Hence Hobson and Sharman define hierarchy ‘as a relationship between 
two (or more) actors whereby one is entitled to command and the other is obligated 
to obey, and this relationship is recognized as right and legitimate by each’.
24 
This  notion  of  hierarchy  as  an  authority  relationship  is  relatively 
uncontroversial and draws upon the generally accepted definition of hierarchy within 
the discipline. For instance, Kenneth Waltz defines hierarchy as ‘relations of super- 
and  subordination’  in  which  ‘actors  are  formally  differentiated  according  to  the 
degrees  of  their  authority,  and  their  distinct  functions  are  specified’.
25 Lake  also 
focuses on hierarchy as a form of authority relation, arguing that external restrictions 
                                                 
20 See Evelyn Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order’, 
International  Relations  of  the  Asia-Pacific  8,  no.  3  (2008):  353-77;  Hobson  and  Sharman,  ‘The 
Enduring  Place  of  Hierarchy  in  World  Politics’,  Lake,  ‘The  New  Sovereignty  in  International 
Relations’ and David A. Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World 
Politics’, International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 47-79.  
21 This distinction between coercion or control and authority is one that has previously been made by 
Lake,  who  argues  that  coercive  commands  are  not  authoritative,  as  authority  relationships  must 
contain some measure of legitimacy. See Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 
304. 
22 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68.  
23 Ibid., 69.  
24 Ibid., 69-70. 
25 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979): 81.   Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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on states constitute hierarchical authority relationships when one state can compel 
another  to  behave  in  a  particular  manner  and  the  subordinate  state  voluntarily 
complies.
26 Lake, like Hobson and Sharman, argues that external restrictions on a 
state’s actions that rest entirely on coercion are not authoritative and presumably do 
not denote a truly hierarchical political relationship. Political relationships that are 
based entirely on the coercion of one state by another are thus something other than 
hierarchy  –  they  involve  outright  domination.  Hence,  in  keeping  the  subordinate 
party  subordinated,  the  superordinate  party  must  rely  not  only  on  the  real  or 
perceived threat of coercion, but also on the perceived legitimacy of their authority 
by both parties in the hierarchical relationship.  
We must be careful, however, not to discount the role of coercion, which 
partially  underpins  any  form  of  hierarchical  relationship.  While  coercion  and 
material capacity might not be the only or even the most important factors in a 
hierarchical  relationship,  hierarchies  cannot  function  in  the  absence  of  the 
superordinate state’s demonstrated or perceived capacity to punish non-compliance 
on the part of the subordinate state.
27 As Lake argues, authority and coercion are 
intimately tied together and while a hierarchical authority relationship entails the 
obligation to obey on the part of the subordinate party, this obligation creates only an 
expectation  of  obedience.
28  Subordinates  can  flout  the  rules  and  commands  of 
superordinates while still recognising the legitimate right of the superordinate party 
to issue and enforce commands.
29 A perceived or demonstrated capacity for coercion 
                                                 
26 Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 311. 
27 Such a ‘coercive’ capacity need not rely only on military force; it could well include other forms of 
sanction such as the conditionalities included in the EU’s agreements with European Neighbourhood 
Policy partner states. See chapter five for more details. It is also important to note here that the 
capacity for coercion is not simply reducible to the material capacity of the superordinate state, but 
can also include the idea or perception on the part of the subordinate state that non-compliance will 
result in sanction.     
28 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, 52.  
29 Ibid.   Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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and enforcement is therefore necessary to keep the subordinate party in line and is an 
important element of a hierarchical relationship.   
However,  while  the  coercive  capacity  of  the  superordinate  party  is  an 
important  component  of  hierarchy,  Hobson  and  Sharman,  Lake  and  Goh  are  all 
persuasive in arguing that hierarchy is not simply reducible to coercion or control.
30 
Social, rather than purely material, factors are crucial to hierarchy formation and 
reproduction.  Indeed,  the  definition  of  hierarchy  as  an  authority  relationship 
recognised  as  legitimate  by  each  party  draws  attention  to  the  social  aspects  of 
hierarchical  political  relationships.  As  Clark  argues,  hierarchy  is  ‘a  social 
arrangement characterised by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders 
of power and glory and the society is classified in successively subordinate grades’.
31 
At its core, hierarchy is a social relationship, one in which the authority to command 
and the obligation to obey is constructed by the ideas and norms that underpin the 
hierarchical  relationship.  As  Goh  argues  ‘hierarchical  social  compacts  cannot  be 
understood without analysis of the collective norms and beliefs that underpin the 
legitimacy of such relations’.
32  
These ideas and norms are what Hobson and Sharman refer to as ‘social 
logics’:  social  ordering  principles  that  shape  hierarchy  formation,  fall  and 
reproduction.
33 These norms shape and construct the identity of the parties involved 
in  the  hierarchical  relationship,  particularly  the  identity  of  states  as  either 
superordinate  or  subordinate  parties.  The  idea  of  European  colonialism  as  a 
‘civilising mission’, for example, underpinned the perceived legitimacy of Europe’s 
                                                 
30 See Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’; Lake, ‘The New 
Sovereignty  in  International  Relations’;  Lake,  ‘Escape  From  the  State  of  Nature’;  and  Goh, 
‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order’. 
31 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989): 2.   
32 Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order’, 357.  
33 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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hierarchical  relationship  with  the  colonies  and  protectorates,  simultaneously 
constructing the Europeans as ‘civilisers’ and the various colonies as ‘uncivilised’ or 
‘barbaric’.
34 However, Hobson and Sharman focus on assessing the extent to which 
the traditional image of an international society comprised solely of sovereign states 
is accurate. In contrast, the focus here is on examining hierarchies between sovereign 
states and outlining the constitutive role of a particular liberal conception of political 
community  between  states  which  provides  a  particular  social  logic  that  partly 
underpins these hierarchical relations.
35 As will be discussed below, this differs from 
Hobson and Sharman’s argument that sovereignty and hierarchy are dichotomous 
concepts.
36    
Importantly, however, the upshot of the definition of hierarchy as a social 
relationship underpinned by social logics is that hierarchical social relationships are 
possible within international society. As noted in the previous chapter, international 
society is underpinned by certain constitutive norms that inform its membership and 
order social interactions between states. These norms are not fixed or given, meaning 
that social interaction within international society need not continuously conform to 
one particular vision of political community between states. It is possible then to 
conceive  of  an  international  society  constituted  by  norms,  or  social  logics,  that 
provide  for  hierarchical  social  relationships  between  different  states.  This 
conceptualisation  of  hierarchy,  and  the  argument  that  as  a  social  relationship 
supported by norms we can conceive of hierarchy within international society, are at 
                                                 
34 Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, 4-5.  
35 While these ideas of liberal superiority are important, they do not fully explain why Western states 
have  sought  to  construct  new  relations  of  hierarchy  within  international  society.  The  idea  that 
liberalism is a superior ideology that is conducive to peace and security certainly informs the choice 
of Western societies to promote liberal values when they intervene in non-Western states, and it also 
informs  the  identity-formation  of  states  as  either  super-  or  subordinate  parties.  What  it  does  not 
adequately explain is why they choose to intervene in the first place.  
36 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 70.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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odds with mainstream International Relations theory and indeed much of the English 
School.  
Of note here is the notion of the ‘anarchical society’, one that Bull argued is 
incompatible  with  hierarchical  relations  between  states.  As  Bull  argues, 
‘International society is based on the rejection of a hierarchical ordering of states in 
favour of equality in the sense of the like application of basic rights and duties to like 
entities’.
37  Therefore,  the  existence  of  hierarchical  relationships  between  states 
would be contrary to the rules and principles of international society. The idea that 
there can be no, or little, society where there is hierarchy is also one adopted by 
Dunne. In his article on society and hierarchy, Dunne questions the extent to which 
international  society  is  compatible  with  hierarchy.  He  suggests  that  US 
interventionism, in particular the 2003 invasion of Iraq, represents new forms of 
hierarchy  within  international  society.
38  US  behaviour  towards  Iraq  endangers 
international society in the sense that the US, the world’s dominant power, is now 
acting with little regard to the norms and rules that constitute international society.
39 
Dunne notes that ‘we see that hierarchy represents a threat to international society 
and a source of ongoing tension’.
40 
The  idea  that  an  international  society  of  sovereign  states  can  exhibit 
hierarchical  political  relationships  is  also  at  odds  with  mainstream  international 
relations discourse and even those scholars, such as Hobson and Sharman, who have 
sought to challenge the conventional image of an international system or society 
comprised solely of sovereign states. According to this view, hierarchical political 
authority exists only within states; relations between states are characterised by the 
                                                 
37 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 228.  
38 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’. 
39 Ibid., 304. 
40 Ibid., 316. Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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absence of such authority.
41 This view is borne out of the tendency to conceptualise 
sovereignty as an indivisible or absolute form of authority in that states either enjoy 
supreme authority over a given territory and population or they do not.
42 Since all 
states are sovereign, none answer to any higher authority. This of course is why 
international society is defined as anarchical – if all states enjoy absolute authority 
and equal rights then there can be no overarching or centralised authority above 
them.  
This means not only that international society is anarchical in the sense of a 
lack of centralised rule or government, but also in the sense that states are sovereign 
equals,  all  equally  enjoying  absolute  authority  and  the  rights  of  constitutional 
independence  and  non-intervention.
43  This  implies  that  sovereignty,  anarchy  and 
hierarchy are incompatible. If two states engage in a hierarchical relationship, then 
the relationship ceases to be anarchical because the subordinate state ceases to enjoy 
absolute or indivisible authority over its territory and equal sovereign rights with the 
superordinate  state.
44  Thus,  if  we  define  sovereignty  as  an  indivisible  form  of 
authority over a given territory and population that is recognised and legitimated by 
other states within international society, then the emergence of hierarchical social 
relationships entails the retreat or diminishment of an anarchical international society 
comprised of sovereign states. In other words, the society of states cannot prevail 
where hierarchy exists.  
                                                 
41 Deudney, ‘Binding Sovereigns’, 190.  
42 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, 57. The classic conception of sovereignty as an indivisible 
or  absolute  form  of  authority  is  that  outlined  by  Bodin.  See  Jean  Bodin,  On  Sovereignty:  Four 
Chapters  From  the  Six  Books  of  the  Commonwealth,  edited  by  Julian  H.  Franklin  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).   
43 Eckert, ‘Peoples and Persons’, 841.  
44 Kenneth Waltz likewise argues that hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible concepts. See Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics, 114-16.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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In order to highlight that hierarchy is not incompatible with the idea of an 
international society of sovereign states and that even subordinated states retain their 
identity as a sovereign entity, the remainder of this section will, for the sake of 
clarity, outline three crucial points made above and address them in order. These 
points  include  the  endangered  existence  of  international  society  in  light  of 
hierarchical relationships between states, the definition of sovereignty as a form of 
indivisible authority and the supposed incompatibility of sovereignty, anarchy and 
hierarchy.  Firstly,  this  chapter  does  not  seek  to  challenge  the  argument  that 
international society is a society of sovereign states, although the impact of non-state 
actors and processes on international politics and on international society itself must 
not  be  overlooked.
45  For  the  most  part,  however,  these  non-state  actors  are  not 
recognised as members of international society.  
Further, Bull’s and Dunne’s claims that modern international society is based 
on  the  rejection  of  hierarchy  are  quite  true.  Contemporary  pluralist  international 
society fundamentally rejects any ranking or ordering of states, particularly on the 
basis of their internal socio-political institutions. But this only obtains in a pluralist 
international society. To suggest that hierarchy and international society itself are 
completely incompatible overlooks the extent to which international society, as a 
construct  of  norms  and  rules  which  constitute  state  identity  (through  the  criteria 
established  for  rightful  membership  and  legitimate  statehood)  and  order  social 
interactions between states, is historically contingent and subject to reconstitution 
over time. Again, the problem here is that Bull and Dunne identify international 
                                                 
45 As Dunne argues, the rules and institutions of international society existed before states and will 
likely  continue  to  exist  should  states  disappear.  This  draws  attention  to  the  extent  to  which 
international  society  is  influenced  and  at  least  partly  shaped  by  non-state  actors.  One  of  the 
implications of the argument of this thesis is precisely that non-state actors and processes, such as 
globalisation,  can  greatly  influence  and  affect  the  norms,  rules  and  institutions  of  international 
society. See Dunne, ‘New Thinking on International Society’, 227; Clark, International Legitimacy 
and World Society.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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society in constitutionally static terms. Hierarchy might well be incompatible with a 
pluralist form of international society, which is the focus of both of their works, but 
they do not show why hierarchy must necessarily mean the retreat of international 
society altogether.  
There  is  no  reason  why  international  society’s  constitutive  norms, 
particularly in terms of the criteria they outline for rightful membership and rightful 
state conduct, cannot give rise to hierarchical relations between states. As is argued 
in this thesis, contemporary hierarchical relationships signify an ongoing process of 
reconstitution  within  international  society  and  contravene  the  pluralist  vision  of 
political  community  amongst  states  which  has  underpinned  its  constitution  since 
decolonisation. But this does not entail the end of international society, nor does it 
mean that those states that do become the subordinate parties in new relations of 
hierarchy  with  Western  societies  cease  to  be  sovereign  states.  By  arguing  that 
contemporary hierarchy is incompatible with, or signifies the end of, international 
society, Bull and Dunne overlook its constitutionally dynamic nature.  
Secondly, the constitutionally dynamic nature of international society means 
that understandings of what constitutes a sovereign state and what rights sovereign 
status entails are also historically contingent and subject to change as notions of 
rightful membership and legitimate statehood shift over time. As noted, sovereignty 
is traditionally defined as an indivisible form of authority over a given territory and 
population  which  is  recognised  by  other  states  within  international  society.
46  As 
Hobson and Sharman note  
                                                 
46 For example, see Oyvind Osterud, ‘Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World 
Order  Dilemma’,  in  Subduing  Sovereignty:  Sovereignty  and  the  Right  to  Intervene,  edited  by 
Marianne Heiberg (London: Pinter, 1994): 18-32. International legal theorists have generally defined 
sovereignty as denoting independence – freedom from intervention and external interference. This 
implies exclusive authority over a territory and would also appear to be incompatible with hierarchical 
relationships between states. See Suganami, ‘Grotius and International Equality’, 231 and Anthony Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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We thus adopt a standard and hence uncontroversial definition of sovereignty, 
including  an  internal  aspect  where  a  government  is  the  supreme  or  exclusive 
authority  within  specified  borders,  and  an  external  aspect  under  which  this 
authority is recognized as such by other juridically equal entities.
47  
If sovereignty is conceptualised in these terms, by definition a state cannot be a 
subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship with another state. To do so, a state 
would  have  to  cede  at  least  some  of  its  authority  to  the  superordinate  state  and 
therefore would also cede its sovereignty.  
Two points are of note here. Firstly, as argued in the previous chapter, and as 
Hobson and Sharman note, the status of a political community as a sovereign state 
does not depend simply on its authority over a given territory. Rather, it is a product 
of social practices of recognition, shaped by prevailing ideas of what constitutes 
legitimate statehood and what criteria states must meet in order to obtain sovereign 
status. This suggests that sovereignty is a malleable concept, shifting in response to 
changing ideas and norms.
48 The mere fact of supreme authority over a territory, 
therefore, does not necessarily mean that a political community is guaranteed as 
being recognised as sovereign. Likewise, it is not self-evident that a state that is 
subject to the authority of another in a hierarchical relationship automatically loses 
its identity as a sovereign state. Even states that have no internal authority at all, of 
which Somalia is the prime example, can continue to be recognised as a sovereign 
                                                                                                                                          
Carty, ‘Sovereignty in International Law: A Concept of Eternal Return’, in Reclaiming Sovereignty, 
edited by Laura Brace and John Hoffman (London: Pinter, 1997): 101.  
47 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 65. The authors also 
note that ‘Under sovereignty, political authority...is bundled together in a unitary and absolute fashion 
rather than shared out’ (p. 72). Also see Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics’.   
48  Wouter  G.  Werner,  ‘State  Sovereignty  and  International  Legal  Discourse’,  in Governance  and 
International  Legal  Theory,  edited  by  Ige  F.  Dekker  and  Wouter  G.  Werner  (Boston:  Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004): 134; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ‘The Social Construction of 
State Sovereignty’, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and 
Cynthia  Weber  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996):  1-21;  Samuel  M.  Makinda, 
‘Sovereignty and Global Security’, Security Dialogue 29, no. 3 (1998): 282-3.  Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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entity despite the lack of exclusive (or any) authority over a given territory and 
population.
49 
 Both Donnelly and Simpson draw attention to what they term ‘sovereign 
inequalities’ within international society: unequal statuses between states which in 
some  instances  provide  ‘higher  ranked’  states  with  greater  authority  over  ‘lower 
ranked’  states,  which  nevertheless  retain  their  sovereign  status.
50  Secondly,  as 
Hobson and Sharman suggest, sovereignty denotes an internal authority relationship, 
which is very similar to their definition of hierarchy as a form of social authority 
relationship.
51 If sovereignty is defined as denoting an authority relationship then it 
becomes  unclear  as  to  why  sovereign  authority  must  necessarily  be  exclusive  or 
indivisible.  As  Lake  argues,  one  of  the  general  characteristics  of  authoritative 
relationships  is  that  authority  is  rarely,  if  ever,  absolute.
52  Sovereign  authority 
therefore can be conceptualised as partial or divisible, which has been recognised 
within  the  discipline  of  International  Relations  and  international  law.
53  As 
Oppenheim argues, ‘as there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-
independent  States  in  existence,  it  may  well  be  maintained  that  sovereignty  is 
divisible’.
54  
More recently, Brownlie has suggested that ‘Sovereignty is divisible both as 
a matter of principle and as a matter of experience’.
55 Sovereignty therefore need not 
be defined in terms of absolute or indivisible authority. This means that it is possible 
                                                 
49 As Robert Jackson contends, post-colonial international society’s ‘negative sovereignty’ regime 
provides for the recognition of a state’s sovereignty without regard to that state’s authority over its 
territory or population. See Jackson, Quasi States, 1.  
50 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 144-52; Simpson, Great Powers and 
Outlaw States.  
51 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 65. 
52 Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 305. 
53 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 145.  
54 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (3
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to conceive of gradations of sovereignty based upon the level of authority over its 
internal  affairs  that  a  state  or  a  political  community  claiming  sovereign  status 
enjoys.
56  This  means  that  a  state  can  be  a  subordinate  party  in  a  hierarchical 
relationship  but  still  be  recognisable  as  a  sovereign  state,  albeit  one  of  ‘lesser 
standing’. Thus, we can conceive of an international society of sovereign states in 
which some states retain their identity as a sovereign entity, but are subject to a 
qualified form of membership and important limitations on their sovereign rights. 
This is precisely what has occurred in the post-Cold War era, with certain states 
becoming the subordinate parties in new relationships of hierarchy with Western 
countries.  
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, these subordinated states do 
not cease to be recognised as sovereign entities, nor is their independence completely 
forfeited or subsumed under Western domination and control. Western interveners 
have  been  at  pains  to  describe  their  interventions  as  ‘partnerships’,  reaffirm  the 
sovereignty  of  their  ‘partners’  and  have  generally  sought  quick  progress  in  their 
attempts to effect liberal reform. Even in the case of Iraq, the US was quick to ‘hand 
back’ sovereignty and reaffirm Iraq’s constitutional independence. In summary, the 
identity  of  a  state  as  sovereign  does  not  necessarily  depend  on  its  exclusive  or 
indivisible  authority  over  a  given  territory  or  population.  Prevailing  notions  of 
rightful membership within international society and social practices of recognition 
between states shape what constitutes a sovereign state. 
Finally, if a form of ‘sovereignty under hierarchy’ can be conceived of, then 
so too can a form of ‘hierarchy under anarchy’. As Donnelly argues, part of the 
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conceptual confusion when it comes to anarchy, hierarchy and sovereignty within 
world  politics  is  that  anarchy  is  equated  with  sovereign  equality  and  defined  in 
opposition to hierarchy.
57 But as Goh and Donnelly argue, anarchical orders need not 
involve equality between states.
58 An anarchical order can exist, in the sense of the 
absence  of  centralised  authority  or  government,  but  still  contain  substantive 
inequalities and hierarchies. Further, as Lake argues, just because the international 
system  is  anarchic,  in  terms  of  the  lack  of  overarching  authority,  it  does  not 
automatically follow that all interstate relationships within that system are anarchic 
as  well.
59  The  problem  here  is  that  hierarchy  and  anarchy  are  established  as 
dichotomous  concepts,  especially  in  the  neo-realist  literature.  Even  Hobson  and 
Sharman  note  that  ‘Hierarchy  is  distinct  from  an  anarchical  system  of  sovereign 
states in which no state is either entitled to command or obligated to obey’.
60 
However, Donnelly argues that this dichotomy between international anarchy 
and hierarchy is flawed. As he contends, anarchy is actually opposed to ‘archy’: 
centralised rule or government.
61 Hierarchy refers not to rule or government, but 
superordination  and  differentiation.
62  A  domestic  example  illustrates  this  point: 
police officers exist in a hierarchical relationship with ‘ordinary’ citizens. They have 
the legitimate authority to issue commands which citizens are obliged to follow. 
However, they do not rule or govern and their authority cannot be equated with that 
of  a  centralised  government.  Within  contemporary  international  society 
superordinate states (like police officers) claim the authority to issue commands to 
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subordinates, but this authority does not mitigate international anarchy because it 
does  not  constitute  a  form  of  centralised  authority  or  rule.
63  Even  Waltz 
acknowledges in Theory of International Politics that all societies are mixed and that 
international  society  can  exhibit  both  hierarchical  and  anarchical  ordering 
principles.
64 Thus, an international society characterised by hierarchical relationships 
between  different  states  is  still  anarchical  because  there  is  still  no  overarching 
authority that resides over all states.  
To  summarise,  hierarchy  is  a  social  authority  relationship,  recognised  as 
legitimate  by  both  the  superordinate  and  subordinate  parties  and  predicated  on 
certain  norms  and  principles  that  facilitate  the  creation,  reproduction  and  fall  of 
hierarchies. This definition of hierarchy is not incompatible with the concept of an 
anarchical society of sovereign states for four main reasons. Firstly, the identity of a 
state as a sovereign entity is predicated on social practices of recognition, meaning 
that what constitutes sovereignty or a sovereign state shifts over time. Secondly, the 
notion that sovereignty entails indivisible or absolute authority is incorrect. Thirdly, 
hierarchy and anarchy are not mutually exclusive concepts. Finally, the argument 
that hierarchical relationships entail the retreat or contraction of international society 
is based on a specifically pluralist vision of international society, one which ignores 
its constitutionally dynamic nature. 
This  pluralist  constitution  is  currently  being  challenged  by  new  forms  of 
hierarchy within international society that are underpinned by social logics partly 
defined by a particular strand of liberalism. The next section of this chapter examines 
the social logics or norms associated with this strand of liberalism, arguing that it 
provides a vision of political community between states characterised by hierarchy 
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and inequality between liberal democracies and illiberal or undemocratic states. As 
will  be  shown  via  a  survey  of  several  literatures  advocating  particular  liberal 
theories,  beginning  with  the  idea  that  liberalism  is  fundamentally  distinct  and 
superior  to  other  ideologies,  this  hierarchical  strand  of  liberalism  advocates  the 
subordination of illiberal states under the authority of Western societies. Depending 
on the scholar, the West gains special governance rights within international society 
or even the right to intervene in non-Western states to impose liberal values while 
the subordinated states are subject to a qualification of their sovereign rights. 
 
Liberal Hierarchy in International Society  
As noted, pluralist international society can be described as liberal in the 
sense that it provides states with the ‘liberal’ rights of formal equality and non-
intervention. However, liberalism is a broad ideological church, and several scholars 
have pointed to the divisions and tensions between different forms of liberalism, 
both  domestically  within  societies  and  internationally  between  societies.  For 
example, Simpson has identified pluralist and anti-pluralist versions of liberalism 
within  international  society,  each  providing  a  competing  image  of  international 
order.
65 Sorensen has likewise identified a ‘Liberalism of Restraint’ broadly based 
upon Berlin’s notion of negative liberty; and a ‘Liberalism of Imposition’ based 
upon positive conceptions of liberty.
66 The point is that both Simpson and Sorensen 
have highlighted competing liberal conceptions of international order, one broadly 
pluralist and the other hierarchical and anti-pluralist. 
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Indeed,  this  hierarchical  version  of  international  liberalism  is  well 
demonstrated within academia. Several liberal international theories have been put 
forward  advocating  a  form  of  anti-pluralist  liberalism  involving  distinctions  and 
hierarchical relationships between liberal and illiberal states. Taken together, these 
theories  provide  an  ideational  framework,  or  social  logic,  that  legitimates  the 
establishment of ‘liberal hierarchies’ within international society. The purpose of this 
section is to investigate the ideas that underpin this hierarchical form of international 
liberalism.  As  will  be  demonstrated,  these  liberal  theories  are  fundamentally 
hierarchical and anti-pluralist in that they seek to limit the range of acceptable values 
and regimes that states may adopt. They also seek to construct formally unequal 
relations between states on their basis of their domestic socio-political institutions. 
As Gray argues, ‘when liberals set up one regime as a standard of legitimacy for all 
the rest, pluralists and liberals part company’.
67 Importantly, as is argued in chapter 
four of this thesis, these ideas are crucial to understanding the Western perception 
that the promotion of liberal values is the key to managing risk within international 
society  and  hence  are  crucial  to  understanding  the  emergence  of  contemporary 
hierarchies.    
The  arguments  and  ideas  put  forth  by  scholars  subscribing  to  these 
‘hierarchical liberal views’ are well summarised by Reus-Smit, who suggests that  
Informed  by  a  mixture  of  Kantian  liberalism  and  democratic  peace  theory, 
cosmopolitan  sensibilities  and  activism,  neoliberal  institutionalism  and  new 
liberal legal theory…these scholars question the equalitarian regime’s version of 
international  liberalism,  advancing  a  markedly  different  formulation.  They 
advocate the formal rehierarchisation of international society, whereby democratic 
states  would  gain  special  governance  rights  –  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
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legitimate use of force – and other states would have their categorical rights to 
self-determination and non-intervention qualified.
68 
There are several ideas that are common to these different liberal theories, including 
their belief in the superiority of liberalism, for various reasons; the idea that the 
domestic regime of a state is determinative of its international behaviour; and the 
advocation  of  the  establishment  of  hierarchical  relationships  between  liberal  and 
non-liberal states. This is particularly reflected in the arguments of some scholars 
that  liberal  states  should  enjoy  special  authority  and  rights  within  international 
society that are not afforded to non-liberal states.  
Firstly it needs to be understood why liberalism is viewed by some as the 
‘best’ basis for ordering social and political relationships within societies. As Jahn 
has suggested, ‘The political systems of the established democracies are taken to 
display a ‘clear moral and practical superiority’, thus, occupying the highest level of 
development and providing the model all other states are expected to follow’.
69 The 
question here then is what makes liberalism so ‘special’? The general theme in many 
of the works surveyed below is that liberal states possess certain distinctive (and 
desirable) attributes that other states do not. A good example is Francis Fukuyama’s 
thesis on the ‘end of history’. This thesis suggests that with the end of the Cold War 
and the defeat of communism at the hands of liberalism/capitalism, the world had 
reached  the  end  of  history:  the  end  of  human  ideological  evolution  and  the 
establishment of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
70 
For Fukuyama, ‘while earlier forms of government were characterised by 
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grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy 
was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions’.
71 It is this lack of 
internal contradictions, coupled with liberalism’s recent victory against communism, 
which  forms  the  basis  of  Fukuyama’s  argument  that  liberalism  and  democracy 
represent  the  end-point  of  our  ideological  evolution.  For  Fukuyama,  liberal 
democracies are inherently peaceful and are the only form of government that can 
satisfy  the  fundamental  condition  of  humanity:  the  struggle  for  recognition.
72 
Because of liberal democracy’s ‘perfection’, ‘there would be no further progress in 
the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really 
big questions had been settled’.
73  
However, until liberalism has been universalised, Fukuyama suggests that 
international society will be divided into two realms: a post-historical, peaceful and 
liberal zone, and an autocratic zone ‘mired in history’.
74 Traditional power politics 
and  conflict  would  continue  to  characterise  the  zone  of  history,  and  relations 
between the post-historical and historical zones would be characterised by mutual 
distrust  and  conflict.  By  depicting  liberal  democracies  as  ‘post-historical’  and 
autocracies  as  ‘historical’,  Fukuyama  not  only  establishes  a  strong  dichotomy 
between liberal and non-liberal, but he also establishes a hierarchical relationship 
between the two in terms of their relative ‘historical development’. This is reflected 
in  Fukuyama’s  suggestions  regarding  a  ‘Liberal  League  of  Nations’  within 
international society that will be discussed further below. 
The democratic peace literature also depicts liberalism as an ideology with 
particular  attributes  that  make  it  the  preferred  form  of  political  and  social 
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organisation  within  states.  This  is  largely  implicit  in  the  argument  that  liberal 
governance and democratic political institutions within states enhance international 
peace and security. As the title of the theory suggests, liberal democracies do not use 
force against one another. For example, Michael Doyle, one of the early democratic 
peace  theorists,  suggests  that  ‘as  their  (liberal  democracies)  number  increases,  it 
announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest’.
75 
Indeed, in a later work, Doyle suggests that the liberal zone of peace should be 
extended, albeit only defensively.
76 Russett’s arguments are also illuminating here: 
‘If history is imagined to be the history of wars and conquest, then a democratic 
world order might in that sense represent the ‘end of history’’.
77 
Several reasons are provided in the literature for this pacifism on the part of 
liberal states. Firstly, because political leaders in liberal democracies rule through the 
consent  of  the  governed,  they  must  build  public  support  for  aggressive  foreign 
policies or acts of war. Since it is the citizenry that will bear the brunt of any war or 
military  action,  they  will  presumably  be  reluctant  to  provide  support  for  such 
endeavours.
78 Secondly, it has been suggested that free trade between liberal states 
and the resultant spread of transnational linkages between these states will compel 
them  to  resolve  their  differences  peacefully  in  order  to  maintain  the  economic 
benefits that accrue from trading.
79 In other words, economic interdependence breeds 
peace.  Thirdly,  liberal  democracies  have  arguably  externalised  their  domestic 
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democratic  decision-making  processes  that  permit  the  peaceful  resolution  of 
conflicts.
80 Finally, liberal democracies are described as strong supporters of human 
rights  which  they  ascribe  universally  to  others.
81  Liberal  democracies  seek  their 
citizens’ true interests and are tolerant and committed to individual freedom.
82  
However, when it comes to autocratic states, the democratic peace literature 
paints a very different picture. In autocratic states, decision-makers frequently resort 
to oppression and violence to maintain political rule. Autocratic states do not rest on 
the consent of the governed and do not respect the rights of their citizens. Thus we 
cannot expect them to act any better towards other peoples.
83 As Russett states:  
In non-democracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their opponents to use, 
violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic 
political processes…Therefore non-democracies may use violence and the threat 
of violence in conflicts with other states and other states may expect them to use 
violence and the threat of violence in such conflicts.
84     
Again, the theme here is that liberal states possess certain qualities and attributes that 
distinguish them from other forms of state. 
The  democratic  peace  literature’s  claims  regarding  the  inherently  pacific 
nature of liberal democracies, including the reasons provided for this pacifism, are 
inspired by and based in part upon Kant’s essay Toward Perpetual Peace.
85 In his 
essay, Kant outlined the necessary conditions for the creation of his ‘Pacific Union’ 
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and  the  resultant  peace  among  states  belonging  to  this  Union.  One  of  the  main 
conditions for the creation of such a Union was that its members have a republican 
constitution, taken by most contemporary scholars to be synonymous with a liberal 
democracy.
86  Kant  argued  that  a  republican  constitution  would  prevent  a  state’s 
recourse to war because 
When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether 
there shall be war or not (and it cannot be otherwise in this constitution), nothing 
is more natural than that they would be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, 
since they would have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardships of 
war…
87 
On the other hand, in an autocracy, ‘[deciding upon war] is the easiest thing 
in  the  world…’
88  The  belief  that  liberal  states  are  inherently  peaceful  in  their 
relations distinguishes liberal democracies from other types of regime, which are 
presumably more aggressive and war-prone. The democratic peace literature thus 
establishes a strong dichotomy between the pacific liberal democracies and the more 
aggressive illiberal, non-democratic states. Indeed, as Macmillan argues, one of the 
more notable features of the democratic peace literature is the ‘almost Manichean’ 
division between liberal democracies and autocracies, and the stridently negative 
light in which autocracies tend to be portrayed.
89 Indeed, much of the democratic 
peace  literature  ‘tends  to  emphasise  the  differences  and,  indeed,  the  opposition 
between liberal and non-liberal states’.
90 Such a division is clearly made by Russett: 
‘Thus an international system composed of both democratic and authoritarian states 
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will include both zones of peace (actual and expected, among the democracies) and 
zones of war or at best deterrence between democratic and authoritarian states’.
91  
The division between the liberal zone of peace and the liberal-illiberal zone 
of war is based on the assumption that the relations between liberal states pose an 
alternative to the conflict and aggression of the non-liberal realm and the relations 
between liberal democracies and autocracies.
92 These arguments have been taken by 
many scholars to mean that a world of liberal states offers the best chance of world 
peace and international stability. Indeed, as will be shown in the fourth chapter, the 
democratic  peace  hypothesis  has  been  extremely  influential  with  Western 
policymakers, informing their adoption of a strategy of liberalisation in territories 
perceived  as  potentially  dangerous  as  a  means  of  managing  new  forms  of  de-
bounded security risks. 
The notion that liberal states possess distinctive qualities that separate them 
from other forms of state is closely linked to the idea that the internal constitution or 
regime  type  of  a  state  is  determinative  or  at  least  influences  its  international 
behaviour. Some scholars have also argued that the perception of a state as a liberal 
democracy or otherwise will determine that state’s relations with others. This line of 
reasoning is evident within the literature on the democratic peace thesis as a response 
to the fundamental question of, if democracies are peaceful in their relations with 
one  another,  then  why  is  this  so?  As  discussed  above,  liberal  ideology  and 
democratic institutions are taken to be the independent variables behind the pacific 
behaviour of liberal states towards one another. Hasenclever and Wagner suggest 
that ‘most liberals agree that domestic politics matter for inter-democratic affairs, 
and  that  relations  among  well-established  democracies  are  characterized  by 
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compromise,  intense  policy  coordination,  and  stable  expectations  for  peaceful 
change’.
93  
Similarly, some international lawyers, most notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
have attempted to develop a ‘liberal’ international legal theory that builds on the 
insights  of  Kant  and  the  democratic  peace  theorists.  Slaughter  subscribes  to  the 
assumption that liberal states are fundamentally different to other polities, resulting 
in their peaceful relations with one another.
94 Liberal states form a ‘zone of law’, one 
characterised by intense transnational linkages in which disputes are solved through 
judicial processes and the rule of law is respected. This is opposed to the ‘rougher’ 
‘zone of politics’ that characterises relations between liberal and non-liberal states.
95 
For Slaughter, traditional international law is insufficient, for like realism it treats 
states as ‘billiard balls’ and divorces a state’s domestic political constitution from its 
international status.
96 As she notes, ‘States cannot be generalised about as a unitary 
category of functionally identical actors. Their preferences and behaviour will differ 
wildly as a function of their domestic political arrangements’.
97 Liberal international 
theory,  however,  explicitly  focuses  on  the  internal  characteristics  of  a  state  as  a 
major determinant of its international behaviour. For Slaughter, this focus on the 
state’s internal constitution arguably captures greater facets of state behaviour within 
international society.
98  
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Other scholars have focused more on the perception of a state’s domestic 
political institutions in determining its foreign relations. For example, Owen argues 
that  ‘Liberalism  gives  rise  to  an  ideology  that  distinguishes  states  primarily 
according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a 
liberal  democracy  or  not’.
99  Once  states  accept  one  another  as  liberal,  they  will 
oppose any sort of war against each other because ‘Liberal democracies are believed 
reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, because they are governed by their citizens’ 
true  interests,  which  harmonise  with  all  individuals’  true  interests  around  the 
world’.
100 Thus, the perception of a state’s internal political constitution is important 
in determining that state’s relations with a liberal democracy. Any two states that 
perceive each other as liberal democracies will enjoy pacific relations. 
In contrast, if one of the states involved does not perceive the other to be a 
liberal  democracy  then  hostile  relations  may  ensue.  Similarly,  Risse-Kappen 
advances a social-constructivist take on the democratic peace. He starts with the 
perception  that,  on  the  basis  of  their  domestic  political  structures,  liberal 
democracies are peaceful and trustworthy and autocracies are potentially aggressive 
and  violent.
101  Therefore,  the  important  point  here  is  that  the  above  arguments 
suggest that either the internal political constitution of a state is determinative of that 
state’s  international  relations,  or  that  perceptions  regarding  the  internal  political 
constitution  of  a  state  will  determine  assumptions  concerning  its  international 
behaviour.  Regime  type  thus  becomes  the  determining  factor  in  international 
relations.  
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This is important because it underpins the idea that international peace and 
security  are  dependent  upon  the  ideological  character  of  state  regimes.  This 
legitimates the promotion of liberal values in the name of ‘international (or even 
national) peace and security’, potentially leading to the subordination of non-liberal 
states  that  are  subject  to  an  imposition  of  liberal  values  and  institutions  by  the 
Western liberal democracies. These two ideas, that liberal states embody distinctive 
and  desirable  attributes  that  make  liberalism  the  ‘best’  form  of  socio-political 
organisation, and that the domestic constitution of a state determines its international 
behaviour,  thus  form  an  important  part  of  the  social  logic  that  underpins 
contemporary  hierarchical  relations  within  international  society.  Indeed,  it  is 
precisely because of these ideas that some scholars have called for the establishment 
of formal hierarchies between liberal and non-liberal states. This is usually in the 
form  of  the  provision  of  special  governance  rights  to  liberal  states  whilst 
simultaneously limiting the sovereign rights of illiberal states, particularly in terms 
of their right to non-intervention.  
For  example,  Buchanan  and  Keohane  attempt  to  develop  a  cosmopolitan 
normative argument for the preventive use of force in humanitarian emergencies. 
Buchanan and Keohane are concerned not only to construct an argument justifying 
preventive uses of force to protect human rights, but also to develop an institutional 
framework that will hold those making the decisions to undertake or refrain from 
intervention  to  account.
102  The  authors  argue  that  in  situations  where  the  UN 
Security Council is not willing or able to authorise preventive humanitarian action, 
states should have recourse to a type of ‘House of Review’ – a democratic coalition 
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charged with issuing authoritative decisions on the use of force in these cases.
103 
Buchanan  and  Keohane  argue  that  only  those  states  that  have  sound  records  of 
respecting  human  rights  can  be  involved  in  institutional  processes  governing  the 
preventive use of force.
104  
Liberal states are uniquely placed to fulfill the role of ‘governors’ of these 
institutional  mechanisms,  not  only  because  they  protect  human  rights,  but  also 
because they are deemed to be, at least by Buchanan and Keohane, comparatively 
more morally reliable than autocracies.
105 While liberal democracies (like most other 
states) may violate cosmopolitan principles, when they do so they are more likely to 
be  held  to  account  by  their  citizens  and  are  forced  to  alter  their  behavior 
accordingly.
106  The  nub  of  this  argument  is  that  only  liberal  democracies  are 
deserving of ‘full’ rights and capable of discharging their full responsibilities when it 
comes  to  responsible  and  effective  international  governance.  This  point  is  also 
apparent in Fukuyama’s suggestions regarding the possible establishment of a type 
of ‘Liberal League of Nations’ responsible for international peace and security and 
constructed according to Kant’s precepts for a perpetual peace. 
For Fukuyama, and others who subscribe to the notion that liberal democracy 
represents a superior form of government, only liberal democratic states are capable 
of  providing  international  public  goods  such  as  collective  security  or  economic 
prosperity.  Fukuyama  believes  that  international  institutions  which  have  been 
established to maintain international peace and security and promote effective liberal 
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international governance, such as the UN, were flawed from the very beginning by 
allowing for a mixed membership of liberal and non-liberal states and sovereign 
equality  between  all  states.
107  Fukuyama  states  his  preference  for  a  liberal 
hierarchisation of international society and the provision of special governance rights 
for liberal democracies when he suggests that 
If one wanted to create a league of nations according to Kant’s own precepts…it is 
clear that it would have to look much more like NATO than the United Nations – 
that is, a league of truly free states brought together by their common commitment 
to  liberal  principles.  Such  a  league  should  be  much  more  capable  of  forceful 
action  to  protect  its  collective  security  from  threats  arising  from  the  non 
democratic part of the world.
108 
International governance thus becomes a bounded affair and the old ideal of a 
universal conference of states is discarded.
109 Instead, only those states with liberal 
political  institutions  enjoy  full  governance  rights  within  international  society. 
Buchanan  and  Keohane,  together  with  Fukuyama,  effectively  seek  to  establish 
hierarchical relationships between the liberal democracies that should have greater 
authority within international society, and the illiberal and undemocratic states that 
should be subject to this authority. Arguments advocating hierarchical relationships 
between liberal and non-liberal states have also come from an emerging literature 
within the field of international law on the possible materialisation of a norm of 
democratic governance within international society, one which would predicate full 
recognition of sovereignty on the internal attributes of political communities. 
Until  recently,  international  lawyers  had  relatively  little  to  say  about  the 
internal characteristics of the state, which was deemed to be a political, rather than 
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legal, affair. International law embodies many of the key rights and principles that 
are  associated  with  pluralist  international  society,  particularly  those  of  sovereign 
equality and non-intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, several legal scholars 
have argued that this has changed, and that international law no longer appears to be 
averse to considering the internal characteristics of states.
110 According to some legal 
scholars, a norm of democratic governance has come to be formulated, both as a 
human right and as a criterion for the recognition of states.
111 The main thrust of 
those  who  argue  that  a  right  to  democratic  governance  has  emerged  is  that  the 
recognition of a state under international law would depend not only on whether that 
state maintains control over a demarcated territory and population, but also whether 
it is has liberal political institutions or not.
112 
Democratic governance has come to be seen as something akin to a universal 
human right, and international law, according to this view, has an important role to 
play in enforcing this right.
113 As Franck contends, there is an emerging consensus 
among states as to the need for a liberal democratic government as a prerequisite for 
membership in the community of nations.
114 The legitimacy of a state depends on the 
prevailing normative standards of international society, which have arguably formed 
a  consensus  around  liberalism  and  democracy.
115  Supposedly,  we  are  moving 
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towards a situation in which international law will be used to measure the legitimacy 
of a state according to its adherence to liberal values. Crawford likewise suggests 
that since the end of the Cold War, liberalism and democracy have become dominant 
values  in  international  society.
116  Fox  also  argues  that  participatory  rights  have 
moved beyond mere theory and have become treaty-based obligations owed by one 
state  to  another.
117  The  identity  of  the  sovereign  has  become  a  matter  for 
international society to judge.
118  
For  Fox,  ‘Governments  which  obtain  power  in  violation  of  participatory 
rights  (i.e.  without  holding  proper  elections)  do  so  illegally.  Presumably,  such 
governments would themselves be considered illegal’.
119 The notion of a democratic 
entitlement  is  of  course  highly  contentious,  given  international  law’s  traditional 
doctrines of non-intervention and recognition on the basis only of effective control 
of a territory. However, what is important here is not so much whether there is 
indeed a recognised legal entitlement to democratic government, but the implications 
and consequences of such an entitlement itself. The most notable characteristic of the 
notion  of  a  democratic  or  liberal  entitlement  is  that  it  seeks  to  ensure  that  the 
supposed normative commitment to liberal political institutions within international 
society  is  codified  within  international  law.  Presumably,  those  states  that  do  not 
conform  to  these  requirements  forfeit  their  claim  to  other  legal  rights  such  as 
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sovereign  equality  or  non-intervention,  especially  considering  Fox’s  claim  that 
regimes that come to power without the consent of the citizenry would be considered 
to be illegal.  
This could allow liberal states to claim the authority to intervene to ensure 
that illiberal states ‘comply with the law’, thus potentially providing a legal basis for 
hierarchical relationships within international society. Different forms of government 
would cease to be equal under international law.
120 The upshot of this, as Kingsbury 
argues, is that  
Emerging liberal thinking about the international legal order argues increasingly 
that  it  is  possible  to  divide  the  world  into  zones,  with  a  liberal  zone  of  law, 
constituted by liberal states practising a higher degree of civilisation, to which 
other states will be admitted only when they meet the requisite standards…The 
theory of liberal and non-liberal zones proposes differential treatment where the 
boundaries  of  the  liberal  zone  are  crossed,  conferring  privileges  based  on 
membership in the liberal zone, and setting high barriers to entry.
121  
However,  perhaps  the  clearest  arguments  made  in  favour  of  establishing 
hierarchical  relationships  between  liberal  and  non-liberal  states  come  from  those 
scholars  who  argue  that  liberal  states  should  have  the  authority  to  intervene  in 
illiberal states to promote liberal values or protect human rights. Given that several 
literatures on liberalism within international society have advanced claims regarding 
the  ‘superior’  and  distinctive  attributes  of  liberal  democracies,  advocated  special 
governance  rights  for  liberal  states  and  sought  to  predicate  recognition  of 
sovereignty  on  the  existence  of  domestic  liberal  socio-political  institutions,  it  is 
unsurprising that some scholars have also advocated intervention against non-liberal 
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states. Since non-liberal states are deemed illegitimate, they are also deemed not to 
enjoy the rights of statehood normally afforded within international society. A good 
example  here  are  the  calls  for  a  ‘liberal  imperialism’  designed  to  facilitate  the 
transmission of liberalism and democracy. 
The calls for a new liberal imperialism revolve around the perceived need to 
address the problems of state failure and civil war in various regions of international 
society. The assumption here is that liberalisation (both political and economic) is 
the  solution  to  these  problems.  For  instance,  Rieff  suggests  a  return  to  the  old 
mandate  or  trusteeship  system,  arguing  for  the  establishment  of  ‘temporary 
trusteeships’ in order to build up state capacity in as short a time as possible so that 
the  ‘trust  territory’  can  take  care  of  its  own  affairs.
122  As  Rieff  himself 
acknowledges, his call for a liberal imperialism is tantamount to a re-colonisation of 
the non-Western portion of the world.
123 As he argues: ‘However controversial it 
may be to say this, our choice at the millennium seems to boil down to imperialism 
or barbarism’.
124 
Cooper likewise suggests that state failure and civil war present the West 
with a choice between empire and chaos.
125 Implicit here is the notion that liberalism 
and  democracy  represent  ‘civilisation’,  and  that  undemocratic,  illiberal  states  are 
‘barbaric’. The problems of failing states and ensuring the security of the West can 
be solved, according to this view, through intervention in illiberal, failed and outlaw 
states  in  order  to  extend  the  benefits  of  liberal  governance.  Roland  Paris  also 
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proposes arguments that favour the return of trusteeship in order to deal with the 
problems  that  have  beset  many  non-Western  states.  Paris  argues  for  ‘liberal 
colonisation’  as  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  post-conflict  peacebuilding.
126  He 
argues that the best way to achieve successful peacebuilding is through marketisation 
and  political  liberalisation,  adopting  the  democratic  peace  thesis  that  market 
democracies promote peace both domestically and internationally, and thus represent 
the apogee of political development.
127 
A  final  example  here  is  the  work  of  Fernando  Teson,  who  attempts  to 
construct a Kantian model of international law. Like other so-called ‘neo-Kantians’, 
Teson  argues  that  the  domestic  political  structures  of  a  state  determine  its 
international behaviour.
128 He suggests that sovereignty resides with the people and 
that respect for a state’s sovereignty is dependent upon its internal legitimacy, or in 
other  words  its  possession  of  liberal  democratic  political  institutions,  respect  for 
human rights, etc.
129 Such internal characteristics are pre-requisites for membership 
within international society.
130 Teson classifies a state as an outlaw when it either 
fails  to  respect  human  rights  or  has  an  undemocratically  elected  regime.  Such 
outlaws are not outside the law of nations, but they do not benefit from the rights 
inferred by full membership within international society.
131 Teson also advocates 
intervention  against  non-liberal  states  – t he  norm  of  non-intervention  only  holds 
                                                 
126  Roland  Paris,  At  War's  End:  Building  Peace  After  Civil  Conflict  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
127 Ibid., 40. 
128 Fernando Teson, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’, Columbia Law Review 92, no. 1 
(1992): 56.  
129 Ibid., 54. 
130 Ibid., 69. 
131 Ibid., 89. Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
 
100 
 
among  liberal  democratic  states  which  ‘deserve’  their  independence.
132  As  he 
contends ‘Sovereignty is to be respected only when it is justly exercised’.
133  
Therefore,  several  scholars  have  explicitly  called  for  the  establishment  of 
hierarchical authority relationships between liberal and non-liberal states, whether 
this involves special governance rights to oversee the preventive use of force in 
humanitarian  emergencies  or  the  authority  to  intervene  in  failing  states  to  effect 
liberal reform. Whatever the specific arguments made, all of these works seek to 
distinguish  between  liberal  and  non-liberal  states  and  subject  the  latter  to  the 
authority of liberal democracies. Importantly, this not only involves claiming special 
authority  for  the  liberal  states,  but  also  removing  or  limiting  the  rights  that  a 
sovereign state would normally enjoy within international society for any illiberal or 
undemocratic states. Not only would illiberal states have their rights to sovereign 
equality and non-intervention qualified but some, such as those advocating a legal 
‘democratic entitlement’, even seek to prevent or revoke the recognition of statehood 
of any political community that does not have liberal political institutions. 
Taken together, these different liberal international theories and the ideas that 
they contain are representative of a social logic partly underpinned by a particular 
vision  of  political  community  between  states  defined  by  an  anti-pluralist  and 
hierarchical  strand  of  liberalism.  It  provides  an  exclusionary  vision  of  political 
community  amongst  states  characterised  by  formalised  hierarchy  and  inequality 
between  different  societies  based  on  their  socio-political  institutions  and  regime 
type. This form of international liberalism is also fundamentally anti-pluralist and 
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monist in that it explicitly seeks to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes 
that states may legitimately adopt. It is precisely the ideas or social logic contained 
in  this  liberal  vision  of  international  society  that  partly  underpins  contemporary 
hierarchy within international society. As demonstrated, this particular liberal vision 
of international society is notably incompatible with a pluralist vision of political 
community between states. 
Unlike pluralists who reject any hierarchical ranking or ordering of different 
human values, the theories of international liberalism surveyed in this chapter seek to 
establish political and economic liberal values as universally applicable and right and 
true  for  peoples  everywhere.  These  theories  quite  clearly  repudiate  the  pluralist 
notion that humans are capable of devising a multitude of values and versions of the 
‘good life’ for themselves or that a good society is one in which the diversity of 
human values is maximised. While some pluralists have argued that liberal regimes 
are best suited for fulfilling the pluralist concern for maximising diversity within 
domestic societies, when applied to international society liberalism can also clearly 
give  rise  to  hierarchy  and  anti-pluralism.
134  These  liberal  theories  might  thus  be 
termed a form of ‘illiberal liberalism’, simultaneously advocating liberty, democracy 
and equality within the state at the same time as they advocate exclusion, inequality 
and subordinate status for any states that do not adhere to liberal values.
135  
While these liberal theories continually speak in terms of the right of all 
peoples  to  be  free  and  entitled  to  liberal  democratic  government,  such  freedom 
simply  means  the  ‘freedom’  to  adopt  the  ‘single  sustainable  model  for  national 
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success’: liberal democracy (and a capitalist free market).
136 The freedom to choose, 
which is an intrinsic element of the pluralist vision of society, is noticeably discarded 
in place of a requirement that all societies adopt liberal political institutions and 
forms of governance. As Gray notes  
It is a mark of an illiberal regime that conflicts of value are viewed as signs of 
error. Yet liberal regimes which claim that one set of liberties – their own – are 
universally  legitimate  adopt  precisely  that  view.  They  treat  conflicts  among 
liberties as symptoms of error, not dilemmas to which different solutions can be 
reasonable.
137  
Therefore, the ideas contained in these liberal international theories provide a 
vision  of  international  society  fundamentally  opposed  to  its  current  pluralist 
constitution. It is precisely the operationalisation of these ideas via new relations of 
hierarchy between Western and non-Western societies in the post-Cold War era that 
signal an ongoing process of reconstitution within international society. Increasingly, 
liberal values and political institutions are posited as the standard that states must 
meet in order to be recognised as full members of international society. As Ian Clark 
argues,  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  we  have  witnessed  the  re-emergence  of 
doctrines  advocating  a  hierarchical  form  of  international  society,  based  on  the 
requirement  of  states  to  conform  to  liberal  standards  of  good  governance.
138 
Importantly, however, contemporary hierarchy within international society cannot 
simply be reduced to these ideas of ‘liberal hierarchy’. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, perceptions of risks to Western security, including ideas as to what 
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constitutes  a  risk,  are  a  crucial  element  in  understanding  new  hierarchies  within 
international society.  
 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  sought  to  outline  a  conception  of  hierarchy  as  a 
fundamentally  social  authority  relationship  underpinned  by  ideas  and  norms. 
Importantly,  it  has  argued  that  states  can  be  both  subordinate  and  superordinate 
parties  in  a  hierarchical  relationship  despite  their  sovereign  status.  It  has  also 
suggested  that  hierarchies  are  possible  within  an  international  society  constituted 
according  to  fundamental  norms  that  provide  criteria  for  rightful  membership  of 
international society and order interstate conduct. This chapter has also sought to 
explore the ideas that partly underpin contemporary hierarchies within international 
society, focusing on several liberal international theories that posit distinctions and 
advocate formalised hierarchies between liberal and non-liberal societies. However, 
while these ideas, or social logics, are important to understanding Western attempts 
to promote liberalism and democracy within non-Western societies, they do not fully 
provide an answer as to why Western states have felt compelled to undertake such 
interventions in the first place.  
The next chapter is thus dedicated to outlining the causal factors that compel 
Western states to intervene in an attempt to promote liberal values. Utilising Ulrich 
Beck’s  notions  of  risk  and  the  world  risk  society,  it  contends  that an  increasing 
preoccupation  with  globalised  security  risks  within  international  society  informs 
contemporary  Western  attempts  to  promote  liberalism.  The  concept  of  risk  and 
Western attempts to manage the new risks of the post-Cold War era provide one way 
of  understanding  the  reasons  and  rationale  that  provide  for  the  justification  and Liberalism and International Hierarchy 
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legitimation of these interventions. In other words, it is not simply a desire to spread 
liberal  norms  that  leads  Western  societies  to  intervene  in  attempts  to  promote 
liberalism,  but  rather  the  notion  that  the  spread  of  liberal  values  is  one  way  of 
managing  new  forms  of  security  risk  within  international  society.  New  forms  of 
hierarchy within international society are therefore underpinned by a ‘liberal social 
logic of risk’. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this new social logic of risk is 
crucial  to  understanding  current  processes  of  reconstitution  within  international 
society.  
105 
 
Three 
Risk and International Society 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has so far argued that international society in the post-Cold War 
era  is  currently  undergoing  a  process  of  reconstitution,  one  which  involves 
increasingly  prevalent  anti-pluralist  and  hierarchical  trends.  The  previous  chapter 
outlined a conception of hierarchy as a social relationship underpinned by norms or 
social  logics  and  also  examined  the  social  logics  that  underpin  contemporary 
international  hierarchy.  As  was  argued,  new  relations  of  hierarchy  within 
international society are partly informed by the ideas contained within a particular 
liberal vision of political community amongst states, one that suggests that a liberal 
international  society  is  one  that  depends  upon  liberal  political  institutions  within 
states. Liberal democracies are constructed as a ‘superior’ form of state, while non-
liberal  societies  are  subordinated  in  new  relations  of  hierarchy  with  the  Western 
democracies.    
However, this particular vision of a liberal international society only forms 
part of the social logic underpinning contemporary hierarchies within international 
society. What was not detailed in the previous chapter is why hierarchical and anti-
pluralist trends have become prevalent within international society in the post-Cold 
War era or why the West has felt compelled to intervene in order to promote liberal 
values.  While  many  scholars  have  identified  these  hierarchical  trends,  few  have 
explored or explained what factors have given rise to them. What compels Western Risk and International Society 
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states  to  intervene,  in  some  cases  forcefully,  in  order  to  promote  liberal  values? 
While the end of the Cold War may have facilitated the West’s ability to intervene 
across the globe, this factor by itself does not fully explain why Western states seek 
to promote liberal values.
1 Further, few scholars have considered what these new 
hierarchies suggest regarding the underlying pluralist constitution of international 
society,  particularly  the  way  in  which  they  affect  legitimate  statehood  (rightful 
membership) and legitimate or rightful conduct within international society.  
Utilising Ulrich Beck’s notions of risk and the ‘risk society’, this chapter 
suggests  that  an  increasing  preoccupation  with  globalised  security  risks  within 
international society compels Western states to intervene in territories identified as 
‘risky’ in order to promote liberal values as a mechanism of risk management.
2 The 
advent  of  these  globalised  security  risks  has  been  facilitated  in  large  part  by 
processes  of  globalisation.  Globalisation  has  been  perceived  as  contributing  to  a 
shrunken world, one in which risks cannot be localised either in terms of time or 
space. This de-bounding of risk is one of the central elements of Beck’s notion of 
‘risk  society’  and  is  also  crucial  to  understanding  contemporary  constitutional 
transition  within  international  society.
3  Confronted  with  de-bounded  global  risks, 
Western states have focused on identifying and reshaping so-called zones of risk – 
states which exhibit internal characteristics that provide an environment conducive to 
risk. These risky environments have primarily been defined in terms of a lack of 
liberal political institutions or state failure. 
Contemporary  hierarchical  relationships  within  international  society  are 
therefore underpinned by a new liberal social logic of risk. This new liberal social 
                                                 
1  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  arguably  facilitated  the  ability  of  Western  countries  to  conduct 
interventions in other states due to the removal of power constraints with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
2 Beck, Risk Society; Beck, World Risk Society.    
3 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 40-2. Risk and International Society 
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logic  of  risk  simultaneously  constructs  Western  societies  as  superordinate  ‘risk 
managers’ with the authority to reshape the domestic socio-political institutions of 
other states and illiberal or failed states as potentially dangerous sites of instability 
and  disorder  in  which  security  risks  might  originate.  These  states  become  the 
subordinate  parties  in  new  relations  of  hierarchy  with  Western  interveners.  The 
upshot of this is that the tolerance of diversity inherent in the notion of a pluralist 
international society means that pluralism becomes a risk in itself. This is because it 
is precisely such a tolerance of diversity that sustains the existence of failed and 
illiberal states that potentially act as originators of global risks. 
A  new  liberal  social  logic  of  risk  has  thus  become a   central  element  in 
constituting contemporary international society. This social logic has become central 
to  the  governing  of  social  relations  amongst  states  –  it  increasingly  determines 
processes of inclusion and exclusion and modes of interaction between members of 
international  society.
4  The  definition  of  illiberal  states  as  potentially  dangerous 
environments  and  subsequent  attempts  to  manage  risk  by  reshaping  these 
environments via the promotion of liberal values alters the constitutional structure of 
international society in a way that gives rise to various hierarchical and anti-pluralist 
trends. This is precisely because the West’s preferred technique of risk management 
                                                 
4 Although I do not explicitly adopt their thesis on governmentality, risk and risk management, there 
is substantial overlap between the arguments outlined in this thesis and that of a growing literature of 
work  examining  risk  from  a  Foucaldian  perspective.  These  studies  generally  focus  on  risk  as  a 
concept or construction used as a means through which to govern, focusing on the practices and 
techniques through which risk is employed as a governing principle. See Louise Amoore and Marieke 
de Goede (eds), Risk and the War on Terror (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Claudia Aradau and Rens Van 
Munster,  ‘Governing  Terrorism  Through  Risk:  Taking  Precautions,  (un)Knowing  the  Future’, 
European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 89-115; Gabe Mythen and Sandra 
Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking ‘What If?’’, Security 
Dialogue 39, no. 2-3 (2008): 221-42; Didier Bigo, ‘Global (In)security: The Field of the Professionals 
of Unease Management and the Ban-opticon’, in Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory, 
no. 4 (Sovereign Police, Global Complicity), edited by Jon Solomon and Sakai Naoki (Hong Kong: 
University  of  Hong  Kong  Press,  2004);  Gabe  Mythen  and  Sandra  Walklate,  ‘Criminology  and 
Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality?’, The British Journal of Criminology 46, 
no. 3 (2006): 379–398.  
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involves  limiting  the  range  of  acceptable  values  and  regimes  that  states  may 
reasonably  adopt,  contravening  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution. 
International  society  has  become  a  new  type  of  risk  society,  one  in  which  the 
dominant members (the West) define and police so-called ‘zones of risk’.  
The invocation of Beck’s risk society thesis as a method of conceptualising 
constitutional transition within international society is intended, in part, to address 
the  failure  of  those  scholars  who  have  identified  new  forms  of  hierarchy  within 
international society to adequately account for the reasons and rationale behind these 
new hierarchies. It is also intended to address the general absence within the English 
School of a theoretical account of change in International Relations. As noted in 
chapter one, international society has generally been viewed in constitutionally static 
terms  within  the  English  School,  and  it  lacks  a  rigorous  theory  of  constitutional 
transition  within  international  society.  If  a  hierarchical  and  anti-pluralist  form  of 
international society has ‘returned’, as scholars such as Simpson suggest, then what 
are  the  features  of  the  hierarchies  and  inequalities  that  anti-pluralism  mandates 
within international society? 
It  is  unsatisfactory  to  simply  claim  that  there  has  been  a  normative  shift 
within international society. What are the reasons for such a shift? Further, what 
shape do the interventions associated with new forms of international hierarchy take? 
Questions to be considered here include why has the West intervened in certain 
situations and not in others? Why are failed or illiberal states now viewed as posing 
such a threat to the West? Why is disorder on the other side of the globe now such a 
problem  for  Western  societies?  This  chapter  suggests  that  the  answer  to  these 
questions lies in the perception that the West now faces novel globalised security 
risks in the post-Cold War era. In doing so, this chapter aims in part to bring the Risk and International Society 
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concepts  of  risk  and  risk  management  into  International  Relations  discourse  and 
build on the minimal body of literature that has so far done so. 
International Relations scholars as a whole have generally been lethargic in 
incorporating the insights provided by Beck’s risk society thesis into contemporary 
aspects of International Relations. Yet while useful, Beck’s notion of the risk society 
cannot be brought into the study of International Relations without some conceptual 
difficulties. For example, when viewed from the perspective of Beck’s risk society 
thesis,  the  relationship  between  risk,  risk  management  and  international  society 
presents  a  paradox.  The  advent  of  new  globalised  risks  that  transcend  national 
boundaries,  Beck  suggests,  opens  a  path  towards  the  emergence  of  a  truly 
cosmopolitan world risk society.
5 Yet, faced with globalised risks, Western states 
have responded by reifying and reinforcing the territorial state and have adopted 
state-based risk management techniques such as the promotion of liberalism. Further, 
rather than truly cosmopolitan, transnational cooperation among states, risk has led 
to the emergence of a more hierarchical, more exclusionary international society in 
which some states police international society to manage risk, while subordinated 
states are subject to the authority of the West.    
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The chapter begins by 
outlining the notion of risk and the idea of the world risk society popularised by 
Beck. It then examines various accounts of hierarchy and constitutional transition 
within  international  society,  arguing  that  these  accounts  have  not  adequately 
conceptualised  either  contemporary  hierarchy  or  the  nature  of  this  constitutional 
transition. Here the argument is made for conceptualising contemporary hierarchy 
and constitutional transition within international society through the prism of Beck’s 
                                                 
5 Ulrich Beck, ‘World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in a Framework 
of Manufactured Uncertainties’, Theory Culture and Society 13, no. 4 (1996): 21-4.  Risk and International Society 
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risk society thesis. Following this, the chapter considers the application of Beck’s 
notions of risk and the risk society to International Relations. It concludes that while 
both  certainly  provide  useful  and  important  insights  into  contemporary  interstate 
relations,  neither  are  wholly  adequate  when  it  comes  to  conceptualising 
contemporary constitutional revision within international society.  
Clearly there is a disjuncture between Beck’s argument of risk as evoking 
world  cosmopolitanism  and  the  argument  presented  here  of  risk  as  the  central 
causative factor of a transition towards a more hierarchical international society. It is 
argued that two problems afflict Beck’s account of risk and the risk society when 
applied to International Relations. Firstly, Beck simply argues that nation-states will 
fade away as world risk society is consolidated without pausing to consider if this is 
a realistic assumption. Secondly, and more importantly, Beck fails to examine how, 
if risk does not entail the end of the state, will it impact upon interstate relations, 
particularly with regard to the norms and rules that underpin a pluralist form of 
international  society?  In  other  words,  Beck  fails  to  consider  the  conditions  that 
underpin a pluralist social order amongst states and the ways in which risk impacts 
upon those conditions.  
 
Risk and the ‘World Risk Society’ 
Since the early 1990s the concepts of risk and the ‘risk society’ have become 
increasingly  popular  and  influential  within  sociological  discourse.  Pioneered  by 
sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, the basic premise of these 
sociological theories of risk is that contemporary society is undergoing a period of Risk and International Society 
 
111 
 
radical  transformation.
6  Beck  characterises  this  social  transformation,  particularly 
predominant in Western societies, as one between what he terms ‘industrial society’ 
or  the  ‘first  modernity’  and  (world)  risk  society  or  the  ‘second  modernity’.  Put 
simply, the argument is that modernisation has simultaneously (and paradoxically) 
brought  great  technological  and  scientific  progress  as  well  as  more  abstract  and 
disembodied  risks.
7  As  technological  capacity  increases,  so  too  does  the 
incalculability of the consequences of the use of such technologies.  
Beck’s  thesis  is  centred  on  two  core  concepts:  risk  and  reflexive 
modernisation or reflexivity, a characteristic of the so-called second modernity. This 
section  examines  these  concepts,  focusing  first  on  risk  and  then  the  notion  of 
reflexivity. To begin with, we need to be clear what is meant by the term risk. One of 
the problems of much of the work on risk within both sociology and International 
Relations is that risk is rarely ever clearly defined. However, Heng has usefully 
provided a clear and systematic definition of risk. On the one hand, risk can be 
invoked as a descriptive term describing a particular danger, hazard or dangerous 
scenario. On the other hand, risk can be used as a normative term that refers to a 
desire to engage in proactive, anticipatory risk management activities.
8 Further, it is 
important to distinguish between risk and threat. It is all too easy to conflate risk 
with threat and use the terms interchangeably. Indeed, much of the literature on risk 
has done just that, failing to clearly distinguish what is meant by threat and risk.  
                                                 
6 Beck, World Risk Society, 1. Also see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990) and Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society 
in the Late-Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991). 
7 John Handmer and Paul James, ‘Trust Us and Be Scared: The Changing Nature of Contemporary 
Risk’, Global Society 21, no. 1 (2007): 120. 
8 Yee-Kuang Heng, ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate: Through the Looking Glass of of Ulrich 
Beck’s World Risk Society’, International Relations 20, no. 1 (2006): 71. Risk and International Society 
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As  Heng  suggests,  threats  can  be  thought  of  in  terms  of  capabilities  and 
intentions.
9 It was this notion of threat that clearly characterised the perception of the 
dangers posed to the West by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Strategists on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain were primarily concerned with the military capabilities 
and intentions of the other side. Thus, during the Cold War, the West was faced with 
a  clearly  defined  enemy  with  clearly  defined  capabilities.  For  instance,  Western 
governments had a rough estimate of the number of Soviet nuclear warheads, they 
knew where Soviet missiles were targeted and they knew they had the capability to 
strike back in the event of war. The dangers posed by the Soviet Union could thus be 
expressed quantitatively: number of warheads, tanks, troops; official Soviet policies 
and actions; etc. 
Threats  thus  constitute  an  action-reaction  relationship.  This  implies  that 
threats should normally be relatively well defined. In order to react to something, we 
need to know what it is we are reacting to. Contrast this with risk, which Heng 
defines in terms of probabilities and consequences.
10 Unlike threats, risks are not 
clearly defined or delineated, they are imprecise and uncertain. Thus in the post-Cold 
War era, in contrast to the Soviet threat, we know there are dangers ‘out there’ such 
as  terrorism  or  human  rights  abuses;  but  the  location  of  these  dangers  and  the 
consequences of their realisation are often unknown. These dangers thus represent 
less of a quantitative threat than they do a qualitative risk. They are qualitative in the 
sense that we cannot know for a fact if a risk is ‘out there’. This is because risk refers 
to the probability that a postulated scenario or event will materialise at some future 
point, meaning risk assessment relies upon our own subjective assessments of what 
the future might bring. 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  Risk and International Society 
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Risk is therefore a concept that marries the present with the future, and can 
be conceptualised as an estimation of the dangerousness of the future.
11 Risks can 
only be understood in the context of futuristic scenarios that may or may not occur. 
Risk does not refer to a present danger so much as it refers to the possibility that a 
given  object  or  event  will  pose  dangers  in  the  future.  This  is  another  way  of 
distinguishing between risk and threat: a risk refers to a future threat that has not yet 
materialised and may never do so. When a risk is realised, when the consequences of 
any given risk become real, then the risk becomes a threat properly so-called. In the 
risk society, we thus look to the future rather than the past as we did during the first 
modernity to guide our present actions. As Beck argues, the relationship between 
past, present and future has been substantially altered – future events become the 
object of current action.
12   
However, perhaps the key point concerning the nature of the new risks faced 
by Western societies, one that, as shall be seen, has direct implications when risk is 
examined  in  the  context  of  perceived  security  risks  to  the  West,  is  their 
uncontrollability  and  tendency  to  exceed  the  limits  of  calculability.  This 
uncontrollability  and  incalculability  is  a  result  of  the  temporal  and  spatial  de-
bounding  of  risks  in  contemporary  international  society.
13  As  Beck  argues,  the 
concept  of  risk  society  is  not  about  the  increase  of  risks,  but  about  their  de-
bounding.
14 Whereas in the past risks were generally localised in terms of time and 
space and thus predictable, controllable and insurable to a certain extent; today’s 
                                                 
11 Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Rens Van Munster, ‘Security, Technologies of Risk, and 
the Political: Guest Editors' Introduction’, Security Dialogue 39, no. 2-3 (2008): 147-54. 
12 Beck, World Risk Society, 137.  
13 Beck, Risk Society, 22; Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle, ‘Catastrophe Risk, Insurance and 
Terrorism’, Economy and Society 33, no. 2 (2004): 136.  
14 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 41. Risk and International Society 
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risks are characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability and diffusiveness.
15 As Jarvis 
argues: 
With  magnitudes  of  risk  so  great,  with  technological  hazards  and  mishaps  so 
extensive that they transcend both place and time by becoming international or 
global  in  scope  and  inter-generational  in  space,  the  prospects  for  the  orderly 
control  and  distribution  of  risk  across  and  within  populations  becomes  both 
impossible and meaningless.
16 
Thus, one of the defining characteristics of the new risks faced by Western 
societies is their tendency towards globalisation.
17 In the risk society, there are far 
too many ‘unknown unknowns’ for so-called experts to be able to give authoritative 
answers  on  the  risks  we  face.
18    The  most  that  can  be  expected  are  definitional 
struggles  over  the  scale,  degree  and  urgency  of  risks.
19  The  risk  society  thesis 
therefore challenges the ‘modern’ notion that risks can be subject to classification, 
quantification and elimination through rational behaviour.
20 The above would tend to 
suggest  that  risks  are,  at  least  in  part,  a  socially  constructed  phenomenon.  Beck 
himself appears to adhere to both a realist and a constructivist approach to risk, 
                                                 
15 Mythen and Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security’, 223.  
16 Darryl S.L. Jarvis, ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State: A Critical Appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the 
World Risk Society Thesis’, Global Society 21, no. 1 (2007): 30. 
17 Beck, Risk Society, 13.  
18  This  phrase  is  from  former  US  Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld’s  infamous  reply  to  a 
question posed at a NATO Press Conference in June 2002, in which he argued that there are ‘no 
knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are 
things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we 
don't know we don't know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, 
and we then say well that's basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known 
knowns  and  the  known  unknowns.  And  each  year,  we  discover  a  few  more  of  those  unknown 
unknowns’. See Donald Rumsfeld ‘Press Conference by US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld’, 
NATO Defence Minister’s Meeting (6-7 June 2002), http://www.nato.int/ docu/speech/2002/s020606. 
htm (accessed 10 May 2007). 
19 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘“It Sounds Like a Riddle”: Security Studies, the War on Terror and 
Risk’, Millennium 33, no. 2 (2004): 381-95. 
20 CASE Collective, ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto’, Security 
Dialogue  37,  no.  4  (2006):  468.  Luhmann  argues  that  risk  is  traditionally  conceptualised  as  ‘a 
controlled extension of rational action’, meaning that rational action can aid in the estimation and 
management  of  risk.  This  is  a  conceptualisation  that  is  shared  by  Power  in  his  work  on  risk 
management.  See Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1998):  13  and  Michael  Power,  The  Risk  Management  of  Everything:  Rethinking  the  Politics  of 
Uncertainty (London: Demos, 2004).   Risk and International Society 
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seeing it as both objectively real and socially constructed. In other words, in his 
approach to risk, Beck adopts a realist ontology and a constructivist epistemology.
21  
As Beck argues: 
Risk society theory...argues that there is both the immateriality of meditated and 
contested definitions of risk and the materiality of risk as manufactured by experts 
and industries world-wide...Risk science without the sociological imagination of 
contested and constructed risk is blind. Risk science that is not informed about the 
technologically manufactured nature of risk is naive.
22  
Heng  similarly  adopts  a  realist-constructivist  approach,  recognising  the  interplay 
between  material  and  cultural  factors.
23  Existing  objects  or  events  that  can  be 
objectively studied can be defined as risks, but the way in which risks are defined, as 
well as the choice as to which risks to address and which to simply tolerate and live 
with, are politically, socially and culturally predicated.
24 Beck’s definition of risk has 
been criticised due to its emphasis on manufactured risks that exist ‘out there’ and 
the fact that social constructions of risk are relegated to the selection of risks to 
address and responses to such risks.
25 This criticism shall be discussed further below. 
Alongside the concept of risk, the second main component of the risk society 
thesis is Beck’s notion of reflexivity or reflexive modernisation. One of the key 
themes of Beck’s work is that what he terms industrial society was almost absolutely 
successful. Unsurpassed standards of wealth and prosperity have been delivered to 
Western societies and capitalist modes of production have been exported across the 
globe.
26 The irony is that it is this very success that is undermining its own material 
                                                 
21 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, 96.  
22 Beck, World Risk Society, 4.  
23 Yee Kuang Heng, War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks 
(New York: Routledge, 2006): 41-2.  
24 Heng, War as Risk Management, 42; Handmer and James, ‘Trust us and be Scared’, 121.  
25 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, 96.  
26 Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity, 2009): 8.   Risk and International Society 
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benefits.
27 Industrial society was guided by linear notions of progress, by certainty, 
security  and  controllability.  Weberian  means-end  rationality  guided  Western 
societies – the reasons for actions are universal and calculable.
28 All individuals, 
because of their rationality, were generally alike in the ends they sought; what differs 
are the capabilities of individuals and the means employed to achieve their ends.
29 
This is essentially the classic realist notion of raison de tat. All states are 
functionally alike and seek the same ends, but their capabilities and the capabilities 
of  other  states  influence  the  means  that  states  employ  to  realise  these  ends.
30 
Outcomes can thus be calculated on the basis of capabilities. Means-end rationality 
extended across Western society, economics and politics during the early-middle 
twentieth century and indeed, informed the Cold War. The actions of both the West 
and the Soviet Union could be predicted and quantified according to capabilities 
(means) and intentions (desired ends and interests).
31 But with the transition to risk 
society, means-end rationality breaks down and is replaced by a reflexive rationality. 
In industrial society, risks were considered unfortunate and unintended side-effects 
of industrialisation that could be identified, insured against, and compensated for 
through scientific expertise and calculations.
32   
According to Beck, the very process of industrialisation that has provided 
such high levels of prosperity to Western societies has also exposed these societies to 
new,  disembodied  and  uncontrollable  forms  of  risk.
33  Risk  society  emerges 
autonomously as modernisation processes that take no account of the consequences 
                                                 
27 Jarvis, ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State’, 25.  
28 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1, edited by 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968). 
29 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society’, Millennium 
30, no. 2 (2001): 289. 
30 Ibid.  
31  Mikkel  Vedby  Rasmussen,  The  Risk  Society  at  War:  Terror,  Technology  and  Strategy  in  the 
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 2.  
32 Heng, War as Risk Management, 33. 
33 See Beck, Risk Society, 19-24.  Risk and International Society 
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and dangers that they produce begin to erode the foundations of industrial society.
34 
There is thus a confrontation between the consequences of modernisation and the 
basis  of  modernisation.  This  is  one  part  of  what  is  meant  by  Beck’s  notion  of 
‘reflexive modernisation’ which is crucial to his risk society thesis. The transition 
from industrial to risk society, from modernisation to reflexive modernisation, is 
automatic, unseen, uncontrollable and ambiguous, meaning that the transition can be 
characterised as reflex-like.
35  
On  the  other  hand,  as  individuals,  organisations  and  governments  within 
these  emerging  risk  societies  become  increasingly  aware  of  the  risks  and 
consequences  of  their  own  lifestyles,  they  are  compelled  to  self-reflect  on  their 
situation.
36 As Beck puts it, ‘society becomes a theme and a problem for itself’.
37 
Thus, society ceases to be defined in terms of the achievement of desired ends (such 
as the production of wealth) and becomes preoccupied with constant reflection on 
how to manage and properly distribute risks which are products of the very society 
that is engaged in self-reflection. Beck’s notion of reflexive modernisation therefore 
means that  
a change of industrial society which occurs surreptitiously and unplanned in the 
wake  of  normal,  autonomized  modernization  and  with  an  unchanged,  intact 
political and economic order implies the following: a radicalization of modernity, 
which breaks up the promises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to 
another modernity.
38 
                                                 
34 Beck, World Risk Society, 73. 
35  Beck,  World  Risk  Society,  73;  Keith  Spence,  ‘World  Risk  Society  and  War  Against  Terror’, 
Political Studies 53, no. 2 (2005): 286. 
36 Beck, World Risk Society, 81.  
37 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in 
Ulrich  Beck,  Anthony  Giddens  and  Scott  Lash,  Reflexive  Modernization:  Politics,  Tradition  and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994): 8. 
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Reflexivity, in the narrower sense of the term meaning societal self-reflection 
on  the  risks  associated  with  modernity,  usefully  encapsulates  the  contemporary 
Western view of the wider international society. In the post-Cold War era, the West 
has adopted a reflexive rationality in its view of international society, constantly 
reflecting on the unforeseen consequences and security risks that have arisen within 
a pluralist international society in an age of globalisation. The result of this new 
reflexive rationality and Western attempts to manage perceived risks is an erosion of 
the  pluralist  basis  of  international  society  and  the  emergence  of  new  forms  of 
hierarchy.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  examines  existing  accounts  of 
contemporary hierarchy within international society, before examining more fully 
the relationship between risk, reflexivity and pluralist international society.   
 
Hierarchy and Constitutional Transition within International Society  
This  section  explores  existing  accounts  of  constitutional  transition  within 
international  society,  particularly  those  that  focus  on  recent  hierarchical  trends 
within  international  society.  One  of  the  weaknesses  of  these  accounts  of 
contemporary hierarchy is that they take these hierarchical trends at face value. Little 
attention is paid to the underlying rationales or causal relationships that inform these 
new hierarchies. Further, few of these accounts have considered the implications of 
such trends for the constitutional structure of international society. The next section 
addresses these weaknesses by employing Beck’s notions of risk and the world risk 
society in order to account for contemporary hierarchical trends within international 
society. It suggests that a liberal social logic of risk underpins these hierarchies and 
represents  a  fundamental  alteration  of  international  society’s  constitution. 
International society is becoming a new type of risk society. Risk and International Society 
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As discussed in chapter one, international society is constituted according to 
fundamental norms that shape its nature and boundaries – hierarchical as opposed to 
egalitarian, exclusionary and restrictive as opposed to inclusive and global.
39 English 
School theorists and constructivists have recognised the importance of norms and 
intersubjective  understandings  among  states  in  shaping  not  only  international 
society, but also the identity and behaviour of states.
40 Despite this, however, many 
English  School  theorists  have  failed  to  identify  key  moments  of  constitutional 
transition within international society, and have attributed to international society a 
relative stability in its constitutional structure that fails to adequately conceptualise 
the  dynamic  nature  of  the  constitutive  norms  underpinning  the  society  of  states. 
Indeed,  in  general  English  School  theorists  have  not  been  overly  successful  in 
accounting for change and transition within International Relations. 
One of the main features of English School theory is that a complete picture 
of International Relations includes an international system, international society and 
a world society, the main question being which one of these elements dominates in a 
given era.
41 Yet there is little discussion of the processes by which an international 
system  gives  way  to  an  international  society,  or  how  an  international  society  is 
subsumed  under  a  world  society.  There  has  also  been  limited  discussion  of 
constitutional transition within international society itself. It is this constitutionally 
static view of international society that generally precludes the English School, as it 
currently stands, from providing an adequate account of contemporary constitutional 
revision  within  international  society.  Another  problem  here  is  that  most  English 
School works continue to conceptualise international society within what might be 
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termed  a  ‘modernist’  framework,  understanding  social  interaction  within 
international society primarily in terms of the territorially discrete nation-state.  
This overlooks the extent to which social relations between states have been 
shaped  and  substantially  altered  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  by  processes  of 
globalisation and the emergence of spatially and temporally de-bounded risks that 
transcend state boundaries and become global in scope. New forms of risk beyond 
the ambit of the nation-state, such as terrorism, have become central to interstate 
relationships within international society. Therefore, such a modernist framework 
ignores  the  extent  to  which  contemporary  social  relations  between  states  are 
increasingly  shaped  by  a  liberal  social  logic  of  risk  as  states  attempt  to  manage 
perceived future dangers. It should be noted, however, that this does not apply to all 
English School scholars. For example, Hurrell has outlined the importance of non-
state  actors  and  processes  of  globalisation  in  regard  to  interstate  relations  and 
international society.
42  
The failure to identify the processes that underpin constitutional transition 
within  international  society  is  evident  in  the  work  of  Simpson.  While  Simpson 
usefully draws attention to historical trends of anti-pluralism and hierarchy within 
international society, he does not consider the processes by which anti-pluralism 
gains ascendance in a given period.
43 Simpson is content in making the argument 
that  the  constitutional  structure  of  international  society  is  best  understood  as  a 
continuous  interplay  between  sovereign  equality  (pluralism)  and  anti-pluralism 
without providing an account of why, in each of his ‘constitutional moments’ where 
pluralism  or  anti-pluralism  established  ascendance,  these  constitutional  shifts 
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occurred.
44 Thus, one of the problems with Simpson’s account of anti-pluralism is 
that he fails to establish any mechanisms of change or causal relationships that might 
account  for  transitions  between  pluralist  and  anti-pluralist  forms  of  international 
society. To be fair, this could be due to Simpson’s assertion that the two exist in 
continuous tension with one another, and while one may enjoy ascendancy over the 
other, both can be identified within international society in any given period.
45 
Arguably, Simpson’s project is simply concerned with outlining the need to 
understand international society and the international legal order in terms of both 
their pluralist and anti-pluralist faces, and the cyclical nature of transitions between 
these two faces. Still, if we do want to understand international society in pluralist or 
anti-pluralist  terms,  we  need  to  be  able  to  account  for  constitutional  transitions 
within international society that reflect either pluralism or anti-pluralism. Why is it 
that one gains ascendance over the other in any given epoch? As Reus-Smit suggests, 
different societies of states develop different constitutional structures based upon 
variable cultural and historical circumstances.
46 What is missing from Simpson’s 
work  then  is  a  careful  examination  of  these  variable  factors  that  influence  and 
explain why international society adopts a pluralist or anti-pluralist face.
47  
Other scholars, such as Anghie, suggest that the constitutional structure of 
international society has actually remained rather constant. Anghie’s study focuses 
on the enduring significance of colonialism for international law. Part of Anghie’s 
argument is that old colonial hierarchies thought dead with decolonisation in the 
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early 1960s have in fact endured and still structure Western relations with the former 
colonies to this day. Indeed, Anghie’s focus on colonialism suggests that interactions 
between the imperial powers and the former colonies have remained constant despite 
the  end  of  colonialism  and  the  obviously  new  criteria  for  inclusion  within 
international society that resulted from this.
48 The main weakness of Anghie’s focus 
on  colonialism  is  that  this  focus  masks  both  the  different  features  of  colonial 
hierarchies compared to contemporary hierarchies and the very different ways in 
which  these  different  forms  of  hierarchy  are  operationalised  within  international 
society. 
Despite the fact that colonialism has indelibly affected and shaped the current 
contours  of  international  law  and  international  society,  Anghie’s  argument  that 
contemporary interventions by the West constitute a continuing form of imperialism 
is  misplaced.  The  colonial  continuities  within  international  law  and  international 
society that Anghie emphasises are overstated. While we can view the contemporary 
emphasis on liberal democracy as the basis of legitimate statehood as a reincarnation 
of  the  standard  of  civilisation,  Anghie  fails  to  examine  the  way  in  which  this 
standard has been operationalised and given effect within international society in the 
post-Cold War era in terms of risk itself. However, he hints at the unique ‘risk-
focused’  nature  of  contemporary  interventions  when  he  argues  that  ‘the 
transformation of the offending society into a democracy is the most effective way of 
ensuring that it will pose no future threat’.
49  
Anghie’s notion of enduring colonialism, along with those who argue for the 
re-emergence of empire or imperialism, overlook the extent to which contemporary 
interventions do not conform to earlier colonial modes of intervention. The aim of 
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post-Cold  War  interventions  might  involve  the  imposition  of  particular  forms  of 
governance,  as  did  colonialism,  but  it  is  certainly  not  motivated  by  economic 
exploitation  or  territorial  aggrandisement,  nor  is  the  sovereignty  of  target  states 
completely disregarded or denied. These states remain states, albeit states of ‘lesser 
standing’. Indeed, Anghie fails to take into account wider social changes that have 
occurred  within  Western  societies  and  within  international  society.  Thus,  when 
Anghie examines contemporary Western ‘imperialism’ in relation to the ‘War on 
Terror’, he asserts that, although this ‘imperialism’ is defensive in nature and aimed 
at achieving security for the West, it is still a continuation of colonialism and the old 
colonial legal and political relationships that structure relations between the West 
and the Periphery.
50 
The question that Anghie’s discussion raises, but does not address, is that if 
contemporary Western interventions do represent the continuance of colonialism in a 
new guise, then how do we account for the fact that the previous Western depiction 
of colonial peoples and territories as inherently inferior and thus ripe for conquest 
and  exploitation  has  transformed  so  that  these  territories  are  now  depicted  as 
representing grave risks that the West must secure itself against? When, and why, 
did exploitation and paternalism transform into fear and anxiety? This is a question 
that Bain also does not adequately address in his work on trusteeship, although he 
acknowledges  that  the  contemporary  hierarchies  associated  with  the  return  of 
trusteeship  are  not  necessarily  similar  in  character  to  those  associated  with 
colonialism.
51  
Dunne  has  also  identified  contemporary  hierarchical  trends  within 
international  society  and  correctly  questions  the  extent  to  which  a  pluralistic 
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international  society  is  compatible  with  forms  of  hierarchy.  For  Dunne,  US 
interventionism in Iraq threatens the existence of international society.
52 In Dunne’s 
words ‘the United States stands in opposition to international society...’
53 Dunne’s 
argument is built on the notion that the US disregard for the prevailing norms of 
international society, demonstrated by the lack of a sound legal basis or widespread 
international legitimacy concerning the invasion of Iraq, means that the US has opted 
out of international society altogether.
54 This argument also tends to assume that US 
interventionism is representative of a form of hierarchy that is incompatible with the 
idea of an international society.  
Legitimacy  is  crucial  to  Dunne’s  understanding  of  international  society  – 
legitimation,  or  lack  thereof,  of  a  particular  US  intervention  by  the  wider 
international  society  is  determinative  of  whether  the  US  is  operating  within 
international society or not. What Dunne does not consider is that the very notion of 
legitimacy  within  international  society  itself  has  changed  in  response  to  an 
increasing Western preoccupation with risk. The problem with Dunne’s account is 
that  he  ascribes  to  international  society  a  relatively  static,  pluralist  constitutional 
structure – he depicts the US action in Iraq as contrary to the prevailing pluralist 
norms of international society and thus the US now sits beyond such a society.
55 This 
overlooks  the  extent  to  which  the  invasion  of  Iraq  is  but  one  example  that  is 
representative of constitutional transition within international society rather than a 
signifier of a US withdrawal from such a society.  
In  other  words,  the  invasion  of  Iraq  marks  an  ongoing  process  of 
constitutional transition within international society, not the withdrawal of the US 
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from a pluralist, constitutionally static international society. Indeed, Dunne does not 
consider the extent to which the intervention in Iraq shares common rationales and 
motives with other contemporary interventions such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
Heng suggests that all of these interventions were actually aimed at the management 
of risk.
56 When one examines these interventions, one finds that the motives and 
rationales  for  intervention  provided  by  the  US  and  other  Western  states  revolve 
around preventing undesirable future occurrences. Contemporary hierarchy within 
international society has taken on a fundamentally new form, underpinned by a new 
social logic of risk. The accounts of constitutional transition and hierarchical trends 
within  contemporary  international  society  surveyed  have  thus  failed  to  either 
adequately  conceptualise  constitutional  transition  within  international  society  or 
adequately conceptualise the nature of contemporary hierarchy. 
These criticisms are also true of the limited number of scholars that have 
applied risk to International Relations. Scholars such as Heng and Rasmussen have 
sought to apply risk to contemporary strategic studies and examine the changing 
nature of warfare through the lens of Beck’s risk society framework.
57 Although 
these scholars have explicitly focused on the changing nature of warfare, neither has 
paused  to  consider  the  effect  of  such  changes  for  interstate  relations  in  general. 
While the argument that Western warfare is now centred on risk management is 
persuasive, the more interesting question that this new ‘risk management mode’ of 
warfare raises is how do such changes impact on the rules and norms that underpin 
interstate relations? It is this question of the impact of risk upon international society 
that will be addressed in the next section.  
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Risk, Reflexivity and Globalisation in International Society 
As  noted,  risk  is  a  concept  that  has  been  relatively  ignored  within 
International  Relations.  As  Jarvis  and  Griffiths  suggest,  there  has  been  scant 
utilisation, theorisation and application of risk to state-state relationships.
58 Yet, at 
least  in  Western  societies,  risk  has  become  one  of  the  defining  concepts  of  our 
time.
59 Risk analysis and management are practices that have proliferated throughout 
all sections of Western society. In the workplace, risk analysis and management are 
both central features of most occupational health and safety policies; in the media we 
are confronted almost weekly with medical research that shows a particular activity 
or a particular food group either increases or decreases the risk of contracting a 
certain disease or ailment. The risks associated with climate change have become 
one of the defining global political issues of our time. Sociologists such as Beck, 
Giddens and Lupton have all provided persuasive accounts of risk and its centrality 
to Western societies.
60 Given the Western preoccupation with risk domestically that 
these scholars have identified, it is little surprise that a similar focus on risk has been 
reflected  in  the  way  the  West  interacts  externally  with  the  wider  international 
society.    
Such a preoccupation with risk has become increasingly evident since the end 
of  the  Cold  War.  Indeed,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  has  presented  International 
Relations  observers  with  a  paradox.  On  the  one  hand,  the  West  no  longer  faces 
existential threats to its survival such as it did during the Cold War. Yet on the other 
hand,  the  West  has  seemingly  become  increasingly  insecure,  anxious  and 
preoccupied with global security risks. As Beck argues, with the end of the Cold War 
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and the bipolar order, we are moving from a world of enemies to one of risks.
61 
Prevailing notions of security have been turned on their head, due in large part to the 
effects of globalisation.
62 This is due to the temporally and spatially de-bounded 
nature  of  modern  security  issues  –  potential  threats  such  as  terrorism  are  now 
imprecisely defined, difficult to locate and potentially uncontrollable.  
These  new  security  issues  are  thus  not  easily  identifiable  in  terms  of 
capabilities and intentions. Indeed, the material power or capabilities of risks such as 
terrorism are difficult, if not impossible to ascertain.
63 Clearly defined enemies have 
been replaced with globalised security risks. Processes of globalisation have been 
instrumental in the de-bounding of contemporary security issues, particularly their 
spatial de-bounding. Scholte defines globalisation as a de-territorialisation of social 
life;  similarly  Rasmussen  suggests  that  ‘A  global  infrastructure  allows  for  the 
extension of social spaces beyond their traditional geographical confines’.
64 One of 
the results of this is that ‘the notion of ‘local conflict’ has been drained of much of 
its meaning; and seeing that much of what was once local is now unavoidably global, 
and often dangerously so, distant islands of anarchy are now ignored only at the risk 
of great peril’.
65  
Processes of globalisation, particularly technological innovation in transport 
and communications, give rise to two interrelated consequences: one, they leave the 
West  more  exposed  and  therefore  vulnerable  to  pockets  of  instability  within  the 
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wider international society. Two, they provide the means by which forces within 
these pockets of instability can potentially strike out at the West.
66 As Coker argues 
‘Risk became central in our thinking and behaviour once we entered a global society. 
For  globalisation  has  drawn  us  out  of  our  self-contained  national  or  local 
communities  into  a  larger  world  which  offers  none  of  the  old  protections’.
67 
Globalisation, once viewed as a force for economic integration, development and the 
spread of liberalism and democracy, is now viewed as containing a ‘dark side’. For 
instance, the Australian Department of Defence’s 2007 Defence Update suggests that  
Australians today are more connected with the wider world than at any other time 
in our history, but the negative side of globalisation is that this connectedness 
brings potential security threats closer to us. Globalisation speeds up the impact 
and  significance  of  existing  and  new  threats,  shortening  response  times,  and 
increasing  uncertainty.  People,  money,  and  ideas  now  move  faster  around  the 
world,  not  always  for  the  good.  While  globalisation  offers  significant 
opportunities, it also can help the spread of extremist terrorism and diseases such 
as avian influenza.
68 
The emphasis in this statement on potential security threats is important. In 
the absence of clearly defined threats, Western societies have become preoccupied 
with  ill-defined  risks.  Further,  this  statement  highlights  the  uncertainty  that  is  a 
feature of attempting to deal with globalised risks that are spatially and temporally 
de-bounded. Western societies now lack what Giddens terms ‘ontological security’: 
the firm knowledge of what to expect.
69 As Rasmussen suggests, during the Cold 
War the risk of destruction for the West (and the East) was arguably much higher 
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than it is today.
70 Yet, the Soviet Union was clearly definable in terms of military, 
economic and political capabilities and the US could, at least to a certain extent, 
gauge the intentions of the Soviet government. Thus, perversely, during the Cold 
War the West enjoyed a higher degree of ontological security – the threat was well 
defined and in a worst-case scenario, people knew what to expect.  
This has changed – as Coker argues, Western societies now share a new ‘risk 
management  ethos  which  has  emerged  in  response  to  the  greater  insecurity  that 
seems to stem from globalisation’.
71 The West’s current lack of ontological security 
is a derivative of the uncertainty that results from the spatially and temporally de-
bounded  nature  of  current  security  risks.  The  lack  of  clearly  defined  threats  has 
meant that focus has shifted to risks and future undesirable possibilities. This new 
focus on risk and preoccupation with potentialities is well demonstrated in the work 
of several scholars. Cooper argues that the twenty-first century risks being overrun 
by technology and anarchy. The West is exposed to the new risks of a globalising 
world.  According  to  Cooper,  we  face  the  choice  of  a  ‘defensive  imperialism’ 
designed to manage global chaos or to live with chaos itself.
72 
This  sort  of  dystopian  narrative  is  not  unique  to  Cooper.  It  is  present  in 
Huntington’s  thesis  on  the  Clash  of  Civilisations  and  his  warning  of  future 
civilisational conflicts facing the West, or the complete breakdown of civilisation 
itself as envisaged by Kaplan.
73 What these dystopian narratives have in common, 
aside from their marked pessimism, is the theme of a Western society that faces 
grave risks and future dangers. None of these works actually describe imminent or 
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immediately  identifiable  threats  to  the  West.  Rather,  they  warn  of  future 
possibilities, whether it is Huntington’s future civilisational conflicts or Cooper’s 
warning of the chaos exhibited in what he terms the ‘premodern zone’. The analysis 
of these scholars exhibits an inherent reflexivity. In reflecting on globalisation and 
contemporary  international  society,  all  have  focused  on  the  risks  generated  by 
globalisation and international society. Emphasis is placed on future scenarios and 
the consequences of such scenarios. 
Similarly,  in  its  preoccupation  with  risk,  the  West  has  also  become 
increasingly reflexive in its view of a pluralist international society in an age of 
globalisation.  Western  states  have  conspicuously  engaged  in  reflection  on  the 
implications and consequences of a globalised, post-Cold War pluralist international 
society in which all states, regardless of their internal characteristics or even their 
ability  to  govern,  are  full  and  equal  members  of  international  society.  However, 
while globalisation has played a role in the de-bounding of risk and increasing the 
vulnerability of the West to such risks, it is a facilitator, not an originator of risk. 
Rather, globalised security risks have been seen to originate in Cooper’s ‘zones of 
chaos’ – illiberal states and states beset by conflict and political instability.
74 The 
emergence of a pluralist international society provided independence for the former 
colonies and finally universalised international society. But one of the consequences 
of this is that ‘the world’s most destitute states, and the patterns of violence to which 
they give rise, are sustained in a rather perverse way by the constitutive norms of 
international society’.
75  
Western reflexivity is well-captured by Ian Clark who, although he does not 
explicitly  utilise  the  concept  of  risk,  argues  that  there  is  an  ongoing  ‘double 
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movement’  within  international  society.  As  international  society  evolved  into  a 
pluralist society of states during the twentieth century, the West, reflecting on the 
vagaries, inconveniences and consequences of the open ‘political market’, has sought 
to forge a more overtly normative, ‘thicker’ version of international society based on 
liberal values. In other words, in response to the possible risks associated with an 
open,  pluralist  international  society,  the  West  has  responded  by  attempting  to 
manage these risks via the promotion of its own liberal values. Clark argues that this 
process is inseparable from the evolution and eventual emergence of the pluralist 
international  society  during  the  twentieth  century.  Further,  this  process  has 
intensified in the post-Cold War era.
76 
While  such  a  ‘double  movement’  has  certainly  found  its  most  forceful 
expression in the post-Cold War era, it has not simply been pluralism per se that the 
West has reacted to. Rather, the West’s reaction to the vagaries and consequences of 
a pluralist international society is better viewed as being conditioned in large part by 
both globalisation and, to a lesser extent, the end of the Cold War. Globalisation and 
the breakdown of the Cold War bipolar structure have left the West exposed to the 
risks  posed  by  the  wider  pluralist  international  society,  including  new  risks 
associated  with  state  failure,  ethnic  conflict  or  human  rights  abuses.  In  essence, 
Clark’s argument is similar to that presented here.  
Clark’s  core  argument  is  that  a  more  overtly  normative,  hierarchical 
international society has emerged in reaction to the evolution and emergence of a 
pluralist international society which has exposed the West to the new risks of the 
‘open political market’. As Clark argues:  
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However,  in  the  second  stage  [of  the  ‘double  movement’],  the  wider  West  – 
incorporating most of Europe but led by the United States – has struck back at the 
very pluralism that the global state system had generated, and of which the World 
Wars and Cold War were symptomatic. It has sought to reassert a greater central 
control of the international system. Its chosen instrument has been the forging of a 
new international society – adhering to a thicker set of legitimating principles 
embracing democracy, liberal values and capitalism – that has been progressively 
formed from within the original.
77 
This  reflexive  view  of  the  risks  associated  with  contemporary  pluralist 
international society encourages the perception of a division between a zone of risk 
and a zone at risk. Those states that have constituted their internal political and social 
institutions in an unacceptable way (e.g. illiberal or undemocratic states), or those 
that have no meaningful political or social institutions to speak of belong to this zone 
of risk. Illiberal regimes and endemic governance problems in many post-colonial 
states are nothing new. Pluralist international society affords states the freedom to 
choose their own domestic institutions for realising their society’s particular version 
of  the  good  life,  even  if  they  should  fail  in  that  endeavour.  Yet  in  an  age  of 
globalisation,  other  sections  of  international  society  can  no  longer  insulate 
themselves from the perceived security risks posed by these states. Thus, the rights 
normally associated with full membership of international society are suspended for 
states  in  the  ‘risky  zone’  which  then  potentially  become  subject  to  Western 
intervention.  
Again, it is important to stress that while states consigned to the zone of risk 
pose no concrete existential security threats to the West in the way the Soviet Union 
did  during  the  Cold  War,  they  are  perceived  as  posing  ill-specified,  amorphous 
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security risks. The security implications of the internal conditions of these states are 
defined in terms of potential future occurrences and possible negative consequences. 
The  uncertainty  and  ill-defined  nature  of  security  risks  means  that  in  seeking  to 
manage  and  prevent  risk,  emphasis  is  placed  on  identifying  and  reshaping  those 
environments  deemed  to  be  potentially  dangerous  or  risky.  Thus,  while  it  is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify exactly what form a security risk 
will take, when such a risk is likely to be realised or what the consequences of its 
realisation will be, broad environmental conditions that are conducive to risk, such as 
undemocratic or illiberal regimes and state failure, can be identified and reshaped so 
as to prevent undesirable future events. 
As such, pluralism, as a fundamental and constitutive normative doctrine of 
international  society,  has  been  eroded  by  the  notion  that  illiberal  states  or  states 
suffering from poor governance potentially pose unacceptable security risks to the 
West. Risk mitigates the recognition of diversity and tolerance inherent in a pluralist 
international society because it is this very recognition that underwrites the existence 
of illiberal and failed states that now potentially act as originators of global security 
risks.  International  society’s  pluralist  constitutive  values  become  a  theme  and  a 
problem in themselves. These values, whilst allowing for diversity and the domestic 
freedom  of  states,  have  also  spawned  unintended  security  consequences. 
International society thus enters a transition towards a reflexive, hierarchical and 
anti-pluralist form of risk society as the West seeks to police the globe in an attempt 
to manage risk. 
A liberal social of risk has therefore become a central element in constituting 
contemporary  international  society.  This  social  logic  erodes  the  pluralist 
constitutional basis of international society, leading to a novel form of international Risk and International Society 
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risk society policed by the West. As discussed earlier, other scholars have tended to 
view  Western  interventionism  as  merely  representing  a  re-hierarchisation  of 
international  society.  However,  they  have  generally  failed  to  recognise  the 
constitutional change that it at stake. International society’s pluralist constitution is 
distinctly affected by new forms of globalised risk and Western attempts at risk 
management. It is the very notion of pluralism itself that becomes the problem in an 
international  society  in  which  the  dominant  powers  seem  acutely  sensitive  to 
potential security risks that they are willing to prevent through interventionist risk 
management techniques.  
 
Re-evaluating Risk in an International Relations Context 
As argued above, the concepts of risk and risk management are useful in 
explaining contemporary hierarchy and constitutional transition within international 
society.  However,  despite  their  usefulness  as  explanatory  concepts,  there  are 
elements of Beck’s risk society thesis that are problematic when considered in the 
context of International Relations. Most of these problems revolve around Beck’s 
understanding and definition of risk, as well as his analysis (or lack thereof) of the 
effects of risk on the state and interstate relations.
78 This final section explores some 
of the limitations of Beck’s thesis when applied to interstate relations. As is argued, 
Beck can be primarily criticised for his failure to examine the relationship between 
risk and international society and the effects of risk for interstate relations.  
One  significant  problem  lies  with  Beck’s  understanding  of  risk.  Beck’s 
earlier work focuses almost exclusively on technologically manufactured risks that 
arise unintentionally out of processes of industrialisation. However in later works, 
                                                 
78 Jarvis, ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State’, 33. Risk and International Society 
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Beck also discusses intentional forms of risk such as terrorism, although the defining 
characteristics  of  de-bounding  and  uncontrollability  apply  to  all  of  these  various 
forms of risk.
79  Further, as suggested above, Beck tends to define risks as objective 
realities that exist out there – risks are given, not constructed. They are empirical 
realities that arise out of extant manufacturing processes and technologies or, in the 
case of terrorism, intentional decisions by given actors.
80 As Beck argues, risks are 
both real and constituted by social perception and construction, hence he describes 
himself  as  ‘both  a  realist  and  a  constructivist’.
81  However,  for  Beck,  social  and 
cultural factors come into play only when one decides what risks to address and how 
to address them.
82  
Yet, as Aradau and Van Muster argue, this reduces cultural and social (and 
political) factors to intervening variables between objective material risks and social 
and policy responses to them.
83 This downplays and underemphasises the socially 
constructed and political nature of risk, which includes both the definition of what 
constitutes a risk and the selection of appropriate responses to given risks. Social, 
political and cultural factors both construct risks and shape responses to such risks; 
indeed, how a risk is socially constructed directly influences the measures adopted to 
manage it. As Coker argues: ‘What the West considers a risk will be moulded by its 
values  and  norms,  for  risks,  like  anxieties,  do  not  exist  independent  of  our 
                                                 
79 See Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in the World Risk Society’, a Hobhouse Memorial Lecture given on 
Wednesday, 15 February 2006 at the London School of Economics, Economy and Society 35, no. 3 
(2006): 329-45. 
80 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 44. 
81 Beck, World Risk Society, 143; Ulrich Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research 
Programmes’, in The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory, edited by Barbara 
Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon (London: Sage, 2000): 211-12.  
82 Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited’, 219. In more recent work, Beck seems to have shifted towards a 
constructivist understanding of risk, rather than only viewing risk assessment and management as 
socially predicated. In his most recent work, Beck has introduced the concept of ‘staging’ – the 
imagining and identification of risk. As he suggests ‘For only by imagining and staging world risk 
does the future catastrophe become present...’ See Beck, World at Risk, 10.   
83 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, 96. Risk and International Society 
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perceptions of them. Consequently, risks are contested’.
84 Likewise, Handmer and 
James suggest that one of the features of complex de-bounded risks is that values are 
central to definitions of risk and the selection of responses to a given risk.
85   
This is particularly important in the context of Western interventions aimed 
at  promoting  liberalism  and  democracy  and  the  effects  risk  has  for  international 
society’s constitution. Beck’s definition of risk is ill-suited to an analysis of the way 
in which the West perceives globalised security risks within international society, or 
the risk management techniques that are adopted in response to such risks. Adopting 
an objectivist or realist ontology of risk obscures the centrality of Western liberal 
values to definitions of, and responses to, risk. In turn, this obscures the effects that 
risk has for the pluralist constitution of international society. The absence of liberal 
democracy  is  central  to  Western  definitions  of  dangerous  environments  that  are 
conducive  as  originators  of  global  security  risks.  Such  an  absence  of  liberal 
democratic  institutions  (or  a  lack  of  social  or  political  institutions  altogether)  is 
indeed an existing empirical condition that to a certain extent (depending on how one 
defines liberalism, democracy or state failure) can be objectively identified. 
But state failure or illiberal regimes do not simply constitute objective risks 
in  their  own  right.  While  both  might  be  real  conditions,  the  way  in  which  such 
conditions are defined as risks is socially constructed. That is, the perception and 
definition of such conditions as threatening or risky is predicated upon perceptions 
of what Western societies deem to be dangerous or hazardous. Indeed, the definition 
of risk is extremely fluid – what is considered a risk in one context is not necessarily 
a  risk  in  another.  For  example,  Iraq  attempting  to  acquire  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  (WMD)  was  presented  as  a  dire  risk  with  potentially  catastrophic 
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consequences.  Yet  Pakistan,  another  state  previously  under  the  control  of  an 
unelected military dictator with an arsenal of nuclear warheads, is not considered 
risky. Rather, it is an ally of the US in the war on terror.
86 Despite the empirical 
facts, Iraq under Hussein was constructed as a risk while Pakistan under Musharraf 
was not. 
The point is that risks cannot simply be reduced to observable phenomena 
that are then separately subject to political and social contestation concerning which 
risks to address and how. Both the definition and management of risk are socially 
constructed. As Eriksson argues, ‘threats, risks, dangers – or whatever they are called 
– are social constructions’.
87 When examining risk management, the centrality of 
values again is apparent in the West’s ‘Grand Strategy’ of risk management, which 
involves promoting liberalism. There is little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest, 
as does the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), that democracy is the solution to 
terrorism and other global security risks – this is a response derived from a Western 
recourse to liberal values.
88 Western conceptions of risk and risk management are 
thus  specific  constructs  influenced  by  liberal  values.  As  argued  above,  the 
consequence of defining risks and risk management in terms of liberalism or its 
absence  for  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution  is  that  the  tolerance  of 
diversity among international society’s members that is central to pluralism becomes 
a risk in itself.  
Thus, the foundations of pluralist international society are eroded and a new 
international risk society displaying anti-pluralist and hierarchical trends emerges. 
                                                 
86 However, continuing political instability in Pakistan has been deemed to present a worrying risk for 
the West.  
87 Johan Eriksson (ed), Threat Politics: New Perspectives on Security, Risk and Crisis Management 
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001): 9.  
88 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (accessed 1 April 2006): 1. Risk and International Society 
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this argument when considered in the context 
of Beck’s world risk society thesis is its stark contrast to Beck’s analysis of the 
effects of risk for the state and international society. For Beck, the global nature of 
new  risks  means  that  states  will  only  be  able  to  manage  them  via  increasingly 
intensified  transnational  cooperation.  As  Beck  argues,  Western  and  non-Western 
societies  share  the  same  time  and  space  and  face  the  challenges  of  the  second 
modernity (world risk society) together.
89 The result, according to Beck, is that true 
cosmopolitanism emerges – world risk society breaks down the old antagonisms of 
industrial society (in particular the nation-state) and states, faced with global risks 
that  affect  them  all,  are  compelled  towards  the  development  of  cooperative 
international institutions.
90 
In other words, Beck suggests that faced with globalised risks, international 
society will transform into a form of world society. Further, the nation-state will 
disintegrate  as  it  is  circumvented  and  annulled  by  processes  of  globalisation, 
particularly its economic processes, and new global risks that escape its control.
91 As 
Beck puts it, the nation-state is a ‘zombie category’: it looks alive, but it is really 
dead.
92  Yet  it  is  precisely  the  opposite  that  has  occurred.  Firstly,  it  is  clear  that 
Beck’s  assumption  that  the  nation-state  will  fade  away  as  world  risk  society  is 
consolidated is naive, simplistic and lacking in empirical basis. The state has not 
faded away and does not appear likely do so in the foreseeable future. As Jarvis 
highlights, globalisation is what states make of it – there is no zero-sum relationship 
between globalisation (and risk) and the state.
93 
                                                 
89 Beck, World Risk Society, 2.  
90 Ibid., 16-20. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ulrich Beck, ‘Terror and Solidarity’, in Reordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of 
September 11
th, edited by Mark Leonard (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002): 115-16. 
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The real problem, however, lies with Beck’s prescriptions of a cosmopolitan 
community in which members of different states and societies share solidarity in the 
face  of  globalised  risks  that  affect  them  all.  Beck’s  argument  that  global, 
transnational  risks  require  transnational  cooperation  amongst  states  which  will 
eventually lead to a cosmopolitan world society is inadequate for conceptualising 
contemporary international society.
94 One of the problems is that Beck is far too 
quick to assume that globalisation and world risk society erode the foundations of 
the  nation-state  and  will  lead  to  its  eventual  usurpation  and  demise.  Such  an 
argument means that there is little need for an emphasis on the effects of risk for 
interstate relations or processes of interaction within international society, since both 
will eventually be subsumed under a new cosmopolitan world risk society bound 
together by the need to collectively manage common dangers.  
Indeed, Beck’s analysis of interstate relations in a world risk society goes 
little  further  than  that  the  management  of  global  risk  will  result  in  transnational 
cooperation between states. The assumption is that cooperation and negotiation will 
be the hallmarks of a world risk society in which all peoples face globalised risks. 
However,  Beck  never  fully  explains  why  this  should  be  the  case,  nor  does  he 
adequately explore the possibility that world risk society will lead to new forms of 
conflict as states attempt to manage risk within international society. In part, Beck’s 
assertion  of  transnational  cosmopolitanism  is  borne  partly  out  his  narrow 
conceptualisation of risk. Beck’s focus on global environmental risks as unintended 
consequences  of  technological  development  and  industrialisation  that  affect  all 
people allow him to suggest that given the mutuality between different societies in 
managing environmental risks, transnational cooperation and cosmopolitanism will 
                                                 
94 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Silence of Words: On War and Terror’, Security Dialogue 34, no. 3 (2003): 265-
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result. In this conceptualisation, there is no ‘other’ intentionally creating the risk – all 
societies contribute to environmental risks through the unintended side effects of 
industrialisation.
95 
Yet the perceived security risks faced by the West are defined as arising from 
the conscious intentions and actions of other states and individuals. International 
security risks are thus inherently human in nature. Terrorism, WMD proliferation or 
human rights abuses all arise out of intentional human activity. Security risks, at 
least as they are perceived and defined by the West, are thus defined in opposition to 
an ‘other’ – someone or some group of individuals (whether it be terrorist groups or 
rogue regimes) that constitute a risk that needs to be managed. Such a definition of 
risk creates an imperative for interventionist and possibly forceful modalities of risk 
management rather than just transnational cooperation. Globalised security risks thus 
constitute a different form of risk compared to Beck’s ‘technological risks’. They 
are, in Heng’s typology of risk, a form of ‘socio-political risk’ that originates in 
conscious human behaviour.
96 The point here is that different types of risk are not 
only defined in different ways, but they are managed via different activities and lead 
to differing social and political effects.   
Indeed, in a later work, Beck suggests just this, arguing that terrorism is a 
very  different  form  of  risk  compared  to  the  ecological  and  financial  risks  (both 
arising out of industrialisation or modernisation) that he had previously identified as 
part of world risk society.
97 Further, Beck argues, correctly this time, that with the 
advent of the terrorist threat, the state is back because of its role as the provider of 
                                                 
95 See Beck, Risk Society.  
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security.
98 Beck also states that definitions of the terrorist enemy ‘other’ by Western 
powers are ‘deterritorialized, de-nationalized and flexible state constructions that 
legitimize the global intervention of military powers as ‘self-defence’.
99 Further, in 
relation  to  the  risk  of  terrorism,  Beck  argues  that  it  has  produced  a  quasi-
revolutionary moment in world politics, one that could result in two very different 
situations. One, it could lead to the end of US unilateralism and isolationism, eroding 
state conflict and differences. On the other hand, it could mean a crusade that results 
in protectionism, nationalism and demonization of the other.
100  
These are curious statements because they would seem to contradict Beck’s 
broader claim that risks necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism. Global interventionism 
or  crusading  is  not  synonymous  with  cosmopolitan  negotiation  and  cooperation. 
Further,  these  statements  highlight  the  hierarchical  and  interventionist  trends  to 
which a social logic of risk gives rise within international society. Despite this, Beck 
continues his ‘cosmopolitan argument’, suggesting that global terrorism, like other 
risks, opens the door for the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan state’.
101 Beck thus fails 
to adequately address the tension that arises in attempting to argue that intentional 
globalised security risks and unintentional ecological and financial risks will have 
the same social and political effects and lead to the same cosmopolitan conclusion. 
Beck himself alludes to this tension with his remarks on the way in which Western 
constructions  of  terrorist  risks  legitimise  interventionist  practices,  or  how  the 
terrorist risk could lead either to further integration or conflict between states. 
                                                 
98 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Fight for a Cosmopolitan Future’, New Statesman 130, no. 4562 (5 November 
2001): 33-4.  
99 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 44 (italics in original). 
100 Beck, ‘Terror and Solidarity’, 114. 
101 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 49-50; Beck, ‘The Silence of Words’, 265-66. Interestingly, this idea 
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Further, Beck’s continued adherence to the ‘cosmopolitan argument’ betrays 
a lack of consideration and understanding of the impact of risk upon social relations 
between  states.  Beck’s  analysis  lacks  a  consideration  of  the  social  and  political 
conflicts to which risk gives rise within a pluralist international society in which 
Western powers have increasingly identified and defined zones of risk on the basis 
of their own liberal values.
102 These efforts at risk management contravene several of 
the norms and rules associated with a pluralist international society. Beck’s failure to 
consider such social conflict demonstrates a lack of understanding of the conditions 
that underpin a pluralist international society. Pluralist international society depends 
primarily  on  recognition  of  the  right  of  other  states  to  internally  constitute 
themselves according to their own societal values, something that is incompatible 
with  a  notion  of  risk  predicated  on  intentional  human  action  and  the  idea  that 
particular internal characteristics of states constitute ‘risky environments’. Beck’s 
analysis of risk thus obscures existing social relations among states in favour of the 
argument  that  these  social  relations,  indeed  international  society  itself,  will 
eventually be transcended. 
Therefore,  while  Beck’s  concepts  of  risk  and  reflexivity  are  useful  in 
understanding  the  nature  of  contemporary  hierarchy  and  constitutional  revision 
within international society, one needs to be careful when applying them to the study 
of International Relations. In particular, Beck can be rightly criticised for his failure 
to  engage  in  a  more  rigorous  examination  of  the  effects  of  risk  for  interstate 
relations,  rather  than  simply  assuming  that  world  risk  society  will  lead  to 
transnational  negotiation  and  a  cosmopolitan  world  society.  Instead,  as  has  been 
argued,  the  advent  of  globalised  security  risks  has  eroded  international  society’s 
                                                 
102 Such contestation was particularly evident during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. For more on 
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pluralist  basis,  leading  to  new  forms  of  conflict  and  new,  increasingly  prevalent 
trends  of  hierarchy  and  anti-pluralism.  It  is  precisely  this  constitutional 
transformation within international society that Beck has failed to capture. In short, 
international society is in the process of transformation, not transcendence.  
 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  explored  the  causal  factors  underpinning  Western 
interventionism in the post-Cold War era, arguing that a new liberal social logic of 
risk underpins these interventions and the hierarchical relationships of which they 
are  representative.  Stemming  in  large  part  from  the  anxieties  and  insecurities  of 
Western societies, international society has become a reflexive form of risk society. 
Yet it is not the world risk society that Beck envisioned. International society has not 
been replaced by a cosmopolitan world society. Certainly, actors other than the state, 
particularly transnational actors such as terrorist organisations, now factor heavily 
within international society. But the state has not been transplanted or eroded by risk, 
contrary  to  Beck’s  assertions.  Rather,  the  state  remains  the  fundamental  actor  in 
world politics – international society remains a society of states. Yet it is a different 
form  of  international  society  that  is  in  the  process  of  emerging,  reflected  in  the 
changing constitutive values that form the basis of this society. 
The  reconstitution  of  international  society  has  seen  increasingly  prevalent 
hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends emerge as Western states seek to manage the 
new risks of a globalised era. Pluralism has become a theme and a problem for itself. 
The notion that all states should be left to constitute their internal social and political 
institutions as they see fit, even if these should fail, has been steadily eroded in the 
post-Cold  War  era  by  the  potential  risks  posed  by  the  ‘chaos’  of  so-called Risk and International Society 
 
144 
 
‘peripheral’ states.
103 The identification of certain environments as conducive to the 
production  of  global  security  risks  creates  an  imperative  to  reshape  these 
environments, resulting in interventionist mechanisms of risk management designed 
to effect the promotion of liberal values and systems of governance. The next chapter 
examines the West’s liberal interventionism as a form of risk management. Rather 
than simply the promotion of liberal values per se, the attempts at promoting liberal 
values in locations such as Solomon Islands and Iraq have more do with preventing 
and managing risks than they have to do with bringing ‘freedom’ and democracy to 
oppressed peoples.
104 Security at home for the West is increasingly seen to depend 
upon liberalism abroad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, 18. 
104 See chapters 5-7 for more details.   
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Four 
The Management of Risk: Promoting Liberal 
Values within International Society 
 
 
Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the post-Cold War era has presented 
Western governments with a range of new security issues, issues that present much 
less of a concrete threat than they do a future and ill-defined risk. Contemporary 
security issues, particularly terrorism, are defined by their temporal and spatial de-
bounding.  These  risks  are  difficult  to  locate  and  can  be  potentially  catastrophic 
should they materialise. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) 1991 
Strategic Concept states: ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the 
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, 
which  makes  them  hard  to  predict  and  assess...’
1  Faced  with  the  high  levels  of 
uncertainty  that  surround  de-bounded  risks  and  potential  catastrophe,  Western 
governments have become increasingly occupied with anticipating and preventing 
these risks before they occur.  
In effect, Western governments have explicitly taken up the mantle of risk 
managers,  seeking  to  govern  risk  and  prevent  negative  future  occurrences.  In  its 
effort to govern security risks, the West has attempted to police the globe, keeping a 
close  watch  over  risky  areas  of  instability  and  intervening  to  reshape  dangerous 
                                                 
1  NATO,  The  Alliance's  Strategic  Concept  agreed  by  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government 
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Rome, 8 November 1991). Also see High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 
(New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004). 
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environments by imposing liberal reform when the risks posed have been deemed 
too  severe.  Indeed,  this  form  of  risk  management  takes  its  cue  from  domestic 
policing models which have replaced the previous focus on crime control and the 
rehabilitation  of  offenders  with  a  new  focus  on  crime  prevention  and  the 
management of criminal behaviour. As Wright argues, high levels of contingency 
and variability in the social and natural environments means that all possibilities 
cannot  be  controlled.
2  Emphasis  is  thus  placed  on  surveillance  and  the 
implementation of preventative mechanisms.   
As  noted,  one  crucial  way  in  which  Western  societies  have  attempted  to 
manage risks has been via the promotion of their own liberal values. The promotion 
of  liberalism  is  not  a  facet  of  Western,  or  more  specifically,  US  foreign  policy 
unique to the post-Cold War era. The idea that democracy and liberalism can be 
promoted as a way of facilitating international peace dates back to the end of the 
First  World  War  and  the  ideological  views  of  US  President  Woodrow  Wilson.
3 
Wilson was one of the first statesmen to articulate the ideas that liberal democracy 
was  the  apogee  of  political  development,  and  that  the  spread  of  the  liberal 
democratic governance model would ensure domestic stability and prosperity within 
states and peace internationally.
4 Since this time, the idea of promoting liberal values 
has retained a central place within US foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, 
this  ideological  commitment  to  the  global  spread  of  liberalism  has  enjoyed  a 
renewed vigour among the US and other Western states.  
                                                 
2 Alan Wright, Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002): 
102. 
3 These views were encapsulated in Wilson’s address to a Joint Session of Congress in 1918. See 
Woodrow Wilson, ‘Program for World’s Peace’, Speech delivered to a Joint Session of the United 
States Congress (8 January 1918).  
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However, interventions to promote liberal values have not been undertaken 
simply for the sake of these values themselves, nor have they been entirely motivated 
(though they may have been in part) by an altruistic desire to bring freedom and 
prosperity to oppressed peoples. Rather, Western attempts to promote liberalism in 
the post-Cold War era constitute a self-interested and utilitarian mechanism of risk 
management.  It  is  not  simply  liberal  values per  se  that  provide  the  impetus  and 
rationale for post-Cold War Western interventions, but the more utilitarian and self-
interested notion that liberal democratic governance provides a way of minimising 
and managing the new risks of the post-Cold War era. Security at home for the West 
increasingly depends upon liberalism abroad.  
As Rasmussen suggests: ‘Even the promise of democracy as a recipe for 
peace and human freedom is today rather a way to manage risk than to realise a 
liberal utopia’.
5 This prescription of liberalism as a tool for managing risks is derived 
from  the  ideological  assumptions  of  a  hierarchical  and  anti-pluralist  form  of 
liberalism that were outlined in the second chapter. But as is argued in this chapter, 
liberalism and democracy are not ends in themselves; they are a means to an end: the 
management of risk and the mitigation of (perceived) Western insecurity in the post-
Cold War era. To argue that liberalism is promoted simply because of the desirability 
or  superiority  of  these  values  themselves,  one  would  need  to  address  both  the 
conspicuous selectivity of Western targets of intervention and the illiberal means 
employed in pursuit of the spread of liberal values.    
The  remainder  of  the  chapter  proceeds  as  follows.  Firstly,  it  investigates 
different  characteristics  of  risk  management,  in  particular  the  ideas  of  the 
precautionary  principle,  anticipation  and  prevention.  These  characteristics  are 
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substantial features of the interventions conducted by the West aimed at promoting 
liberal  values  and  institutions.  In  particular,  the  concepts  of  prevention  and  the 
precautionary principle are important components of interventions that are justified 
by  a  risk  management  rationale.  The  next  section  of  the  chapter  examines  more 
closely the idea of the promotion of liberal values as a form of risk management, and 
looks at the similarities between domestic policing models that advocate the removal 
or  reshaping  of  those  environmental  conditions  deemed  conducive  to  risk  and 
initiatives  aimed  at  promoting  liberal  values.  The  final  section  addresses  Heng’s 
argument that the promotion of liberal values and risk management are two distinct, 
incompatible activities. It argues instead that promoting liberalism in the post-Cold 
War era is best understood as a form of risk management, aimed at reducing the 
opportunities for the origination of risk.  
 
The Management of Risk 
The management of risk has become a core part of the business of Western 
governments in the late-modern age.
6 From health to immigration to the environment 
and  of  course  to  new  globalised  security  risks,  risk  management  has  become  an 
increasingly important function of government. But what is risk management? What 
are some of the activities or mechanisms that one might identify as being involved in 
the management of risk? The simple answer is that there are many. There is no one 
single  technique  or  activity  that  constitutes  risk  management.  Rather,  risk 
management involves a multitude of approaches, principles and activities.
7 However, 
regardless of the methods or principles adopted, all forms of risk management are 
                                                 
6 United Kingdom Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle 
Risk and Uncertainty (November 2002), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strateg 
y/assets/su risk.pdf (accessed 15 May 2007).  
7 Heng, War as Risk Management, 52.  The Management of Risk 
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centred  upon  reducing  the  likelihood  and  understanding  the  consequences  of 
negative  future  events.
8  Risk  management  is  thus  primarily  concerned  with 
prevention – when we seek to manage risk, we ultimately seek to prevent particular 
future scenarios from occurring.  
Risk  management’s  focus  on  the  likelihood  of  future  events  and  the 
consequences  of  their  materialisation  means  that  it  is  characterised  by  three  key 
characteristics: proactive anticipation, the precautionary principle and, as mentioned, 
prevention.  This  section  of  the  chapter  examines  each  of  these  features  of  risk 
management, beginning with proactive anticipation, which is the first step in any 
form of risk management process. It then examines in more detail the notion of 
prevention (as opposed to pre-emption – see below) and the precautionary principle. 
This section concludes with a brief consideration of the political implications of risk 
management  activities  and  processes,  particualrly  their  potentially  un-evaluable 
nature.  When  attempting  to  govern  future  occurrences  that  may  or  may  not 
materialise,  it  becomes  almost  impossible  to  evaluate  the  efficacy  of  the 
implemented risk management processes or whether those attemtping to manage the 
risk genuinely believed that there was a potential danger in the first place. 
Before risk management processes can be implemented, there must first be a 
risk to prevent – adverse future scenarios or events must be proactively predicted. 
When we anticipate risks, we are also essentially defining the risks that we seek to 
address. As suggested in the previous chapter, the anticipation and definition of risk 
is a socially mediated exercise. Risks do not just exist out there; risk anticipation and 
definition depend in large part upon subjective perception, including the values that 
                                                 
8 Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, ‘Introduction’, in Managing Strategic Surprise: 
Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment, edited by Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and 
David Gordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 4. The Management of Risk 
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we bring to bear when defining risk.
9 The sorts of anticipated scenarios that we 
define as risks will be shaped by subjective understandings of what we deem to 
potentially dangerous or threatening.
10  
However,  risk  anticipation  is  not  only  concerned  with  anticipating  and 
defining the risk. It also involves assessing the likelihood that the risk will occur and 
the consequences of its materialisation. Risk is defined in terms of probabilities and 
consequences, which means that a large part of risk anticipation and definition must 
be  concerned  with  attempting  to  understand  the  likelihood  and  consequences  of 
occurrence.
11 Indeed, anticipation of possible security risks is especially important 
when  faced  with  the  potentially  catastrophic  results  of  their  realisation,  as  was 
demonstrated  in  the  aftermath  of  9/11.  Anticipating  risks  is  thus  an  attempt  to 
colonise the future by identifying potential dangers and assessing their probabilities 
and consequences.
12 In an age of risk, society becomes much more speculative as it 
seeks to deal with the unknown and manage global security risks.
13   
This  means  that  surveillance  and  monitoring  are  crucial  aspects  of  risk 
anticipation and definition. Horizon-scanning becomes a highly important activity in 
a risk society. This is most readily demonstrated in the recent advent of various types 
of ‘early warning systems’ such as military satellite technologies, improved tsunami 
                                                 
9 The centrality of values to the anticipation and definition of risk is crucial to understanding the 
West’s invocation of liberal values not only in defining what constitutes a risk (lack of liberalism) but 
also its response to security risks (promoting liberal values).   
10 As Bracken, Bremmer and Gordon note, strong differences are to be expected between individuals 
and societies when it comes to the management of risk. See Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David 
Gordon, ‘Conclusion: Managing Strategic Surprise’, in Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From 
Risk Management and Risk Assessment, edited by Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 304. 
11 Heng, The “Transformation of War” Debate’, 71. 
12 Pat Caplan, ‘Introduction: Risk Revisited’, in Risk Revisited, edited by Pat Caplan (London: Pluto 
Press, 2000): 22.              
13 Beck, Risk Society, 22.  The Management of Risk 
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warning systems in Australia or multitudes of medical scans and ‘check-ups’.
14 Early 
warning systems and processes in effect allow us to ‘peer into the future’ through 
constant surviellance and vigilance. The idea is to mitigate uncertainty and surprise 
by providing constant information on potential areas of risk and early notification of 
any emergent ‘dangers on the horizon’. The anticipation, definition and assessment 
of risk thus depends in large part upon constant flows of information derived from 
processes of monitoring and surveillance.  
Once  a  potential  risk  has  been  anticipated  and  defined,  it  must  then  be 
prevented from occurring. As mentioned above, prevention is a central focus of risk 
management. As Van Munster states ‘Because risk management is not focused upon 
an  existing  existential  threat,  the  logic  of  risk  management  is  by  definition 
preventive’.
15 However, it is important to note that the concept of prevention is not 
synonymous with that of pre-emption. Much has been made recently of the concept 
of pre-emption after the Bush Administration’s 2002 NSS outlined a strategy of pre-
emptive self defence to meet the threats (or rather risks) of terrorism and rogue states 
seeking  to  aquire  WMD.
16  Despite  Rasmussen’s  claim  that  prevention  and  pre-
emption are not analytically distinct, prevention is not to be confused with the term 
pre-emption.
17 As Yost suggests, ‘pre-emptive attack consists of prompt action on 
the  basis  of  evidence  that  an  enemy  is  about  to  strike,  while  –  in  contrast  – 
preventive  war  involves  military  operations  undertaken  to  avert  a  plausible  but 
                                                 
14 Paul Bracken, ‘How to Build a Warning System’, in Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From 
Risk Management and Risk Assessment, edited by Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 16. 
15 Rens Van Munster, ‘Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War 
on  Terror’,  Political  Science  Publications  10/2005  (Department  of  Political  Science  and  Public 
Management: University of Southern Denmark, 2005): 8. 
16 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002): 6. 
17 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 94.  The Management of Risk 
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hypothetical future risk’.
18 Thus pre-emption involves reacting to a threat defined on 
the  basis  of  capabilities  and  intentions,  whereas  prevention  refers  to  proactively 
addressing future scenarios that may or may not occur.  
The right of pre-emptive self defence is one that has been recognised within 
customary  international  law  for  some  time.
19  The  criteria  employed  in  assessing 
whether a state has a right to pre-emption has generally been restrictive, concerned 
almost exclusively with the imminence of an attack that a particular state seeks to 
pre-empt.
20  In  1841,  US  Secretary  of  State  Daniel  Webster  articulated  a  legal 
doctrine  of  pre-emption  when  he  argued  that  need  to  act  pre-emptively  must  be 
‘instant,  overwhelming,  and  leaving  no  choice  of  means,  and  no  moment  for 
deliberation’.
21 This focus on imminence and minimal time for deliberating options 
suggests that pre-emption is an activity carried out in response to a threat that can be 
clearly located and which is extant. As Van Munster suggests ‘Whereas anticipatory 
self-defence as it is understood in international law still operated with an image of 
reactive violence, the war on terrorism replaces this picture with that of proactive 
intervention’.
22 Pre-emption is geared towards addressing present threats in the here 
and now, not ill-defined risks that may be realised sometime in the future, as is 
prevention. Risk management therefore cannot adequately be conceptualised as an 
activity in pre-emption – it is an activity in prevention.  
Despite the somewhat confusing language of threat and pre-emption used in 
the 2002 NSS, what this document actually outlines is a concept of risk management 
                                                 
18 David S. Yost, ‘NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force’, International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 
41 (italics in original). Also see Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’, Political Science 
Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003): 365-388. 
19 Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-emption’, European Journal of International Law 14, 
no. 2 (2003): 214.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of 6 August 1842, cited in David 
M. Ackerman, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq’, Congressional 
Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 11 April 2003): 2. 
22 Van Munster, ‘Logics of Security’, 9.  The Management of Risk 
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centred on a preventive form of self-defence aimed at proactively anticipating and 
managing globalised security risks. Two passages from the NSS are of note. Firstly, 
the document suggests that ‘Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United 
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past’.
23 
Rather than reacting to threats as it did before, the US now seeks to proactively 
prevent these threats, or risks, from occurring at all. Further the NSS goes on to state 
that 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent 
such  hostile  acts  by  our  adversaries,  the  United  States  will,  if  necessary,  act 
preemptively.
24 
This statement outlines a rationale of preventing spatially and temporally de-
bounded  risks  rather  than  reacting  to  well-defined  threats  and  is  distinctly 
precautionary (see below). Finally, speaking of rogue states attemtping to acquire 
WMD, the NSS suggests that ‘We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction 
against the United States and our allies and friends’.
25 This statement clearly outlines 
a doctrine of proactive and anticipatory action and does away with the criteria of 
imminence that is central to the legality of pre-emptive action under international 
law. Thus, depsite the confusing language of pre-emption and threat employed in the 
document, the NSS essentially outlines an anticipatory and preventive doctrine of 
risk management. Faced with ill-defined globalised security risks, the only course of 
                                                 
23 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002): 15. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 14 (italics mine).  The Management of Risk 
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action  open  to  Western  societies  is  to  proactively  prevent  these  risks  from 
occurring.
26 
This emphasis on proactivity and prevention is also reflected in the 2006 US 
Department  of  Defense’s  Quadrennial  Defense  Review,  which  suggests  that  the 
Department has undergone a shift in emphasis ‘From responding after a crisis starts 
(reactive) – to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive)’ and 
‘From crisis response – to shaping the future’.
27 The National Defense Strategy deals 
with similar issues, arguing that ‘A reactive or defensive approach would not allow 
the United States to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open 
society’.
28 Rather, a preventive and anticipatory approach is required in order to deal 
with the new global security risks. The document also suggests that ‘Uncertainty is 
the  defining  characteristic  of  today's  strategic  environment’.
29 I n  an  uncertain 
environment,  one  cannot  simply  wait  for  risks  to  materialise  –  one  must  act  to 
prevent possibly catastrophic future occurrences. 
This uncertainty and concern for the possibly catastrophic consequences of 
realised security risks leads to an emphasis on the third main characteristic of risk 
management: the precautionary principle, or ‘better safe than sorry’ doctrine. Faced 
with possibily devastating consequences, it is deemed better to act on the basis of 
uncertainty and attempt to prevent the risk rather than wait for confirmation that the 
                                                 
26 This preventive approach is also evident in the High Level Panel’s recommendations on dealing 
with new, transnational and interconnected security issues. See High Level Panel, A More Secure 
World. 
27 United States Department of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (6 February 2006), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (accessed 5 July 2007): vi. 
28 United States Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States (March 
2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf (accessed 7 September 2007): 
1. 
29 Ibid., 2.  The Management of Risk 
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risk  is  real  when  it  could  be  too  late  to  act  preventively.
30  As  Heng  claims, 
precautionary principles only come into play when certainty concerning a risk is 
contested  and  the  potential  of  catastrophic  damage  is  great.
31  The  precautionary 
principle first arose in response to global environmental risks and was enshrined in 
Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  
This document states that ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.
32 Originally, the idea 
of the precautionary principle was designed to speed up environmental decision-
making if it was being delayed by scientific uncertainty and a lack of knowledge.
33 
The effect of this is that the precautionary principle provides a way of overcoming 
the need for proving that a risk is real or imminent, legitimating preventive action in 
the face of uncertainty.
34  It compels decision-makers to address more false negatives 
(risks  that  were  thought  non-existent  or  relatively  small  in  likelihood  and 
consequence but were actually real and serious) and be less hesitant in addressing 
false positives (risks thought real and serious which later turned out to be small or 
non-existent).
35 
In dealing with contemporary security issues, Bush and other Western leaders 
have  explicitly  invoked  precautionary  principles  to  justify  actions  designed  to 
                                                 
30  Jessica  Stern  and  Jonathan  B.  Wiener,  ‘Precaution  Against  Terrorism’,  in  Managing  Strategic 
Surprise:  Lessons  From  Risk  Management  and  Risk  Assessment,  edited  by  Paul  Bracken,  Ian 
Bremmer and David Gordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 111. 
31 Heng, War as Risk Management, 57. 
32  United  Nations  Environment  Programme,  Rio  Declaration  on  Environment  and  Development 
(1992), http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 
& l=en (accessed 15 May 2007). Despite the divergent discourses, the politics of the environment and 
national security have both employed the same concepts and ideas – those of risk, prevention and 
precaution.  Although  faced  with  different  types  of  risk,  both  advocate  the  use  of  precautionary 
doctrines. 
33  Hans  Sanderson  and  Soren  Petersen,  ‘Power  Analysis  as  a  Reflexive  Scientific  Tool  for 
Interpretation  and  Implementation  of  the  Precautionary  Principle  in  the  European  Union’, 
Environmental Science and Pollution Research 9, no. 4 (2002): 221.  
34 Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, 115.  
35 Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, 115; Heng, War as Risk Management, 57. The Management of Risk 
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manage security risks. In a 2004 speech on global terrorism, Tony Blair outlined a 
rationale for precautionary and preventive action by the British Government when he 
suggested that  
On each occasion the most careful judgement has to be made taking account of 
everything we know and the best assessment and advice available. But in making 
that judgement, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? Or 
not to act and hope it's OK? And suppose we don't act and the intelligence turns 
out to be right, how forgiving will people be?
36   
In other words, Blair’s message is it is better to be safe than sorry and act to prevent 
possible risks before they are realised.  
Bush too has explicitly invoked precautionary principles in his justifications 
for military action against terrorists and rogue states. Speaking of rogue states in his 
2002 State of the Union address, Bush stated that  
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States.  In  any  of  these  cases,  the  price  of  indifference  would  be 
catastrophic...We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side.  I will not wait on 
events, while dangers gather.  I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. 
 The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.
37  
Again,  Bush  speaks  in  the  language  of  possibilities  –  rogue  states  could 
provide arms to terrorists; they might attempt to attack the West. He also speaks in 
the  language  of  precaution  –  the  US  will  not  wait  on  such  risks  to  materialise. 
                                                 
36 Tony Blair, Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat (London: Office of the 
Prime Minister, 5 March 2004). 
37 George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 
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Instead, it will act with precaution and prevent these risks from occurring. Former 
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also spoke in precautionary terms after 
9/11, suggesting at a NATO Defence Ministers Meeting that absolute proof cannot 
be a precondition for action.
38 Further, Dick Cheney is reported to have suggested 
that even if the probability of a WMD or terrorist attack was only one percent, the 
US should act as if it were a certainty.
39 Both Rumsfeld’s remarks and Cheney’s 
reported arguments are strongly indicative of the precautionary principle, advocating 
action even in the face of little or no evidence, uncertainty and imperfect knowledge.  
Crucially,  this  emphasis  on  prevention  and  precaution  legitimates  the 
management of risk within those dangerous environments in which possible dangers 
originate. It defeats the purpose of anticipating and preventing risks to simply wait 
for the risk to arrive on one’s doorstep. Further, from a precautionary perspective 
waiting for the risk to arrive would be irresponsible. It is better to act cautiously and 
manage the risk well away from vulnerable areas and avoid any possible disasters. 
The  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  follows  such  a  logic,  suggesting  that  in 
adopting a preventive and precautionary stance, the first line of defence will often be 
abroad.
40  A  preventive  and  precautionary  doctrine  of  risk  management,  in  the 
context of managing security risks within international society, is thus potentially 
also  an  interventionist  doctrine.  It  provides  a  rationale  for  anticipating  risks  that 
might arise in a risky zone of international society and proactively intervening in this 
zone to manage potential hazards.  
                                                 
38  Donald  Rumsfeld,  ‘Remarks  by  US  Secretary  of  Defense,  Donald  Rumsfeld  at  the  Defence 
Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council’ (6 June 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/200 
2/s020606d.htm (accessed 15 September 2006). 
39 See Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its Enemies Since 
9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).  
40 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy 
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003): 11.  The Management of Risk 
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Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  risk  management’s  emphasis  on 
prevention and precaution also means that when assessing the effectiveness of risk 
management activities, performance is evaluated in negative terms of non-events 
rather than positive outcomes. If a possibly adverse future scenario never occurs, this 
can be taken as an indicator of the success of the risk management processes and 
practices that were proactively implemented to manage the risk and prevent its future 
realisation. Risk management is an activity or process that is evaluated in terms of 
what did not happen rather than what did. Because of its focus on prevention, we can 
only ever conclusively evaluate the failure of a risk management activity – if the risk 
being managed is not prevented and actually occurs then it is fairly obvious that risk 
management has failed. But if the possible future scenario never happens, how do we 
assess  whether  this  was  a  result  of  implemented  risk  management  practices  or 
whether we simply incorrectly anticipated a risk that was not going to occur? 
Without straying too deeply into this topic, it is important to be aware that as 
the process of risk definition is subjective and socially mediated, it is also inherently 
political.  This  means  that  the  implementation  of  risk  management  activities  can 
potentially be useful in serving narrow political interests rather than highlighting a 
genuinely  potentially  dangerous  object  or  situation.  There  is  thus  an  inherent 
riskiness  to  the  management  of  risk  itself,  particularly  in  an  age  where  Western 
governments have demonstrated their preparedness to intervene in certain instances 
in response to perceived global security risks. The upshot is that if a risk does not 
occur  it  is  difficult  to  establish  whether  this  was  a  result  of  risk  management 
practices, incorrect anticipations of risk (false positives), or a deliberate invocation The Management of Risk 
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of risk designed to serve ulterior political motives.
41 Preventing future possibilities 
means that risk management becomes almost un-evaluable. 
Thus,  paradoxically,  while  risk  perception  and  definition  are  inherently 
political exercises that rely on subjective interpretation and arguably serve distinctive 
political interests, the very definition of an object or scenario as ‘risky’ serves to 
mask the social and political context within which such risks are constructed. As 
Jayasuriya argues:  
By conceiving of these threats as various types of risk, these theories of reflexive 
modernization work to dislodge the social and political context that produces these 
threats, and end up naturalizing these risks and failing to understand the way in 
which these risks are both naturalized and politicized.
42 
Especially  within  the  context  of  contemporary  interventions  designed  to  manage 
risk,  one  must  be  wary  of  preventive  and  precautionary  doctrines  that  mandate 
interventionist actions on the basis of ifs, maybes and probabilities. As Rasmussen 
notes ‘It is fortunate that people should remain critical about strategic precautionary 
principles, because the doctrine of managing the flows of insecurity by occasional 
pre-emption  makes  it  impossible  to  hold  policymakers  accountable  for  their 
policies’.
43  
Proactivity,  anticipation,  prevention  and  precaution  are  active  elements  of 
risk management. As will be demonstrated, they are certainly features of Western 
interventionism  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  However,  these  are  broad  risk 
management features and what must also be discussed are the specific practices that 
have  been  employed  by  the  West  in  its  bid  to  manage  globalised  security  risks. 
                                                 
41 For example, it could be argued that the justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (the risk of 
WMD proliferation) were merely a cover for the real motive behind the invasion, namely the Bush 
administration’s desire to secure Iraqi oil reserves. For more on this, see chapter seven.  
42 Kanishka Jayasuriya, Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2005): 43.    
43 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 137.  The Management of Risk 
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Important  here  is  the  notion  of  ‘reshaping  the  environment’  –  identifying 
environments  with  dangerous  characteristics  and  mitigating  or  eliminating  these 
characteristics so as to reduce the likelihood that they will produce risk. This form of 
risk  management  takes  its  cue  from  criminology  and  doctrines  of  ‘crime 
management’  that  attained  popularity  in  Western  societies  in  the  1970s.  The 
following section thus focuses on the contemporary management and prevention of 
crime  in  Western  societies  in  order  to  provide  insights  into  how  reshaping  the 
environment  as  a  form  of  risk  management  has  been  used  by  the  West  within 
international society in the post-Cold War era.    
 
Managing Crime in Western Societies: Policing Environments of Risk 
In  their  respective  works  on  risk,  war  and  strategic  studies  in  the 
contemporary age, both Heng and Rasmussen make reference to the importance of 
criminology in the study of risk and risk management practices.
44 In the 1970s, new 
criminologies emerged that focused on crime not as an abberration or abnormality to 
be controlled, but as a risk to be managed via a range of different policing techniques 
and methods.
45 These new risk management-focused criminologies contain elements 
that  are  useful  in  understanding  contemporary  Western  interventionism  within 
international society, particularly the focus on managing risk through the promotion 
of  liberal  values  and  political  institutions.  It  is  precisely  this  technique  of 
environmental reshaping that the West has employed in its attempt to manage risk 
within international society. 
Prior to the emergence of new criminologies in the 1970s, the focus of crime 
control and prevention was on rehabilitating individual offenders and attempting to 
                                                 
44 Heng, War as Risk Management, 35-8; Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 106-8.  
45 David Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society’, British Journal of Criminology 36, no. 4 (1996): 445-71. The Management of Risk 
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address  the  underlying  causes  of  criminal  behaviour.
46  The  emphasis  on 
rehabilitation was largely reactionary – once a criminal had already committed an 
offence  and  had  been  caught,  they  could  then  be  punished  and  rehabilitated. 
Obviously, this focus on rehabilitation remains, but as Heng suggests, by the 1970s 
the  overarching  theme  of  criminology  had  shifted.
47  There  was  widespread 
dissatisfaction with rehabilitation as a method of crime control and prevention.
48 
Faced  with  rising  crime  rates  in  the  face  of  attempts  to  rehabilitate  offenders, 
criminologists and Western governments admitted that crime could not be wholly 
eliminated. Instead, it would have to be accepted as a social risk to be managed.  
Policing thus became more about the management of the risk of criminal 
activity.  Believing  that  crime  could  not  be  eradicated,  Western  governments  and 
criminologists turned their attention to preventing criminal acts before they occurred. 
The  modern  focus  of  controlling  crime  via  the  punishment  and  rehabilitation  of 
criminals has given way to a more managerial focus concerned with the prevention 
of criminal risk.
49 The focus of policing has therefore shifted from the individual 
offender to the wider society of potential victims who must be protected.
50 Managing 
crime involves managing the environment in which criminals operate rather than 
managing  and  controlling  individual  offenders.
51  In  other  words,  the  previous 
emphasis on the criminal disposition of the individual has given way to an empahsis 
on the environmental situation within which crime occurs.
52  
                                                 
46 Nancy Reichman, ‘Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance Based Model of Social Control’, 
in Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control 8, edited by Andrew T. Scull and Stephen Spitzer 
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986): 164. 
47 Heng, War as Risk Management, 37.  
48  Gordon  Hughes,  Understanding  Crime  Prevention:  Social  Control,  Risk  and  Late  Modernity 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998): 59. 
49 Wright, Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice, 40-2. 
50 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.  
51 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 108.  
52 Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, 59.  The Management of Risk 
 
162 
 
This focus on the management of crime has given rise to policing approaches 
that emphasise the prevention of crime by reducing environmental factors that are 
conducive  to  criminal  activity.  In  other  words,  by  reshaping  risky  environments, 
authorities  can  remove  opportunities  to  engage  in  criminal  activity  and  hence 
mitigate the risk of criminal conduct and the damage that this may entail.
53 This 
policing tactic is known as ‘situational crime prevention’, which Clarke defines as ‘a 
pre-emptive approach that relies, not on improving society or its institutions, but 
simply on reducing the opportunities for crime’.
54 In other words, as Rose argues, 
the  aim  of  situational  crime  prevention  is  to  ‘act  pre-emptively  upon  potentially 
problematic zones, to structure them in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of 
undesirable events or conduct occurring’.
55 Faced with an inability to influence or 
change the causes of criminal behaviour, it is preferable to focus efforts on changing 
environmental factors which are more susceptible to manipulation and change.
56  
As Hughes  suggests, the notion of situational crime prevention is essentially 
a form of risk management.
57 Situational crime prevention views crime as a risk to 
be  managed,  focusing  on  preventing  possible  future  crime  by  reshaping 
environments that are conducive to criminal activity.
58 Criminal risk is mitigated by 
manipulating  the  circumstances  in  which  such  behaviour  is  exhibited  via  the 
establishment  of  forms  of  control  over  risky  situations  and  spaces.
59  There  are 
numerous examples of situational crime prevention measures, such as Closed Circuit 
TV  cameras  on  street  corners  in  major  cities  and  home  alarm  systems.  These 
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measures make it more difficult for individuals to engage in criminal activity without 
getting caught, and in doing so hopefully reduce the incentives for crime. This of 
course serves to reduce the likelihood that crime will occur, mitigating the risk of 
criminal  activity.  This  model  of  situational  crime  prevention  represents  a  new 
penology, one which focuses on probabilistic calcualtions of risk.
60  
The increasing centrality of risk and risk management within criminology 
and  policing  is  demonstrative  of  a  wider  social  preoccupation  with  risk  in  late-
modern  Western  societies.  But  these  criminological  studies  of  risk  and  risk 
management  are  important  not  simply  because  they  demonstrate  a  preoccuaption 
with risk similar to the West’s view of the dangers posed by a globalised pluralist 
international society. They are important because this domestic policing model of 
environmental reshaping is one that the West has adopted in its attempts to manage 
globalised security risks within international society. As Coker argues: 
In this world of uncertainties and risks, the only option open to governments is to 
police the world. And in a globalised age we see the emergence of a new concept 
of  policing  which  takes  its  cue  from  the  domestic  model,  where  people  have 
moved from ‘community policing’ to ‘policing communities of risk’.
61 
Similar to the domestic policing model, Western interventionism is a form of 
situational prevention: those territories that are deemed to pose an intolerable risk are 
reshaped  via  the  promotion  of  liberal  values  and  democratic  governance.  Based 
heavily upon the ideological prescriptions of theories associated with a hierarchical 
version of international liberalism surveyed in chapter two, Western governments 
have explicitly invoked liberalism and democracy as the key to managing risk. The 
next section examines the promotion of liberalism as a form of risk management. 
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Conceptualising  the  promotion  of  liberal  values  as  risk  management  provides  an 
explanation of many of the key features of the contemporary promotion of liberal 
values,  such  as  why  only  particular  territories  are  targeted  for  intervention  and 
importantly  why  liberal  values  are  paradoxically  promoted  via  illiberal  means. 
Scholars such as Simpson have identified this paradox, but have failed to provide an 
account of why this relationship obtains.  
 
Managing Risk Through Liberalism 
The notion that liberalism is the solution to global security risks is derived 
from a Western recourse to its own liberal values, and is heavily predicated upon 
ideas of democratic or liberal peace. As discussed in chapter two, these theories 
suggest  that  international  peace  and  prosperity  depend  upon  domestic  liberal 
governance within as many states as possible. Indeed, chapter two outlined the extent 
to  which  a  large  body  of  scholars  display  an  ideological  commitment  to  liberal 
democracy as the only legitimate form of government (or governance). Building on 
this material, this section examines the extent to which liberal values and institutions 
are touted by Western governments not only as the standard of legitimate statehood 
within  international  society,  but  also  as  the  primary  means  by  which  Western 
societies can achieve security in the uncertain and risky post-Cold War international 
society. 
Therefore, this section explores the arguments put forth by several Western 
governments that suggest that liberalism is a means to security. It argues that the 
inclusion of liberalism within discourses of security and risk management explains 
many of the features of the contemporary promotion of liberal values, particularly 
the  selectivity  apparent  in  determining  which  territories  will  be  subject  to The Management of Risk 
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intervention  and  socio-political  reshaping  and  the  paradoxically  illiberal  methods 
that have been used to promote liberal values. While liberalism is certainly crucial to 
the  definition  of  what  constitutes  a  potentially  dangerous  environment  and  the 
selection  of  appropriate  risk  management  techniques,  Western  interventionism 
cannot be understood as an exercise in promoting liberal values simply for the sake 
of these values themselves. Rather, liberalism is established as the primary means by 
which Western societies can achieve security in the uncertain and risky post-Cold 
War international society. 
As Rasmussen has suggested, faced with uncertainty and unpredictability, 
Western leaders have sought recourse to values for guidance on how to deal with 
these new forms of risk.
62 Indeed, Western leaders have explicitly sought to invoke 
liberal values, deemed to be certain and enduring, as means of generating greater 
certainty  and  mitigating  feelings  of  insecurity  among  a  populace  faced  with 
uncertainties  and  risks.
63  Liberal  values  become  the  key  to  managing  risks  and 
providing  security  for  an  increasingly  insecure  society.  For  example,  Blair  has 
overtly  spoken  of  the  centrality  of  Western  liberal  values,  speaking  of  the 
intertwining of values and interests, and asserting that ‘The spread of our values 
makes  us  safer’.
64  Speaking  of  Iraq,  Blair  suggested  that  the  fight  against  rogue 
states and terrorism was one defined precisely in terms of the defence of Western 
values against the extremist ideology of the terrorists.
65 
Former US Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush have also spoken in 
similar terms concerning the spread of Western values of liberty and democracy. 
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Clinton’s 1998 NSS asserts that ‘Underpinning our international leadership is the 
power of our democratic ideals and values. In designing our strategy, we recognize 
that  the  spread  of  democracy  supports  American  values  and  enhances  both  our 
security and prosperity’.
66 The subsequent 1999 NSS likewise suggests that ‘Our 
security  depends  upon  the  protection  and  expansion  of  democracy  worldwide, 
without  which  repression,  corruption  and  instability  could  engulf  a  number  of 
countries...’
67 Bush too has spoken in such terms, the 2006 NSS suggesting that     
In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the 
distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a 
world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens 
and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best 
way to provide enduring security for the American people.
68 
More  specifically,  in  response  to  the  risk  of  terrorism  the  2006  National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism suggests that ‘The long-term solution for winning 
the  War  on  Terror  is  the  advancement  of  freedom  and  human  dignity  through 
effective democracy’.
69 Western liberal values are therefore integral to the definition 
and management of risk within international society. The way in which the West 
defines and attempts to deal with risk can only be understood within the context of 
its liberal values. The Western recourse to values in the face of globalised security 
risks is unsurprising given the assertions made above by Bush, Blair and Clinton that 
security and safety for the West is to be found not only in military force but also in 
the spread of Western values. As Clark suggests, the West has sought to forge new 
liberal  standards  of  legitimacy  for  full  membership  within  international  society 
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precisely  as  a  means  to  protecting  itself  from  the  risks  posed  by  a  globalised, 
pluralist international society.
70  
In  invoking  these  standards,  Western  leaders  have  drawn  heavily  on  the 
democratic peace theory and neo-Kantianism. Discussing the Bush Administration, 
Leffler argues that ‘Wolfowitz, Rice, Powell and their colleagues embrace the idea 
of a democratic peace’.
71 In particular, Bush overtly draws on ideas of democratic 
peace in the 2006 NSS which states that 
Governments  that  honor  their  citizens’  dignity  and  desire  for  freedom  tend  to 
uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize 
their  people  also  threaten  the  peace  and  stability  of  other  nations.  Because 
democracies  are  the  most  responsible  members  of  the  international  system, 
promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening 
international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-
supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.
72  
Significantly,  this  passage  demonstrates  that  non-democracies  are  risky  precisely 
because of what they are. These states are classified as risky or outlaw primarily on 
the basis of a lack of functioning liberal democratic institutions.  
Such states thus might be termed ‘ontological outlaws’ – their outlaw or risky 
status is derived precisely from what they are, not how simply how they behave.
73 
As Hobson suggests, ‘It is what these states are – non-democratic – that becomes the 
essential problem and the basis of their pariah status’.
74 As such the only way to deal 
with  particularly  risky  ontological  outlaws  is  to  reshape  them  into  something 
different. Illiberal states must be subject to liberalisation. This again emphasises the 
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impact of a liberal social logic of risk on the pluralist constitutional structure of 
international society. When risk (and subsequently risk management) is defined in 
terms  of  narrow  and  contested  values  of  liberalism  and  democracy,  then  the 
toleration of difference and respect of the right of states to constitute their socio-
political institutions according to their own societal values is jeopardised. Western 
security depends upon homogeneity and conformity, for it is the ‘certainty’ of the 
progressive  and  universal  nature  of  liberalism  that  can  mitigate  the  risks  and 
uncertainties of a globalised, pluralist international society. 
The problem here though is that the idea that liberal values are an appropriate 
response to security risks legitimates, in some instances, the forceful imposition of 
such values. We are thus left with a paradoxical situation in which liberal values and 
democracy  are  promoted  via  illiberal  means.
75  It  is  the  conceptualisation  of 
liberalism  as  a  means  to  preventing  and  avoiding  security  risks  with  potentially 
catastrophic consequences that establishes an urgency that underwrites this paradox. 
It is therefore the use of liberalism as a means of risk management that provides an 
explanation  of  the  contradiction  of  promoting  liberal  values  via  illiberal  means. 
Fuelled  by  the  imperatives  of  prevention  and  precaution,  Western  attempts  to 
manage risks have been characterised by coercion, new relations of hierarchy and in 
some cases overt violence. 
The paradox of attempting to promote liberal values, supposedly a force for 
emancipation  and  freedom,  via  the  subjection  of  local  populations  in  the  target 
territories to foreign authority and interference is exposed by interventions in Iraq or 
Solomon  Islands,  for  example.  Despite  the  rhetoric  of  Bush  and  Blair,  the 
progressive elements of Western liberal values are potentially lost when they become 
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a means of risk management, to be spread globally via the subordination of those 
states identified as potentially dangerous in new hierarchical relations with Western 
societies.  Further,  several  scholars  such  as  Hobson,  Sorensen  and  Simpson  have 
identified  such  a  paradox.
76  As  Hobson  notes,  the  emancipatory  and  progressive 
elements of democracy are curtailed by its centrality to ‘new global structures of 
hierarchy, domination and violence’.
77 Liberalism, because of its perceived potential 
as means to managing risk, has become part of the discourse of national security in 
several Western societies.  
For example, speaking in relation to the War on Terror, Hehir argues that 
‘The contemporary advocacy for democratisation has, however, asserted a security-
oriented justification that presents democracy as conducive to counter-terrorism’.
78 
Liberalism,  as  a  harbinger  of  national  security,  must  be  quickly  implemented  to 
prevent  these  security  risks  –  liberal  values  must  be  promoted  swiftly  and  if 
necessary, coercively. The doctrines of prevention and precaution mandate against 
sitting back and waiting for rogue states or risky environments to gradually segue 
into liberal democracies. The imperative to promote liberty is urgent, an urgency that 
is  fuelled  by  the  uncertainty  that  characterises  the  spatially  and  temporally  de-
bounded risks with which the West is faced. The progressive aspects of promoting 
liberalism are therefore mitigated by this perceived urgency and the illiberal methods 
to which it gives rise in order to ensure the swift establishment of stable liberal 
democracies in identified zones of risk.  
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As will be shown in the case studies, despite talk of ‘partnerships’ between 
Western  interveners  and  those  states  subjected  to  Western-led  liberalisation,  the 
promotion  of  liberal  values  and  institutions  is  conducted  with  minimal  local 
participation and accountability. Instead, local populations are expected to adapt to 
externally imposed values, institutions and conceptions of the good life which are 
deemed to be right and true for peoples everywhere. As Sorensen argues,  
A vigorous Liberalism of Imposition, on the other hand, risks undermining what it 
seeks to achieve, because it invokes a liberal imperialism that removes the local 
responsibility that is the very condition of freedom and paves the way for illiberal 
counter-reactions.
79 
However, while the scholars mentioned above have identified the paradox inherent 
in promoting liberalism via new relations of hierarchy and coercion, few, with the 
exception of Hobson, have failed to adequately explain what underpins this paradox 
or the relationship between security and liberal values in Western societies.
80   
For  example,  while  Hehir  has  certainly  identified  the  nexus  between 
liberalism  and  security  in  relation  to  Western  counter-terrorist  policies,  his  main 
focus is on disproving the idea that failed states are havens for terrorists or that 
democracy can effectively mitigate terrorism.
81 This means that little attention is 
paid to why such ideas obtain in the first place. Hehir says little in regard to this 
question, except for a brief comment that the idea that democracy reduces terrorism 
is based upon a conflation of democratic peace theory and counter-terrorism.
82 But 
Hehir fails to examine in more depth why democratic peace theory, and liberalism in 
general,  have  become  important  components  of  contemporary  Western  strategic 
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doctrines or the tension that arises from the promotion of liberal values via illiberal 
means. Further, Hehir’s argument that there is no plausible link between failed states 
and terrorists overlooks the extent to which security issues such as terrorism are now 
defined in terms of future risks that have not yet materialised. 
Taken on its own, Hehir’s argument is certainly plausible. However, the issue 
of whether there is presently or in the past has been a link between illiberal or failed 
states and terrorism misses the point. What is important is the perception that these 
environments might one day potentially give rise to future security risks. This is a 
perception that again will come to the fore in the case studies. The risk management 
motivation of contemporary interventions aimed at promoting liberal values means 
that the question of whether there is presently a link between failed/illiberal states 
and  terrorism  is  not  as  important  as  the  perception  on  the  part  of  Western 
governments that these states might one day provide an environment conducive to 
the origination and fomentation of risk. 
Simpson’s work on two liberalisms within international society, one pluralist 
and  egalitarian,  the  other  anti-pluralist  and  hierarchical,  also  has  little  to  say 
concerning the underlying factors that explain such a paradox. Simpson distinguishes 
between ‘strong’ and ‘mild’ variants of anti-pluralism, and it is the strong version 
that is important here.
83 Those who advocate the strong version of anti-pluralism 
stress  the  legitimacy  of  excluding  illiberal  states  from  international  society  and 
intervening in such states to promote liberalism.
84 Simpson does suggest that there is 
an inherent tension to this ‘strong’ form of liberal anti-pluralism when he states that 
‘The idea of intervening to promote democracy through the use of force, then, has 
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struck most observers as self-contradictory...’
85 The question that is raised then is 
why contemporary liberal anti-pluralism has manifested, in certain situations, as a 
strong version of anti-pluralism that has resulted in interventions to promote liberal 
values. 
What compels Western states to adopt illiberal measures that contradict the 
liberal values that they are trying to promote? This is a question that Simpson does 
not adequately answer, due in large part to his failure to account for why hierarchical 
trends have recently re-emerged within international society in the form of an anti-
pluralism  underpinned  by  a  hierarchical  liberal  vision  of  political  community 
amongst states. The absence of any explanation regarding why new hierarchies have 
emerged means that Simpson is ill-placed to explain why Western societies have 
paradoxically attempted to promote liberalism via new relations of hierarchy. Indeed, 
Simpson  unsatisfactorily  surveys  the  literature  on  various  ‘mild  and  strong  anti-
pluralists’ and considers the extent to which a norm of democratic governance is 
emerging within international society.
86 But this tells us little about the underlying 
causal factors that explain contemporary Western interventionism and its inherent 
contradictions.  
It  is  the  imperative  of  risk  management  and  the  encapsulation  of  liberal 
values  within  discourses  of  national  security  that  explain  the  contradictions 
associated with the promotion of liberalism via illiberal methods. The imperative of 
risk  management  legitimates  the  establishment  of  hierarchical  relations  between 
Western  interveners  and  risky  states  deemed  to  require  socio-political  reshaping. 
This in turn leads to the implementation of liberal reforms with little to no local 
involvement  or  participation,  minimal  consideration  of  local  social  values  and 
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structures and, in the case of Iraq, also involving the use of force. However, some 
have questioned whether the moralistic overtures and positive prescriptions of the 
liberal values promoted by the West are compatible with the negative goals of risk 
management. Therefore, the next section investigates whether promoting liberalism 
can rightly be construed as a form of risk management, suggesting that those who 
argue that the two are incompatible ignore the extent to which liberalism has been 
central to the definition of, and response to, risk in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Promoting Liberal Values or Risk Management?  
Western governments, particularly those of the US and the United Kingdom 
(UK), appear to have concluded that the best way to reduce the opportunities for the 
emergence and realisation of globalised security risks is to reshape risky territories 
into  liberal  democracies.  This  notion  of  promoting  liberalism  as  the  key  to 
addressing  security  issues  is,  as  mentioned,  derived  from  various  neo-Kantian 
theories  and  especially  the  idea  of  a  democratic  or  liberal  peace.  It  is  here  that 
potential tensions emerge between promoting liberal values and risk management. 
These theories of democratic peace or, for example, Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 
seek to achieve the positive aim of progressing towards the endpoint of a global 
liberal utopia. But risk management does not deal with attempting to improve the 
world. Rather, it simply seeks to negatively prevent certain future occurrences.
87   
However,  such  a  tension  only  emerges  if  one  focuses  on  the  disparities 
between the ends of risk management and the ends of the ideological project of 
promoting liberal values. Rather than focusing on promoting liberalism as an end in 
itself, it is possible to focus on the promotion of liberalism as a means that has as its 
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goal the management of risk. While the prescriptions of the democratic peace and 
other  liberal  theories  may  inform  the  decision  to  use  democracy  promotion  as  a 
means  of  risk  management,  the  utopian  ends  sought  by  such  theories  do  not 
automatically discount promoting liberal values as a form of risk management.
88 
Hence,  although  Western  governments  have  explicitly  utilised  these  theories  of 
democratic  peace  in  developing  their  strategies  for  managing  risk,  unlike  these 
theories the aim of Western interventionism is not to achieve a liberal utopia. The 
interventions undertaken represent less of an attempt to achieve positive outcomes; 
instead they are negative activities aimed at preventing particular outcomes.  
Indeed, the term ‘liberal social logic of risk’, which underpins contemporary 
hierarchies  within  international  society,  is  meant  to  denote  a  fusion  between  the 
ideas associated with a hierarchical form of international liberalism and Western 
perceptions of risk and subsequent attempts to negatively prevent possible future 
events. The result of this is the Western strategy of reshaping potentially dangerous 
states into stable liberal democracies primarily as a preventive mechanism of risk 
management, not in order to achieve positive ideological ends. If we were to take 
liberalism promotion as the end in itself, then one would be faced with some serious 
anomalies  in  the  Western  record  of  the  promotion  of  liberal  values  within 
international  society,  not  least  of  which  include  the  sporadic  pattern  of  liberal 
interventions and the willingness of Western governments to ally themselves with 
illiberal regimes (e.g. Pakistan under Musharaff) in order to combat security risks 
such as terrorism. While the West’s ‘grand strategy’ of risk management might be 
ideologically influenced, it is not simply engaged in an ideological crusade. Rather, 
it is engaged in a much more self-interested, utilitarian process of risk management.  
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This notion that liberal values are a means to providing for security is an old 
one. As demonstrated above, it is evident in the foreign policies of Clinton, Blair and 
Bush  and  stretches  back  to  Wilson.
89  The  ability  of  the  US  and  other  Western 
societies to defend themselves is taken to depend primarily on the political character 
of other states.
90 What is new is that in an age of globalised security risks, in which 
security  has  become  defined  in  terms  of  the  prevention  and  management  of 
amorphous, de-bounded risks, the promotion of liberal values has become a primary 
mechanism of risk management. Indeed, given the notion that liberalism abroad can 
provide  for  security  at  home,  it  is  not  entirely  surprising  that  promoting  liberal 
values has become a means of managing risk.  
This  is  certainly  not  to  say  that  the  democratic  peace  and  other  theories 
associated  with  a  hierarchical  form  of  international  liberalism  are  not  important. 
These ideas have gained increasingly widespread support and significance within 
both academia and the foreign policies of Western governments. They inform not 
only what constitutes an environment conducive to risk, but also Western attempts at 
risk management within international society. As such we cannot understand risk 
management within international society without first examining these theories of 
liberal hierarchy. Rather, the point here is that while these ideas are important, their 
progressive  and  idealistic  connotations  are  tempered  by  the  more  utilitarian 
motivation  of  managing  risk.  Despite  the  rhetoric  of  Bush,  Blair  and  others, 
democracy and liberalism abroad are not the ends; they are the means to preventing 
risk.  
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This  division  between  the  ideological  prescriptions  of  those  advocating 
positive notions of democratic peace and the more negatively geared objective of 
risk management has led some, such as Heng to suggest that risk management and 
democracy promotion are two mutually exclusive activities.
91 Discussing the 2003 
Iraq  War,  Heng  argues  that  the  regime  change  that  took  place  in  Iraq  was 
incompatible with regular notions of routine risk management.
92 Heng’s arguments 
revolve around the point made above that promoting liberalism and democracy is an 
ideological  activity  guided  by  grand  notions  of  progress  that  aspires  to  achieve 
positive  outcomes,  whereas  risk  management  is  an  activity  that  merely  seeks  to 
prevent possible outcomes from materialising.
93  
However, Heng has a problem in arguing that promoting liberalism is not 
compatible with risk management given that in all three of his case studies (Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq) Western governments replaced the incumbent regimes with 
new liberal democracies (and as of writing, in the case of Kosovo potentially created 
a  new  state).
94  This  is  an  important  similarity  between  these  cases  that  Heng 
overlooks. While Heng’s argument that these interventions represent attempts at risk 
management is persuasive, largely ignoring the attempts at liberalisation in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan and questioning whether building liberal institutions in Iraq was 
consistent with a risk management approach is not. In all three cases risks were 
identified, Western leaders sought, in part, recourse to liberal values to legitimate the 
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92 Ibid., 133. 
93 Ibid., 161. 
94 For more on Iraq, see chapter seven. As of writing, ongoing instability in Afghanistan poses a threat 
to  the  stability  of  the  democratic  government  installed  after  the  American  invasion  in  2001.  In 
Kosovo, NATO, the OSCE and EU personnel have worked since NATO’s bombardment of Serbia 
due  to  human  rights  abuses  in  Kosovo  to  build  a  democratic  government.  The  EU  in  particular 
continues to oversee the development of Kosovo’s political, legal and economic institutions as part of 
the Stabilisation and Association Process with Kosovo. See European Commission, Kosovo (Under 
UNSCR  1244/99)  2008  Progress  Report,  SEC(2008)  2697  (Brussels:  European  Commission,  5 
November 2008).   The Management of Risk 
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intervention,  and  liberal  democratic  institutions  were  constructed.  Further,  Heng 
does not explain why the notion of reshaping the environment, which he lists as a 
risk management practice, should be confined to the military measures such as no-fly 
zones or weapons inspections that he identifies.
95 
These of course do prevent the opportunities for security risks to emerge, but 
why does this also not apply to liberalism promotion? Promoting liberal values and 
democratic  governance  is  arguably  one  of  the  more  far-reaching  forms  of 
environmental reshaping. It involves remoulding the social, political, economic and, 
possibly  over  time,  cultural  institutions  of  the  target  territory.  Whether  the 
assumption of Western governments that promoting liberal values is the best way to 
prevent  opportunities  for  the  emergence  of  risk  is  correct  is  highly  debatable; 
however  what  is  important  is  that  Western  governments  perceive  it  to  be.  As 
demonstrated above, Western governments have been explicit in their support for 
liberalism as the solution to managing globalised security risks. Promoting liberal 
values is a form of risk management.  
Heng is also ambivalent in making his argument about the mutual exclusivity 
of promoting liberalism and risk management. On the one hand, he suggests that 
with  the  shift  back  to  ideological  issues  by  the  Bush  Administration,  risk 
management’s ‘time was up’.
96 Yet Heng then admits towards the end of his work 
that  ‘an  argument  could  be  made  that  spreading  democracy  and  war  as  risk 
management  are  simply  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  both  concerned  with  and 
designed ultimately to reduce international security risks’.
97 Heng also states that 
‘This more positive moral view of changing the world for the better could thus be in 
a real sense about risk management, since the goal is ultimately to reduce the risks 
                                                 
95 Heng, War as Risk Management, 14.  
96 Ibid., 159.  
97 Ibid., 145. The Management of Risk 
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we  face  by  sculpting  the  political  set-up  of  other  countries’.
98  Yet  Heng  still 
maintains that evidence points to the conclusion that democracy promotion and risk 
management cannot be combined into coherent and sustainable policies.
99  
Perhaps the biggest problem with Heng’s argument is that it divorces the role 
of values from the definition and management of risk. As Coker argues, what we 
consider to be a risk will be moulded by our values.
100 This has already been seen 
with Blair and Bush’s responses to potential security risks arising out of the war on 
terror and will be further demonstrated in the subsequent case study chapters.
101 The 
definition of risk and responses to risk has been defined precisely in terms of the 
West’s  liberal  values.  Indeed,  it  is  surprising  that  given  that  Heng  argues  that 
responses to risk are socially and culturally mediated, he does not make more of the 
notion that responses to risk are selected on the basis of the values that risk managers 
bring to bear when attempting to prevent perceived future hazards.
102  
Rather  than  attempting  to  establish  an  artificial  dichotomy  between 
contemporary  Western  risk  management  within  international  society  and  the 
promotion of liberal values, it is important to be aware of the close relationship 
between  the  two.  Heng  focuses  on  promoting  liberalism  as  an  end-state,  an 
ideological and moral imperative focused on positive outcomes that are incompatible 
with what he terms the ‘minimalist ethos’ of risk management.
103 However, this 
focus on the promotion of liberal values as a positive end-state obscures its role as a 
means  towards  the  more  minimalist  risk  management  ends  that  Heng  is  focused 
upon. While Heng is correct to suggest that there is a tension between the positive 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 159. 
99 Ibid., 145. 
100 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.  
101 See chapters 5-7.  
102 Heng, War as Risk Management, 41. 
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ends of the theories of liberal hierarchy that inform liberalism promotion and the 
negative  goals  of  risk  management,  the  centrality  of  liberal  values  to  the  very 
interventions that Heng cites as examples of war as risk management means that the 
promotion  of  such  values  cannot  simply  be  dismissed  as  incompatible  with  the 
management of risk.  
However,  the  imperative  of  risk  management  does,  as  suggested  above, 
temper the more idealistic and positive aspects of notions of the liberal or democratic 
peace.  This  is  not  only  due  to  the  negative  use  of  liberal  values  as  a  means  of 
preventing  risk  rather  than  realising  positive  ends,  but  also  the  way  in  which 
managing  risk  via  the  promotion  of  liberalism  has  been  executed  via  the  use  of 
illiberal  methods.  However,  despite  the  tensions  between  the  positive  and 
progressive aspects of liberal or democratic peace theories and the more negative and 
utilitarian gearing of risk management, promoting liberal values has been touted as 
the means to the end of managing global security risks by Western governments. 
Terrorism, rogue states seeking WMD or, abuses of human rights can all supposedly 
be managed and mitigated by reshaping identified environments of risk into liberal 
democracies.  Contemporary  Western  interventionism  within  international  society 
thus represents an amalgamation of two distinct yet interrelated trends. 
Firstly, we have the increasing incorporation of ideas of liberal or democratic 
peace within discourses of national security in Western societies. Secondly, we have 
the emergence of insecure Western risk societies faced with de-bounded risks and 
uncertainty.  Subsequently,  we  find  a  Western  emphasis  on  anticipating  future 
security risks and preventing their occurrence. Promoting liberalism and democracy 
becomes intimately tied to risk and risk management for two reasons. One, liberal 
values provide certainty and moral clarity in an uncertain and risky world. Two, The Management of Risk 
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Western leaders have determined that promoting liberalism and democracy, in effect 
reshaping  potentially  risky  environments,  will  prevent  the  opportunities  for  the 
emergence of security risks. Whether this prescription is true or not is highly suspect 
and debatable, but nevertheless it is one that Western states have followed in their 
attempts to manage the risks of the post-Cold War era.  
 
Conclusion 
Risk management within international society is an activity that cannot be 
fully understood without first examining the centrality of Western values of liberty 
and democracy to the process of anticipating and defining risks and the selection of 
appropriate responses to such risks. Not only have Western leaders identified risky 
environments  primarily  according  to  the  absence  of  liberal  socio-political 
institutions,  but  they  have  also  explicitly  suggested  that  liberalism  is  the  key  to 
maintaining  Western  security  and  the  management  of  global  security  risks.  The 
result is the emergence of an international risk society characterised by coercion and 
hierarchy,  one  in  which  some  states  lose  their  right  to  internally  constitute 
themselves as they deem appropriate according to the Western perception that these 
states demonstrate risky environmental characteristics. 
Liberal democracy becomes the standard of a new, more restrictive notion of 
rightful membership within international society precisely because it is this standard 
that  is  perceived  as  reducing  the  opportunities  for  the  emergence  of  globalised 
security risks. The renewed emphasis on the socio-political characteristics of the 
state has occurred for a specific reason – faced with ill-defined risks, focus has fallen 
on  those  environments  which  are  conducive  to  the  origination  of  risk.  Liberal 
environments provide fewer opportunities for the production of risk than do other The Management of Risk 
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forms of state or indeed, those states with no meaningful socio-political institutions 
at  all.  The  implication  of  this  is  that  attaining  greater  security  for  the  West  via 
illiberal forms of liberalism promotion and relations of hierarchy means ever-less 
security for non-Western societies.
104  
The remaining chapters of this thesis deal with the Western attempts at risk 
management within international society. These case studies primarily explore the 
extent to which Western interventions have a) been prompted by perceived security 
risks and the desire to manage such risks, b) demonstrated the key risk management 
elements  of  anticipation,  prevention,  and  precaution,  and  c)  focused  on  the 
promotion of liberalism as a way of reshaping environments identified as potentially 
dangerous so as to reduce opportunities for the production of risks. Importantly, the 
case  studies  also  explore  the  effects  of  risk  and  risk  management  for  the 
constitutional  structure  of  international  society.  Examining  cases  such  as  the 
invasion of Iraq, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and Australia’s state-
building activities in the Asia-Pacific, these case studies demonstrate that in the post-
Cold  War  era  the  West  has  become  preoccupied  with  global  security  risks, 
attempting to manage them via different (in some instances highly coercive) methods 
of liberalism promotion. In the process of doing so, these interventions give rise to a 
more overtly hierarchical and anti-pluralist form of international society.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Ikenberry makes the related point that the Bush administration’s vision of pre-emptive intervention 
and  the  promotion  of  democracy  involve  the  attainment  of  greater  sovereignty  and  authority  for 
America and increasingly conditional sovereignty for those states that fail to meet Western standards 
of  domestic  constitution  and  behaviour.  See  G.  John  Ikenberry,  ‘America’s  Imperial  Ambition’, 
Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 44.   
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Five 
Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU were highly significant events 
for the Union, in a number of respects. Not only did these enlargements provide 
membership to many of the Eastern European post-communist states, but they also 
posed the question of how an enlarged EU would deal with non-EU states in its 
immediate region. The expansion of the EU through the accession process brought it 
much closer to identified zones of instability and risk within international society 
and created a new hierarchy of states both within the EU and between the EU and its 
new  neighbours.
1  As  Dannreuther  notes,  enlargement  meant  that  states  on  the 
periphery  of  Europe  in  Northern  Africa,  the  Middle  East  and  the  former  Soviet 
republics could no longer be ignored.
2 Many of the potential globalised security risks 
that the EU faces, such as terrorism, transnational crime or illegal immigration, are 
perceived to originate in the areas that now sit alongside the external borders of the 
Union.
3  
                                                 
1 Although not a focus of this chapter, an interesting aspect of the 2004 enlargement is the unequal 
membership conditions that were placed on the acceding states. For example, all 15 member states 
before the enlargement placed restrictions on the movement of migrants from the Central European 
states, despite their status as full EU members. See Jon Kvist, ‘Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to 
the Bottom? Strategic Interaction Among EU Member States in Social Policy’, Journal of European 
Social Policy 14, no. 3 (2004): 301-18.   
2 Roland Dannreuther, ‘The European Security Strategy’s Regional Objective: The Neighbourhood 
Policy’, in The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, edited by Sven 
Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (Oxon: Routledge, 2008): 63. 
3  As  Jeandesboz  argues,  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  is  structured  through  two  main 
discursive structures or narratives, the ‘duty narrative’ and the ‘threat narrative’, which represents the 
EU’s neighbourhood as posing a range of risks that need to be managed. See Julien Jeandesboz, Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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The EU’s concern with its immediate neighbours was clearly recognised in 
the 2003 ESS, which highlighted the necessity of ensuring stability and prosperity in 
the regions bordering Europe.
4 Even before this document was released, the EU had 
begun to develop the ENP, designed to promote European values of liberalism and 
democracy and bring non-EU members in the region closer to the EU’s governance 
and  regulatory  standards.  The  point  of  the  ENP  is  therefore  to  create  the  EU’s 
definition of a ‘good neighbour’: states with liberal democratic political institutions, 
functioning market economies and governance standards in line with those of the 
EU. Those states that enter into partnership agreements with the EU are expected to 
meet a range of benchmarks concerning their domestic institutions; in return they are 
offered the promise of significant political and economic benefits, although they are 
not offered the prize of EU membership.
5  
The argument presented in this chapter is that the ENP constitutes an exercise 
in  risk  management  by  the  European  Union.  Faced  with  multifaceted  and 
multidirectional risks to its security, the EU has attempted to manage these possible 
dangers by entering into agreements with several states in identified zones of risk in 
an  attempt  to  induce  liberal  political  and  economic  reform.  Like  the  Australian 
government in the Asia-Pacific (see next chapter), the enlarged EU views itself as 
sitting on the doorstep of several risky zones, creating an imperative to engage with 
states  in  these  zones  in  an  attempt  to  promote  liberal  values  and  standards  of 
governance.  As  Smith  states  ‘The  process  of  growing  closer  to  the  EU  by 
                                                                                                                                          
‘Labelling the ‘Neighbourhood’: Towards a Genesis of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal 
of International Relations and Development 10, no. 4 (2007): 387-416.  
4 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12-14.  
5 See Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619, 
speech delivered at Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project (Brussels, 5-6 December 
2002).  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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‘approximating’ its values and standards is expected to help increase prosperity and 
security in the neighbourhood...’
6 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section is split into two parts. Part 
one involves an examination of the EU’s strategic outlook, particularly its views on 
the international security environment. The focus here is on the main security issues, 
such as the delimiting effects of globalisation, that the EU seeks to deal with and the 
way in which such issues are defined and characterised, with particular reference to 
the  ESS.  As  will  be  demonstrated,  the  EU  is  predominantly  concerned  with 
temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, rather than threats, to its security. The 
second part of this section deals with the EU’s self-identification as a ‘normative 
power’, the way in which this structures the EU’s perceptions of what constitutes a 
‘good’ international society and its subsequent desire to spread liberal values. The 
section  concludes  with  a  brief  examination  of  the  justifications  that  have  been 
provided  for  the  formulation  of  the  ENP.  It  is  argued  that  the  ENP’s  primary 
function is to manage risks to European security by inducing partner states to adopt 
liberal reforms.  
The next section of the chapter examines the ENP itself. Of special interest 
here are the EU’s ‘Country Reports’ and ‘Action Plans’ for each state involved in the 
ENP which outline the reforms that need to be carried out in partner countries and 
which are used to evaluate progress. These reforms essentially involve a series of 
impositions upon ENP partners which run counter to the pluralist constitution of 
international  society  in  that  they  effectively  remove  the  right  of  these  states  to 
constitute  their  domestic  institutions  in  line  with  their  own  societal  values.  This 
section also examines the ENP’s use of conditionality as the primary instrument for 
                                                 
6 Karen E. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs 81, no. 
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achieving  compliance  with  its  mandated  reforms.  Rather  than  attempt  to  impose 
liberal reform on ENP countries in a similar vein to American regime change in Iraq, 
the EU has essentially dangled carrots at its neighbours, compelling them to reform 
themselves in return for political and economic benefits. Yet while the tactics may 
differ, like their American (and Australian) counterparts, the EU has adopted the 
promotion of its own liberal values as its primary strategy of risk management. 
The final section of the chapter examines the implications for international 
society’s  pluralist  constitution.  The  ENP  represents  a  manifestation  of  the  EU’s 
claim to have the authority to determine the socio-political and economic make-up of 
its neighbours, resulting in new hierarchical relationships between the EU and ENP 
partners.  These  hierarchies  are  underpinned  by  a  liberal  social  logic  of  risk, 
constructing  the  EU  as  a  benevolent  normative  power  and  the  ENP  partners  as 
unstable,  risky,  and  in  need  of  liberalisation.  These  new  hierarchies  are  further 
legitimated by ENP partners who sign up to the ENP and recognise the authority of 
the  EU  to  direct  the  reform  of  their  domestic  institutions  on  the  promise  of  the 
political and economic benefits that are offered as a result of a closer relationship 
with the EU. In effect, the leverage that the EU obtains as a result of its political and 
economic dominance in the region allows it to dictate the necessary criteria that ENP 
countries must fulfil if they are to receive any benefits. 
 
European Security Risks in the Post-Cold War Era 
The ending of the Cold War represented a fundamentally altered international 
security  environment,  particularly  so  in  Europe  which  was  freed  from  the  Iron 
Curtain and the divisions that it had represented. However, while the overarching 
threat  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  gone,  a  more  unstable  and  uncertain  security Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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environment emerged in its place, something that was recognised rather quickly in 
Europe  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  NATO’s  1991  Strategic  Concept  clearly 
suggested  that  a  range  of  new,  non-traditional  security  issues  were  of  growing 
concern.
7 These new security issues were non-traditional not only in the sense that 
they involved non-state groups and actors, but also because they were defined as 
multi-directional, multi-faceted and highly unpredictable in relation to the threats of 
the Cold War era.
8 These new security issues were thus defined in terms of risk. This 
nexus between security and risk is one that has likewise been adopted in the EU’s 
evaluation of the contemporary strategic environment (see below).   
Until  the  1992  Maastricht  Treaty  which  established  the  European  Union, 
common European security policies were largely confined to NATO and the Western 
European Union (WEU).
9 With the establishment of the European Union in 1992 
and  its  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  pillar,  one  could  begin  to 
discuss common European security strategies and policies outside of NATO or the 
WEU. To date, the high point of the evolution of the CFSP since 1992 has been the 
publication of the ESS, formulated by Javier Solana who serves as both the High 
Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the European 
Union.
10 This document is particularly important not only because it represented the 
EU’s first adoption of an overarching strategic document, but also because it clearly 
                                                 
7 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept.  
8 Ibid.  
9 The WEU is a separate organisation established in 1948 to provide collective self-defence for its 
members. See Western European Union, ‘History of the WEU’, http://www.weu.int/ (accessed 10 
December 2008).  
10 The provisions of the CFSP contained in the Maastricht Treaty have been altered twice thus far, in 
both the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2001 Treaty of Nice. For more on the evolution of the CFSP 
and EU foreign relations in general see Council of the European Union, ‘The Common Foreign and 
Security  Policy  (CFSP)’,  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&mode=g 
&lang=en  (accessed  28  October  2008)  and  European  Commission,  ‘External  Relations’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/index_en.htm (accessed 31 October 2008).  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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outlined Europe’s focus on the effects of globalisation and particular risks to its 
security in the post-Cold War era.
11  
The focus on new forms of risk rather than threat is outlined early in the ESS 
when  it  states  that  ‘Large-scale  aggression  against  any  Member  State  is  now 
improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible 
and less predictable’.
12 Uncertain, ill-defined and unpredictable risks have replaced 
the overarching threat of the Soviet Union faced by Europe during the Cold War.
13 
Further,  similar  to  its  Australian  and  American  counterparts,  the  EU  is  highly 
cognisant of the security implications of globalisation. The first section of the ESS, 
which deals with the key risks and global challenges that Europe now faces, begins 
by discussing the effects of globalisation and what these mean for European security, 
emphasising both its positive and negative aspects. While processes of globalisation 
have brought freedom and prosperity to peoples around the world, they have also led 
to  increased  European  vulnerability  and  dependence  on  the  global  infrastructure 
erected by these processes.
14 
As Javier Solana argues  
The world we live in has been dramatically changed in little more than a decade. 
The  geo-strategic  scene  has  been  transformed.  The  process  we  describe  as 
‘globalisation’ has facilitated the easy movement of people, goods and ideas, but 
also of grievances, criminality and weapons.
15  
                                                 
11  Sven  Biscop  and  Jan  Joel  Andersson,  ‘Introduction’,  in  The  EU  and  the  European  Security 
Strategy:  Forging  a  Global  Europe,  edited  by  Sven  Biscop  and  Jan  Joel  Andersson  (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2008): 1. 
12 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 6. 
13 The uncertain, diverse and ill-defined nature of contemporary risks to European security has been 
reinforced in a recent report by the European Council. See Council of the European Union, Statement 
on Strengthening International Security (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 11 December 
2008).  
14 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 5.  
15 Javier Solana, The Voice of Europe on Security Matters, S0242/03 (Brussels, 26 November 2003), 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/78071.pdf  (accessed  21  November 
2008).   Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
 
188 
 
More pointedly, globalisation has increased European vulnerability to instability and 
security risks arising in locations far from Europe. As the ESS suggests, ‘In an era of 
globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at 
hand’.
16 Solana also highlighted Europe’s vulnerability in a speech to the Institute 
for European Politics in Berlin in 2003: 
Globalisation brings more freedom and wealth, but if not properly managed it can 
also  generate  new  frustrations.  We  must  be  alive  to  the  prospect  of  new 
combinations  of  threats:  terrorism  capitalising  on  the  persistence  of  regional 
conflicts; criminal organisations acquiring weapons of mass destruction, whether 
through theft, collaboration with rogue States or the collapse of State structures; 
collusion  between  fundamentalists,  cyber-terrorists  and  international  criminal 
organisations.
17 
Indeed, in an address to the European Parliament, Solana explicitly suggested 
that a globalised world is one that presents Europe with new risks: ‘The globalised 
world we now live in offers new opportunities for increased freedom and prosperity. 
It has also made some familiar problems worse and brought about a new range of 
risks’.
18 The theme here, and one that will be repeated in the subsequent case studies, 
is that of a Western society or collective of societies that is faced with, and becomes 
increasingly anxious over, new forms of multi-faceted and multi-directional risk. The 
security  implications  of  globalisation  revolve  predominantly  around  the  way  in 
which its processes can provide a global operational scope for non-state actors such 
as terrorists, criminals or illegal migrants that can be difficult to locate and identify. 
                                                 
16 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 11.  
17 Javier Solana, The EU Security Strategy: Implications for Europe's Role in a Changing World, 
S0230/03 (Berlin, 12 November 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/press 
data/EN/discours/77889.pdf (accessed 15 November 2008).  
18 Javier Solana, Summary of the Address by Mr Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy to the European Parliament, S0137/03 (Brussels, 18 November 2003), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/76240.pdf  (accessed 
19 November 2003).  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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As  the  Belgian  foreign  policy  think-tank  Royal  Institute  for  International 
Relations  suggests  ‘Today,  nobody  can  insulate  its  security  from  the  rest  of  the 
world, since the ramifications of globalisation are borne in upon all’.
19 This concern 
with the ‘dark side’ of globalisation is one that has, unsurprisingly, also been readily 
reflected in the security policies and strategies of several EU members. For example, 
the UK’s 2008 National Security Strategy argues that 
The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of 
threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the 
potential to undermine wider international stability...These and other threats and 
risks  are  driven  by  a  diverse  and  interconnected  set  of  underlying  factors, 
including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, 
demographic changes and globalisation.
20 
The globalised, de-bounded nature of contemporary security issues is also 
reflected  in  the  way  in  which  the  EU  seeks  to  address  such  challenges,  namely 
through global engagement and intervention in identified zones of risk. Risk opens 
up  new  zones  or  spaces  of  governance  that  require  constant  monitoring  and 
management. Identified zones of risk (or communities of risk as Coker terms it) 
within international society are subjected to interventionist modes of regulation.
21 
This involves a shift from an international society defined in terms of the territorially 
discrete nation-state to one defined in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded 
zones of risk. Accordingly, rather than focusing solely on securing and defending the 
EU’s  external  borders  against  identified  threats  (such  as  that  of  Soviet  invasion 
during the Cold War), securing the EU now depends upon global engagement with 
                                                 
19 Royal Institute for International Relations, A European Security Concept for the 21st Century, 
Egmont Paper 1 (Gent: Academia Press, April 2004): 5. 
20  United  Kingdom,  The  National  Security  Strategy  of  the  United  Kingdom:  Security  in  an 
Interdependent World (London: Cabinet Office, 2008): 3. 
21 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.   Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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those states or territories deemed to belong to zones of risk. As the ESS states, ‘Our 
traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based 
on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be 
abroad’.
22  The  Council  of  the  European  Union  has  similarly  suggested  that 
globalisation means that European defence may begin in other countries rather than 
on the EU’s borders.
23 
The important point here is that European security becomes predicated not 
only on border control or the EU’s ability to secure its own geographical space, but 
rather on the EU’s active engagement with the outside world.
24 In an international 
risk  society  in  which  risks  are  not  geographically  defined  or  limited,  risk 
management similarly must take on a spatially de-bounded quality. Simply securing 
the geographical space of the EU will not fully protect it from globalised risks that 
can  materialise  in  any  location.  Rather,  the  EU  must  engage  with  and  reform 
territories identified as posing potential dangers. Hence the EU’s identification of the 
ENP as one of the key planks of its security strategy – engaging with its largely 
illiberal and potentially unstable neighbours becomes the key to securing Europe. 
Browning  and  Joenniemi  make  a  similar  point,  arguing  that  ‘Notably,  however, 
instead of simply drawing a line of ultimate exclusion...external threats are to be 
countered by EU attempts to order the space beyond its borders through the export of 
                                                 
22 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 11.  
23 Council of the European Union, Working for Peace, Stability and Security: European Union in the 
World (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2005): 6. 
24 This point is similar to that made by Walters in his work on border security and what he terms 
‘domopolitics’ which, as he argues, captures several features of the contemporary political meaning of 
security and governance. Domopolitics is based on the conjunction between home, land and security, 
and rationalises particular methods of defending the ‘home’ or ‘sanctuary’ (e.g. the state) against the 
dangerous outside world. But more importantly in the context of the argument made in this chapter, 
domopolitics also involves the domestication and taming of those forces outside the home which 
threaten it. Hence domopolitics contains an important tendency to engage in an ordering of the outside 
world in a bid to domesticate threatening (or risky) elements. See William Walters, ‘Secure Border, 
Safe Haven, Domopolitics’, Citizenship Studies 8, no. 3 (2004): 237-60.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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EU norms and practices’.
25 This is important as in doing so the EU establishes the 
hierarchical  and  anti-pluralist  relationships  with  those  territories  subjected  to  its 
ordering  that  this  thesis  argues  is  the  central  feature  of  contemporary  risk 
management efforts within international society.  
Another feature of the ESS (and European foreign policy in general) is the 
emphasis on conflict and threat prevention. Like any risk society, the EU is forward-
looking, attempting to anticipate and prevent risks rather than react to dangers once 
they  have  materialised.  The  EU  has  therefore  highlighted  the  importance  of 
preventive  activities  in  its  effort  to  manage  new  security  risks.
26  Contemporary 
security issues cannot be dealt with reactively; proactive intervention is the key to 
risk management. Solana suggests that  
Making a stand first requires being more active. The threats are today dynamic. 
Left alone, they will become more dangerous. The EU must actively counter these 
threats. It must be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Preventive engagement can 
avoid more serious problems. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot 
start too early.
27 
The  ESS  itself  urges  European  states  to  ‘develop  a  strategic  culture  that 
fosters early, rapid, and where necessary, robust intervention’.
28 This emphasis on 
proactive anticipation and prevention is indicative not only of a precautionary desire 
to prevent the materialisation of potential catastrophes, but also the temporally de-
bounded nature of contemporary security risks. The EU’s preventative approach puts 
emphasis  on  horizon-scanning,  early  warning  and  continual  vigilance  precisely 
                                                 
25 Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy’, European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (2008): 531.   
26 This emphasis on preventative activities as a response to contemporary security issues is one that 
continues to be a central aspect of EU security policy. See Council of the European Union, Report on 
the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, 
S407/08 (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 11 December 2008). 
27 Solana, The EU Security Strategy: Implications for Europe's Role in a Changing World.  
28 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 17.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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because it is unclear at what point in time a risk might materialise or a crisis will 
occur.  At  any  given  moment  in  the  future  a  new  crisis  could  emerge  without 
warning. This temporal uncertainty, along with the perceived catastrophic nature of 
security  risks,  leads  to  future-oriented,  anticipatory  methods  of  risk  management 
centred on the proactive prevention of possible future scenarios rather than reacting 
to emergent threats. 
Further, as alluded to above, the EU’s conceptualisation of the contemporary 
international security environment has included an overt emphasis on precaution and 
the tendency to assume the worst. This precautionary and pessimistic attitude is one 
that is often associated with an insecure risk society. The ESS states, in regard to 
post-Cold  War  security  issues,  that  ‘The  new  threats  are  dynamic.  The  risks  of 
proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more 
dangerous’.
29 The ESS assumes that a failure to act against possible risks will only 
increase the danger confronting Europe and the wider West; as it argues, prevention 
now will mitigate the potential materialisation of catastrophic risks later.
30 Further, 
the suggestion by Solana that threat (or rather risk) prevention cannot start too early 
is  distinctly  indicative  of  precautionary  principles  which  likewise  suggest  that 
prevention  against  anticipated  risks  can  never  occur  too  early,  regardless  of  the 
existence  (or  not)  of  conclusive  evidence  that  corroborates  the  risk  assessments 
being made.
31  
                                                 
29 Ibid., 11 
30  The  idea  that  failing  to  act  or  acting  inadequately  will  increase  the  dangers  facing  Europe  is 
seemingly confirmed in a recent report on the implementation of the ESS. It also suggests that certain 
risks, such as WMD proliferation, have increased since the adoption of the ESS while all risks have 
become more unpredictable and complex. See European Council, Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy, 3. 
31  This  precautionary  trend  is  also  evident  in  the  EU  Counter-Terrorism  Strategy’s  emphasis  on 
protection  from  terrorist  attacks.  The  Strategy  focuses  on  enhanced  border  controls  and  ‘target-
hardening’ as a precaution against possible terrorist attacks. See Council of the European Union, The 
European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 30 November 
2005): 10-11. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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European foreign and security policies have therefore demonstrated a focus 
on  new  forms  of  risk  and,  subsequently,  an  emphasis  on  precautionary  and 
preventive  methods  of  risk  management.  Importantly,  however,  they  have  also 
explicitly  identified  the  promotion  of  European  values  of  political  and  economic 
liberalism as a central aspect of EU risk management efforts. This has been most 
clearly demonstrated in the EU’s overt identification of enlargement and the ENP, 
both  centred  on  the  promotion  of  EU  values  and  standards  of  governance,  as 
providing key security benefits. The EU’s desire to spread liberalism and democracy 
is, however, not a new one. The promotion of democracy and liberal values has been 
well-established in EU foreign policy and practice since its inception in 1992. As 
Kubicek  states,  among  international  actors  seeking  to  promote  liberalism  and 
democracy, the EU should be assigned a leading role.
32 
Indeed,  Article  III-292  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  a  Constitution  for  the 
European Union (which was ultimately not ratified by EU members) states that  
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law.
33 
The EU’s explicit desire to promote its values of liberty and democracy has been 
encapsulated  in  its  self-identification  as  a  ‘normative  power’.
34  The  idea  of  a 
                                                 
32 Paul J. Kubicek, ‘International Norms, the European Union and Democratization: Tentative Theory 
and  Evidence’,  in  The  European  Union  and  Democratization,  edited  by  Paul  J.  Kubicek  (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2003): 1.  
33  European  Union,  Treaty  Establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe,  Art  III-292,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML  (Brussels:  European  Union,  16 
December 2004) (accessed 10 December 2008): 131.  
34 Helene Sjursen, ‘What Kind of Power?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 170.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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‘Normative  Power  Europe’  (NPE)  is  one  that  has  recently  received  a  substantial 
amount of academic interest.
35  
Simply put, the idea of NPE suggests that the unique characteristics of the 
EU predispose it to act in a fundamentally different way than other major actors 
within international society.
36 This fundamentally different behaviour is supposedly 
encapsulated in the EU’s desire to use its so-called ‘ideational power’ or influence to 
alter  what  is  considered  ‘normal’  within  International  Relations  by  promoting 
supposedly universal norms through non-coercive means.
37 More than this though, 
one can suggest that the concept of normative power denotes the placing of value-
promotion above more tangible interests. That is, the promotion of the EU’s norms 
and values is a good in itself.
38 However, it should be noted that there is a lack of 
clarity within the academic literature as to precisely what normative power means.
39 
For example, does it just mean a state or political entity that promotes norms and 
                                                 
35 The concept of normative power is one that is generally attributed to Manners’ article on the 
concept. However, the idea of normative power builds on the earlier concept of ‘civilian power’ 
introduced  in  Duchene’s  1972  article  on  the  European  Community.  It  is  unclear  in  much  of  the 
literature whether ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative power’ refer to the same concept or are analytically 
distinct, although Manners has suggested in a 2006 article that they are in fact analytically distinct. 
See Francois Duchene, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans 
Look Ahead, edited by Richard Mayne (London: Fontana, 1972): 32-47; Ian Manners, ‘Normative 
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 1 (2002): 
235-58 and Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’, Journal 
of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 182-99.  
36  Manners  has  identified  nine  supposedly  universal  norms  that  the  EU  promotes  (the  supposed 
universality  of  these  norms  is  highly  problematic,  for  reasons  discussed  below  in  relation  to  the 
inherent  distinction  between  ‘good’  and  ‘bad’  norms  that  is  central  to  the  concept  of  normative 
power): sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, 
sustainable  development  and  good  governance.  See  Ian  Manners,  ‘The  Normative  Ethics  of  the 
European Union’, International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 65-80. 
37 Sjursen, ‘What Kind of Power?’, 172.  
38 Helene Sjursen, ‘The EU as a ‘Normative’ Power: How Can This Be?’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 236.  
39 Ibid., 239. This point is also made in Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, ‘(Non-) Normative Power EU 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor’, European 
Political Economy Review 7 (Summer 2007): 181-94.    Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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does it necessarily preclude the use of particular instruments for promoting them, 
such as the use of force? 
40  
If this is so, then it is merely a descriptive term and is of little utility as an 
analytical concept.
41 Even if we assume that the concept is analytically useful, it 
raises further questions, such as is normative power a ‘good’ thing? That is, does it 
lead to ethical outcomes or is it merely a form of anti-pluralism, involved with the 
spread of the EU’s particularistic values at the expense of those of other cultures? 
Further, there is scant theorisation in the literature of why the EU should be regarded 
as a unique normative power when other actors, most notably the US, have also 
explicitly identified the promotion of particular values as a core component of their 
foreign policies. Simply pointing to the unique characteristics of what the EU is in 
comparison to the US or any other state does not provide an adequate explanation of 
why the EU should be regarded as a unique normative power when several Western 
states and regional organisations are also involved in the promotion of liberal values.     
But perhaps the most telling criticism of the concept, at least as it is defined 
by  some  scholars  within  the  literature,  is  that  the  idea  that  a  normative  power 
promotes its norms even at the expense of its own self-interest is one that does not 
                                                 
40  Some  commentators,  such  as  Therborn  or  Stavridis,  argue  that  EU  militarisation  will  actually 
enhance its credentials as a force for the promotion of democratic norms. Others, such as Manners, 
Smith and Whitman either argue that militarisation of the EU will corrode its status as a civilian or 
normative  power  or,  in  the  case  of  Manners,  reject  the  idea  that  normative  power  requires  the 
instrumental exercise of military force. See Goran Therborn, ‘Europe in the Twenty-First Century: 
The World’s Scandinavia?’, in The Question of Europe, edited by Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson 
(London: Verso, 1997): 357-84; Stelios Stavridis, ‘‘Militarising’ the EU: The Concept of Civilian 
Power Europe Revisited’, The International Spectator 36, no. 4 (2001): 43-50; Manners, ‘Normative 
Power Europe’, 242; Richard G. Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International 
Identity  of  the  European  Union  (Basingstoke:  Macmillan,  1998);  Karen  E.  Smith,  ‘The  End  of 
Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator 35, no. 
2 (2000): 11-28.      
41 The concept has been subject to several critiques. See Hedley Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: A 
Contradiction  in  Terms?’,  Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies  21,  no.  2  (1982):  149–82;  Adrian 
Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, 
no. 2 (2006): 217-34 and Michael Merlingen, ‘Everything is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative 
Power Europe’, Security Dialogue 38, no. 4 (2007): 435-53.   Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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hold up well to empirical analysis.
42 Western societies do not promote liberal values 
primarily because of their inherent ‘goodness’ or out of an altruistic desire to spread 
liberty  to  people  across  the  world.  These  may  be  secondary  objectives,  but  the 
primary objective of promoting liberalism and democracy is an instrumental desire 
to increase Western security. However, this does not mean that the concept is not 
useful in the context of the argument presented here; it is for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the EU has explicitly identified itself as a normative power and has 
defined its foreign policy approach in terms of the spread of its liberal values. As 
Benita  Ferrero-Waldner,  European  Commissioner  for  External  Relations  and  the 
ENP  has  suggested, ‘ As  an  organisation  founded  on  respect  for  human  rights, 
democracy and the rule of law, we believe democracy is inherently valuable and 
universally desirable. And we are morally obliged to foster those values in all our 
international partners’.
43 This quote is particularly important because it shows that 
the liberal values that the EU seeks to export are also central to its own self-identity 
– liberalism and democracy are fundamental aspects of what the EU is.
44 Further, 
these  values  inform  the  EU’s  perception  of  the  outside  world  which  leads  it  to 
behave in particular ways within international society (e.g. as a transmitter of liberal 
values).    
Secondly,  the  very  notion  of  NPE  is  arguably  premised  on  a  distinction 
between the norms that a normative power seeks to export and any form of deviance 
                                                 
42 This is particularly so in light of the publication of the ESS, which explicitly links the promotion of 
liberal norms to EU security interests. Manners has offered the example of the EU’s bid to persuade 
the US and China to abolish the death penalty, but this bid has been unsuccessful to date and the EU 
has  not  been  willing  to  give  up  any  vital  interests  in  order  to  pursue  this  issue.  See  Manners, 
‘Normative Power Europe’, 245-52.  
43  Benita  Ferrero-Waldner,  Remarks  on  Democracy  Promotion,  SPEECH/06/790,  Democracy 
Promotion:  The  European  Way.  Conference  organised  by  the  European  Parliament’s  Alliance  of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (Brussels, 7 December 2006) (italics mine).  
44 Manners has similarly argued that EU norms of liberalism and democracy are crucial constitutive 
factors that structure its international identity. See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 241. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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from them.
45 Seeking to reform other societies in line with one’s own particular 
norms and values necessarily implies a dichotomy between the ‘superior’ values that 
are being exported and deviant norms that are in need of reform or elimination.
46 
Behr argues that such a distinction has largely informed the EU’s foreign policy 
outlook, particularly with relation to enlargement and the ENP: 
Common to the politics of ‘standard of civilization’ in the 19th century, the EU 
perceives the political and economic accomplishments of its member states as 
universal  norms  for  every  system  of  rule.  This  universality  is  constructed 
antithetically  while  describing  the  applicant  states  and  Eastern  Europe  as 
backward  zones  whereas  the  EU  appears  as  a  modernized,  safe  political  and 
economic heaven.
47 
In this respect, the EU’s self-identification as normative power leads it to a distinctly 
anti-pluralist view of international society. As the above quote from the EU External 
Commissioner aptly demonstrates, the EU effectively views itself as having a duty to 
effect  a  homogenisation  of  international  society’s  members  by  promoting  its 
‘universal’ liberal values.  
The EU’s ‘normative mission’ is to forge a ‘deeper’ version of international 
society  by  extending  the  scope  of  the  shared  norms  and  values  that  underpin  a 
pluralist international society to include positive obligations regarding the internal 
                                                 
45 As Diez argues, NPE ‘constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside 
world’’. This is a point that has been ignored in much of the literature on the subject. See Thomas 
Diez,  ‘Constructing  the  Self  and  Changing  Others:  Reconsidering  ‘Normative  Power  Europe’’, 
Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005): 613-36. 
46 Although he approaches the topic from a Foucauldian perspective, Merlingen argues that NPE has 
two faces – the celebrated face concerned with promoting liberal values and fundamental individual 
civil  and  political  rights;  and  the  second  face  which  subjects  locals  to  the  EU’s  ‘normativising 
universalist pretensions’. This includes new patterns of arbitrary domination between the EU and 
local populations in those countries subjected to EU norm promotion. This is very similar to the 
argument made here that the EU’s attempts to promote liberal norms in its neighbourhood through the 
ENP  gives  rise  to  relations  of  hierarchy  between  the  EU  and  ENP  partners.  See  Merlingen, 
‘Everything is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe’, 449.       
47 Hartmut Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics 
Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations 13, 
no. 2 (2007): 254.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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constitution of its members. In doing so, the EU effectively establishes a hierarchy 
between those states or regions adhering to the ‘good norms’ that it seeks to promote 
and those that do not. This point is crucial because in a post-Cold War security 
environment in which Western societies have identified liberalism as the panacea to 
multi-faceted risks, this process of differentiation leads to the establishment of new 
zones  within  international  society  defined  in  terms  of  risk:  the  zone  of  Western 
societies at risk and the risky zone of illiberal and undemocratic states. The EU’s 
role as an exporter of liberal norms therefore becomes much more than simply a 
reflection of what the EU is; it becomes the key to its risk management efforts. 
This  argument  is  readily  demonstrated  in  the  ESS.  It  suggests  that  the 
promotion  of  European  values  is  a  key  element  of  not  only  strengthening  and 
improving  the  quality  of  international  society,  but  also  achieving  security  for 
Europe: 
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that 
are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed 
democratic  states.  Spreading  good  governance,  supporting  social  and  political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law 
and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international 
order.
48 
The upshot of this statement is that the ‘best’ or ‘safe’ forms of domestic governance 
and  government  are  very  clearly  defined  by  the  EU  in  terms  of  liberalism  and 
democracy. Presumably, liberal democratic states stand in distinction to illiberal or 
undemocratic states that are characterised as inferior or unstable, and thus potentially 
risky.  
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It is precisely this construction of liberal democracy as safe and progressive, 
coupled  with  the  notion  that  any  deviance  from  the  EU’s  liberal  democratic 
standards  represents  backwardness  and  potentially  dangerous  instability,  which 
informs  the  EU’s  desire  to  promote  liberal  values  as  a  means  to  managing  risk. 
Further, such a dichotomy is well demonstrated regarding the EU’s perspective on its 
ENP partners. As Ferrero-Waldner has argued, ‘it is in our interest to contribute to 
our partners’ modernisation efforts’.
49 The use of the term ‘modernisation’ implies 
that the ENP partners are backward or ‘pre-modern’ compared to the progressive and 
modern  EU  due  to  their  lack  of  liberal  values  and  institutions.  Again,  this 
demonstrates the seeming paradox of the EU’s efforts to deepen international society 
which nevertheless results in new distinctions and new hierarchies between liberal 
and illiberal states.   
The thinking on the part of the EU seems to be that exporting its supposedly 
progressive values of liberalism and democracy to other states will draw those states 
into the Western zone of peace and prosperity, thus preventing the danger that the 
previously illiberal and unstable socio-political conditions of these territories will 
give rise to risks to European security. Primarily, the diffusion of liberal values has 
occurred  through  EU  enlargement  and  the  ENP.  As  Christopher  Hill  argues, 
enlargement constitutes the EU’s long-term preventative measure against conflict 
and instability.
50 Bringing states into the EU by requiring them to undergo extensive 
socio-political reforms is the best way for the EU to manage security risks. The ENP 
serves the same function in lieu of enlargement with regard to the EU’s neighbours.
51  
                                                 
49 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Regions, SPEECH/07/829 
(Brussels: Structured Dialogue – Committee of the Regions, 18 December 2007).  
50 Christopher Hill, ‘Britain and the European Security Strategy’, FORNET CFSP Forum Working 
Paper  no.  6,  http://www.fornet.info/documents/Working%20Paper%20no%206.pdf  (accessed  17 
November 2008): 1.   
51 Ibid. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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Promoting liberal values is a task which the EU sees as most urgent within its 
identified neighbourhood or ‘backyard’, which includes North Africa, the Middle 
East  and  the  former  Soviet  republics.
52  Within  its  immediate  proximity  on  the 
European continent, enlargement has been the main method used to transmit EU 
values  and  effect  domestic  reforms  within  prospective  member  states.  The  EU 
enlargement process saw ten new members join the Union in 2004, with Romania 
and  Bulgaria  joining  in  2007  and  Croatia,  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia  and  Turkey  currently  in  accession  negotiations.
53  The  so-called 
‘Copenhagen Criteria’ adopted at the 1993 Copenhagen Council were relatively clear 
in  the  conditions  prospective  members  had  to  fulfil:  liberal  democratic  political 
institutions, a functioning market economy and acceptance of the EU acquis (the 
body  of  EU  law  to  date),  along  with  an  ability  to  take  on  the  obligations  of 
membership.
54 
However, enlargement has also had more negative consequences, particularly 
in relation to the fact that it has brought the enlarged EU closer to states residing in 
zones  of  risk  on  the  periphery  of  Europe  and  beyond.  The  enlarged  EU’s  new 
neighbours  have  been  perceived  and  defined  primarily  in  terms  of  the  potential 
dangers they pose for Europe.
55 As Smith argues, ‘The 2004 enlargement, however, 
brought the EU closer to them, and thus created an immediate need to ensure that the 
                                                 
52 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Who Participates?’, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
world/enp/partners/index_en.htm (accessed 8 December 2008).  
53 BBC News, ‘Q and A: EU Enlargement’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2266385.stm (accessed 
30 October 2008).  
54  European  Commission,  ‘How  Does  a  Country  Join  the  EU?’,  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turk
ey/index_en.htm (accessed 28 October 2008).  
55 Browning and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 531. Indeed, the 
European Commission has stated in a pamphlet on the ENP that it is a response to the hopes and fears 
of its citizens about the challenges of today’s world (globalisation, terrorism, organised crime, etc) 
that are derived from instability and insecurity in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood. See European 
Commission,  Working  Together:  The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy ( Luxembourg:  Office  for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007): 6. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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wider neighbourhood was stable, to avoid the risk of instability spilling over into the 
larger  EU’.
56  These  security  considerations  have  constituted  a  large  part  of  the 
justifications provided by the EU for the establishment and implementation of the 
ENP in light of its 2004 enlargement.  
The  perceived  instability  and  potential  risks  posed  by  the  EU’s  new 
neighbours have been central to the process of developing the ENP from the very 
beginning. In 2002 the development of the ENP began with a letter from Jack Straw, 
then the UK Foreign Minister, to his Spanish counterpart, Josep Piqué, outlining the 
need to address the instability present in many of the EU’s future neighbours.
57 A 
year later, the ESS noted that one of the key tasks for the EU in terms of security 
policy was to build stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood: 
The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU 
closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries 
to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with 
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.
58 
The EU has thus identified the need for engagement with its neighbouring 
states  as  a  means  of  mitigating  any  potential  risks  that  they  may  pose.  Romano 
Prodi,  during  his  tenure  as  the  President  of  the  European  Commission,  argued 
several years before the formal creation of the ENP that ‘We need to institute a new 
and inclusive regional approach that would help keep and promote peace and foster 
stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately promoting the emergence 
                                                 
56 Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, 758. 
57 Letter from Jack Straw to Josep Piqué (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 January 
2002). 
58 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12-13. Albioni makes a similar point, 
arguing that the EU is faced with neighbours that play a crucial role in ‘soft’ security issues such as 
terrorism,  illegal  trafficking  and  organised  crime.  See  Roberto  Albioni,  ‘The  Geopolitical 
Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 1 
(2005): 1-16. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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of better global governance’.
59 Further, the European Commission suggests that ‘As 
enlargement brings the EU into direct contact with neighbours marked by political 
and social instability, its response is to share with them its prosperity and stability, 
thus consolidating its own security’.
60 The importance of these statements is that 
they highlight the instrumental security considerations which underpin the ENP and 
the EU’s role in its neighbourhood.  
These considerations, along with notion of an international society divided 
into  differing  zones  of  order,  are  also  reflected  in  another  statement  from  the 
European Commission: 
In order to realise the vision of building an increasingly closer relationship with 
our neighbours, and a zone of stability, security and prosperity for all, the EU and 
each ENP partner reach agreement on reform objectives across a wide range of 
fields within certain “common” areas such as cooperation on political and security 
issues,  to  economic  and  trade  matters,  mobility,  environment,  integration  of 
transport and energy networks or scientific and cultural cooperation.
61  
These statements neatly summarise the security considerations that, at least in part, 
inform the EU’s objective of facilitating economic and socio-political reform within 
ENP partner states. As Del Sarto and Schumacher contend ‘Seeking to establish a 
cushion of new neighbours, some of whom will enjoy a virtual EU membership, may 
be read as an attempt of preventing the emergence of new fault lines and zones of 
instability – at least in the EU’s immediate periphery’.
62 The ENP functions as a risk 
                                                 
59 Prodi, A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.  
60 European Commission, ‘European Union in the World: Our Neighbours’, http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
what/neighbourhood/index_en.htm (accessed 20 November 2008).  
61  European  Commission,  ‘The  Policy:  How  does  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  Work’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/howitworks_en.htm (accessed 2 December 2008).  
62 Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?’, European Foreign Affairs 
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management mechanism designed to export EU values of liberalism and democracy 
to states within identified zones of risk.  
Therefore, this section has demonstrated the preoccupation of the EU with 
the security implications of globalisation and its focus on new forms of temporally 
and spatially de-bounded risks to its security. It has also highlighted the importance 
of the EU’s self-image as a normative power based upon liberal values and the way 
in which this structures the EU’s anti-pluralist view of international society and its 
self-defined role as an exporter of liberal values. Taken together, this has manifested 
in  a  broadly  preventive  and  precautionary  approach  to  security  issues  affecting 
Europe  based  on  the  EU’s  engagement  with  zones  of  risk  in  its  periphery.  This 
engagement  is  primarily  designed  to  effect  liberal  reform  in  these  peripheral 
territories as a means to achieving security for the EU. This latter aspect has been 
demonstrated  by  the  predominance  of  security  justifications  provided  for  the 
formulation of the ENP. 
The next section investigates in more detail the provisions of the ENP, and 
the way in which it is used by the EU as a risk management mechanism designed to 
promote liberal reform. It suggests that the ENP essentially constitutes an intrusive 
form of regulation based on conditionality, wherein the EU uses its political and 
economic leverage in order to entice states to adopt the required reforms. It is highly 
intrusive  in  the  sense  that  such  reforms  go  far  beyond  institutional  reform  or 
compliance with liberal standards of good governance; they also involve specific 
legislative and regulatory reforms within the partner states. Further, the progress of 
each state that is part of the ENP is subject to extensive monitoring and review via 
periodic reports produced by the European Commission.  
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The ENP and the Promotion of Liberal Values along the European Periphery  
Prior to, and since its 2004 expansion, one of the EU’s central problems in 
relation to its new neighbourhood was how to provide suitable incentives for its 
neighbours  to  adopt  EU  values  and  regulations  without  offering  the  prize  of 
membership. As Romano Prodi argued in 2002, the EU needed to offer theses states 
‘more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter’.
63 In 
March  2003,  the  European  Commission  proposed  the  ‘Wider  Europe  – 
Neighbourhood’  initiative  that  would  eventually  evolve  into  the  ENP.
64  This 
initiative was initially confined to the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe. 
However,  pressure  from  the  southern  EU  members  to  include  Mediterranean 
countries  eventually  led  to  the  expansion  of  the  ENP  into  North  Africa  and  the 
Middle East.
65 The European Commission formulated the current ENP in May 2004 
with the publication of the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper.
66  
The basic method of the ENP is to offer partners the opportunity to move 
beyond mere cooperation and instead engage in considerable political and economic 
integration with the EU in return for adopting the required reforms.
67 However, it 
should  be  noted  that  European  partnerships  with  Eastern  European  and 
Mediterranean  states  designed  to  achieve  political  and  economic  reform  are  not 
                                                 
63 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability. 
64 See European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, COM(2003) 104 final (Brussels: European Commission, 11 March 2003).  
65 Current ENP partner countries include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Ukraine.    
66 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Communication from the 
Commission, COM(2004) 373 final (Brussels: European Commission, 12 May 2004). 
67 This includes a stake in the EU internal market and enhanced political dialogue, among other 
benefits. See Danuta Hubner (Member of the European Commission responsible for Regional Policy), 
Enlargement,  Neighbourhood  Policy  and  Globalisation:  The  Need  for  an  Open  Europe, 
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new.
68  For  example,  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
(EMP),  launched  in  November  1995,  preceded  the  ENP.
69  Of  course  in  Central, 
Eastern  and  South-Eastern  Europe,  EU  enlargement  and  Stabilisation  and 
Association  Agreements  have  been  the  primary  mechanisms  for  achieving  the 
desired reforms in partner states. The ENP, however, has become one of the primary 
initiatives informing the EU’s relations with its near neighbours.  
Briefly, it is useful to outline in a little more detail how the ENP works. The 
core objectives of the ENP were detailed in the Strategy Paper, which suggests that  
The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement 
with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for 
all  concerned.  It  is  designed  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  new  dividing  lines 
between  the  enlarged  EU  and  its  neighbours  and  to  offer  them  the  chance  to 
participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic 
and cultural co-operation.
70 
In order to do so, the strategy paper proposes that the EU define, in consultation with 
partners, priority areas for reform, the fulfilment of which will bring them closer to 
the EU. The latter part of this method, the bringing of partner states closer to the EU, 
is significant as bringing partners closer to the EU involves adopting the standards 
that the EU sets itself for ENP partners. This precludes any real consultation with 
partners over the necessary standards to be adopted.  
At the outset of the process, the European Commission prepares ‘Country 
Reports’ detailing the situation in each country that has agreed to subject itself to the 
                                                 
68 This language of partnership is one that has also been used in other post-Cold War interventions, 
notably Australia’s involvement in the domestic governance of several of its Asia-Pacific neighbours. 
See chapter six.  
69  European  Commission,  ‘External  Relations:  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm  (accessed  23  November  2008).  The 
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ENP. The identified priority areas of reform in ENP partner states are then detailed 
in ‘Action Plans’ that outline the necessary reforms that must be carried out. The EU 
then provides financial and technical assistance to ensure that the desired reforms are 
successfully implemented, whilst also conducting periodic assessments and reviews 
of  the  progress  being  made  by  each  ENP  partner  state.
71  As  the  Commission 
envisages, the end result of the ENP  
involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, 
drawn  into  an  increasingly  close  relationship,  going  beyond  co-operation  to 
involve  a  significant  measure  of  economic  and  political  integration.  This  will 
bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and 
well-being.
72 
One  crucial  feature  of  this  statement  is  the  identification  of  the  security 
benefits to be obtained by the EU as a result of the ENP. These security benefits are 
twofold.  Firstly,  by  promoting  liberal  values  in  neighbouring  states,  the  EU  can 
reshape socio-political environments on its borders and prevent the emergence of 
security  risks.  Secondly,  the  idea  of  a  ‘ring  of  friends’  surrounding  the  EU  is 
suggestive of the formulation of a buffer zone, one intended to keep security risks 
from penetrating the EU’s core (e.g. Western Europe). ENP partner states are thus 
subject to environmental reshaping not only to prevent the risks that they themselves 
pose to the EU, but also to effect their transformation into a new ‘liberal buffer zone’ 
protecting the EU’s core.  
Another  important  feature  of  this  statement  is  the  centrality  of  the  EU’s 
‘fundamental values and objectives’ to the ENP and its anticipated outcomes. There 
is no mention of the values or objectives of partner states, precisely because it is 
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these ‘deviant’ values that the ENP seeks to reshape. As Del Sarto and Schumacher 
argue, ‘The Commission does not leave any doubts that the ‘commitment to shared 
values’  –  such  as  democracy,  liberty,  rule  of  law,  respect  for  human  rights  and 
human dignity – refers to the values of the EU and its Member States’.
73 The point of 
the ENP is not to engage in negotiation or compromise over the disparate values or 
governance  standards  held  by  the  EU  and  the  ENP  partners.  Rather,  the  ENP 
functions solely as an anti-pluralist disseminator of the EU’s liberal values, which is 
precisely  what  the  EU  means  when  it  refers  to  ‘shared  fundamental  values  and 
objectives’.
74  
Despite this, the EU has emphasised differentiation in its relationships with 
ENP partners, arguing that each relationship will be varied and unique.
75 Yet this 
differentiation really only refers to the variations that occur between ENP partner 
states in their progress towards assimilating the ‘common values’ that the EU is 
seeking to export. As President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso 
has argued  
It will be clear that there is a very different relationship between the EU and each 
of its neighbours, reflecting how close we are to each other in implementing the 
common values we share, the specific nature of each partner’s economy, and the 
desires and aspirations you have for your relationship with the EU.
76 
                                                 
73Del Sarto and Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP’, 23-4. 
74 The Commission communication on a new Wider Europe Framework explicitly states that ‘shared 
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75 See European Commission, European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper.  
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Therefore, despite the stress on differentiation between ENP partners in light of their 
unique  circumstances,  such  differentiation  is  limited  only  to  the  level  of  liberal 
reform achieved by each partner state.   
The  ENP’s  central  function  as  a  homogenising  mechanism  for  exporting 
liberal values is also readily demonstrated in the Country Reports and Action Plans 
which cover common core values and reforms for each partner country. As Smith 
argues  
The  action  plans  are  striking  for  at  least  two  other  reasons.  The  first  is  the 
prominence within them of political objectives, including – most notably – respect 
for specific human rights and democratic principles. Insistence upon these could 
herald  a  new  era  in  the  EU’s  relations  with  its  Mediterranean  neighbours  in 
particular,  in  which  human  rights  and  democracy  have  not  usually  been  an 
important aspect.
77 
Both  the  Country  Reports  and  the  Action  Plans  are  key  documents  in  the  ENP 
process, outlining the goals and strategic objectives of the partnership between the 
EU and the state concerned. However, the scope of the Country Reports and the 
reforms mandated in the Action Plans go much further than simply adopting, for 
example, institutions of representative government or public sector reforms in line 
with liberal notions of good governance.  
While the promotion of broad EU values remains an important part of these 
documents, they also involve more specific measures in a variety of policy areas that 
the EU’s neighbouring states are required to adopt. These more specific measures 
involve potentially extensive legislative and regulatory reform and are essentially 
aimed at bringing ENP states into line with the EU’s acquis communitaire.
78 The 
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wide scope of the areas that come under the regulatory purview of the ENP are 
demonstrated clearly in the Country Reports. The Country Report for Armenia, for 
example, deals with the following areas: political issues, democracy and the rule of 
law, human rights, foreign affairs, economic and social situation, state involvement 
in the economy, regulatory frameworks, transport, energy, environment and research 
and  innovation,  to  name  a  few.
79  Other  Country  Reports  are  of  similar  breadth, 
covering a large range of areas and issues. The wide scope of the Country Reports is 
of course repeated in the Action Plans, which outline the large number of reforms 
that ENP partners must undertake in order to meet the requirements for increased 
integration with the EU. 
The reforms contained in the Action Plans are a mix of exhortations to adopt 
liberal values and abide by particular international treaties and declarations (such as 
the  1998  International  Labour  Organisation  Declaration  or  the  UN  Convention 
against  Transnational  Organised  Crime).
80  They  also  include  more  specific 
regulatory and legislative reforms. For example, some of the priorities for action 
outlined in the Action Plan for Jordan include: 
• Continue to develop an independent and impartial judiciary. Further reinforcing 
of the administrative and judiciary capacity. 
•  Take  steps  to  develop  further  the  freedom  of  the  media  and  freedom  of 
expression 
•  Further  promote  equal  treatment  of  women,  by  preparing  a  plan  to  increase 
women’s participation in political and economic life. 
•  Strengthen  political  dialogue  and  co-operation  on  issues  of  international  and 
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regional interest including the Middle East Peace Process and the fight against 
terrorism. 
• Take measures to improve business conditions to enhance growth and increase 
investment in Jordan.
81 
Notably,  security  considerations  are  also  a  feature  of  most  of  the  Action 
Plans, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism. ENP countries are required to 
continue to work on developing cooperation with the EU on terrorism and other 
security issues. This includes the implementation of specific policies and programs 
such as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which deals with the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
82 The ENP thus also takes what might 
be  termed  a  more  ‘direct’  approach  in  protecting  the  EU  from  security  risks  by 
ensuring that ENP countries cooperate extensively with the EU on security matters 
and align their security policies and capabilities with those of the EU. It is useful to 
point out that this demonstrates again the wide scope and intrusiveness of the ENP’s 
regulatory ambit – it goes well beyond enforcing compliance with liberal values.    
The intrusive regulatory scope of the ENP is coupled with mechanisms of 
monitoring and assessment that provide for EU oversight of the implementation of 
mandated reforms. As noted in the previous chapter, surveillance and monitoring are 
key facets of risk anticipation and definition – potentially risky situations or objects 
must be subjected to constant scanning and assessment in order to provide for early 
preventive  action  against  possible  dangers.  The  EU  has  engaged  in  this  sort  of 
activity via the various progress reports that it has released since 2005. These reports 
effectively act as audits on the effectiveness of the implementation of the ENP’s 
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mandated liberal reforms in partner countries. They thus also act as form of horizon 
scanning, allowing the EU to anticipate and define the possible future risks that each 
ENP partner poses according to the level of liberal reform that they have achieved. 
For  instance,  in  2008  the  Commission  released  reports  reviewing  and 
assessing overall progress, sectoral progress and the progress of most ENP states in 
implementing  reforms.  The  progress  reports  for  each  country  cover  the  areas 
identified in need of reform in the Action Plans, detailing the achievements that have 
been made in these areas against the objectives set and those areas where further 
work is needed.
83 The progress report for Moldova, for example, outlines specific 
legislative  reforms  that  have  been  undertaken  by  Moldova  under  the  criteria  of 
strengthening  democracy  and  respect  for  human  rights,  including  parliamentary 
reform and anti-corruption initiatives. The report also discusses the shortcomings of 
Moldova’s efforts in these areas and the next steps Moldova needs to take to meet 
the  EU’s  regulatory  demands.
84  These  progress  reports  further  underline  the 
intrusiveness of the ENP – partner countries have their internal affairs subject to 
constant  scrutiny  and  review.  The  domestic  situations  of  ENP  partners  become 
internationalised, subject to oversight by the EU.  
In  order  to  compel  ENP  partners  to  adopt  the  large  number  of  required 
reforms  detailed  in  the  Action  Plans,  the  EU  has  employed  the  method  of 
conditionality. Indeed, conditionality is arguably the central aspect of the ENP.
85 
Conditionality  is  defined  by  Collingwood  as  a  ‘form  of  power  that  entails  the 
combination of a promise of aid or financial assistance (or other benefits) with a 
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threat of sanctions’.
86 It is therefore a means of compulsion. The conditional aspects 
of the ENP are well highlighted by the EU External Relations Commissioner:   
ENP gives us a framework for promoting democracy and economic development 
in the countries around the borders of an expanded EU. It aims to encourage the 
spirit  of  democracy  by  providing  our  partners  with  incentives  to  reform.  As 
countries strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights; and 
promote market-oriented economic reforms, we offer a share in the EU’s single 
market;  closer  cooperation  on  energy  and  transport  links;  and  a  chance  to 
participate in the EU’s internal programmes.
87 
Partners are provided with aid and closer political and economic integration 
only once they have met the necessary prerequisites that have been set by the EU.
88 
The conditional aspects of the ENP were clear rather early in its development, the 
2003 European Commission Wider Europe – Neighbourhood communication stating 
that 
In  return  for  concrete  progress  demonstrating  shared  values  and  effective 
implementation  of  political,  economic  and  institutional  reforms,  including  in 
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from 
the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.
89  
This conditionality, and the intrusive transformation of ENP partner states that it 
seeks to effect, is founded upon the EU’s political and economic leverage. The lure 
of  economic  and  political  benefits,  such  as  access  to  the  EU  internal  market  or 
enhanced international influence, provides the Union with substantial leverage over 
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ENP  partner  countries  that  will  supposedly  allow  it  to  achieve  extensive  socio-
political and economic reforms in candidate countries.
90  
Importantly, the conditionalities imposed by the ENP are heightened by its 
emphasis  on  bilateral  relations  between  the  EU  and  ENP  partners.  Unlike  the 
multilateral  focus  of  the  EMP,  for  example,  the  ENP  is  based  upon  bilateral 
relationships between the EU and individual partner states.
91 This bilateralism serves 
to  accentuate  the  political  and  economic  inequalities  between  the  EU  and  ENP 
partners,  providing  the  EU  with  an  even  greater  leverage.
92  By  engaging  with 
neighbouring  states  on  a  one-on-one  basis,  the  bargaining  power  of  the  EU  is 
significantly heightened vis-a-vis the neighbouring state. This allows the EU to set 
the terms and conditions of its relations with its neighbours with very little input 
from  the  neighbours  themselves.  Both  the  reforms  to  be  implemented  and  the 
rewards to be offered for doing so are decided upon solely by the EU. As Tassinari 
argues,  the  bilateral  partnership  approach  of  the  ENP  is  thus  a  veiled  form  of 
unilateralism – the EU acts individually in setting the standards and values to be 
promoted.
93  
The  use  of  conditionality  to  compel  member  states  to  conform  to  liberal 
standards and values underscores the point that the ENP partners have little real 
ownership over these values and standards. The relationship between the EU and 
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ENP  partners  is  depicted  as  a  horizontal  one  between  equals  negotiating  over 
mutually  beneficial  reforms.  Further,  the  implementation  of  these  reforms  is 
portrayed  by  the  EU  as  very  much  bottom-up  in  nature.  Such  reforms  are 
implemented by the ENP partners themselves, in their own time and according to the 
unique socio-political and economic context of each country, with a helping hand 
from  the  EU.
94  However,  despite  the  rhetoric  of  the  European  Commission,  the 
relationship  is  very  much  a  vertical,  rather  than  horizontal,  one  between 
fundamentally  unequal  ‘partners’.  The  EU  has  effectively  claimed  the  right  to 
determine the socio-political and economic constitution of its neighbours. Rather 
than a ‘partnership’, the ENP represents a hierarchical authority relationship between 
the EU and the subordinated ENP partner states.  
This is further demonstrated by the EU’s attempt to impose the same set of 
liberal values and standards of governance in sixteen different countries stretching in 
an arc from Morocco to Belarus. Rather than setting individual agendas for reform in 
consultation with ENP countries based on their unique socio-political and economic 
circumstances, the Action Plans outline similar sets of regulatory and institutional 
reforms in each ENP partner.
95 The point here is that the reforms outlined in the 
Action  Plans  are  actually  top-down  in  nature.  The  ENP  leaves  no  room  for 
negotiation or compromise over the reforms that must be carried out. Rather, it is an 
attempt at standardisation and homogenisation within Europe’s neighbourhood that 
is reflective only of the EU’s core values and principles. The top-down nature of the 
ENP is further highlighted by Browning and Joenniemi. As they point out, no new 
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Commission  and  cited  in  this  chapter  speak  of  the  ENP  in  these  terms.  The  emphasis  in  these 
documents is of course on notions of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual ownership’. 
95 For example, all of the Action Plans set similar reforms in the areas of strengthening democratic 
institutions  and  protecting  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  For  more  see  European 
Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Reference Documents’. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
 
215 
 
institutions have been established by the EU in order to oversee the implementation, 
operation and evaluation of the ENP.
96  
Rather, as its website clearly demonstrates, the European Commission retains 
control over all aspects of the ENP.
97 This has led to a centralisation of all aspects of 
the  ENP  in  the  hands  of  the  European  Commission,  which  as  Browning  and 
Joenniemi  argue,  undermines  the  levels  of  ‘joint  ownership’  and  partnership 
available in the ENP: 
Meanwhile, hierarchical elements in the ENP stem directly from the emphasis on 
conditionality, which means notions of ‘joint ownership’ ultimately are widely 
seen to add up to little. Thus, it is the EU that is setting the goals of the specific 
ENP Action Plans and that will decide if they have been implemented or not.
98 
The vertical and conditional nature of the ENP is therefore indicative of an 
authoritative, hierarchical relationship between the EU as the superordinate party and 
the subordinated ENP partners. The hierarchical and unequal nature of the ENP is 
legitimated not only by a liberal social logic of risk, but also the unique benefits 
offered to ENP partners, benefits that are withheld as a sanction for non-compliance. 
Conditionality involves both the dangling of carrots to entice states to adopt 
particular reforms and the use of sticks as punishment for non-compliance with the 
set conditions. This usually takes the form of a withholding of the benefits being 
offered.
99 This is certainly the case with the ENP, although it goes further than the 
simple withholding of aid or technical assistance. The ENP only provides closer EU 
integration for those states that meet the required benchmarks – ENP partners are 
                                                 
96 Browining and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 534.  
97  See  the  European  Commission’s  website  on  external  relations  and  the  ENP,  available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/welcome_en.htm.  The  Commission  has  appointed  its  own 
Commissioner for the ENP, publishes the Country Reports, Action Plans and Progress Reports and is 
the main source of information on all aspects of the ENP. 
98 Browning and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 533. 
99 This is certainly the case with the ENP, which does not provide any real benefits until ENP partners 
meet the set conditions.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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held at arm’s length until the required reforms are implemented.
100 This means that a 
failure to comply ultimately involves exclusion from a ‘special relationship’ with the 
EU,  which  arguably  can  provide  far  more  tangible  and  intangible  benefits  than 
increased  aid  or  technical  assistance.
101  ENP  partners  thus  have  an  interest  in 
adopting the mandated reforms and legitimating their subordination in new relations 
of hierarchy with the EU.  
It is precisely this attempt to compel ENP partners to adopt external values 
and standards of governance through conditionality, irrespective of their established 
domestic institutions or societal values, that underscores the hierarchical and anti-
pluralist  relationships  between  the  EU  and  ENP  partners.  Indeed,  although  it  is 
somewhat  of  an  oxymoron,  Hurrell  has  argued  that  conditionality  provides  an 
example of a broader post-Cold War movement within international society towards 
a form of ‘coercive solidarism’. This coercive solidarism is designed to provide more 
effective enforcement of the normatively deeper version of international society that 
the  EU  and  other  Western  powers  seek  to  construct.
102  More  accurately,  the 
conditionality  of  the  ENP,  along  with  its  intrusive  regulatory  scope,  signals  a 
hierarchical and anti-pluralist shift within international society.  
It  should  be  noted  that  conditionality  is  not  a  new  method  used  by 
international actors to promote particular values or policies, and indeed has been 
                                                 
100 This is clear in the EU’s frequent assertion that closer integration with ENP partners will reflect 
their  willingness  to  adopt  the  ‘common’  values  that  are  ‘shared’  with  the  EU.  For  example,  see 
European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, 4. 
101 For example, in the case of the Eastern European ENP partners, the ENP is potentially a step 
towards an eventual offer of EU membership. This is particularly the case for Georgia and Ukraine, 
both of which have already announced their wish to join the EU. For the non-European partners, the 
benefits of greater integration include the obvious economic advantages associated with entry into the 
EU market, but also less tangible benefits such as greater international prestige and influence arising 
out of an intimate association with the EU.  
102 See Hurrell, On Global Order, 63-5. The term ‘coercive solidarism’ is an oxymoron because, as 
Linklater and Suganami argue, true solidarism is a condition rooted in societal consensus. It cannot 
arise as a result of the coercion of one member or group of members of international society by 
another. The use of coercion or compulsion to impose particular values leads to the emergence of a 
hierarchical, rather than solidarist, international society. See Linklater and Suganami, The English 
School of International Relations, 271. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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used quite extensively in the post-World War Two period. A prime example here are 
the  Structural  Adjustment  Policies  (SAPs)  implemented  by  several  international 
financial institutions (IFIs), most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Some might question why the EU’s use of conditionality is any different to that of 
the SAPs or other forms of conditionality that have been used.
103 There are two main 
ways in which the conditionalities of the ENP, and the hierarchical relations they 
denote, differ from other forms of conditionality that have been used. Firstly, the 
logic underpinning the conditionality of the ENP is fundamentally different from that 
of other forms of conditionality, such as the SAPs.  
Unlike the ENP, security considerations have generally not played a large 
role  in  motivating  the  use  of  conditionality  by  the  IFIs  or  donor  states.  Rather, 
economic considerations, particularly the need to open up markets to free trade and 
ensure  proper  governance  within  state  financial  and  monetary  institutions,  have 
motivated these forms of conditionality.
104 Secondly, and more importantly, these 
conditional  agreements  have  normally  placed  specific  requirements  upon  states 
receiving aid in specific economic policy areas. The SAPs, for example, do not come 
close to the scope or breadth of the conditionalities imposed by the ENP. Unlike 
other  programs  underpinned  by  forms  of  conditionality,  the  ENP  seeks  a 
fundamental reshaping of several different areas of the governments and societies of 
the ENP partner states.
105 
                                                 
103 For an excellent overview of SAPs and their inherently conditional and hierarchical nature see 
David  P.  Fidler,  ‘A  Kinder,  Gentler  System  of  Capitulations?  International  Law,  Structural 
Adjustment Policies and the Standard of Liberal, Globalised Civilisation’, Texas International Law 
Journal 35, no. 3 (2000): 387–414.    
104 Ibid. 
105 As Hurrell notes, there has recently been a significant expansion of conditional agreements beyond 
economic policy to include human rights, good governance, sustainable development, democracy, etc. 
See Hurrell, On Global Order, 64.   Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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In summary, the ENP is a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism, subjecting 
ENP partner states to extensive socio-political and economic regulation and constant 
scrutiny and oversight of their internal affairs. In order to participate in the ENP, 
states must agree to subject themselves to the regulation of several different areas of 
their societies by the EU. Indeed, the range of priority areas identified in the Action 
Plans for each country is staggering in its breadth and significantly reduces the range 
of acceptable values and regimes that ENP states can legitimately adopt. This of 
course is counter to the pluralist vision of international society. The ENP effectively 
constructs new relations of hierarchy in Europe’s peripheries as the EU seeks to 
subject  its  neighbours  to  a  wide-ranging  reshaping  of  their  socio-political 
environments as a mechanism for managing perceived risks to European security.     
 
Implications for International Society 
Both the idea of NPE and the ENP itself are important when discussing the 
implications  of  the  EU’s  neighbourhood  policy  for  international  society.  This  is 
because both are important elements in demonstrating the way in which a liberal 
social logic of risk underpins new relations of hierarchy within international society. 
On the one hand, the concept of NPE not only constructs the EU as an altruistic actor 
within international society, but it also legitimates the spread of its liberal values. 
The notion of Europe as an altruistic normative power is a crucial aspect of the 
legitimation of the new hierarchies to which the ENP gives rise. Further, NPE results 
in  a  fundamentally  anti-pluralist  view  of  what  constitutes  an  acceptable  form  of 
international society. Despite its pretensions towards respect for international law 
and the values and norms of pluralist international society, the EU’s view of a stable 
or ‘good’ international society is one in which domestic diversity between states is Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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eliminated  in  favour  of  liberal  notions  of  good  governance  and  democratic 
government.  
On the other hand, the EU’s recent attempts to promote liberal values in its 
immediate periphery have been justified in large part as a means through which 
Europe can secure itself against various risks. Primarily through enlargement and the 
ENP, the EU has sought to promote liberal values and institutions as a mechanism of 
risk management. A liberal social logic of risk that simultaneously constructs liberal 
democracies as peaceful, stable and non-risky; and illiberal or undemocratic states as 
backwards and potentially dangerous thus underpins the new relations of hierarchy 
to which the ENP gives rise. As demonstrated above, the EU has been explicit in its 
attempts to promote liberalism as a means of ensuring greater security for itself. The 
EU  has  sought  to  forge  a  much  deeper  form  of  international  society  with  a 
constitution based on a much thicker set of common (liberal) values and principles 
than that to be found in a pluralist international society.
106 
In doing so, it has claimed the authority to reshape the domestic institutions 
of other states according to its own liberal values. In one sense, it is tempting to view 
the EU and its behaviour as representing the emergence of a more solidarist form of 
international  society  in  place  of  its  previous  pluralist  face.  As  Linklater  and 
Suganami  argue,  true  solidarism  can  only  arise  in  a  setting  of  equal  exchange 
between states – a solidarist international society is one grounded in consensus over 
the thicker set of norms and rules to be adopted.
107 Indeed, the EU’s identification as 
a  normative  power,  a  term  that  tends  to  carry  with  it  altruistic  and  egalitarian 
                                                 
106 This is reflected in the ESS’s statement that the quality of international society depends on the 
quality  of  its  members  and  that  the  best  form  of  international  society  is  one  comprised  of  well-
governed democratic states. Thus would imply a commitment to a normatively deeper constitution of 
international society that goes beyond the norms associated with a pluralist international society, one 
entailing positive obligations regarding the domestic constitution of its members.  
107 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 271. Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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connotations, and its emphasis on partnership and joint ownership with ENP partners 
does tend to paint a picture of consensus over shared values.
108 
But  as  demonstrated  above,  these  ‘shared  values’  only  reflect  the  liberal 
values of the EU. There is no scope for accommodating the societal values of ENP 
partners, precisely because such deviance is perceived to be risky and therefore is 
something to be managed and eventually eliminated. This point is reinforced by the 
use of conditionality as means of compelling ENP partners to implement the desired 
liberal reforms. The ENP seeks a comprehensive reshaping of the societies of the 
EU’s neighbours in line with the EU’s own liberal values. It represents an attempt by 
the EU to exercise the authority to determine the socio-political constitution of its 
neighbours. The ENP therefore clearly delineates a hierarchical relationship between 
the EU, the superordinate party, and the unstable, socio-politically backward and 
subordinated countries surrounding it. These states must assimilate liberal norms for 
their own good and that of the EU. 
The very existence of the ENP is an acknowledgement by the EU that the 
countries along its external borders are a source of instability and possible security 
risks. These countries are not equal partners with the EU – rather, they pose a range 
of risks to European security. However, an important feature of the EU’s attempts to 
address  these  risks  has  been  its  adoption  of  a  less  coercive  approach  to  risk 
management  than  has  been  the  case  in  other  interventions  similarly  designed  to 
manage risk. The EU’s self-identification as a normative power means that the use of 
more  forceful  measures  to  achieve  particular  reforms  in  other  countries  is  not  a 
                                                 
108 While secondary to the argument presented here, Hyde-Price makes an important point in relation 
to the academic study of the concept of Normative Power Europe when he suggests that when the 
analyst views the object of study as embodying the core values that they themselves believe in, it 
becomes  difficult  to  achieve  any  real  critical  distance,  potentially  leading  to  analyses  skewed  in 
favour of the concept. This is something that one should be aware of when approaching the literature 
on this topic. See Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ Power Europe’, 218.    Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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viable option (of course other constraints, such as European military capabilities or 
the legacy of European imperialism, are also important). Rather, the EU seeks to 
induce  liberal  transformations  in  its  peripheries  by  exploiting  its  economic  and 
political leverage, providing the benefits of closer integration only on the condition 
that the mandated reforms are fully implemented. 
The promise of these political and economic benefits is precisely the reason 
why  ENP  states  recognise  the  authority  of  the  EU  to  determine  their  domestic 
constitution. The ENP partners therefore legitimate their subordinate status within 
new relations of hierarchy in return for these benefits. This is similar to what Lake 
refers to as a form of ‘social contract’ between super- and subordinate parties in a 
hierarchical relationship.
109 Yet while the hierarchical relationship between the EU 
and ENP partners has not involved the deployment of large numbers of troops or EU 
officials  in  ENP  states,  it  does  share  several  characteristics  with  other  recent 
interventions  by  Western  societies.  These  include  the  identification  of  certain 
domestic characteristics as constituting environments of risk, the subsequent removal 
of the risky states’ right to sovereign equality and non-intervention in its internal 
affairs, and finally intervention designed to reshape the risky environment. 
Importantly,  the  ambitious  scope,  extensive  oversight  and  extraordinary 
intrusiveness  of  the  ENP  mean  that  it  represents  a  level  of  interference  in  the 
domestic affairs of these states akin to that in the Asia-Pacific or Iraq. While the EU 
may have selected less coercive means to ensure that its demands are met, it has still 
claimed an extensive level of authority over its subordinated neighbours. The EU’s 
attempt to transform its neighbours into liberal democracies is also distinctly anti-
pluralist in that it seeks to limit the range of values and regimes that states may 
                                                 
109 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, 53-6; Lake, ‘Regional Hierarchy’, 36.  Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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legitimately adopt. The ENP effectively replaces the pluralist right of states to freely 
determine their domestic constitution in a way that reflects their own societal values 
with a positive obligation to adopt the required liberal reforms in order to qualify for 
the benefits that the EU is offering. Partner countries are compelled to open almost 
all facets of their societies to EU regulation and oversight. 
In  sum,  the  ENP  represents  new  forms  of  hierarchy  within  international 
society, based upon a liberal social logic of risk, which are corrosive of its pluralist 
constitution. The EU’s neighbourhood policy provides a regional example of the 
broader  argument  of  this  thesis,  namely  that  attempts  to  manage  risk  via  the 
promotion of liberal values results in the emergence of a more hierarchical, anti-
pluralist international society. However, the ENP gives rise to a more consensual 
form of hierarchy and inequality between the EU and ENP partners than is the case 
in  Iraq.  This  is  precisely  why  the  ENP  provides  an  important  case  study  of  the 
effects of risk upon international society. Together with the other case studies, the 
case of the ENP shows that risk can give rise to dynamic forms of hierarchy within 
international society, from the more consensual hierarchies discussed here to the 
overt domination that the invasion of Iraq represented. 
This reinforces the contention in chapters three and four that risk assessment, 
identification and management are at their core subjective enterprises. This means 
that  risk  management  can  take  a  variety  of  forms,  leading  to  various  types  of 
intervention  and  thus  various  types  of  hierarchy  within  international  society. 
Nevertheless, the core relationship between risk, pluralism and hierarchy remains 
intact. The EU, like other Western societies, views pluralist diversity as a risk in 
itself because it gives rise to illiberal, unstable environments within which potential 
hazards can develop. Its response has been to attempt to intervene in its potentially Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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unstable  neighbours  through  the  ENP.  In  the  process,  these  attempts  at  risk 
management give rise to new and novel relations of hierarchy that are corrosive of 
international society’s pluralist constitution. As will be shown in the subsequent case 
studies, this is a pattern that has been played out on several occasions in the post-
Cold War era.  
 
Conclusion 
Like  other  Western  societies  in  the  post-Cold  War  era,  the  EU  and  its 
members  have  become  increasingly  pre-occupied  with  the  negative  aspects  of 
globalisation, particularly its ability to give effect to new forms of temporally and 
spatially  de-bounded  risks  to  their  security.  The  2004  enlargement  of  the  Union 
exacerbated these concerns by bringing the EU closer to identified zones of risk 
within international society. These zones have been identified as risky and unstable 
by  the  EU  primarily  due  to  the  lack  of  liberal  institutions  and  notions  of  good 
governance in many of the countries situated within these zones. Aware that these 
territories could act as originators of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, the 
EU has moved to export its liberal values as part of a situational prevention risk 
management  technique  aimed  at  reshaping  the  socio-political  and  economic 
environments of its neighbours.  
The  primary  means  for  doing  so  has  thus  far  been  the  ENP,  a  program 
‘designed to help our direct neighbours to our east and south come closer to the 
EU…’ through a program of standardisation and homogenisation in the risky zones 
surrounding Europe.
110 Its aim is to construct a new zone of peace, prosperity and 
                                                 
110  Benita  Ferrero-Waldner,  The  European  Union  and  Central  Asia  –  Building  a  21
st  Century 
Partnership,  SPEECH/06/615  (L.N.  Gumilyev  Eurasian  National  University, Astana,  17  October 
2006). Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery  
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stability stretching from the EU into its wider neighbourhood. Despite its pretensions 
towards cooperation, partnership and mutual ownership, the ENP actually involves 
the imposition of EU values of liberalism and democracy in return for the benefits 
associated with closer political and economic integration with the EU. Indeed, the 
idea that the ENP is designed to bring neighbours closer to the EU signifies that the 
ENP is not a normal partnership involving mutual exchange between equal partners. 
Rather, it is a mechanism designed solely for the purpose of exporting the EU’s 
liberal values as a technique of risk management.  
The ENP thus denotes a hierarchical relationship between the EU and the 
backward, potentially risky states that are expected to assimilate liberal values. The 
ENP opens partner states to significant intrusion and interference across most areas 
of  their  societies,  from  the  nature  of  the  state’s  governing  institutions  to 
environmental  and  energy  policy  or  the  commitment  of  the  state  to  particular 
international instruments or treaties. The EU has thus demonstrated decidedly anti-
pluralist tendencies in its relations with its neighbours, tendencies affirmed by its 
view  that  a  ‘better’  international  society  would  result  through  a  liberal 
homogenisation of its constituent members.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the language of partnership and joint ownership has also been heavily employed by 
the Australian government as a means of legitimating its interventions in the Asia-
Pacific.  Like  the  ENP,  the  language  of  partnership  in  the  context  of  Australia’s 
activities in the Asia-Pacific only serves to legitimate the hierarchical relations that 
emerge  between  the  interveners  and  those  territories  subjected  to  socio-political 
environmental reshaping. Like the EU, in its attempts to manage risk, the Australian 
government  has  contributed  to  the  ascendance  of  hierarchical  trends  within 
international society at the expense of its pluralist constitution.      
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Six 
‘Cooperative Interventionism’: Australia and 
the Management of Risk in the Asia­Pacific 
 
 
Introduction 
Since most Pacific island territories achieved their independence in the 1960s 
and 1970s, Australia has been a major source of foreign aid for these new states. 
Pacific island nations such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former trust territory of 
Australia until 1975 and, more recently, East Timor and Solomon Islands have relied 
heavily upon Australia for aid funding and support. In turn, Australia has focused 
heavily  on  liberal  notions  of  good  governance  as  the  prerequisite  for  economic 
development  and  social  and  political  stability  in  the  Pacific  island  states.
1  Until 
recently, Australia’s policy position on development aid was largely centred on a 
‘hands-off’ approach – provide aid funding to these states and allow their respective 
governments to formulate and adopt their own development agendas.
2 The point was 
to avoid any suggestion that Australia was interfering in the internal affairs of these 
states or sought to establish itself as a neo-imperialist regional power.
3  
                                                 
1 This emphasis on liberal good governance was apparent in the regional development policies of the 
former Keating government in the mid-1990s and continues to this day. See Greg Fry and Tarcisius 
Tara  Kabutaulaka,  ‘Political  Legitimacy  and  State-Building  Intervention  in  the  Pacific’,  in 
Intervention and State-building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of Co-operative Intervention, edited by 
Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008): 14 and 
William  Sutherland,  ‘Global  Imperatives  and  Economic  Reform  in  the  Pacific  Island  States’, 
Development and Change 31, no. 2 (2000): 459-80.  
2 Elisa Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands (Canberra: 
Australian  Strategic  Policy  Institute,  2003):  8.  However,  the  Keating  government  did  attempt  to 
condition aid funding on compliance with Australian notions of good governance. See Greg Fry, 
‘Climbing Back Unto the Map? The South Pacific Forum and the New Development Orthodoxy’, 
Journal of Pacific History 29, no. 3 (1994): 64-72.   
3 Ibid.  Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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However,  after  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks  and  2002  Bali  bombings,  this 
approach has been cast aside in favour of a new interventionist approach that favours 
substantially increased Australian involvement in the internal affairs of these states 
in order to facilitate governance reforms and build institutional capacity.
4 Recent 
interventions in PNG and Solomon Islands have demonstrated Australia’s newfound 
willingness  to  promote  good  governance  in  the  Pacific  islands  by  intervening 
directly in their economic, social and political affairs. The argument presented in this 
chapter is that a pre-occupation with spatially and temporally de-bounded security 
risks provides the impetus for Australia’s new interventionist approach to promoting 
good governance in the Asia-Pacific. As will be shown, since 9/11 the Australian 
government  has  become  increasingly  pre-occupied  with  globalised,  transnational 
risks to its security. Further, it has determined that the primary method with which to 
manage such risks in its immediate region is to prevent state failure in several Pacific 
island states by reshaping their socio-political and economic environments via the 
promotion of liberal standards of good governance. 
Australia has come to view itself as positioned on the doorstep of an ‘arc of 
instability’ or ‘Asia-Pacific zone of risk’.
5 This zone of risk is one characterised by 
the presence of several small, fragile states beset by political and social instability 
and  economic  underdevelopment.  These  territories  are  perceived  as  potentially 
facing state failure. It is these conditions of state weakness and potential failure, 
conceived in terms of poor governance and weak state institutions, which pose an 
                                                 
4 This view is part of a broader international concern with state failure and the dangers posed by weak 
or  failed  states  to  Western  security  interests  that  emerged  after  9/11.  See  David  Chandler, 
‘Introduction:  Peace  Without  Politics’,  International  Peacekeeping  12,  no.  3  (2005):  307-21  and 
Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 127-40.    
5 The term ‘arc of instability’ is one that has been popularised by the Australian government and the 
media. For more on the concept and Australia’s interactions with the region see Dennis Rumley, 
Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin (eds), Australia’s Arc of Instability: The Political and 
Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006).   Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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environment conducive to the origination of globalised security risks. Terrorists or 
other transnational criminals such as drug smugglers might potentially exploit weak 
Asia-Pacific  states,  increasing  the  risk  that  they  will  use  these  territories  as  a 
launching  pad  for  operations  within,  or  attacks  against,  Australia.
6  An  important 
point here is that the spatial and temporal de-bounding of risk blurs the distinction 
between  international  and  domestic  space,  meaning  that  securing  the  homeland 
requires  intervention  abroad.  As  the  Australian  government  has  concluded, 
instability in the immediate region makes it more difficult for Australia to secure 
itself against globalised risks.
7 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines Australia’s broad 
foreign  policy  approach  since  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks,  arguing  that  Australian 
foreign policy has become increasingly pre-occupied with de-bounded security risks. 
Following this, the chapter examines how this broader emphasis on security risks has 
impacted  upon  the  Australian  government’s  policies  regarding  its  neighbouring 
island states, with a particular focus on PNG and Solomon Islands. Here it suggests 
that  the  Australian  government’s  perception  that  weak  or  failing  states  leave 
Australia more exposed to de-bounded risks informs a new interventionist approach 
designed  to  promote  good  governance  throughout  the  Asia-Pacific.  It  is  the 
promotion of liberal notions of good governance as a way of reshaping the socio-
political  and  economic  environments  of  Pacific  island  states  that  constitutes 
Australia’s primary risk management technique.  
                                                 
6 The idea that terrorists could use weak or failing states as bases is one that first gained prominence 
in the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks. See Commission on Weak States and US 
National Security, On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security (Washington D.C.: Center for 
Global Development, 2004): 1.  
7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and 
Trade Policy Whitepaper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003): 93. Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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Next, the chapter discusses Australia’s attempts at risk management, focusing 
on the interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG. This section concentrates on the 
type of governance and institutional reforms Australia has sought to achieve in these 
countries and the methods that have been used to do so. Importantly, despite the 
consensual nature of Australia’s state-building endeavours (both PNG and Solomon 
Islands  acceded  to  Australian  involvement  in  their  internal  affairs)  and  their 
description as ‘cooperative interventions’ or partnerships, what these interventions 
have essentially sought to do is subject Pacific island states to Australian-led socio-
political regulation as a way of managing risk.
8 The Australian government sets the 
parameters of what constitutes good governance and sufficient institutional capacity, 
often  with  only  minimal  involvement  of  the  local  officials  or  populations  in  the 
affected states. 
This section concludes with a consideration of the implications of Australia’s 
attempts  at  state-building  in  PNG  and  Solomon  Islands  for  international  society. 
Australian  attempts  at  risk  management  within  the  Asia-Pacific  have  led  to  the 
emergence of new relations of hierarchy in the region. Like the hierarchies that result 
from the EU’s ENP, underpinning new hierarchical relationships in the Asia-Pacific 
is  a  liberal  social  logic  of  risk  which  constitutes  illiberal  or  fragile  states  as 
potentially dangerous sites of risk fomentation and origination. It also legitimates the 
Australian government’s claim to have the authority to intervene in these risky states 
in  order  to  protect  Australia’s  security.  Australia  has  claimed  the  right,  as  a 
developed and benevolent regional power, to dictate its own liberal conceptions of 
good governance as the pre-requisite that weak or failing states must meet to achieve 
development and stability.  
                                                 
8 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon 
Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 2 (2005): 299. Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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Australia’s Foreign Policy Outlook Post-9/11: Increased Interventionism in the 
Asia-Pacific   
The  September  11  terrorist  attacks  were  a  watershed  moment  for 
international society, one that will be sure to have lasting and significant impacts on 
international  politics  and  inter-state  relations.  In  Australia,  9/11,  along  with  the 
October 2002 Bali bombings in which 88 Australians lost their lives, represented a 
fundamental shift in Australian views of the wider international society. This was 
reflected not only in Australia’s broad foreign policy stance, but also in terms of its 
approach to the immediate region. As Wesley argues, 9/11 produced a shock within 
the Australian government that led to the emergence of what he terms a new ‘foreign 
policy  logic’.
9  Former  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  Alexander  Downer  likewise 
suggests that the world changed fundamentally after 9/11 and the Bali bombings.
10 
An important component of Australia’s foreign policy shift in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks  has  involved  the  Australian  government’s  increasing  awareness  of,  and 
concern with, a range of temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks and the 
uncertain strategic environment to which they give rise.  
The risks associated with global terrorism and WMD proliferation (and their 
prevention)  has  become  the  defining  feature  of  Australian  foreign  policy.
11  As 
Downer  argues,  ‘Australia’s  security  is  at  risk  from  the  threat  of  international 
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.
12 Downer later contended 
during a speech to the UN General Assembly that ‘Where once it was possible to 
                                                 
9  Michael  Wesley,  ‘Perspectives  on  Australian  Foreign  Policy,  2001’,  Australian  Journal  of 
International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002): 47-63.  
10  Alexander  Downer,  ‘Security  in  an  Unstable  World’  (Canberra:  National  Press  Club,  26  June 
2003),  http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_unstableworld.html  (accessed  17 
September 2008).  
11 This includes the risk that terrorists might acquire WMD. See Department of Defence, Defence 
Update 2007, 9.  
12 Downer, ‘Security in an Unstable World’.   Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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view terrorism as the lamentable legacy of a few unsafe regions, today almost no 
country has been left untouched’.
13 These shifts and new focuses in foreign policy 
have not been unique to Australia. They are also reflective of broader changes in the 
international  security  environment.
14  Following  9/11,  most  Western  societies, 
particularly the US and the UK, have focused heavily on the dangers posed to their 
security interests by spatially and temporally de-bounded risks.  
Australia’s  new  foreign  policy  outlook  was  clearly  articulated  in  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade’s  (DFAT)  2003  White P aper.  This 
document describes Australia as part of an uncertain and dangerous world, one in 
which globalisation has increased the vulnerability of Australia and other states to 
transnational  risks.
15  Downer  has  also  highlighted  the  uncertainty  and 
unpredictability  inherent  in  the  contemporary  international  environment  that 
Australia  must  navigate.
16  Indeed,  it  is  Australia’s  increased  concern  with  this 
uncertainty and unpredictability that is one of the more important features of its post-
September  11  foreign  policy  approach.  It  gives  rise  to  a  more  cautious  and 
apprehensive  international  outlook,  one  in  which  the  Australian  government  has 
become  increasingly  pre-occupied  with  de-bounded  risks  to  Australia’s  national 
security.   
This  increased  apprehensiveness  is  particularly  evident  in  the  Australian 
government’s views regarding globalisation. Prior to 9/11, globalisation was viewed 
rather positively; Downer continually extolled the virtues of open markets, free trade 
                                                 
13 Alexander Downer, ‘Speech to the United Nations General Assembly’, (New York: United Nations 
General Assembly, 24 September 2003), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030924_ 
general_assembly_ny.html (accessed September 2008). 
14 See Kabutaulaka, ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention’. 
15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, ix. 
16  Alexander  Downer,  ‘Advancing  the  National  Interest:  Australia’s  Foreign  Policy  Challenge’ 
(Canberra: National Press Club, 7 May 2002), http://foreignminister.gov.au/ speeches/2002/020507_f 
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and technological advances in communications, transport and production.
17 Further, 
in the 2000 Department of Defence White Paper, globalisation is also regarded in 
largely  positive  terms.  It  is  seen  as  bringing  a  number  of  security  benefits  to 
Australia, predominantly because it increases the stake that governments have in a 
stable international order.
18 Yet by the 2003 DFAT White Paper, this largely positive 
view  had  dissipated,  replaced  with  a  more  cautious  and  negative  view  of 
globalisation and its effects. In the DFAT White Paper, globalisation is regarded as 
providing several benefits, but also a range of challenges to state institutions and 
governance.
19 
The  2005  Defence  Update,  a  supplement  to  the  Defence  White P aper, 
likewise considers the negative security implications of globalisation. It argues that 
While  the  international  system  is  never  static,  globalisation  is  accelerating  the 
movement  of  ideas  and  technologies.  It  has  increased  the  interdependency 
between countries and made borders more porous.  It has increased the potency of 
the terrorist threat, and the potential danger of WMD proliferation. Failing states 
are a significant concern because the insecurity they face can easily move beyond 
their borders.
20 
It is precisely due to its potential to give rise to spatially de-bounded risks such as 
terrorism that globalisation has come to be viewed in a more uneasy manner by the 
Australian  government.  One  of  the  crucial  points  that  Australian  government 
officials have made regarding globalisation’s security implications is the inability of 
states to insulate themselves from globalisation’s effects, both good and bad.  
                                                 
17 See Alexander Downer, ‘Australia - Meeting our International Challenges’ (Canberra: National 
Press  Club,  1  March  2001),  http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2001/010301_fa_npc.html 
(accessed 15 September 2008).  
18  Australian  Department  of  Defence,  Defence  2000:  Our  Future  Defence  Force  (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2000): 15. 
19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, ix. 
20  Australian  Department  of  Defence,  Australia’s  National  Security:  A  Defence  Update  2005 
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As  Alexander  Downer  commented,  ‘In  a  globalised  world,  Australia’s 
security  interests  are  increasingly  affected  by  lawlessness  and  disorder  in  other 
states’.
21 The demarcation between internal and external security has evaporated in 
the face of globalised, spatially de-bounded risks. Internal disorder in states across 
the globe can have negative consequences for Australia’s security. Such a view is 
expressed in DFAT’s 2003 White Paper: 
Changes in the international security environment, too, have added to the blurring 
between  domestic  and  international  issues.  The  faster  and  freer  movement  of 
people and goods has increased the vulnerability of Australia and other countries 
to  non-traditional  security  threats,  including  terrorism,  organised  crime, 
environmental degradation and disease.
22 
The point that Downer and the White Paper allude to in these statements is 
that geographical location no longer offers Australia the protection it once did. This 
is a view explicitly articulated in the 2003 Defence Update, which suggests that 
Paradoxically however, in some other important ways, certainty and predictability 
have decreased because the strategic advantage offered by our geography does not 
protect Australia against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic 
missiles. Nor does it protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism.
23  
An important point made in the above comment is that the advent of spatially de-
bounded risks associated with globalisation produces higher levels of uncertainty 
and  unpredictability  that  the  Australian  government  must  deal  with  in  the 
contemporary security environment. As a result of the uncertain and unpredictable 
                                                 
21  Alexander  Downer,  ‘Australian  Foreign  Policy  Today  and  Tomorrow’  (Melbourne:  Monash 
University,  22  August  2007),  http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2007/070822_monash.html 
(accessed 17 September 2008). 
22 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, 124. 
23  Australian  Department  of  Defence,  Australia’s  National  Security:  A  Defence  Update  2003 
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nature of new global risks, attention has fallen on more readily identifiable regions of 
disorder, or zones of risk, where dangers can potentially grow. 
Particular attention in this regard has been paid to the issue of state fragility 
and  failure.  As  the  2003  White P aper  suggests  ‘Some  regions  of  disorder  have 
become more volatile, more of a threat to global order and thus more relevant to 
Australia’s security interests’.
24 Such a view was reiterated in both the 2005 and 
2007 Defence Updates. The 2005 Update suggests that 
 Globalisation can add to the potential fallout from failing states in those situations 
where economic development, governance and the rule of law break down. Failing 
states may provide the opportunity for recruiting, training and deploying terrorists. 
A vacuum of governance and law and order creates an environment within which 
these groups can flourish. Due to the easy movement of people and goods, the 
consequences  arising  from  failing  states  are  often  transported  beyond  their 
borders.
25 
The 2007 Update likewise concludes that  
Our national interests as a democratic, trading and globally engaged country are 
threatened by the rise of terrorism and by instability in areas such as the Middle 
East. In a globalised world, ignoring problems further afield only invites these 
threats  to  come  closer  to  Australia...a  more  integrated  world  and  ongoing 
technological  and  demographic  change  magnifies  the  range  and  number  of 
potential threats and the strategic effect of events, including some distant ones, on 
Australia’s security.
26 
Again, the point here is that zones of risk within international society cannot be 
ignored  –  to  do  so  would  only  allow  potential  dangers  to  develop.  Hence,  the 
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problems  that  characterise  these  zones  of  risk  become  global  problems  that  can 
adversely affect Australian, and Western, security interests.  
Therefore,  the  Australian  government  has  placed  emphasis,  particularly 
within the immediate Asia-Pacific region, on managing these risks by reshaping the 
socio-political and economic environments of weak states in an attempt to prevent 
state failure. A central part of this focus on reshaping risky environments has been 
the  importance  that  the  Australian  government  has  attached  to  promoting  liberal 
values and good governance.
27 Roberts et al make a significant point in this regard: 
Post 9/11, war on terror geopolitical constructions of regions as potential sites for 
fomenting terrorism become part of the reason why the governance agenda in the 
Pacific  receives  support  from  foreign  policy  interests  in  relatively  powerful 
countries  such  as  the  US  and  Australia…We  could  say  that  in  the  present 
geopolitical  era  there  is  an  intensification  in  the  application  of  the  security–
governance nexus in certain regions or zones, including the Pacific.
28 
This focus on good governance is not new – good governance is a concept 
that has been a key part of development policy since the late 1980s.
29 Indeed, there 
has been a strong focus on governance as the panacea to development problems in 
the Pacific since the early 1990s.
30 However, good governance is a concept that is 
                                                 
27 The idea of re-organising and re-configuring state institutions and processes of governance bears 
some similarity to Power’s arguments regarding contemporary organisational responses to risk, a key 
element of which has been the rise of organisational internal control systems that involve organisation 
or system-wide regulatory mechanisms and processes designed to manage risk. It is possible to view 
good governance as a form of internal control system of the state, providing regulatory frameworks 
and processes that manage a range of possible social, political, economic and security risks. See 
Power,  The  Risk  Management  of  Everything,  24-8  and  Michael  Power,  Organized  Uncertainty: 
Designing a World of Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 34-65. 
28  Susan  M.  Roberts,  Sarah  Wright  and  Phillip  O’Neill,  ‘Good  Governance  in  the  Pacific? 
Ambivalence and Possibility’, Geoforum 38, no. 5 (2007): 971.  
29 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual 
Challenges’, Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795. 
30 Elise Huffer, ‘Governance, Corruption and Ethics in the Pacific’, The Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 
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generally ill-defined and open to competing interpretations and definitions.
31 As both 
Roberts et al and Weiss note, governance is a slippery and malleable concept that 
can be subject to definitional adjustment.
32 As Roberts et al argue, the result is that 
‘good governance’, as it has come to be defined in the post-9/11 era, is increasingly 
enmeshed with Western security concerns.
33 So while the focus on governance as the 
solution  to  development  problems  in  non-Western  territories  is  not  new,  the 
emphasis  on  governance  as  a  means  to  achieving  security  for  the  West  against 
globalised risks is. In short, governance has become recast in the post-9/11 period as 
a  mode  of  risk  management.  Good  governance  is  simultaneously  the  means  for 
achieving sustainable development and managing de-bounded risks.
34 
In  this  uncertain  and  dangerous  world  the  Australian  government  has 
emphasised  the  promotion  of  good  governance  as  the  necessary  response  to  the 
hazards posed by state weakness or failure.
35  Importantly, state weakness or fragility 
has been defined precisely in terms of weak institutions lacking sufficient capacity 
and  poor  governance.  As  the  Australian  Agency  for  International  Development 
(AusAID),  Australia’s  main  aid  agency,  suggests,  it  is  the  lack  of  sustainable 
institutions  or  good  governance  that  creates  state  weakness  and  hence  the  risky 
environment.
36  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  what  constitutes  ‘good’ 
governance, as opposed to poor governance, is not merely an apolitical and technical 
                                                 
31 See Martin Doornbos, ‘“Good Governance”: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?’, Journal 
of Development Studies 37, no. 6 (2001): 93-108.  
32 See Roberts et al, ‘Good Governance in the Pacific?’ and Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance 
and Global Governance’. 
33 Roberts, et al, ‘Good Governance in the Pacific?’, 971; Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and 
Global Governance’, 795-8. 
34 The broader nexus between the discourses of security and development is one that has recently 
received increasing scholarly attention. See Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: 
The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001). 
35 As Hameiri notes, the post-Cold War era has witnessed high levels of growth in the interest of 
policy makers and scholars with the issue of state failure. See Shahar Hameiri, ‘Failed States or a 
Failed  Paradigm?  State  Capacity  and  the  Limits  of  Institutionalism’,  Journal  of  International 
Relations and Development 10, no. 2 (2007): 122.   
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affair,  but  rather  is  distinctly  informed  by  Australia’s  liberal  values.  Australia’s 
support for the global promotion of liberal values is well captured by Downer:  
We believe that the liberal democratic model provides the best mechanism for 
addressing political, economic and social problems – globally, as well as locally. 
We believe that governments and societies which tend towards liberal democracy 
are  better  at  creating  wealth,  alleviating  poverty,  respecting  human  rights, 
fostering creativity and bringing stability to the world...Liberal democracy is the 
soundest  basis  for  peace  and  prosperity.  It's  the  basis  for  dynamism  and 
innovation. It's in Australia's national interest for democracy to spread. And so it's 
a core value of our foreign policy.
37 
Australia’s  explicit  support  for  liberal  values  and  democratic  forms  of 
government defines the particular conception of good governance that it seeks to 
promote. As AusAID suggests, political principles associated with good governance 
include  a  representative  and  accountable  government,  a  pluralistic  society  with 
freedom of expression and the primacy of the rule of law.
38 Such principles represent 
the distinctive values that are associated with liberal political ideology and a liberal 
democratic form of government. As Fukuyama argues, good governance and liberal 
democracy are functionally linked as the very definition of what constitutes ‘good’ 
governance or ‘good’ state institutions draws heavily on notions of accountability, 
transparency and individual freedoms.
39 However, this is not to say that the mere 
existence of these liberal institutions is sufficient in itself. Rather, these institutions 
must have the capacity to operate effectively and according to sound processes. As 
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Downer argues, ‘Of course, creating and sustaining free societies requires more than 
just a tradition of regular elections and economic liberalisation. Good governance 
and effective institutions are essential building-blocks of free societies’.
40  
Again, while this emphasis on good governance pre-dates the 9/11 attacks 
and Bali bombings, it is an emphasis that has been employed more forcefully by the 
Australian government (and Western societies in general) since 2001.
41 Through the 
promotion  of  good  governance  in  zones  of  risk,  dangerous  environments  can  be 
reshaped and Australia’s security and prosperity can be enhanced. As the DFAT 
White Paper argues 
Good governance – which includes the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
development  of  sustainable  policies  and  institutions  –  is  a  basic  condition  for 
security and prosperity in all countries. The improvement of governance around 
the world can help create an environment that contributes to the security and 
prosperity  of  Australia…One  challenge  that  good  governance  imposes  on 
Australian  foreign  policy  is  the  advancement  of  human  dignity,  justice  and 
freedom.
42 
Unsurprisingly,  this  is  a  view  that  Downer  has  echoed,  and  one  that  he 
consistently held to during his tenure as Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 
2007 he suggested that 
Because when we face threats like transnational crime and terrorism, strong nation 
states are more important than ever. Only effective and robust states – I would 
argue  democratic  and  free  liberal  states  –  are  equipped  to  meet  the  range  of 
challenges we face, and survive and thrive...To deal with global problems, we 
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need strong states. We need states that are effectively run. We need states with 
institutions that are accountable to their citizens.
43 
As a result of Australia’s increased concern with fostering good governance as a 
mechanism through which to manage perceived risks to its security, the methods 
through which the Australian government has sought to promote good governance 
have changed.  
These changes are particularly evident with regard to Australia’s attempts to 
foster development in the Pacific island states. The broad shift in Australia’s foreign 
policy  outlook  was  one  that  had  significant  implications  for  Australian  policy 
regarding  neighbouring  fragile  states  in  the  immediate  region.  As  noted  in  the 
introduction, since attaining their independence, most of the Pacific Island states 
have suffered from instability, disorder and underdevelopment. Until 9/11 and the 
Bali  bombings,  the  popular  view  in  Australia  regarding  the  development  of  the 
Pacific  island  states  was,  as  Alexander  Downer  suggests,  that  these  new  states 
should be left alone to enjoy their independence.
44 Australia’s role was to provide 
external aid and support, not to involve itself in the internal affairs of these states. 
This view has changed as 9/11 and the Bali bombings caused a rethink in Australian 
policy towards the Asia-Pacific, one that would result in a shift from a ‘hands-off’ to 
a ‘hands-on’ approach in weak states in the region.
45 
As Fry and Kabutaulaka argue, what is distinctive about this new approach is 
the  linking  of  security  objectives  to  the  development  agenda  and  Australia’s 
increased  readiness  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  its  neighbours.
46  This  hands-on 
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Ridden Island Nations’, Wall Street Journal Online (28 July 2007),  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1 
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approach has involved a newly assertive Australia that has undertaken ‘an ambitious 
attempt  at  regionwide  social  engineering...’
47  State  weakness  in  the  Pacific  has 
acquired a new strategic significance, primarily due to the perception that Australia 
now sits on the cusp of an ‘Arc of Instability’, a risky environment that could be 
exploited  by  terrorists  or  transnational  criminals.  The  issue  of  state  fragility  and 
failure has thus come to the fore in Australian policy regarding the Pacific. The view 
within the Australian government appears to be that if it is left unchecked, this Asia-
Pacific zone of instability in Australia’s backyard could leave it exposed to the risks 
associated with terrorism or transnational criminal operations.
48 
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) report on Solomon Islands 
summarises the Australian government’s thinking well: 
In today’s globalised world, the failure of Solomon Islands as a modern nation 
state would not simply mean that its people would revert to the Pacific Island idyll 
of subsistence prosperity among the palm trees...Without an effective government 
upholding  the  rule  of  law  and  controlling  its  borders,  Solomon  Islands  risks 
becoming  –  and  has  to  some  extent  already  become  –  a  petri  dish  in  which 
transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed.
49  
The issue here is that fragile or failing island states such as Solomon Islands or PNG 
constitute environments within which de-bounded risks can develop and foment. As 
Dinnen  et  al  argue:  ‘Post  9/11,  the  focus  was  on  the  security  risks  presented  to 
Australia by the region’s ‘weak’ and ‘failing’ states. These, in turn, were viewed as 
potential havens for transnational crime and terrorism’.
50  
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Hameiri  likewise  makes  an  argument  very  similar  to  that  presented  here, 
suggesting that Australia’s aid approach in the Pacific has been securitised and that 
the nature of this securitisation is reflective of a risk management approach that 
seeks to prevent the spill-over of transnational risks by building institutional capacity 
in weak Pacific states.
51 Thus, it is seen as no longer viable to simply sit back and 
provide aid to weak states in the Pacific in the hope that they will use it wisely to 
develop capable institutions and undertake governance reforms. The new dangers 
faced by Australia provide a mandate for a more proactive, preventive approach to 
promoting good governance in a bid to avoid state failure in the region, one in which 
Australia becomes the ‘regional sheriff’, policing and regulating Pacific island states 
as a form of risk management.
52 
These  changes  to  the  Australian  approach  towards  promoting  good 
governance  are  neatly  captured  by  the  Australian  government’s  back-flip  on  the 
issue of intervening in Solomon Islands. Despite continuing conflict and instability 
in the Solomon Islands beginning in 1998, the Australian government, prior to 2003, 
consistently  rejected  pleas  from  the  Solomon  Islands  government  for  Australian 
assistance  to  curb  the  violence  and  halt  the  conflict.  The  Australian  government 
persistently stuck to its hands-off, non-interventionist approach to the Asia-Pacific, 
even in the face of the kidnapping of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu by 
militants  in  2000.
53  However,  by  2003  this  had  all  changed.  By  this  stage,  the 
Solomon  Islands  state  had  all  but  collapsed,  to  the  increasing  concern  of  the 
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Australian government. However, this concern with the security implications of the 
failure of the Solomon Islands state, which was highly probable, was not limited to 
the Australian government. 
Wainwright’s ASPI report on Solomon Islands argued in favour of Australian 
intervention,  outlining  Australia’s  security  interests  that  were  at  stake  should 
Solomon Islands descend into complete state collapse.
54 The result was that in June 
2003,  the  Howard  government  decided  to  intervene  in  Solomon  Islands  to  re-
establish law and order and build good governance and capable state institutions. 
Then-Prime  Minister  John  Howard’s  justification  of  the  decision  to  intervene, 
provided in a ministerial statement to Parliament, was instructive regarding the risk 
management rationale underlying the intervention:   
A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons 
but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region. Failed states 
can  all  too  easily  become  safe-havens  for  transnational  criminals  and  even 
terrorists. Poor governance and endemic corruption provide the conditions that 
support criminal activities. If Australia wants security, we need to do all that we 
can to ensure that our region, our neighbourhood, is stable – that governance is 
strong and the rule of law is just.
55  
The  two  main  elements  of  Australia’s  international  outlook  since  9/11,  a 
preoccupation  with  de-bounded  risks  and  the  focus  on  the  promotion  of  good 
governance within weak states as a means of managing such risks, are evident in this 
statement. As Howard suggests, failed states provide the conditions within which 
security  risks  can  flourish.  Hence,  reshaping  the  socio-political  and  economic 
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environment  of  fragile  states  becomes  a  mechanism  of  risk  management. 
Importantly, the above also clearly suggests that the primary motive or rationale for 
the intervention was not to improve the lives of Solomon Islanders. If it was, the 
intervention  would  have  occurred  earlier  than  2003.  Rather,  the  intervention 
occurred  in  2003  because  after  9/11  and  the  Bali  bombings,  the  Australian 
government  became  increasingly  anxious  over  the  possible  risks  to  its  national 
security posed by failed states in the region.  
However, at the time of the intervention, there was no substantial evidence of 
a  direct  threat  to  Australian  security  by  terrorists  or  criminals  operating  out  of 
Solomon Islands, nor was there any credible evidence to suggest that the presence of 
terrorists or transnational criminal groups within Solomon Islands was an imminent 
possibility.
56  As  Nick  Warner,  former  Special  Coordinator  of  the  Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), suggested ‘And while there 
was no evidence that transnational criminals were targeting Solomon Islands, there 
was  no  point  waiting  for  this  to  happen’.
57  Rather,  the  security  concerns  of  the 
Australian government were defined with reference to the future possibility that if 
left unchecked, state failure in the Solomon Islands could leave Australia vulnerable 
to temporally and spatially de-bounded risks at some future point in time. There was 
thus  a  distinctive  element  of  precaution  in  Australia’s  decision  to  intervene  in 
Solomon Islands and later PNG. Despite the lack of any firm evidence that terrorists, 
transnational criminals or any other form of de-bounded security risk might arise out 
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of the situation in either of these countries, the Australian government still justified 
its interventions with reference to Australian security interests.  
The next section examines Australia’s interventions in Solomon Islands and 
PNG, considering the methods that the Australian government has employed in both 
countries in order to facilitate the desired governance reforms. The point of these 
reforms  is  to  subject  Solomon  Islands  and  PNG  to  socio-political  and  economic 
regulation  in  order  to  control  their  environmental  conditions  and  manage  risk. 
Despite the assertions that RAMSI or the Enhanced Cooperation Package (ECP) in 
PNG are representative of a partnership between Australia and the affected state, the 
populations of the territories have little control over the reforms being carried out. 
Negotiation, compromise and most importantly local input are largely taken out of 
the equation. Rather than a partnership, RAMSI and the ECP are representative of 
new hierarchies in the Asia-Pacific, involving the Australian government’s claim to 
have the authority to construct and reform liberal institutions in Pacific Island states 
as a means of managing risk.   
 
Promoting Good Governance: Liberal Reform in PNG and Solomon Islands 
Since independence, both the Solomon Islands and PNG have suffered from 
state  weakness  and  developmental  problems,  yet  the  concern  that  the  Australian 
government has expressed regarding the possibility of state failure in these territories 
is itself rather new. In Solomon Islands, continuing civil conflict and widespread 
disorder were ignored for a number of years until 2003. Australia’s interventionist 
activities in PNG are also of comparatively recent origin.
58 The remainder of this 
section focuses on the Australian government’s state-building efforts in Solomon 
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Islands and PNG. It firstly examines RAMSI before considering the ECP in PNG. As 
will be shown, the primary purpose of these interventions is to achieve security for 
Australia by subjecting the affected territories to environmental reshaping via socio-
political and economic regulation. 
Briefly, it is important to outline the conditions that led to the deployment of 
RAMSI in Solomon Islands in July 2003. The problems in Solomon Islands began in 
1998 when Guadalcanalese militants, members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement 
(IFM), began launching low-level skirmishes against settlers from the neighbouring 
island of Malaita on Guadalcanal.
59 The militants were aggrieved over the presence 
of these settlers, who arrived on Guadalcanal in the preceding decades. However, 
despite the appearance of the conflict as a product of ethnic tensions between the two 
groups, Hameiri and Dinnen et al have noted that underpinning these tensions were 
fundamental  economic  and  developmental  issues  associated  with  the  changes 
brought  about  by  globalisation  (particularly  uneven  levels  of  development 
throughout Solomon Islands), state corruption and demographic factors.
60   
The Malaitans retaliated against the Guadalcanalese militants, forming the 
Malatian Eagle Front (MEF). It was MEF members who kidnapped Prime Minister 
Ulufa’alu  in  2000.  Following  this  coup,  lawlessness  and  disorder  prevailed  in 
Solomon Islands. In response, Australia and New Zealand brokered the Townsville 
Peace Agreement, which was signed in October 2000. This agreement provided for 
the disarmament and dissolution of the militias.
61 While it significantly reduced open 
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conflict between the militant groups, the Townsville Agreement failed to stop high 
levels  of  criminal  activity  –  violence,  looting  and  extortion  were  all  common 
between  2000  and  the  beginning  of  RAMSI  in  2003.  Further,  the  economy 
plummeted as a result of the conflict and disorder (GDP declined by 14% in 1999 
and 9% in 2000), and Solomon Islands faced a continuously deteriorating security 
environment coupled with economic collapse.
62 It became clear by 2003 that the 
Solomon Islands government did not possess the capacity to halt the decline. This 
led  to  a  formal  request  from  the  Solomon  Islands  government  for  a  regional 
intervention in the country.
63  
Despite Alexander Downer’s dismissal of intervening in Solomon Islands as 
late as January 2003, the Howard government took the decision in June 2003 to lead 
a regional intervention in Solomon Islands.
64 Soon thereafter, on 30 June, a meeting 
of  the  Pacific  Islands  Forum  in  Sydney  ratified  Australia’s  proposal  for  the 
intervention.
65 A crucial aspect of Australia’s decision to intervene, one that has 
informed subsequent justifications for RAMSI, is the notion of a Solomon Islands 
state that was at significant risk of failure, one that the Australian government had a 
vested  interest  in  managing  in  order  to  avoid  further  risks  to  Australia’s  own 
security.  Importantly,  this  means  that  RAMSI  was  in  effect  a  preventive  action, 
aimed  at  ensuring  that  Solomon  Islands  did  not  eventually  descend  into  state 
failure.
66 As Barbara notes:  
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‘The Australian Government justified intervention on the grounds that a failed 
state in the region would become a haven for transnational security threats (such 
as  terrorism  and  organized  crime)  and  that  action  was  required  to  prevent 
Solomon Islands from collapsing’.
67  
This  means  that  the  decision  to  intervene  was  commensurate  with  the 
anticipatory  outlook  that  one  would  normally  associate  with  risk  management 
activities.  Further,  it  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  prevailing  failed  states 
discourse, in which state failure is seen as a result of poor governance and weak 
institutional capacity, has largely informed Australia’s assessment of the situation in 
the Solomon Islands. The root causes of the dysfunctional Solomon Islands state 
have been identified as poor governance, insufficiently capable institutions and the 
resilience  of  existing  socio-political  structures.
68  Even  before  the  Australian 
government had moved to intervene in Solomon Islands, Wainwright had defined the 
territory  as  a  failing  state,  arguing  that  Solomon  Islands  had  largely  ceased  to 
function as a capable sovereign state and that a continuance of Australia’s previous 
hands-off approach would only serve to facilitate state failure.
69  
RAMSI was therefore designed from the outset as a comprehensive state-
building  exercise.  Once  RAMSI  had  achieved  its  immediate  objective  of  halting 
violence  and  disorder  in  the  country,  which  it  successfully  did  shortly  after  its 
deployment on 24 July 2003, RAMSI officials quickly set to work on the main task 
of reforming state institutions and improving governance. Stabilising the security 
situation was always intended as a prelude to RAMSI’s state-building efforts.
70 A 
large  part  of  RAMSI’s  state-building  focus  has  been  capacity  building,  with 
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institutions  in  three  key  pillars,  law  and  justice,  economic  governance  and  the 
machinery  of  government,  targeted  for  capacity  building  programs.
71  As  this 
suggests,  RAMSI  is  a  complex  and  multi-faceted  operation,  responsible  for 
reforming several key institutions of the Solomon Islands state. 
In  the  law  and  justice  pillar,  RAMSI  has  undertaken  a  comprehensive 
rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP). This has involved the 
dismissal of a sizeable number of officers (including 160 former officers who have 
been arrested for various offences) and the formation of the Solomon Islands Police 
Force Capacity Development Management Team, designed to assess and manage 
capability  gaps  in  the  RSIP.
72  Economic  governance  reforms  have  included 
stabilisation  of  the  government  budget  and  improvement  of  government  revenue 
collection,  building  the  capacity  of  the  Treasury  and  Ministry  of  Finance  and  a 
programme of taxation reform, amongst other initiatives. RAMSI’s machinery of 
government pillar is involved in strengthening many parts of the Solomon Islands 
government  and  bureaucracy.  This  has  involved  significant  work  conducted  to 
strengthen the capabilities of key accountability institutions such as the Ombudsman 
and the office of the Auditor-General.
73 Perhaps the most notable aspect of RAMSI’s 
work is the wide scope and comprehensiveness of its mandate. 
RAMSI is involved in regulating most areas of the Solomon Islands state, 
reforming legal, economic, political and social institutions. Its mandate, and indeed 
its practice since deployment, has been to regulate and reshape the socio-political 
environment of Solomon Islands by subjecting key areas of the Solomon Islands 
government to its capacity building programs. Part of RAMSI’s approach to capacity 
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building has been to embed personnel in ‘line positions’ within key areas of the 
Solomon Islands government. This has involved RAMSI personnel conducting much 
of the work within these areas, even to the extent of an Australian Federal Police 
(AFP)  Officer  being  named  as  the  Commissioner  of  the  RSIP.
74  Other  notable 
RAMSI appointments within the Solomon Islands government include the Solicitor-
General, Deputy Legal Draftsperson and Acting Auditor-General.
75 The effect of this 
has been to subject control of key institutions of the Solomon Islands government to 
RAMSI  officials,  enabling  them  to  exercise  direct  control  over  the  governance 
reforms  and  institutional  capacity  building  that  are  supposedly  taking  place  in 
‘partnership’ with the Solomon Islands government. 
In  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  for  example,  RAMSI  officials  have  been 
extensively involved in improving government finances and financial transactions.
76 
This work has included challenging and amending appropriation bills passed by the 
Solomon Islands parliament.
77 This is a highly significant exercise of authority by 
foreign officials in an ostensibly sovereign state. Also of note here are the immunity 
provisions of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (FIAA), passed by the 
Solomon  Islands  parliament  in  2003.  This  Act  legalises  RAMSI’s  presence  in 
Solomon Islands and protects its personnel from any form of legal proceeding in the 
country.
78  This  means  that  despite  RAMSI’s  significant  influence  and,  in  some 
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cases, direct control of key government institutions in Solomon Islands, the Solomon 
Islands government and therefore its people are unable to hold RAMSI personnel to 
account for their actions.  
While the Solomon Islands government supposedly retains its sovereignty 
and  its  responsibilities  for  governing  its  territory,  in  effect  RAMSI  exercises 
extensive influence and control over several key institutions without any established 
mechanism  of  accountability  between  RAMSI  and  the  Solomon  Islands  people. 
Rather,  RAMSI  personnel  are  predominantly  accountable  to  interdepartmental 
committees  within  the  Australian  government  (involving  key  departments  and 
agencies such as the AFP, Treasury and DFAT) who make decisions and formulate 
policy with little to no Solomon Islands involvement.
79 Such control is therefore 
troubling  from  a  democratic  standpoint  as  it  means  that  RAMSI  officials  can 
undertake significant action without the possibility of being held to account by the 
Solomon Islands people. Indeed, this feature of RAMSI’s operation stands in stark 
contrast  to  the  liberal  democratic  values  that  RAMSI  seeks  to  impart  via  its 
institutional and governance reforms. 
An important point here is that RAMSI’s state-building initiatives, like those 
that have taken place in other regions, are based on very particular ideas of what a 
strong  and  effective  state  should  look  like.  As  Morgan  and  McLeod  suggest 
‘However,  idealised  concepts  of  state  structure  and  functioning,  including 
assumptions  about  ideal  relationships  between  individuals,  civil  society  and 
particular state institutions, are central to statebuilding practices’.
80 In the case of 
RAMSI, good governance and institutional capacity are defined in largely liberal 
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terms. The insistence on applying external notions of liberal good governance is of 
course reflective of the idea that Western notions of liberalism, democracy and good 
governance are universally applicable and represent a suite of values, institutions and 
processes that can be applied anywhere. Part of the reasoning behind this stems from 
ideological prescriptions that maintain the universality of Western values of liberty 
and democracy.
81 
Despite the tendency of RAMSI to view its work in Solomon Islands in terms 
of technocratic and apolitical notions of ‘capacity building’, the very institutional 
capabilities  and  processes  that  it  seeks  to  build  are  reflective  of  its  broader 
commitment  to  ensuring  a  well-functioning,  liberal  democratic  Solomon  Islands 
government. This is so despite the fact that the means RAMSI uses to do so stand in 
tension with the liberal values that it seeks to promote. Morgan and McLeod suggest 
that through RAMSI’s activities in Solomon Islands ‘Australia is attempting to build 
a  modern  nation-state  through  state-building  activities  aimed  at  replacing  local 
modes of politicking with political stability based on liberal democratic values and 
practices’.
82  Therefore,  while  RAMSI  may  be  predominantly  concerned  with 
‘technical’ issues in Solomon Islands, its solutions to these issues are based upon 
political and ideological prescriptions of what constitutes a strong and effective state. 
As  noted,  Alexander  Downer  has  argued  that  only  liberal  democracies 
constitute effective states and AusAID’s definition of good governance is explicitly 
reflective of liberal values.
83 To suggest then that RAMSI’s mission in Solomon 
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Islands, or state-building in general for that matter, is merely a case of technocratic, 
administrative  reform  divorced  from  political  or  ideological  considerations  is 
incorrect.
84 Such considerations are integral to RAMSI’s state-building project as 
liberal  values  inform  the  reforms  undertaken  in  Solomon  Islands.  One  of  the 
criticisms of RAMSI is that its focus on technocratic notions of institutional capacity 
and good governance has caused it to neglect the social and political factors that 
have contributed to the problems in Solomon Islands.
85 However, such a criticism 
overlooks  the  fact  that  the  promotion  of  good  governance  and  building  of 
institutional capacity, despite their supposedly technocratic nature, are underpinned 
by liberal values and ideology and are intended to have very real social and political 
effects. 
The point of RAMSI’s mission is to reshape the social and political structures 
that caused state fragility in Solomon Islands, transforming the country into a stable 
liberal democracy as a means to managing risk. Similarly, Hameiri contends that 
reconstituting state-society relations in the Solomon Islands is precisely the point of 
RAMSI’s  capacity  building  programs.
86  Whether  this  is  congruent  with  existing 
social practices in Solomon Islands is not considered. Rather, what is important is 
that RAMSI’s programs attempt to build sustainable institutions practicing Western 
notions  of  liberal  good  governance.  It  is  notable  that  while  the  Australian 
government  and  RAMSI  officials  continually  speak  of  improving  the  lives  of 
Solomon Islanders in partnership with the local population, the prescriptions for such 
an improvement are based entirely on Australia’s liberal notions of good governance 
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and the good life.
87 Rarely are we told how the reforms undertaken in Solomon 
Islands relate to, and affect, existing social and political relationships. 
Importantly, the above features of RAMSI’s intervention in Solomon Islands, 
namely the sometimes direct and always unaccountable control of state institutions 
by RAMSI personnel and the attempt to reconstitute existing social and political 
structures in accordance with liberal values and notions of good governance, belies 
the often-used description of RAMSI as a ‘cooperative intervention’. Rather, the talk 
of a ‘partnership’ between Solomon Islands and RAMSI serves to legitimate the new 
relations  of  hierarchy  between  Solomon  Islands  and  Australia  (as  the  main 
contributor to RAMSI) to which RAMSI’s mission gives rise. Of course it is true 
that unlike other post-Cold War interventions, notably those in Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, RAMSI represents an intervention that was not only consented to, but was 
actually requested by the affected state. Indeed, RAMSI’s continued operation is 
dependent upon its mandate from the Solomon Islands government.
88 
However, the fact that RAMSI needs the support of the Solomon Islands 
government in order to continue its work in the country does not necessarily mean 
that it operates in partnership with the Solomon Islands people. While this support 
serves to legitimate RAMSI’s presence, the hierarchical nature of the relationship 
between  Solomon  Islands  and  Australia  is  revealed  by  the  distinct  lack  of  local 
participation in RAMSI’s work. Indeed, the participation of local officials or the 
local  population  is  deemed  risky  in  itself,  potentially  leading  to  unwelcome 
interference in attempts to promote liberal good governance by those that are deemed 
to lack the capacity to effectively operate within liberal institutions and governance 
processes (precisely the reason why interventions such as RAMSI occur in the first 
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place). We therefore might characterise RAMSI as practicing a ‘top-down’ form of 
state-building,  legitimated  by  the  perceived  urgency  of  building  a  stable  liberal 
democratic state in Solomon Islands as a mechanism of risk management.
89  
The perceived dangers inherent in any deviance from RAMSI’s prescribed 
notions  of  institutional  capacity  and  good  governance  militate  against  any  true 
partnership between RAMSI and the government and people of Solomon Islands. 
This underscores the contradiction that exists between attempting to promote liberal 
values and good governance via interventionist and regulatory mechanisms of risk 
management  that  often  involve  distinctly  illiberal  trends  and  practices.  Hence, 
RAMSI should not be viewed as a partnership between Australian state-builders who 
consult and collaborate with local officials and the local populace in an attempt to 
promote particular conceptions of good governance and institutional capacity that are 
modified  in  light  of  existing  socio-political  structures  and  relationships.  Rather, 
RAMSI must be understood as a regulatory exercise, involving the subordination of 
Solomon Islands in a hierarchical authority relationship with Australia.  
Again, part of RAMSI’s operation has involved placing its officials in line 
positions within the Solomon Islands government, including senior positions. This is 
reflective of the fact that RAMSI is essentially involved in a regulatory exercise. 
Despite  the  talk  of  capacity  building,  placing  RAMSI  officials  within  important 
positions in different areas of the Solomon Islands government does little to build the 
capacity of the local public servants who are eventually supposed to assume these 
roles for themselves. This is suggestive of a hierarchical relationship between the 
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external  intervener  who  ‘knows  best’  (Australia)  taking  control  of  the  poorly 
functioning institutions of the affected state that must be subjected to regulation and 
reform. In short, as Hameiri notes, RAMSI’s capacity building programmes denote a 
power relationship, not a partnership.
90  
Therefore, RAMSI’s state-building initiatives in Solomon Islands amount to 
a new form of interventionist socio-political regulation as Australia seeks to reshape 
the environment in Solomon Islands so as to prevent state failure and the possible 
materialisation  of  spatially  and  temporally  de-bounded  risks.  However,  Solomon 
Islands is not the only Pacific island state to be subject to Australia’s claim to hold 
the  authority  to  determine  the  domestic  constitution  of  states  in  the  Asia-Pacific 
region.  PNG,  for  example,  has  also  been  exposed  to  Australian  socio-political 
regulation  through  the  implementation  of  interventionist  capacity  building 
programmes. Australian development assistance in PNG has been ongoing since the 
country  achieved  its  independence  from  Australia  in  1975.  However,  despite  the 
influx of Australian aid, which was largely provided with little to no conditions after 
independence,  PNG  has  continued  to  suffer  from  underdevelopment  and  state 
weakness. 
This  has  resulted  in  a  deteriorating  law  and  order  situation,  economic 
stagnation and poor delivery of government services.
91 Like Australia’s development 
policy shift in Solomon Islands, its hands-off approach in PNG has significantly 
altered since 9/11 and the 2002 Bali Bombings, again reflecting, in part, Australia’s 
concern  with  the  risks  posed  by  failing  states  on  its  doorstep.
92  Also  similar  to 
Solomon Islands, the problems in PNG have been defined in terms of possible state 
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failure,  meaning  the  Australian  government  has  focused  on  poor  standards  of 
governance  and  weak  institutional  capacity.  As  an  ASPI  report  on  PNG  stated 
‘Underlying all these problems, however, are pervasive and systemic weaknesses in 
the capacity of the PNG state to provide effective government’.
93 Again, similar to 
RAMSI in Solomon Islands, Australia has adopted a more interventionist, hands-on 
approach to state-building in PNG. 
This new approach was encapsulated in the ECP, designed to reshape PNG’s 
risky socio-political environment by re-establishing law and order in several regions 
of  the  country  and  building  the  capacity  of  several  key  state  institutions.
94  The 
Australian and PNG governments had negotiated the final terms of the assistance 
package at the 2003 Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, although the 
final  agreement  was  not  signed  until  July  2004  due  to  PNG  concerns  with  the 
Australian government’s insistence on immunity provisions for its officials.
95 The 
ECP saw Australian police and other officials appointed in line positions within the 
PNG government and Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), including 
an  Australian  appointment  to  the  position  of  Solicitor-General  along  with  other 
appointments in the Prosecutor’s office and correctional services.
96   
While the bulk of Australian personnel committed to this mission comprised 
230 police officers, it also included 18 personnel working in non-policing law and 
justice areas, 36 personnel assigned to economic and finance institutions, and 10 
officials assigned to immigration services, border security and aviation safety.
97 The 
ECP thus provided for significant Australian control of PNG state institutions in 
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which  Australian  officials  were  deployed.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  ECP  was 
described  as  a  ‘cooperative  partnership’  between  PNG  and  Australia,  similar  to 
Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands partnership or collaboration extended 
only as far as the formal consent of the affected state to the deployment of Australian 
officials within its territory. The necessary governance and institutional reforms that 
were  perceived  to  be  required  were  selected  with  reference  to  Australia’s  own 
standards  of  liberal  good  governance  and  institutional  capacity.  AusAID’s  2004 
regional aid strategy for the Pacific reflected this, listing the strengthening of liberal 
governance  though  the  improvement  of  the  capacity  and  accountability  of  the 
machinery of government as one of the key focuses of its development program.
98  
This was compounded by the placement of Australian personnel directly into 
line positions with PNG state institutions, who, rather than operating in partnership 
with their PNG counterparts, assumed direct responsibility for key areas within the 
PNG government. Further, similar to the FIAA that provides the legal authority for 
RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands, a key provision of the agreement between 
Australia  and  PNG  establishing  the  ECP  was  that  of  immunity  for  Australian 
personnel working in PNG. Australian officials enjoyed immunity from civil and 
disciplinary  proceedings  in  PNG,  although  criminal  jurisdiction  was  exercised 
concurrently by Australia and PNG.
99 Despite this, Australia retained jurisdiction 
over  any  criminal  offences  committed  by  Australian  personnel  in  the  course  of 
discharging their duties.
100 
This  meant  that  Australian  officials  would  be  able  to  exercise  significant 
control and influence within state institutions in PNG without being able to be held 
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to account by the PNG government or its people. Like their RAMSI counterparts, 
Australian  personnel  in  PNG  were  effectively  insulated  from  oversight  and 
interference by the PNG government. The immunity provisions reflected Australian 
concerns regarding its personnel being subject to oversight by the very institutions 
that they sought to reform. The importance attached to these immunity provisions 
was  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  the  Australian  government  would  not  agree  to 
implement  the  ECP  until  PNG  acquiesced  to  its  demands  for  immunity  for 
Australian officials, which the Australian government viewed as a precondition for 
the  implementation  of  the  ECP.  Again,  the  immunity  provisions  of  the  ECP 
underscored the unequal and hierarchical relationship that Australia’s intervention in 
PNG represented. The Australian government has claimed the authority to reform the 
domestic institutions of PNG without established mechanisms of accountability. 
However, PNG objections to the immunity provisions of the ECP agreement 
did not end with the deployment of the mission. There were several outspoken critics 
of the ECP in PNG, including the Governor of Morobe Province, Luther Wenge, 
who eventually challenged the PNG legislation enabling the ECP on constitutional 
grounds.
101 This challenge was upheld by the Supreme Court of PNG in May 2005, 
which  ruled  that  the  immunity  provisions  were  unconstitutional  because,  among 
other issues, they violated the rights of PNG citizens and the authority of PNG’s 
police and prosecutors.
102 This led to the immediate withdrawal of the majority of 
the Australian police contingent and those officials working in line positions within 
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the PNG government assumed advisory roles.
103 As Downer commented, Australia 
could  not  allow  its  personnel  to  be  subject  to  vexatious  litigation  and  would  no 
longer allow its aid money to be wasted in countries like PNG suffering from poor 
governance and weak institutional capacity.
104 
Therefore,  many  of  the  issues  surrounding  Australia’s  involvement  in 
Solomon Islands through RAMSI are also present in its intervention in PNG through 
the ECP. Firstly, the intervention was motivated, amongst other considerations, by 
the perceived vulnerability of Australia to spatially and temporally de-bounded risks 
and  the  need  to  prevent  the  failure  of  Australia’s  neighbouring  states  lest  they 
become  environments  conducive  to  the  breeding  of  de-bounded  security  risks. 
Secondly, potential state failure was defined in terms of poor governance and weak 
capacity, and hence the ECP was an intervention designed to reshape PNG’s socio-
political  and  economic  environment  by  promoting  liberal  good  governance  and 
building institutional capacity. Thirdly, the intervention involved the appointment of 
Australian experts in line positions within key government institutions who, as a 
result of immunity provisions, were unaccountable to the PNG government or its 
people.  This  ensured  that  Australian  officials  would  be  insulated  from  potential 
interference in their work. 
Finally,  despite  the  description  by  the  Australian  government  of  the 
intervention  as  a  cooperative  or  collaborative  partnership,  collaboration  only 
extended to the consent of the PNG government to Australia’s intervention. Pre-
existing socio-political structures and relationships in PNG were not countenanced 
by  the  reforms  that  the  Australian  government  sought  to  implement,  for  these 
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reforms  were  informed  entirely  by  external  notions  of  liberal  good  governance. 
Again, this is unsurprising given that it is existing social and political structures that 
are  perceived  as  contributing  to  state  weakness  and  as  a  consequence,  also 
potentially give rise to an environment conducive to the origination of de-bounded 
risks. Australia claims the authority to intervene in weak states suffering from poor 
governance  and  weak  capacity  in  an  effort  to  reshape  their  socio-political 
environments as a technique of managing risk. These features of the interventions in 
Solomon Islands and PNG thus display the emergence of new regional hierarchies 
underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk. Like the EU’s ENP, these hierarchies 
are  corrosive  of  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution  in  that  they  involve 
Australian attempts to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that Pacific 
Island states can adopt.    
 
Implications for International Society 
The question of the political implications of state-building interventions for 
interstate relations has become a topic of importance, for both scholars and policy 
practitioners.  The  notion  that  developed  states  should  intervene  to  build  the 
governing capacity of weak states raises questions concerning international society’s 
pluralist constitution, especially the right of states to be free from interference in 
their internal affairs. It also raises questions regarding the pluralist right of states to 
constitute  their  domestic  institutions  as  they  see  fit,  whether  or  not  they  are 
successful in that endeavour. The practice of state-building in the post-Cold War era 
is one based upon a very particular picture of what the state should look like.
105 
Western state-builders have been explicit in their attempts to build liberal democratic 
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states underpinned by liberal notions of good governance, in some instances as a 
means to managing risk.  
Indeed, Australia’s new approach to fostering development in Pacific Island 
states that emerged during 2003 is one distinctly based upon a liberal social logic of 
risk.  Not  only  has  the  Australian  government  clearly  identified  state  fragility  as 
posing  potential  dangers  to  Australian  security,  but  it  has  also  sought  to  reform 
domestic  institutions  in  states  such  as  Solomon  Islands  and  PNG  in  order  to 
construct stable liberal democracies. This social logic of risk has therefore informed 
the  emergence  of  new  relations  of  hierarchy  which  are  represented  by  recent 
Australian  attempts  at  state-building  in  the  region.  The  talk  of  ‘cooperative 
interventionism’ or ‘partnerships’ between Australia and Solomon Islands or PNG 
serves only to legitimate what are in fact relations of hierarchy. A liberal social logic 
of  risk  simultaneously  constructs  Australia  as  a  ‘superordinate  state-builder’  and 
Solomon  Islands  or  PNG  as  fragile,  potentially  risky  and  subordinated  states 
requiring institutional reform and capacity building. 
The  supposed  partnership  between  Australia  and  Solomon  Islands,  for 
example, is mitigated by the appropriation of direct control within state institutions 
by  RAMSI  personnel  and  the  unaccountability  of  these  officials  to  the  Solomon 
Islands  government  and  people.  The  Australian  government  has  claimed,  and  in 
Solomon  Islands  continues  to  exercise,  the  authority  to  reshape  the  internal 
institutions of its island neighbours according to its own liberal notions of good 
governance and institutional capacity. The social logic of risk which underpins this 
new hierarchical relationship has shaped new spaces of governance within the state, 
both in Solomon Islands and Australia. In Australia, new spaces are opened (for 
example, inter-departmental committees) through which the Australian government Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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exercises authority within Solomon Islands as a superordinate party. In Solomon 
Islands new spaces of transnational authority are constructed through which external 
interveners can exercise significant authority over the Solomon Islands state.
106  
The  point  here  is  that  state  institutions  and  social  and  political  structures 
within Solomon Islands and PNG (during the ECP) become subject to the oversight 
and authority of the Australian government. Importantly, in relation to the definition 
of hierarchy detailed in chapter two, the exercise of Australian authority is generally 
recognised as legitimate by Australia and, respectively, Solomon Islands and PNG. 
For  example,  Solomon  Islands  had  invited  Australian  intervention  on  several 
occasions  before  RAMSI’s  eventual  deployment  in  July  2003.  Further,  the 
requirement that the Solomon Islands parliament must annually review and endorse 
RAMSI’s  presence  in  the  country  serves  as  an  important  tool  that  legitimates 
Solomon  Islands’  subordinate  status.  Although  the  legitimacy  of  RAMSI’s 
operations  has  been  subject  to  political  contestation  within  Solomon  Islands, 
generally  the  Solomon  Islands  government  has  recognised  the  legitimacy  of  its 
subordination in the hierarchical relationship with Australia.
107 Indeed, it is precisely 
Solomon  Islands’  consent  to  RAMSI’s  activities  that  allows  the  Australian 
government and RAMSI to depict their activities as a ‘cooperative intervention’. 
Importantly though, despite their subordinated status, Solomon Islands and 
PNG remain sovereign states. Both retain their formal legal identity as sovereign 
states and continue to enjoy recognition of this sovereignty by other members of 
international society, despite significant external interference in their internal affairs. 
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However, while both remain sovereign states, they are subject to a lesser form of 
sovereignty, one in which their right to non-intervention and sovereign equality are 
mitigated  by  the  notion  that  state  fragility  or  failure  could  lead  to  unacceptable 
security risks for Australia. The mitigation of these rights, along with Australia’s 
attempts  to  build  stable  liberal  democracies  in  PNG  and  Solomon  Islands 
irrespective of pre-existing social or political structures, signifies a distinctive shift 
away from international society’s pluralist constitution. The expectation that weak 
states  must  conform  to  imposed  standards  of  liberal  good  governance  and 
institutional capacity effectively removes the right of these states to determine their 
socio-political institutions according to their own societal values. 
Discussing contemporary state-building, Chandler argues that ‘The pluralist 
post-World  War  II  framework  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  has  been  replaced, 
overnight, by a new hierarchy of Western power. Yet this hierarchy has not been 
formalised  in  the  way  that  empire  was  in  the  past’.
108  Indeed,  the  social  logic 
underpinning contemporary state-building interventions, including those in the Asia-
Pacific,  should  not  be  equated  with  the  old  colonial  hierarchies.  Notions  of 
civilisation and the imperative of territorial and economic aggrandisement on the 
part of European states underpinned these hierarchies. Contemporary state-building 
interventions,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been  characterised  by  the  reluctance  of 
Western  interveners  to  assume  direct  control  over  weak  states  subjected  to 
intervention.  Rather,  Western  governments  have  continued  to  emphasise  the 
intervened states’ formal legal sovereignty and status as members of international 
society. 
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In  short,  underpinning  new  relations  of  hierarchy  in  the  Asia-Pacific  is  a 
liberal  social  logic  of  risk,  one  which  constitutes  illiberal  or  fragile  states  as 
potentially dangerous sites of risk fomentation and origination. This social logic of 
risk legitimates the claim of Western societies such as Australia to intervene in these 
risky  states  in  order  to  protect  their  own  security.  This  distinctly  contradicts  the 
pluralist  constitution  of  international  society  that  has  ordered  social  interactions 
between  states  since  decolonisation.  Indeed,  this  shift  between  pluralist  and 
hierarchical forms of international society is neatly captured in the shift that occurred 
after  9/11  and  the  Bali  bombings  in  Australia’s  approach  to  development  in  the 
region. In place of its hands-off approach prior to 2003, Australia has engaged in a 
new proactive and interventionist approach to development in the region designed as 
a means of managing risk. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and subsequent bombings in Bali in 2002 
prompted a distinctive shift within Australia’s foreign policy outlook. Since these 
terrorist incidents, the Australian government, under the leadership of both former 
Prime Minister John Howard and incumbent Kevin Rudd, has become increasingly 
concerned  with  anticipating  and  managing  temporally  and  spatially  de-bounded 
security  risks.  Its  focus  on  spatially  de-bounded,  globalised  risks  has  been 
particularly evident in its shifting views on globalisation. In 2000, globalisation was 
viewed as a largely positive phenomenon, helping to increase integration between 
states. But by 2003, globalisation was viewed in a more negative light, also being 
seen to facilitate transnational risks to Australian security. In short, globalisation left Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific 
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Australia more exposed and therefore vulnerable to globalised security risks such as 
terrorism and transnational crime.  
One of the more immediate effects of this shifting foreign policy outlook was 
the formulation of a more assertive and interventionist approach to weak states in the 
Asia-Pacific, Australia’s ‘geographical backyard’. Compelled by the idea that failed 
states constitute environments conducive to the origination of globalised risk, the 
Australian government has embarked on more far-reaching and interventionist state-
building exercises, particularly in Solomon Islands and PNG. Gone is the old hands-
off approach to development aid; in its place is a new hands-on approach informed 
by the need to effect an environmental reshaping of failing states by imposing liberal 
standards of good governance in order to protect Australia’s security interests. The 
resulting  interventions  in  Solomon  Islands  and  PNG  have  involved  extensive 
Australian involvement and control within key areas of the governments of both 
states. 
The effect has been that Solomon Islands and PNG have been subject to a 
form of socio-political regulation. Despite the consensual nature of the interventions 
and their description as partnerships, the point has been to impose external standards 
of good governance in both states. This has resulted in the erosion of international 
society’s  pluralist  constitution  and  the  emergence  of  new  relations  of  hierarchy 
between  Australia  and  weak  states  in  its  immediate  neighbourhood.  These  new 
hierarchical relationships posit a distinction between Australia as the state-builder at 
risk from fragile states, which gains the right to manage these potential dangers via 
intervention; and weak states in the region who pose unacceptable security risks and 
lose their unqualified right to non-intervention and sovereign equality. These fragile 
states become subordinate partners in new relations of international hierarchy.  
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Seven 
Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: 
The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
 
Introduction 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is an important case study in the examination of 
risk, risk management and their effects upon international society in the post-Cold 
War era. The two key elements of the theoretical framework outlined in chapters 
three  and  four  are  readily  identifiable  in  the  case  of  Iraq.  Firstly,  spatially  and 
temporally de-bounded risks and the perceived need to prevent them were central to 
the justifications and rationale provided by proponents of the March 2003 invasion 
of  Iraq.  Secondly,  in  response  to  these  uncertain,  temporally  and  spatially  de-
bounded  risks,  the  US  and  its  ‘Coalition  of  the  Willing’  sought  to  reshape  the 
environment  from  which  the  risks  associated  with  WMD  proliferation  were 
perceived to originate by deposing Hussein’s regime and promoting liberal values in 
Iraq. Indeed, the former Bush administration was explicit that ‘victory’ in Iraq and 
the management of the risks of terrorism and WMD proliferation would primarily 
involve  a  stable  and  democratic  Iraq.
1  The  invasion  of  Iraq  therefore  provides 
perhaps  the  clearest  empirical  example  yet  of  the  argument  that  risk  and  risk 
management are integral features of post-Cold War international society. 
Not least because of the questionable legality and contentious nature of the 
so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of prevention, the invasion of Iraq aroused a great deal of 
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controversy  within  international  society.
2  Many,  including  prominent  US  allies, 
questioned the necessity and legitimacy of the use of armed force against Iraq in the 
absence of a Security Council mandate.
3 The subsequent inability of coalition forces 
to find any WMD, links to terrorists or to generate domestic stability within Iraq 
after  the  overthrow  of  Hussein  has  only  served  to  heighten  the  controversy  and 
debate surrounding the invasion. Debate continues to this day regarding the question 
of  the  need  for  such  an  invasion  and  the  reasons  why  the  Bush  administration 
originally decided to use force against Iraq. Part of the argument put forth by those 
who opposed the invasion was that there was no clear evidence of any overt threat 
posed by Hussein’s regime to the security of the West. 
This is similar to the ‘risk management argument’ put forth here – there was 
indeed a conspicuous lack of clear evidence that the perceived risks of WMD or Iraqi 
links with terrorists presently existed in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. 
However,  several  critics  have  alternatively  suggested  that  this  lack  of  evidence 
means that the invasion was little more than a grab for oil or motivated in part by 
Bush’s desire for personal revenge against Saddam (in response to the assassination 
attempt on George Bush Snr. in 1993).
4 The argument that the US and its allies went 
into Iraq to secure oil supplies assumes that the subsequent failure to find substantial 
stockpiles of WMD means that the original justification for the war, disarming Iraq, 
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was little more than a smokescreen to cover the real motives behind the war.
5 This 
argument  also  effectively  dismisses  the  goal  of  promoting  liberalism  in  Iraq, 
suggesting that this was never a serious aspiration of the US or its allies in the first 
place. 
Such an argument overlooks the fact that in the six years since the end of the 
initial military campaign, the Coalition of the Willing has worked to construct an 
effective  democratic  government  in  Iraq  (with  questionable  levels  of  success). 
Notwithstanding the considerable lack of evidence to suggest that oil or revenge 
were the prime motivators of the invasion, in sum, those who have advocated such 
notions fail to properly and seriously consider WMD and democracy as the actual 
reasons behind the decision to engage in military conflict.
6 In particular, advocates of 
the ‘oil thesis’ have paid insufficient attention to the language and rhetoric employed 
by Bush, senior administration officials and foreign leaders such as former Prime 
Ministers Tony Blair and John Howard. During the lead up to the war, Bush in 
particular  conceptualised  and  framed  the  dangers  posed  by  Hussein’s  regime  in 
terms of future eventualities and possibilities.
7 
Justifications  for  war  were  couched  in  terms  of  ‘what  ifs’  and  ‘maybes’, 
despite confident assertions that Iraq did in fact pose an imminent threat. In large 
part,  notwithstanding  the  argument  that  ulterior  political  goals  motivated  the 
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that the ‘grab for oil’ was an obvious political motivation for the invasion in the US that threatened to 
undermine the Bush administration’s claim that the invasion was consistent with international law. 
See William R. Clark, Petrodollar Warfare (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers, 2005) 
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invasion, much of the initial debate during the lead-up to the Iraq War arose as a 
result of differing judgements regarding the risks posed by Hussein’s regime. As 
noted in chapters three and four, given that risks are essentially defined and selected 
for  response  according  to  subjective  and  probabilistic  calculations  of  anticipated 
future scenarios and their likely consequences, risk definition and anticipation is an 
inherently political exercise. Varying risk definitions were evident in the Security 
Council  in  the  adoption  of  UNSCR  1441  in  November  2002  and  subsequent 
American and British attempts to gain acceptance for a further UNSCR explicitly 
authorising the use of force.
8 They were also evident in exchanges between those 
Western nations that advocated war (US, Britain, Australia and Spain) and those that 
did not (among others, France and Germany).     
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section of the 
chapter examines the period leading up to the 2003 war. As will be demonstrated in 
this section, the arguments made by the Bush administration and its allies in favour 
of military action against Iraq were largely defined in terms of the need to prevent a 
set of possible future dangers. Further, while the promotion of liberalism was put 
forth as a reason for engaging in military action, this justification was secondary to 
the primary objective of preventing Iraq from obtaining WMD and providing them 
to terrorists. Promoting liberalism was not the end itself – it was a means to ensuring 
that Iraq would not give rise to the aforementioned security risks. The second section 
of the chapter examines US state-building in Iraq and the bid to replace Saddam’s 
regime with a new liberal democracy. It is argued here that the push to create a 
democratic  Iraq  was  informed  by  the  situational  approach  to  risk  management – 
                                                 
8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441: The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc 
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reshaping potentially dangerous environments so as to mitigate the potential for the 
emergence of future security risks. 
The final section of the chapter examines the effects of the Iraq invasion on 
the constitutional structure of international society. The argument here is that the 
Iraq War was thoroughly corrosive of the norms generally associated with a pluralist 
international society. There is a question, however, as to whether the invasion and 
subsequent  occupation  of  Iraq  represents  an  example  of  a  hierarchical  political 
relationship between Iraq and the US as the leading member of the Coalition. As 
noted in chapter two, hierarchical relationships rely on the perceived legitimacy of 
the  relationship  by  both  superordinate  and  subordinate  parties.
9  Certainly,  the 
invasion  of  Iraq  was  not  deemed  legitimate  by  many  members  of  international 
society,  including  Iraq  itself.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  initial  invasion  and 
occupation of Iraq represented a case of coercive domination rather than hierarchy. 
However, a hierarchical relationship, underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk 
informing the US’ desire to reform Iraq into a liberal democratic ‘safe-haven’ or 
‘outpost’ in the Middle East, did eventually emerge (and continues to prevail) once 
the US had ‘transferred’ sovereignty back to Iraq.   
 
Going  to  War  in  Iraq:  Uncertainty,  Precaution  and  the  Prevention  of  De-
bounded Risks  
This section examines the lead-up to the war, concentrating on the period 
beginning 29 January 2002 (the date of Bush’s State of the Union address) until the 
end of 2004, with a particular focus on the justifications provided for going to war in 
Iraq and the way in which the issue of Iraq’s alleged WMD was framed. As will be 
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shown,  the  dangers  posed  by  Iraq’s  possession  of  WMD  were  characterised  as 
temporally  and  spatially  de-bounded  risks  with  potentially  catastrophic 
consequences.
10 However, at the outset it is important to note that the point of this 
section is not to evaluate whether or not Blair and Bush were telling the ‘truth’ in 
their claims of WMD, nor does it seek to evaluate evidence to determine the extent 
to which Iraq actually did possess prohibited WMD or missile systems.
11  
Rather,  the  focus  here  is  limited  to  an  examination  of  the  way  in  which 
particular Western leaders conceptualised the dangers posed by Hussein, and the 
language they employed in making the case for the need for military action in Iraq. 
Before doing so, however, it is useful to briefly outline the historical context that 
informed the lead-up to war. The cessation of hostilities following Iraq’s defeat in 
the 1991 Gulf War was conditioned upon Iraq’s agreement to voluntarily eliminate 
its  stockpiles  of  WMD  and  ballistic  missiles  with  a  range  greater  than  150 
kilometres,  pay  the  appropriate  reparations  to  Kuwait  for  damage  and  suffering 
inflicted and cease its support for terrorism.
12 To ensure that Iraq complied with its 
disarmament obligations, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established 
to conduct, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inspections 
of Iraqi WMD facilities. UNSCOM was also tasked with verifying Iraq’s compliance 
with the provisions of Resolution 687, which outlined the conditions of the cessation 
of hostilities with Iraq.
13  
                                                 
10 Indeed, the dangers posed by Iraq were often explicitly described as ‘risks’ rather than ‘threats’ – 
see below. 
11 For a thorough overview of the reasons and motivations behind the invasion of Iraq, see George 
Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).  
12 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687: Iraq-Kuwait, UN Doc SC/Res 687 (1991) (3 
April 1991). 
13 The IAEA was charged with overseeing Iraq’s nuclear disarmament. See David M. Malone, The 
International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006): 153. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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In  October  1998,  Iraq  declared  that  it  would  no  longer  cooperate  with 
UNSCOM after several years of allegedly attempting to obstruct its work.
14 Despite 
British and American airstrikes during Operation Desert Fox,
15 weapons inspectors 
did not return to Iraq until the passing of UNSCR 1441 in November 2002.
16 After a 
relative lull in political interest concerning Iraqi WMD after Desert Fox, the issue 
came to the fore again in 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Importantly, by the 
time of Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, which clearly indicated that the US 
government  was  considering  military  action  to  disarm  Iraq,  a  great  deal  of 
uncertainty surrounded the issue of Iraqi WMD due to a lack of inspections over the 
preceding three and half years.
17 There were high levels of uncertainty regarding 
both the location of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and the timeframes involved regarding 
possible  efforts  by  Iraq  to  reconstitute  its  WMD  development  programs  and 
stockpiles.
18 In other words, it was not known when Iraq would achieve a workable 
WMD capability or what stage in the WMD development process Iraq had reached.  
Despite this uncertainty, by mid-2002 the Bush administration, along with 
former Prime Ministers Tony Blair in the UK and John Howard in Australia, were 
pushing for action over the alleged risks posed by Iraq’s desire to acquire WMD. 
One  of  the  defining  aspects  of  the  lead-up  to  the  intervention  was  the  explicit 
invocation of the concepts of risk, prevention and precaution in conceptualising the 
                                                 
14 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, ‘UNSCOM: Between Iraq and a Hard Place’, European Journal of 
International Law 13, no. 1 (2002): 144. 
15 See Christine Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against 
Iraq’, European Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2002): 11. 
16  Christoph  Bluth,  ‘The  British  Road  to  War:  Blair,  Bush  and  the  Decision  to  Invade  Iraq’, 
International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 871-92.   
17 Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address. 
18 A UN report regarding disarmament in Iraq concluded that the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons 
had been eliminated by UNSCOM and IAEA inspections. Questions did remain, however, regarding 
certain elements of Iraq’s WMD programmes, and the report concluded that a level of uncertainty 
would remain regarding the complete verification of Iraq’s WMD. See Letter dated 27 March 1999, 
from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security 
Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc 
S/1999/356. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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dangers posed by Hussein’s regime and justifying military action. The nature of the 
alleged  dangers  posed  by  Hussein’s  regime  was  clearly  defined  in  terms  of  the 
temporal and spatial de-bounding that is a crucial feature of contemporary risk. Not 
only was the spatial location of Iraqi WMD uncertain, but action against Iraq was 
also explicitly defined with regard to possible future events. Iraqi WMD was not 
limited to clear evidence of presently extant threats; it was also inclusive of the 
possible acquisition of WMD by Iraq in the future. 
Indeed,  Bush  clearly  highlighted  the  globalised  nature  of  contemporary 
security risks as a justification for preventive action in Iraq. On several occasions, 
Bush referred to the idea that America used to be able to rely on its geographical 
location, situated between two vast oceans, to protect it from harm. But with the 
globalised nature of contemporary risk, geography no longer offers America any 
protection. As Bush argues 
But September the 11th brought home a new reality, and it's important for all our 
citizens to understand that reality. See, a lot of us, when we were raised, never 
really worried about the homeland. We all believed that two oceans would forever 
separate us from harm's way, and that if there was a threat gathering overseas, we 
could pick and choose whether or not we wanted to be involved in dealing with 
that threat. September the 11th delivered a chilling message to our country, and 
that is oceans no longer protect us. And therefore, it is my obligation to make sure 
that  we  address  gathering  threats  overseas  before  they  could  do  harm  to  the 
American people.
19  
Tony  Blair  also  alluded  to  the  qualitatively  different  dangers  faced  by 
contemporary Western societies compared with those faced during the Cold War: 
                                                 
19 George W. Bush, Excerpts from Remarks in Louisiana Welcome (Washington D.C.: Office of the 
Press Secretary, 3 December 2002). Also see George W. Bush, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair 
Discuss Keeping the Peace (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 7 September 2002). The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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So these are new and different dangers. It's not like the old Soviet bloc versus 
NATO. There, defensive alliances were formed; crises occurred, often serious; but 
in a funny way, the world knew where it was.  The year 2002 is different.  These 
dangers can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a 
cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation.
20 
Perhaps the key point in this statement is that even though the West faced complete 
destruction during the Cold War, at least during this period Western societies knew 
exactly  what  they  faced  –  they  possessed  Gidden’s  ontological  security.
21  The 
problem now is that while no overwhelming threats currently exist, new dangers that 
do exist today are de-bounded and difficult to locate, meaning that Western societies 
now find themselves in a highly uncertain security environment.  
This emphasis on globalised, spatially debounded risks was matched with a 
consistent  framing  of  the  dangers  posed  by  Iraqi  WMD  in  terms  of  futuristic, 
temporally de-bounded scenarios. Bush and Blair in particular continually invoked 
images of possible future risks that could materialise at any given time. The dangers 
posed by Iraqi WMD were not limited to any specific timeframe. Rather, they were 
continually described as open-ended and temporally ill-defined. This focus on future 
dangers is unsurprising in the context of reflexive Western risk societies constantly 
pre-occupied  with  attempting  to  anticipate  and  manage  future  possibilities.  As 
Rasmussen suggests, the notion that Western societies now increasingly perceive 
their strategic environment in terms of risks is lent credence by the fact that security 
is now conceived of in terms of future threats.
22 
Bush was explicit throughout 2002 and early 2003 in his focus on protecting 
America against future threats. In March 2002, Bush stated that ‘one thing I will not 
                                                 
20 Tony Blair, PM Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 11 
November 2002).  
21 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 35-69. 
22 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 114.  The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of 
mass destruction’.
23 Bush’s pessimistic anticipations of a future in which Hussein 
had  not  been  removed  from  power  or  disarmed  were  further  evident  in  his 
discussions with US congressional leaders: 
The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and from year to 
year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them. And when they have fully 
materialized it may be too late to protect ourselves and our friends and our allies. 
By then the Iraqi dictator would have the means to terrorize and dominate the 
region. Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax 
or VX – nerve gas – or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally. We refuse to 
live in this future of fear.
24 
In this statement Bush centres on future scenarios and the consequences of 
their  realisation.  Of  most  importance  is  that  Bush  never  clearly  suggests  in  this 
statement precisely when such risks will come to pass. While he does warn that it 
could be ‘too late’ to act by the time such risks materialise, he does not (and cannot) 
specify and what point in time they will do so. Bush thus describes temporally de-
bounded risks, as there is no specific timeframe provided telling us when the threat 
will be fully formed. All we are told is that one day, at some unclear and undefined 
point in time, Iraq will have a WMD capability that will pose severe dangers for 
Western societies. It is on the basis of these temporally de-bounded dangers that 
Bush argues for preventive action against Iraq.   
Most of Bush’s statements regarding Iraq during 2002 and 2003 therefore 
employed terms such as ‘could’, ‘might’ or ‘imagine’ – he continually referred to 
                                                 
23 George W. Bush, President Bush Holds Press Conference (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press 
Secretary, 13 March 2002).  
24 George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Iraq with Congressional Leaders (Washington D.C.: 
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possibilities and probabilities rather than immediate or imminent dangers. Bush’s 
2003 State of the Union address was indicative in this regard: 
With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam 
Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create 
deadly havoc in that region…Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and 
other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one 
canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we 
have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day 
never comes.
25 
Absent from this statement is any evidence that Iraq presently has WMD. 
Also of importance is the notion that a failure to prevent such possibilities could lead 
to  catastrophic  consequences.  The  two  main  components  of  defining  risk, 
probabilities and consequences, are at play in this statement. Firstly, Bush points to 
the probability of rogue states providing WMD to terrorist organisations. Secondly, 
he emphasises the potentially catastrophic consequences of such an eventuality. We 
are asked to anticipate a possible future and imagine what it would be like if WMD 
were deployed on American soil. What was at stake here was not a currently WMD-
armed Iraq posing a direct threat to the security of the United States. Rather, the 
issue was the notion that if Iraq attempted to develop WMD the consequences for 
American security could be disastrous.    
Throughout 2002 and into 2003, Bush maintained his focus on future events 
and continually invoked future possibilities as the principal rationale for military 
action in Iraq. In February 2003 he stated that 
There are people who worry about the future. I understand that. And I worry about 
the future. I worry about a future in which Saddam Hussein gets to blackmail 
                                                 
25 George W. Bush, 2003 State of the Union Address (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 
28 January 2003) (italics mine).  The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
276 
 
and/or attack. I worry about a future in which terrorist organizations are fuelled 
and funded by a Saddam Hussein. And that's why we're bringing this issue to a 
head.
26  
Tony  Blair  shared  Bush’s  emphasis  on  future  possibilities  in  his  discussions 
regarding the ‘threat’ that Hussein ostensibly posed. At a speech in Blackpool in 
September 2002, Blair argued that  
if we do not deal with the threat from this international outlaw and his barbaric 
regime, it may not erupt and engulf us this month or next; perhaps not even this 
year or the next. But it will at some point. And I do not want it on my conscience 
that we knew the threat, saw it coming and did nothing.
27 
Like Bush, Blair does not point to a specific timeframe when he discusses the 
risks of Iraq and WMD. The argument for action against Iraq (although at this point 
Blair was not talking only of war, but was hopeful of action through the UN) made 
above rests on little more than Blair’s subjective analysis of possibly adverse future 
scenarios emanating from Saddam and his ostensible cadre of WMD.
28 Blair again 
established this emphasis on future scenarios at a press conference in January 2003 
when he stated that  
my fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial 
states  has  used  weapons  of  mass  destruction…or  alternatively  these  weapons, 
which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall into the hands of 
these terrorist groups…And I understand of course why people think it is a very 
remote threat and it is far away and why does it bother us. Now I simply say to 
                                                 
26 George W. Bush, President Meets with National Economic Council (Washington D.C.: Office of 
the Press Secretary, 25 February 2003).  
27 Tony Blair, Prime Minister’s Speech to TUC Conference in Blackpool (London: Office of the 
Prime Minister, 10 September 2002).   
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you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction come together…
29 
Despite the sense of urgency with which Blair and Bush attempted to portray 
the dangers posed by Saddam, clearly lacking from their conceptualisation of these 
dangers  was  the  idea  that  Saddam,  WMD  and  possible  linkages  with  terrorists 
constituted  an  imminent  threat.  Blair  confirmed  that  Iraq  was  not  considered  an 
imminent threat to Britain in 2004: ‘Had we believed Iraq was an imminent direct 
threat to Britain, we would have taken action in September 2002; we would not have 
gone to the UN’.
30 Indeed, imminence could not be demonstrated given that Blair 
was dealing will temporally ill-defined risks. Imminence cannot be demonstrated 
without reference to a specific timeframe, which is precisely what was lacking from 
the dangers that Blair identified.  
Then-Australian Prime Minister John Howard also spoke in futuristic terms 
regarding  the  supposed  threat  that  Iraq  posed.  In  a  Ministerial  Statement  to  the 
Australian House of Representatives he suggested that ‘Saddam Hussein will not 
abandon his chemical and biological weapons programs. He will keep striving to 
build a nuclear capacity. And he will almost certainly, at some time in the future, use 
these weapons to fulfil his ambition to dominate his region’.
31 Howard further added 
that ‘Proliferation of these weapons will make the world a much more dangerous 
place for all of us’.
32 Howard, like Bush and Blair, points to posited speculations of 
future  scenarios  –  there  is  no  temporal  limitation  placed  on  the  risks  posed  by 
                                                 
29  Tony  Blair,  ‘PM:  ‘Saddam  Should  Take  the  Peaceful  Route  and  Disarm’’  (13  January  2003), 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page3005.asp (accessed 9 July 2007).  
30 Blair, Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat.  
31 John Howard, Ministerial Statement to Parliament on Iraq (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
4 February 2003), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20030821-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speech 
es/speech69.html (accessed 3 July 2008).  
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Hussein’s pursuit of WMD. Instead, action against Iraq is justified in order prevent 
Hussein from acquiring and using WMD ‘at some point in the future’.   
The framing of the threat posed by Hussein in terms of future, temporally ill-
defined  possibilities  was  especially  evident  in  the  discussions  regarding  Iraq’s 
possible development or acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Shortly after his speech to 
the UN General Assembly outlining the dangers posed by Saddam in September 
2002, Bush argued in a radio address to the nation that ‘Today this regime likely 
maintains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents...Should his regime acquire 
fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year’.
33 Bush 
further added that 
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched 
uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less 
than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. 
Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his 
aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would be 
in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to 
pass nuclear technology to terrorists.
34 
It is important to note that during 2002 and early 2003, there was virtually no 
evidence that Iraq even had the required materiel or capabilities to produce a nuclear 
weapon. The IAEA, reporting on its inspections conducted between November 2002 
and March 2003, concluded that it had found no significant evidence of a revival of 
any nuclear programmes or attempts to acquire uranium. Further, it found that there 
had been a substantial degradation of the facilities and finances required to support 
                                                 
33  George  W.  Bush,  President  Discusses  Growing  Danger  posed  by  Saddam  Hussein's  Regime 
(Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 14 September 2002) (italics mine).   
34 George W. Bush, President Outlines Iraqi Threat (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 
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such a nuclear programme.
35 While this report was not released until five months 
after the beginning of hostilities in Iraq, it is notable that Bush repeatedly spoke 
about  Iraq’s  possible  acquisition  of  nuclear  weapons,  even  though  the  IAEA’s 
verification mission had yet to be completed.  
This lack of evidence and firm knowledge regarding WMD was indicative of 
a broader level of uncertainty that was a product of the temporally and spatially de-
bounded nature of the risks that the US, UK and Australia sought to manage. As 
Aradau,  Guerro  and  Van  Munster  suggest,  risk  introduces  ‘uncertainty  and  the 
unknowable at the heart of the governing process’.
36 If the Iraq War was an exercise 
in risk management and was justified and rationalised by the need to prevent the 
materialisation of perceived de-bounded risks, then one would expect uncertainty 
and ‘unknowing’ to be a key problem faced by those attempting to control these 
risks.  Such  uncertainty  was  evident  in  policy  statements,  speeches  by  Western 
leaders and especially in the intelligence assessments of Iraq and WMD. Richard 
Perle clearly outlined the uncertain nature of dealing with the risks posed by Iraq’s 
WMD: ‘the whole question of removing him [Hussein] involves a balancing of risks 
in the face of uncertainty’.
37 
Bush was explicit in addressing the uncertainties regarding the issue of Iraqi 
WMD in several statements. In a November 2002 press conference he suggested that  
And they – no one likes war, but they also don't like the idea of Saddam Hussein 
having a nuclear weapon. Imagine what would happen. And by the way, we don't 
know how close he is to a nuclear weapon right now. We know he wants one. But 
                                                 
35  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  Implementation  of  United  Nations  Security  Council 
Resolutions Relating to Iraq, IAEA Report GOV/2003/50-GC(47)/10 (8 August 2003): 4.  
36 Aradau, Guerro and Van Munster, ‘Security, Technologies of Risk and the Political’, 150. 
37  Richard  Perle,  ‘Why  the  West  Must  Strike  First’,  On  the  Issues  (Washington  D.C.:  American 
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we don't know. We know he was close to one at one point in time; we have no 
idea today.
38 
Further, in October 2002 Bush suggested that ‘Many people have asked how close 
Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly, 
and that’s the problem’.
39  
This sentiment, that it is what we do not know rather than what we do that is 
the  problem,  was  also  encapsulated  in  an  Australian  Defence  Intelligence 
Organisation (DIO) report on Iraq and WMD. This report suggested that ‘What is not 
known about Iraq’s WMD programmes is as worrying as what is known’.
40 Such 
statements clearly outlined one of the main problems facing those concerned with 
Iraq and WMD – high levels of uncertainty and a lack of conclusive knowledge. 
Leading up to war in 2002 and early 2003, it was precisely such uncertainty and 
‘unknowing’  that  provided  a  major  impetus  for  taking  action.  Commenting  in 
relation  to  intelligence  gathered  by  Australia’s  Office  of  National  Assessments 
(ONA),  a  Parliamentary  Committee  tasked  with  assessing  the  quality  and 
presentation of the intelligence relating to Iraq in the lead-up to the war suggested 
that ‘The early assessments, in 2000 and 2001, suggest the possibility of a revival of 
the WMD programmes in Iraq. However, there are as many qualifications as there 
are certainties’.
41 
More specifically, one of the problems faced by the intelligence agencies, 
aside from actually proving the existence of Iraqi WMD, was that they could provide 
little intelligence regarding the location of any WMD that did in fact exist. An ONA 
                                                 
38 George W. Bush, President Outlines Priorities (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 7 
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39 Bush, President Outlines Iraqi Threat. 
40 DIO Assessment (10 October 2002), cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and 
DSD, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
2004): 36.  
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assessment in September 2002 concluded that the intelligence on Iraq was ‘slight on 
the scope and location of Iraq’s WMD activities’.
42 British intelligence on Iraq, like 
that of the Australians, demonstrated a high degree of tentativeness and uncertainty. 
In May 2001, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reported that intelligence on 
Iraq regarding WMD was ‘patchy’.
43 Even though British intelligence assessed that 
Saddam had indeed used the lull in weapons inspections between 1998 and 2002 to 
resume production of chemical and biological weapons, it could not determine what 
had been produced or in what quantities.
44 Further, British intelligence did not know 
where Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities were located, nor did they know where 
these weapons could be deployed.
45 
In  sum,  like  their  Australian  counterparts,  British  intelligence  reports 
indicated a firm believe that Iraq did in fact have WMD. However, they could not 
point to the specific location of these weapons, what weapons Iraq already possessed 
or  when  more  weapons  would  be  produced.  Although  the  American  intelligence 
agencies were far more assertive than their British and Australian counterparts, their 
assessments also demonstrated a great deal of uncertainty regarding Iraq’s WMD 
capabilities  and  development  programs.  In  July  2003,  the  White  House  released 
declassified excerpts from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, which 
stated  that  ‘We  lack  specific  information  on  many  key  aspects  of  Iraq's  WMD 
programs’.
46  This  lack  of  knowledge  was  reiterated  in  the  assessment  of  Iraq’s 
chemical  weapons:  ‘Although  we  have  little  specific  information  on  Iraq's  CW 
                                                 
42 ONA Assessment (6 September 2002), cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee, Intelligence on 
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43  Intelligence  and  Security  Committee,  Iraqi  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  –  Intelligence  and 
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44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 19. 
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[chemical weapons] stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons 
(MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last 
year’.
47 
Importantly, this uncertainty or ‘unknowing’ manifested in an overt tendency 
on the part of several Western leaders to assume the worst when it came to Iraq and 
WMD. This informed the sense of urgency that was apparent in the statements by 
Bush, Blair and others convinced of the need of preventive military action in Iraq. 
By assuming that Saddam was in fact developing or did have WMD, or that his 
regime  had  contacts  with  terrorist  organisations,  the  dangers  posed  by  Saddam 
became  characterised  as  a  potentially  existential  threat  warranting  urgent  and 
immediate  action.  As  Lawrence  Freedman  suggests,  ‘worst-case  analysis  was 
rampant on the subject of Iraq...’
48 Bush himself outlined the worst-case scenario 
clearly, suggesting that ‘Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs 
and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and 
we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring’.
49 
Bush reiterated this point declaring that ‘To assume this regime's good faith 
is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And 
this is a risk we must not take’.
50 Consequently, this tendency to assume the worst 
led to a strong emphasis on precaution. Throughout 2002 and 2003, advocates of 
intervention in Iraq stressed the need to err on the side of precaution, to take action 
against Iraq before it was too late and a catastrophic scenario eventuated. Adopting a 
wary or guarded approach to action against Iraq could, so the argument went, lead to 
devastation for Western societies. Indeed, both Bush and Blair in particular painted 
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an image of risks so severe, of catastrophic potentials so great, that action had to be 
taken before something terrible happened.  
As Blair argued at length, in the face of uncertainty, Western societies could 
not afford to sit back and hope that the risk would disappear: 
Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have 
happened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would 
develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get 
their hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. 
Perhaps we would have found different ways of reducing it. Perhaps this Islamic 
terrorism would ebb of its own accord. But do we want to take the risk? That is 
the judgement. And my judgement then and now is that the risk of this new global 
terrorism  and  its  interaction  with  states  or  organisations  or  individuals 
proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared to run. This is not a time to 
err on the side of caution; not a time to weigh the risks to an infinite balance; not a 
time for the cynicism of the worldly wise who favour playing it long.
51 
In  its  authorisation  to  use  military  force  against  Iraq,  the  United  States 
Congress also spoke in precautionary terms:  
the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a 
surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to 
international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that 
would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to 
justify action by the United States to defend itself.
52 
Again,  the  uncertainty  surrounding  Iraq’s  WMD  capabilities  and  the  extreme 
consequences of the possible use of such weapons is utilised as the justification for 
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precautionary  and  preventive  action  against  Iraq.  Bush  put  it  more  bluntly  in 
November  2002,  arguing  that  ‘there's  risk  in  all  action  we  take.  But  the  risk  of 
inaction is not a choice, as far as I'm concerned. The inaction creates more risk than 
doing our duty to make the world more peaceful’.
53 
Finally, these precautionary trends also included not waiting for conclusive 
evidence  that  Iraq  did  in  fact  possess  WMD  capabilities  or  was  attempting  to 
produce or acquire them. Conclusive evidence or the demonstration of a clear causal 
relationship  as  the  basis  for  action  is  precisely  what  the  precautionary  principle 
rejects.
54 Bush commented that ‘Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for 
the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom 
cloud’.
55 Interestingly, this ‘clear evidence of peril’ was ambiguous rather than clear. 
Indeed,  as  Bush  readily  admits,  the  ‘smoking  gun’  had  not  been  found.  This 
statement  is  therefore  highly  precautionary  –  the  consequences  of  Iraq  obtaining 
WMD are so catastrophic and severe that we cannot wait for the evidence that they 
do in fact exist to take action. By that stage, it will be too late.   
Therefore, risk and its associated concepts clearly informed the rationale and 
justifications for war provided by Bush, Blair and other supporters of intervention in 
Iraq. In particular, it has been shown that the dangers posed by Iraq were framed in 
terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, high levels of uncertainty and a 
subsequent  emphasis  on  precaution  and  prevention.  That  Bush,  Blair  and  others 
consistently spoke of in terms of risks rather than imminent, clearly defined threats is 
lent further credence by the ambiguous and inconclusive evidence that was used to 
support the arguments for military action. In attempting to deal with de-bounded 
risks mired in uncertainty, Bush and Blair in particular responded as archetypal risk 
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managers, demonstrating a strong emphasis on prevention and precaution. This was 
shown  not  only  by  their  willingness  to  engage  in  military  conflict  despite  the 
imperfect and incomplete evidence and intelligence at their disposal, but also by 
their willingness to assume the worst in the face of the uncertainty surrounding Iraq, 
WMD and terrorism.  
The Iraq War was therefore justified as an exercise in risk management. It 
was a war intended to prevent globalised security risks by reshaping the social and 
political environment in Iraq by removing Saddam and supplanting his regime with a 
new liberal democracy. By promoting democratic governance and a host of other 
liberal values, an environment inhospitable to the emergence of de-bounded risks 
such as WMD proliferation or terrorism could be created. The next section of the 
chapter explores the Coalition effort to transform Iraq into a liberal democracy. It 
focuses  first  on  the  justifications  and  rationales  provided  for  embarking  on  the 
promotion of liberal values in Iraq, before examining some of the specific reforms 
and modes of governance pursued by the Coalition.  
 
Situational Prevention in Iraq – Regime Change and the Promotion of Liberal 
Values 
As suggested in chapters three and four, it is primarily the temporally and 
spatially de-bounded nature of contemporary risk that compels Western governments 
to  adopt  situational  risk  management  approaches  in  their  efforts  to  govern  risk. 
Unlike the risks themselves, environmental conditions conducive to risk production 
are readily identifiable and definable. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, an absence 
of  liberal  institutions  and  good  governance  has  been  identified  as  constituting  a 
potentially dangerous socio-political environment. During 2002 and 2003, Iraq was The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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identified as a risky environment giving rise to temporally and spatially de-bounded 
dangers  associated  with  WMD  proliferation.  These  dangers  were  perceived  as 
sufficiently acute to warrant military action in order to force a liberal reshaping of 
the  Iraqi  socio-political  environment.  It  was  clear  before  the  commencement  of 
military  operations  in  March  2003  that  the  Coalition  would  supplant  Hussein’s 
regime with a liberal democracy – during the lead-up to the war, Bush and Blair 
discussed bringing liberty and democracy to Iraq.
56 
However, such a claim was dismissed by many critics of the intervention, 
who suggested that it was little more than an attempt to provide a moral gloss to an 
intervention that was inspired by separate motives and goals.
57 However, the fact is 
that  once  the  initial  combat  phase  ended,  Coalition  forces  immediately  began 
working  towards  the  formation  of  a  liberal  democratic  government  in  Iraq. 
Therefore, the argument that the Americans and their allies went to Iraq to promote 
liberal  values  and  forms  of  governance  cannot  be  dismissed  outright.  Yet,  the 
scepticism displayed by many over this issue is not entirely misplaced. To suggest 
that the promotion of liberal values was the primary goal of the Coalition ignores the 
fact that bringing liberty to Iraq was very much a secondary issue in the lead-up to 
the war. As demonstrated above, the focus was firmly on the risks associated with 
terrorism and WMD. 
It was these risks that were put forward as the primary justification for the 
war – Western governments were far more concerned with their own security than 
they were with bringing freedom to Iraqi citizens. Tony Blair intimated as much 
when he argued that despite the foul nature of Hussein’s regime, regime change and 
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the forging of a liberal Iraq were not Britain’s primary motivation for taking military 
action  in  2003.  Rather,  the  primary  motivation  was  to  enforce  Iraq’s  WMD 
disarmament  obligations.
58  This  section  therefore  argues  that  the  promotion  of 
liberty  and  democracy  in  Iraq  was  not  an  end  goal  of  the  involved  Western 
governments.  Rather,  it  was  a  means  to  the  end  of  securing  themselves  against 
globalised security risks. As Hobson suggests, democracy (and a range of liberal 
values)  are  being  pursued  in  Iraq  and  the  wider  Middle  East  predominantly  for 
strategic  reasons,  not  because  of  some  altruistic  mission  intended  only  to  bring 
freedom to the populations of this region.
59 
Despite the focus on WMD and terrorism in the lead up to the war, bringing 
liberty and democracy to the Iraqi people was discussed before the onset of military 
action in March 2003. Indeed, during this period, the solution offered by US officials 
to the risks posed by Saddam’s regime and its pursuit of WMD was the removal of 
Hussein  and  the  reshaping  of  Iraq  into  a  liberal  democracy.  The  2002  NSS  had 
already clearly outlined not only America’s new preventive strategy, but also the 
central  role  that  American  values  of  liberty  and  democracy  were  to  play  in 
addressing the new security risks that the US faced.
60 By February 2003, Bush was 
speaking much more explicitly of promoting liberal values in Iraq:  
The Iraqi people today are not allowed to speak out for freedom, but they have a 
right to live in freedom. We don't believe freedom and liberty are America's gift to 
the  world;  we  believe  they  are  the  Almighty's  gift  to  mankind.  And  for  the 
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oppressed people of Iraq, people whose lives we care about, the day of freedom is 
drawing near. 
61 
While this statement clearly illustrates Bush’s desire to spread liberty in Iraq, 
it does not clearly outline the security benefits that would accrue to Western societies 
as a result. These benefits, however, were articulated in a press briefing at the end of 
February 2003:  
A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by 
bringing  hope  and  progress  into  the  lives  of  millions.  America's  interests  in 
security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free 
and peaceful Iraq.
62 
The intertwining of liberal values and security interests discussed in chapter four is 
again emphasised here – a free and democratic Iraq is congruent both with American 
values and with Bush’s interest in securing America against perceived risks. Bush 
reiterated  the  idea  that  reshaping  Iraq  into  a  liberal  democracy  would  benefit 
Western security interests when he claimed that  
The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable 
and  free  nations  do  not  breed  the  ideologies  of  murder.  They  encourage  the 
peaceful pursuit of a better life…A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic 
and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.
63 
Not only would a liberal and democratic Iraq reduce the opportunities for the 
emergence of security risks such as terrorism, but it could also lead to a broader 
social and political reshaping of the Middle East. This region is an identified risky 
zone within international society, one in which state governments are predominantly 
                                                 
61 George W. Bush, President Meets with Small Business Owners in Georgia (Washington D.C.: 
Office of the Press Secretary, 20 February 2003).  
62 George W. Bush, President Discusses the Future of Iraq (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press 
Secretary, 26 February 2003). 
63 Ibid.  The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
289 
 
autocratic and from which several contemporary security risks are seen to emanate.
64 
The assumption on the part of Bush and other members of the administration was 
that long-term peace and stability for both Western societies and the Middle East 
depended on liberal reform throughout the region.
65 Again, the point here is that 
liberal values are conceived of in mostly instrumental terms – promoting liberalism 
is merely one way of managing the ‘Middle Eastern zone of risk’.  
After the end of the initial combat phase and the collapse of Saddam’s regime 
in April 2003, this theme of the need to successfully reshape the political and social 
environment in Iraq was one that was repeated often. The political focus in Coalition 
countries shifted from attempting to sell the war to justifying the continued presence 
of  Coalition  forces  in  Iraq.  This  justification  was  couched  primarily  in  terms  of 
staying in Iraq ‘until the job was done’ – the ‘job’ being to ensure that Iraq makes a 
successful transition to a liberal democracy.
66 Since the war, it has been repeatedly 
argued  by  those  that  favoured  military  action  in  Iraq  that  failure  to  achieve  this 
outcome  would  lead  to  Iraq  becoming  a  haven  for  terrorists  and  other  forms  of 
security risk.
67  
Bush has perhaps been the most explicit and consistent Western leader in 
arguing that the security of America and its Western allies depend on the success of 
American efforts to build a stable and liberal Iraqi state. In each successive State of 
the Union address between 2004 and 2008, Bush repeatedly argued that American 
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security depended on liberal values and democratic governance taking hold in Iraq.     
During the 2005 State of the Union address, Bush argued that  
the victory of freedom in Iraq will...bring more hope and progress to a troubled 
region,  and  thereby  lift  a  terrible  threat  from  the  lives  of  our  children  and 
grandchildren...We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends, and freedom 
in Iraq will make America safer for generations to come.
68 
Reshaping  Iraq  and  forging  a  new  political  and  social  environment  based  upon 
liberal values and forms of governance is the key, according to this statement, to 
governing risks and making America’s future safer.  
Such  sentiments  were  restated  by  Bush  in  his  2006  State  of  the  Union 
address:  
Abroad, our nation is committed to an historic, long-term goal – we seek the end 
of tyranny in our world. Some dismiss that goal as misguided idealism. In reality, 
the future security of America depends on it...Dictatorships shelter terrorists, and 
feed  resentment  and  radicalism,  and  seek  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 
Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and 
their neighbours, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in 
the world makes our country safer so we will act boldly in freedom's cause.
69 
The main argument was clear and consistent during Bush’s tenure: America must 
succeed in building a liberal democratic Iraq for the sake of its future security.
70  
The strategy of effecting liberal reform in Iraq as a means of managing risk 
was consolidated in the 2005 US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI). This 
document outlined the conditions for an American victory in Iraq and the strategic 
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framework that would be employed to achieve victory. Perhaps the most interesting 
aspect of the document was the way in which victory in Iraq was defined. One might 
expect that complete victory would result once all insurgents and terrorists in the 
country had been eliminated. And yet, this is not the primary condition for victory 
outlined in the NSVI. Instead, the document states that the strategy to be employed in 
Iraq  involves  helping  ‘the  Iraqi  people  build  a  new  Iraq  with  a  constitutional, 
representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient 
to  maintain  domestic  order  and  keep  Iraq  from  becoming  a  safe  haven  for 
terrorists’.
71 
Reshaping Iraq into a liberal society with a democratic government is the 
ultimate strategy of the American government. The document appears to contain the 
explicit assumption that a liberal and democratic Iraq in itself would mitigate the 
dangers posed by the terrorists and insurgents operating in Iraq. Not only would a 
stable democratic government have the capacity to eliminate any remaining terrorists 
or  insurgents,  but  it  would  also  provide  the  conditions  necessary  to  reduce  the 
possibility  of  individuals  adopting  extremist  ideologies  and  engaging  in  terrorist 
activity.
72  The  Bush  administration’s  belief  in  reshaping  the  Iraqi  socio-politcal 
environment into a liberal democracy reflects an optimistic view of the ability of 
American power, coupled with American ideals, to reshape the world into a better 
place.
73  This  would  be  a  better  world  not  only  for  the  oppressed  peoples  that 
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America’s power and liberal values would liberate; but also for America and other 
Western societies.  
As noted in chapter four, this reflects a series of assumptions concerning the 
inherently ‘good’ nature of liberal democratic states and the power of liberal values 
to curb the political and social conditions which give rise to security risks such as 
terrorism or rogue states seeking to acquire WMD. However, Bush was not alone in 
his views regarding the nexus between liberal values and security. Blair appeared to 
share  Bush’s  sentiments  regarding  the  importance  of  liberal  values  in  Iraq  for 
Western  security,  although  he  was  not  as  explicit  or  consistent  in  making  the 
argument that Western security depends upon liberty in Iraq. During an address to 
British troops in Basra in 2004, Blair suggested that 
Democracies  don't  sponsor  terrorism.  No  country  that  obeys  the  rule  of  law 
tortures and maims its citizens. No government that owes its position to the will of 
the people will spend billions of pounds on chemical and biological and nuclear 
weapons whilst their people live in poverty.
74 
Blair further outlined the argument that it is a lack of freedom and democracy 
that breeds security risks such as terrorism, and hence that the promotion of liberal 
values in oppressive environments will lead to a reduction in the emergence of such 
dangers:  
Because it is in a free, democratic and stable Iraq that not just the violence, but the 
wretched  and  backward  philosophy  of  these  terrorists  will  be  defeated  and 
destroyed…if you've got freedom and democracy, and the rule of law, you can 
raise your family, you can earn a decent standard of living, you can go about your 
daily business without fear of the secret police or terrorism. And in those types of 
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societies, the terrorists who thrive on hatred and fanaticism, they get no breathing 
ground, they get no breathing space.
 75 
Further, in a speech to the US Congress in 2003, Blair again argued that 
Western security depended on spreading liberal values: ‘The spread of freedom is the 
best security for the free. It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack’.
76 
Blair reiterated such points in 2004, stating that  
That is precisely why the terrorists are trying to foment hatred and division in Iraq. 
They know full well, a stable democratic Iraq, under the sovereign rule of the Iraqi 
people, is a mortal blow to their fanaticism. That is why our duty is to rebuild Iraq 
and Afghanistan as stable and democratic nations…It is a practical recognition 
that just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous 
tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; 
so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic progress, 
tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of humankind. The best defence 
of our security lies in the spread of our values.
77  
It is clear from these statements that liberalism in Iraq is regarded as the solution to 
the security risks perceived to have existed under Hussein’s regime.  
Importantly, these statements did not merely constitute empty rhetoric – once 
the Coalition had control of Iraq, it moved quickly to begin the work of establishing 
a  new  liberal  democratic  polity.  Once  Coalition  forces  had  attained  control  of 
Baghdad, control over post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq was initially 
exercised by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), 
created by Bush under National Security Presidential Directive 24 of 20 January 
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2003.
78  However,  ORHA  activities  did  not  last  long,  and  shortly  after  combat 
operations had been (prematurely) declared over by President Bush in May 2003 the 
Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  assumed  the  ORHA’s  humanitarian 
assistance and reconstruction missions. It also assumed responsibility for the broader 
project  of  building  representative  political  institutions  and  improving  governance 
within Iraq.
79 Although nominally an international body, the CPA was created by the 
American  government  and  was  headed  by  American  Presidential  Envoy  Paul 
Bremer.
80  
The  CPA’s  mission  was  to  help  the  Iraqis  build  what  was  deemed  four 
foundational pillars of their sovereignty: Security, Governance (emphasising liberal 
notions of good governance), Essential Services and Economy (again emphasising a 
liberal  notion  of  good  governance).
81  The  CPA’s  main  strategic  objective  was  a 
stable peace for a unified and democratic Iraq.
82 As outlined in its first Regulation, 
the  CPA  vested  itself  with  full  governmental  authority,  assuming  all  executive, 
legislative and judicial authority needed to meet its objectives.
83 The assumption of 
this authority was justified on the basis of the laws of war (the US and UK having 
designated  themselves  as  occupying  powers)  and  UNSCR  1483.  This  Resolution 
called  upon  the  US  and  UK  to  effectively  administer  Iraq  so  as  to  provide  the 
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conditions in which the Iraqi people would be able to assume the responsibilities of 
self-government.
84 
Interestingly, this meant that despite the talk of democracy and liberalism in 
Iraq, during the period of CPA control over Iraq, Bremer essentially ruled by decree, 
issuing  promulgations  in  the  form  of  regulations,  orders  or  memoranda.
85  Such 
promulgations involved significant measures aimed at reshaping the political and 
social environment in Iraq. While not all of these reforms were directly related to 
building representative institutions or formulating an adherence to liberal forms of 
good  governance  most,  if  not  all,  of  these  promulgations  were  informed  by  the 
CPA’s main objective of formulating a stable and democratic Iraq. The point here is 
that despite the liberal pretensions of the Coalition’s risk management activities in 
Iraq, when put into effect, risk management activities may also involve decidedly 
illiberal activities or tendencies.  
One of the more notable, and controversial, promulgations in this regard was 
Bremer’s order to undertake the so-called ‘de-Ba’athification’ of Iraqi Society. The 
CPA announced its intention to pursue the de-Ba’athification of Iraq in April 2003, 
formalising this announcement one month later with Order One of the CPA.
86 Not 
only was the Ba’ath Party disbanded, but all former members were prohibited from 
employment in the public service. Ostensibly, this was to ensure that the Ba’ath 
Party  could  not  threaten  Iraq’s  future  democracy  or  pose  a  security  risk  to  the 
Coalition.
87 This measure was coupled with the disbanding of the Iraqi military, 
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intelligence agencies, and organisations charged with guarding Saddam Hussein.
88 
This was similarly designed to reshape the political and security environment in Iraq. 
Similar to the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party, it was aimed at removing all influences 
of Saddam’s previous regime that could destabilise Iraq and pose a risk to Coalition 
efforts to politically and socially reform the country.
89 
The intention of the Coalition, particularly the Americans, in Iraq was not 
simply to supplant Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy, but to completely 
eradicate  all  elements  of  this  regime  from  the  Iraqi  political  landscape.  This 
evidenced a far-ranging reshaping of the Iraqi social and political environment. Any 
and  all  significant  members  of  the  former  regime  or  Ba’ath  Party  (indeed,  even 
insignificant members) were to be relieved of their positions and excluded from the 
new  liberal  government  being  constructed.
90  Such  measures  also  highlighted 
distinctly illiberal trends regarding the way in which the CPA governed Iraq. As 
noted,  these  measures  were  issued  in  promulgations  by  Bremer,  who  was 
unaccountable to the Iraqi people. Another notable feature of the CPA’s governing 
of Iraq was the speed with which it moved to begin securing liberal reforms in Iraq 
and establishing the foundations for representative government.  
This reflected the importance placed upon securing liberal reforms in Iraq as 
a means of controlling risks. It was imperative that Iraq be reshaped into a liberal 
society as quickly as possible. In July 2003, Bremer promulgated the establishment 
of the Governing Council of Iraq as part of the Iraqi interim administration. This 
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organisation  did  not  supersede  the  CPA,  although  it  did  have  its  own  set  of 
responsibilities. Notably, the Governing Council was not an elected body, but rather 
consisted  of  twenty-five  members  hand-picked  by  the  US.
91  Ostensibly,  the 
Governing Council was established to give the Iraqis some representation in the 
interim administration of Iraq before the formation of a transitional government. In 
November 2003, the CPA, in consultation with the Governing Council, agreed to a 
plan outlining the process by which the CPA would relinquish control and hand 
sovereignty back to Iraq.
92 
The  plan  involved  the  formulation  and  signing  of  the  Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) and the selection of an interim National Assembly and 
government, to which sovereignty would be handed by mid 2004.
93 Again, neither 
the TAL nor the interim government were acceded to by the Iraqi people – they were 
issued  or  appointed  by  the  CPA  in  consultation  with  the  Governing  Council.  In 
March 2004, the CPA issued the TAL, which outlined the process to be followed in 
Iraq’s  transition  to  full  representative  governance.  Importantly,  this  document 
dictated that Iraq’s future government ‘shall be republican, federal, democratic, and 
pluralistic…’
94 This clause in the TAL reflected not the expressed preferences of the 
Iraqi people, but rather that of the Coalition, which dictated the form of Iraq’s new 
government. 
In short, liberal democratic government was not chosen by the Iraqi people 
and could not be given the fact that they were never offered a choice. Instead, liberal 
institutions were imposed by the CPA in Iraq, reflecting Coalition preferences for a 
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liberal  reshaping  of  the  political  and  social  environment  in  a  bid  to  manage 
globalised security risks. Given the thinking that liberalism in Iraq is the answer to 
perceived security risks, it is unsurprising that the Coalition did not leave the Iraqis 
much room to manoeuvre as they worked towards self-government. It was further 
unsurprising that the Coalition were careful to decide for themselves who would be 
appointed to the Governing Council and also played a substantial role in deciding 
who,  along  with  the  Governing  Council  and  UN  Special  Representative  to  Iraq 
Lakdhar  Brahimi,  would  be  a  part  of  the  interim  government  and  the  interim 
National Assembly.
95   
The actual handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government occurred 
on 28 June 2004, at which time the CPA was dissolved and ceased to exist.
96 Bremer 
left  Iraq  immediately  after  the  formal  handover  of  sovereignty  was  complete.
97 
Perhaps one of the most notable features of the CPA then is its relative brevity, 
governing  Iraq  for  a  period  of  only  fourteen  months.  The  quick  transferral  of 
sovereignty was unsurprising given that Coalition countries viewed it as a crucial 
first step on the road towards an Iraqi democracy.
98 However, even after sovereignty 
had  nominally  been  returned  to  the  Iraqis  and  the  CPA  dissolved,  the  interim 
government continued to be constrained by the Transitional Administrative Law and 
Bremer’s edicts, several of which would continue to remain in force.
99  
While Coalition forces continued to exercise control over security in Iraq 
after the handover of sovereignty, political control was now nominally in the hands 
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of  the  Iraqi  people.  On  30  January  2005,  elections  were  held  to  establish  a 
transitional  National  Assembly  and  government  that  would  draft  a  permanent 
constitution in Iraq. This constitution was ratified in October 2005, allowing for the 
holding  of  another  general  election  to  elect  a  permanent  National  Assembly  and 
government.
100 This election was held in December 2005, achieving a turnout of 
over  seventy  percent  of  the  voting  population  and  resulting  in  a  permanent 
government of Iraq taking office in May 2006.
101 Thus, in just over three years, the 
Coalition had built institutions of representative governance in Iraq that had resulted 
in a freely elected Iraqi government.  
However,  despite  the  speed  with  which  the  Coalition  formed  a  liberal 
government in Iraq, the processes by which liberal governance was promoted were 
themselves decidedly hierarchical and illiberal. Firstly, Bremer had been appointed, 
not elected as head of the CPA and governed Iraq through the issue of edicts and 
promulgations, a practice described as ‘autocratic’.
102 Further, while Bush stressed 
that it was up to the Iraqis to decide what form of government they wanted, it was 
clear from the outset that the scope of this decision was limited to what form of 
liberal government they wanted. The Coalition had not invaded Iraq and overthrown 
Hussein simply to witness the establishment of another dictatorship.
103  
Faced with perceivably urgent security risks, the case of Iraq demonstrates 
the  willingness  of  Western  states  to  employ  their  situational  method  of  risk 
management, reshaping risky environments into liberal democracies, via distinctly 
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illiberal means. On the surface, one could say that the political and social reshaping 
of Iraq was a success – most remnants of Hussein’s regime had been eliminated and 
his  dictatorship  had  been  replaced  with  a  liberal  government.  Theoretically,  this 
should  mean  enhanced  security  for  Western  societies  against  the  perceived  risks 
posed by Iraq under Hussein’s regime. Yet the democratic government in Iraq is not 
a  stable  one,  continually  beset  by  instability  caused  by  sectarian  violence  and 
insurgency.  The  continued  and  at  times  severe  violence  has  necessitated  the 
continued  presence  of  Coalition  troops  in  Iraq,  although  major  allies  such  as 
Australia  have  removed  their  forces  from  the  country  and  the  British  have 
substantially reduced their troop numbers.
104 
The US thus continues to exercise significant authority within Iraq. Despite 
the initial period of coercive domination in which the Coalition overthrew Hussein’s 
regime, new relations of hierarchy have been constructed between Iraq and the US. 
This hierarchical relationship is distinctly underpinned by a liberal social logic of 
risk, constructing the US and its allies as peaceful liberal societies that hold the 
authority  to  impose  liberalism  in  illiberal  or  outlaw  states  that  are  perceived  to 
endanger their security. Not only were risk, prevention and precaution central to the 
justifications provided for the invasion, but liberal values were crucial to defining the 
appropriate responses to the perceived risks posed by Hussein’s regime. The next 
section briefly considers the extent to which this social logic of risk has underpinned 
relations of hierarchy between the US and Iraq. It also considers the implications of 
forceful regime change in Iraq for international society.  
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International Society after Iraq 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq undoubtedly aroused a great deal of controversy 
within international society regarding the necessity, legitimacy and legality of the 
invasion. The political fallout of the intervention was significant to say the least. Not 
only had the efficacy and credibility of the UN been called into question in the face 
of a superpower which possessed the capability to bypass the UN altogether if it 
wished (and ultimately did), but some even went so far as to question the continued 
viability of the post-1945 international order or international society itself.
105 That 
such  claims  have  been  made,  coupled  with  the  high  levels  of  dissent  within 
international society regarding the invasion, demonstrates the cleavages that were 
wrought  by  the  Iraq  War,  especially  those  regarding  the  incompatibility  of  the 
invasion with international society’s prevailing pluralist constitution. 
Indeed, several facets of the US invasion of Iraq do not sit well with the 
norms of pluralist international society. The norms of sovereign equality and non-
intervention were both thoroughly violated. The heterogeneity normally associated 
with a pluralist international society appeared to be replaced in 2003 with a coercive 
homogeneity, in which the US and its allies dictate liberal democratic governance to 
illiberal states deemed to be particularly risky. As Dunne argues, the point of the 
norms underpinning pluralist international society was to prevent diverse political 
communities  from  being  overrun  by  the  more  powerful  members  within  that 
society.
106 Yet clearly, this is exactly what happened in Iraq – the pluralist norms of 
international society had little effect in preventing Iraq from being overrun by the US 
and its Coalition. 
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Less  clear,  however,  is  how  to  conceptualise  the  resulting  political 
relationship between Iraq and the US. As demonstrated above, a liberal social logic 
of risk clearly informed both the justifications for the war and the risk management 
methods that the Coalition employed in Iraq. However, in the case of the invasion of 
Iraq, it is not entirely obvious that this social logic of risk gave rise to or underpinned 
the emergence of new relations of hierarchy between the US and Iraq. Certainly, the 
initial  invasion  and  overthrow  of  Hussein’s  regime  was  a  case  of  coercive 
domination,  not  hierarchy.  This  is  because  of  the  lack  of  widespread  legitimacy 
surrounding the invasion. Clearly, the subordinated state did not initially recognise 
the  Bush  administration’s  claim  that  the  US  not  only  had  the  right  to  prevent 
possibly  dangerous  risks  to  its  security,  but  also  the  authority  to  determine  the 
domestic socio-political constitution of other states within international society. 
Equally  as  clear  was  the  use  of  coercion  to  compel  Hussein’s  regime  to 
disband and establish US authority over Iraq. The initial invasion and conquest of 
Iraq,  therefore,  cannot  be  described  as  a  hierarchical  relationship  recognised  as 
legitimate by both the superordinate and subordinate states. However, this does not 
mean that Iraq, or the wider international community, did not eventually bestow at 
least a measure of legitimacy on the US’ claim of authority. The initial invasion may 
not have enjoyed legitimacy, but arguably the US’ continued presence and exercise 
of authority in Iraq did, at least partly.
107 Firstly, of note are UNSCRs 1483 and 1511 
which recognised, and therefore provided a legal basis for, the CPA’s control over 
Iraq.
108  Critics  might  counter  that  the  Security  Council  was  simply  acting 
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pragmatically, and in accordance with established international law, in recognising 
the Coalition as the occupying power in Iraq. 
This argument is certainly plausible, but regardless of the Security Council’s 
motives  in  passing  the  Resolution,  the  fact  remains  that  it  did  provide  legal 
recognition,  and  arguably  a  measure  of  legitimacy,  of  the  CPA’s  claim  as  the 
governing authority of Iraq. Crucially, the Resolution also recognises the US’ claim 
to  hold  the  authority  to  promote  liberalism  and  reshape  Iraqi  socio-political 
institutions, stating that the UN seeks to work with the CPA ‘to advance efforts to 
restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, 
including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally 
recognized, representative government of Iraq’.
109 Secondly, the US clearly retained 
significant  authority  in  Iraq,  particularly  for  security,  after  the  ‘transfer’  of 
sovereignty in June 2004 and the election of Iraq’s transitional National Assembly in 
early 2005.   
This  authority  was  generally  recognised  as  legitimate  by  the  transitional 
government and subsequently by the permanent government of Prime Minister Nouri 
al Malaki, which took office in 2006 after the December 2005 elections. Particularly 
since the formation of the Transitional National Assembly, the relationship between 
Iraq  and  the  US  can  be  regarded  as  hierarchical.  The  US  maintains  significant 
authority  in  Iraq  in  an  effort  to  stabilise  the  country  and  preserve  the  liberal 
institutions that it established after its invasion. In turn, the Iraqi government has 
recognised the role and authority of US forces in Iraq. Again some might suggest 
that the al Malaki government has no choice but to accept US authority over Iraq, but 
the fact remains that the Iraqi government is still dependent upon the US for the 
                                                 
109 Security Council, Resolution 1483, 3 (italics mine); Wheatley, ‘The Security Council’, 534-5. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
304 
 
provision of social order in Iraq and thus has a clear interest in recognising and 
legitimating its hierarchical relationship with the US.
110  
Unlike the ENP and Australia’s interventions in the Asia-Pacific, a liberal 
social of risk gave rise to overt domination in Iraq before the emergence of truly 
hierarchical relations between the US and the Iraqi government. Again, however, 
despite the differing tactics employed to manage the risks and subsequently their 
differing effects, the justifications for all three interventions relied on depictions of 
de-bounded  risks  to  Western  security  and  the  negative  consequences  of  leaving 
potentially  risky  environments  unchecked.  Further,  common  to  EU,  Australian, 
British and American definitions of a dangerous environment has been the lack of 
functioning liberal institutions, whether due to state weakness or the existence of 
illiberal regimes. In sum, interventions in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and Iraq have all 
been underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk that has given rise to new relations 
of hierarchy between the superordinate Western risk managers and the subordinated 
risky states. 
The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent emergence of relations of hierarchy 
between Iraq and the US also clearly illustrate the corrosive effect of Western risk 
management interventions upon international society’s pluralist constitution. Rather 
than an international society defined in terms of the maximisation of the range of 
potential values and regimes that a state can adopt, Western perceptions of risk and 
attempts at risk management lead to the emergence of an ‘international risk society’ 
defined  in  terms  of  the  imperative  to  conform  to  non-risky  (liberal)  forms  of 
domestic  governance.  Failure  to  conform  to  this  model  of  good  governance  can 
potentially  result  in  varying  modes  of  intervention  aimed  at  managing  risk, 
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depending on the perceived severity of the potential dangers involved. In the case of 
Iraq,  the  pluralist  vision  of  political  community  amongst  states  and  its  attendant 
norms  were  not  simply  mitigated;  they  were  forcefully  and  thoroughly  violated 
because the American government and several of its allies deemed themselves to be 
at grave risk. 
Importantly though, unlike other scholars who have suggested that the US 
invasion of Iraq threatens the existence of international society, what is at stake here 
is not international society’s existence, but the way in which it is to be constituted, 
particularly in terms of rightful membership and rightful conduct. The 2003 invasion 
of Iraq did not completely invalidate the idea of an international society in which 
states view themselves as bound by, and act in accordance with, common rules and 
principles informed by a core set of commonly accepted norms. Nor did the invasion 
of Iraq represent its complete removal from international society. Iraq did not cease 
to be a state or separate political community, despite the curtailing of the rights 
normally afforded to states within international society. 
It is notable that the Americans were quick to transfer sovereignty back to 
Iraq and, despite its subordination, see to the establishment of a democratic and (at 
least nominally) independent Iraqi state. This suggests that risky territories are not 
entirely removed from international society, but rather have their membership rights 
temporarily suspended until they have been ‘rehabilitated’. As Mazzar argues, state 
sovereignty can be dispensed with, at least temporarily, when the West attempts to 
enforce its rules on non-Western, peripheral states.
111 What the governing of risk 
means then for international society is not a contraction of its membership, but rather 
a shift in the way in which membership is understood. It is precisely within these 
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shifting understandings of rightful membership that we can discern contemporary 
hierarchical trends within international society. Iraq has shown that a respect for 
pluralist diversity within international society has been subsumed under the notion 
that should a state deviate too far from the prescribed ‘non-risky’, liberal standards 
of domestic governance then it potentially becomes, in extremis, subject to coercive 
interventionism and forceful regime change.  
 
Conclusion 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was motivated primarily by the perception that 
Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  posed  a  number  of  unacceptable  and  potentially 
catastrophic  risks  that  had  to  be  prevented.  The  justifications  provided  by  Bush, 
Blair  and  other  Western  leaders  and  officials  for  going  to  war  in  Iraq  explicitly 
pointed to future possibilities as the basis upon which action needed to be taken. 
Indeed,  the  dangers  posed  by  Hussein,  WMD  and  terrorism  were  explicitly 
conceptualised in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks. At no stage did 
Bush, Blair or any other Western officials supportive of the war point to a specific 
‘thing’, one that was spatially and temporally identifiable, and say ‘this is the threat’.  
While the term threat was often used, this ‘threat’ was spatially and temporally ill-
defined and surrounded by high levels of uncertainty.  
Despite  the  talk  of  threats  what  was  really  being  referred  to  were  risks. 
Action in Iraq represented an intention to prevent possible future scenarios from 
eventuating. Risk management is thus a suitable characterisation of the 2003 Iraq 
War.  In  order  to  manage  the  risks  posed  by  WMD  and  terrorism,  the  Coalition 
adopted a situational prevention approach, seeking to politically and socially reshape 
Iraq into a liberal democracy as a means of ensuring that it would no longer act as a The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
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source of global security risks. By transforming Iraq into a liberal democracy, an 
environment hostile to the production of such risks, rather than conducive to them, 
would be created. The promotion of liberalism in Iraq was therefore not so much an 
end goal as it was a means to the primary objective of enhancing Western security 
against perceived risks. 
There is little doubt that the intervention raised serious questions concerning 
the pluralist constitution of international society. In the previous cases surveyed in 
this  thesis,  the  interventions  undertaken  by  Western  societies  were  far  more 
consensual. Liberal values have been promoted by Australia in the Asia-Pacific, for 
example,  but  the  interventions  undertaken  by  the  Australian  government  were 
consented to by the target states. The invasion of Iraq, however, represented the 
subjugation and domination of one sovereign state by another, regardless of the fact 
that the Americans were seeking to replace a dictatorship with a democracy. The 
pluralist right of all states to internally constitute their political and social institutions 
as they see fit was absolutely violated in Iraq, along with other key norms of pluralist 
international society such as non-intervention and sovereign equality. 
Yet after this initial period of coercive domination, discernible relations of 
hierarchy did emerge between the US and Iraq’s new democratic government. Iraq 
therefore provides another example of the way in which a liberal social logic of risk 
underpins the emergence of a more hierarchical form of international society. The 
notion  that  Iraq  under  Hussein’s  regime,  and  indeed  the  wider  Middle  East, 
constitutes an environment conducive to the origination of risks such as terrorism or 
WMD proliferation creates an urgent imperative to intervene and reshape the region 
so as to prevent such risks from ever emerging. Of course, this risk management 
argument is but one of many interpretations of the reasons and rationale for the The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
308 
 
Coalition’s  invasion  of  Iraq.  Others  have  highlighted  the  centrality  of  American 
desires  to  secure  Iraq’s  oil  reserves  or  consolidate  its’  strategic  influence  in  the 
Middle East. 
However, unlike the risk management approach outlined in this chapter, these 
alternative explanations do not account for two crucial aspects of the intervention: 
the constant invocation by Bush and other Coalition leaders of the de-bounded risks 
posed by Hussein and WMD as the primary justification for war and the subsequent 
emphasis  on  liberal  governance  and  institutional  reform  within  Iraq.  The  former 
facet of the intervention is dismissed as a smokescreen designed to cover the real 
motives of the war, despite the lack of evidence to suggest that this was in fact the 
case;  the  latter  is  ignored  altogether.  The  risk  management  approach  overcomes 
these  limitations  by  actually  engaging  with  the  justifications  provided  for  the 
invasion and the actions of the Coalition in Iraq once Hussein had been deposed. 
Further, it sheds light on the implications of the invasion for our understandings of 
contemporary social relationships between states, something that a superficial focus 
on a ‘grab for oil’ does not. Therefore, the risk management approach provides a 
more persuasive and comprehensive analysis of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
What form of international society has emerged in the post-Cold War era? 
That is the question that this project began with. The preceding chapters have argued 
that international society has recently become more hierarchical and anti-pluralist as 
a result of a new liberal social logic of risk that underpins new relations of hierarchy 
between  Western  societies  and  supposedly  risky  illiberal  and  fragile  states.  This 
thesis has drawn attention to the crucial role of risk and risk management in shaping 
the  constitutional  structure  of  international  society  in  the  post-Cold  War  era. 
Paradoxically,  as  Western  societies  seek  to  construct  a  more  liberal  form  of 
international society as a way of managing new forms of security risk, what actually 
emerges is an international society characterised by hierarchy and anti-pluralism.  
This is because the liberal social logic of risk underpinning contemporary 
hierarchies constructs liberal societies as ‘safe havens’ that are potentially threatened 
by illiberal environments in which a range of temporally and spatially de-bounded 
security risks can grow. This division between an illiberal zone of risk and a liberal 
zone comprised of Western societies at risk creates an imperative to reshape illiberal 
territories in order to mitigate the possible dangers that they pose for the West. The 
result has been a series of interventions, especially since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks,  in  which  Western  societies  have  claimed  the  authority  to  determine  the 
domestic  institutions  of  those  states  which  are  targeted  for  intervention.  This 
signifies  an  erosion  of  international  society’s  pluralist  constitution  in  that  these 
interventions explicitly attempt to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes Conclusion  
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that  states  may  adopt.  These  interventions  are  thus  representative  of  on-going 
processes of constitutional revision within international society.    
Crucial to these processes of reconstitution is the temporally and spatially de-
bounded  nature  of  contemporary  risks.  It  is  precisely  the  inherent  difficulties  in 
directly managing risks which are difficult to identify and locate that has led to the 
West’s adoption of a situational risk management approach that seeks to reshape 
environments perceived as being conducive to the origination of risk. New forms of 
de-bounded risk are difficult to identify and locate, meaning that simply securing 
borders or securing the homeland itself will not suffice in achieving greater security 
for the West. The three case studies have demonstrated that both the perception of 
new forms of de-bounded risk and the notion that liberal values and institutions can 
be equated with greater security have become core aspects of the security policies of 
several Western states.  
The US, EU and Australia have all attempted to manage perceived risks by 
promoting  liberal  values  and  institutions  in  territories  identified  as  potentially 
dangerous. These interventions have all demonstrated that the de-bounded nature of 
contemporary  security  issues  means  that  securing  the  ‘homeland’  requires  active 
intervention abroad in order to mitigate risks where they might originate. As the EU 
highlighted in the 2003 ESS, defence of the homeland now requires engagement with 
territories identified as belonging to zones of risk.
1 International society has become 
defined in terms of spatially and temporally de-bounded zones of risk rather than the 
territorially discrete nation-state. The borders of these zones of risk are fluid and are 
not geographically fixed. Thus, failing states in the Asia-Pacific suddenly becomes a 
security issue of grave concern for the Australian government when the security 
                                                 
1 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 11. Conclusion  
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implications of state weakness in the Asia-Pacific had previously been paid scant 
attention.  
A liberal social logic of risk has become crucial to the governing of social 
relationships between states. The attempt to impose liberal values on subordinated 
states as a mechanism of risk management (and hence forge a new form of liberal 
international  society)  actually  results  in  a  new  form  of  illiberal  international 
governance between states. This is most clearly demonstrated in the illiberal methods 
that Australia, the EU and the US have used in order to impose liberal values and 
institutions  in  various  states.  For  example,  in  Solomon  Islands  unaccountable 
RAMSI officials have, in certain instances, assumed direct control over key areas of 
the Solomon Islands government. In Iraq, Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, effectively 
governed the country for over a year by edict. There is thus a very real disjuncture 
between the way in which liberal values have been imposed on particular states as a 
means of managing risk and these liberal values themselves.  
The consequence of these attempts to manage risk by forging a more liberal 
international society via illiberal means is that the pluralist notion that states should 
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others so as to provide maximum 
scope for all states to freely construct their domestic institutions has been eroded. 
Indeed, this is clearly demonstrated in the above examples of the governance of risky 
territories by Western states. Both the CPA and RAMSI have explicitly attempted to 
limit the range of values and regimes that Solomon Islanders and Iraqis can freely 
choose for themselves by removing popular accountability of their efforts to impose 
liberal reform. The upshot here is that these interventions have led to significant 
changes in prevailing notions of rightful membership and rightful conduct within 
international society. Conclusion  
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Within pluralist international society, the recognition of sovereignty and full 
membership  was  largely  detached  from  the  internal  characteristics  of  the  state. 
However, the period following the end of the Cold War has seen the application of 
particular criteria applied to the recognition of sovereignty and membership within 
international society.
2 In other words, particularistic (liberal) values have ‘come to 
dominate the conception of an appropriate form of international society’.
3 The result 
of this is the curtailment of the sovereign rights of those states that fail to adhere to 
these  liberal  values  –  domestic  liberal  institutions  have  recently  become  the 
guarantor of the enjoyment of full sovereign rights within international society. The 
invocation  of  a  new  liberal  standard  for  full  membership  has  also  resulted  in 
considerable  shifts  in  legitimate  conduct  within  international  society.  Western 
societies have claimed the authority to determine the socio-political constitution of 
other states as a means of managing risk. 
In the process, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention have 
been disregarded in the interactions of Western states with particular, supposedly 
risky,  non-Western  states.  The  2003  invasion  of  Iraq  provides  the  most  overt 
example of the disregard for the principles of sovereign equality or non-intervention 
when a Western state or coalition of states perceives itself as facing particularly 
acute risks. However, the invasion of Iraq is only one out of series of interventions 
(such  as  the  EU’s  ENP  and  Australian  interventions  in  the  Asia-Pacific)  which 
highlight a broader pattern of behaviour and a consequent shift in the patterns of 
legitimate state conduct within international society. Together, the three cases of 
intervention surveyed in this thesis reveal a distinctive shift in modes of interaction 
between  Western  and  non-Western  societies.  This  is  most  evident  in  the 
                                                 
2 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 27. 
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subordination of territories identified as potentially dangerous within new relations 
of hierarchy.  
Yet, while this thesis has provided a response to the question of what form of 
international society in the post-Cold War era, it also gives rise to another question: 
where to for international society from here? The issue of international society’s 
post-Cold War reconstitution is one that will continue to be an important area of 
research in the years to come. Will international society continue to exhibit shifts 
towards  hierarchy  and  anti-pluralism,  or  will  the  norms  and  rules  of  pluralist 
international society be re-asserted? Ikenberry has addressed this question, arguing 
that what he terms the ‘version 2.0’ liberal international order forged after World 
War Two is in the process of evolution (broadly, this 2.0 liberal order is similar to 
what I describe as a pluralist international society and its attendant liberal rights of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention).
4 Ikenberry recognises, as does this thesis, 
that  international  society’s  constitutional  structure  is  evolving  due  to  a  range  of 
factors  and  issues  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  However,  Ikenberry’s  conclusions 
regarding this changing constitutional structure differ from those presented here.  
Ikenberry suggests that international society might continue to evolve in three 
ways – towards either a version 2.5 or 3.0 liberal international order, or the complete 
breakdown of liberal international order.
5 Version 3.0 represents the reduction of 
international hierarchy as the US relinquishes certain rights and privileges it holds as 
the world’s superpower and responsibility for international governance is diffused 
between a greater number of major states.
6 Version 2.5 represents a point somewhere 
between versions 2.0 and 3.0 in which the US relinquishes some of its rights but not 
others. Neither of these two possibilities, nor the third of a complete breakdown of 
                                                 
4 See Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0’. 
5 Ibid., 80-3. 
6 Ibid., 80. Conclusion  
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liberal  order,  captures  the  current  transformation  of  international  society.  Liberal 
international order has certainly evolved since the end of the Cold War, but the 
hallmark of this evolution is the paradoxical removal of the liberal rights that states 
enjoyed in their interactions with one another under international society’s pluralist 
constitution as Western societies seek to manage risk by imposing liberal values and 
institutions within states.  
Contemporary constitutional revision represents neither a shift towards a 2.5 
nor 3.0 version of liberal international order, at least as Ikenberry describes it. Recent 
attempts to increase the number of liberal democratic states mean that international 
society has arguably become more liberal. However, if this is so then we need to 
recognise that this international society is liberal without being pluralist and involves 
new  forms  of  hierarchical  and  illiberal  governance  between  states.  But  as  noted 
above, the question is whether current trends of hierarchy and anti-pluralism will 
continue to prevail within international society in the long term. This is difficult to 
answer, particularly with the election of Barack Obama as President of the United 
States, which has resulted in discernible shifts in America’s foreign policy approach. 
The Obama administration has thus far appeared to broadly support the norms and 
rules  of  pluralist  international  society,  reaffirming  the  principles  of  sovereign 
equality  and  non-intervention  and  seeking  to  manage  security  issues  through 
diplomacy and engagement with other states and international institutions.  
However, while it is too early to provide any conclusive answers as to where 
current processes of reconstitution will eventually lead, it is apparent that as of the 
writing of this conclusion (May 2009), hierarchical relationships based on attempts 
to  manage  risks  by  promoting  liberalism  continue  to  prevail  –  all    of  the 
interventions examined in the case studies are still on-going. For instance, despite the Conclusion  
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change of government in Australia in November 2007, Australia remains the primary 
contributor to RAMSI. The EU is still engaged in efforts to promote political and 
economic reform in ENP partner countries. Finally, while the Obama administration 
has tabled plans for a withdrawal from Iraq, it is looking to bolster NATO forces 
operating in Afghanistan as it attempts to consolidate the democratic regime under 
President Harmad Karzai. 
Further, it is apparent that most (if not all) of the elements of the liberal 
social logic of risk continue to pertain to the security policies of many Western 
societies.  Firstly,  Western  leaders,  including  relatively  new  leaders  such  as 
Australian  Prime  Minister  Kevin  Rudd  or  Obama  have  continued  to  extol  the 
security benefits of liberal values and institutions. Obama has spoken on several 
occasions of the need for America to embrace its liberal values in order to enhance 
its security. As he stated at a recent graduation of US Naval and Marine officers, 
‘We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but 
because we swear to; not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe 
and keep us true to who we are’.
7 
Secondly, preoccupations with risk continue to be a defining feature of the 
security outlook of several Western nations. In December 2008, the Commission on 
the  Prevention  of  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  Proliferation  and  Terrorism, 
established by the US Congress, published its initial report entitled World at Risk. 
The title aside, this report explicitly characterises WMD proliferation and terrorism 
as  temporally  and  spatially  de-bounded  risks  and  argues  that  globalisation  has 
                                                 
7 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States Naval Academy Commencement 
(Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 22 May 2009).   Conclusion  
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forever changed the international strategic environment.
8 It also demonstrates several 
characteristics  associated  with  a  risk  management  approach,  including  active 
anticipation and horizon scanning, precaution, and an emphasis on prevention. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  reports’  key  statements  is  a  speculated  scenario  of  a 
possible future event: ‘The Commission believes that unless the world community 
acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of 
mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end 
of 2013’.
9 Therefore, it is not a question of whether or not perceptions of risk and 
attempts at risk management will continue to be defining features of the security 
policies of Western societies, but rather how these perceptions of risk and the risk 
management techniques utilised might vary over time. As was argued in chapters 
three  and  four,  the  assessment  of  risks  and  the  selection  of  risk  management 
techniques  are  social  constructs  subject  to  political  contestation.  One  important 
avenue of future research that this thesis has raised is therefore the analysis of the 
politics behind risk and risk management. This has been beyond the scope of this 
thesis,  but  several  important  areas  of  investigation  pertain  to  the  politics  of  risk 
management. 
For example, how are risk assessments conducted and which organisations or 
individuals  within  Western  governments  are  responsible  for  the  identification  or 
definition of particular risks? In short, who decides what constitutes a risk and which 
risks to address? How are these decisions made? This is a particularly important 
issue, especially when identified risks are subject to intense political contestation. 
The build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (and its aftermath) have demonstrated just 
                                                 
8 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, World 
at  Risk:  The  Report  of  the  Commission  on  the  Prevention  of  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage Books, 2008): xii.  
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how politically divisive risk management activities can be when different individuals 
or groups disagree over the severity of the risks at hand or the risk management 
techniques implemented. Another area of investigation in regards to the politics of 
risk management is the selection of particular risk management tools or techniques. 
The case studies have shown that different Western societies have adopted differing 
risk management tactics, despite the common strategy of promoting liberal values. 
For instance, one might query what informs the EU’s use of conditionality to compel 
states to adopt liberal reform as opposed to simply utilising military force to achieve 
regime change and political reform as the US did in Iraq.    
Finally,  another  avenue  of  further  investigation  in  terms  of  risk  and  risk 
management are the utilisation and theorisation of these concepts in an International 
Relations context. As highlighted in the introduction, more work is needed on the 
impact of risk and risk management on prevailing modes of international governance 
and the constitution of international society. Risk and risk management have the 
potential  to  become  important  conceptual  and  analytical  tools  for  studying  state 
behaviour  and  interstate  interaction,  particularly  given  the  salient  nature  of 
contemporary  risks  such  as  terrorism  or  global  climate  change.  International 
Relations theory needs to take greater account of risk and risk management, as these 
concepts bear on many of the key issues within International Relations, including 
questions of international order and justice, sovereignty and global governance. 
In  summary,  this  thesis  has  provided  an  analysis  of  the  changing 
constitutional  structure  of  contemporary  international  society,  suggesting  that  its 
prevalent features are new hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends based upon a liberal 
social of risk. This on-going process of constitutional revision suggests a distinctive 
shift away from the pluralist constitution of international society that has prevailed Conclusion  
318 
 
since decolonisation. By promoting liberalism within the state in order to manage 
new forms of de-bounded security risk, Western societies have contributed to the 
construction of new modes of hierarchical and anti-pluralist international governance 
within international society.   
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